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ABSTRACT 
 
THE CONTRIBUTION OF AFRICAN TRADITIONAL MEDICINE FOR A MODEL 
OF RELATIONAL AUTONOMY IN INFORMED CONSENT  
 
 
 
By  
Peter Ikechukwu Osuji, C.S.Sp. M.A. 
May 2013 
 
Dissertation supervised by Gerard Magill, PhD 
The Western liberal approach to informed consent defines autonomy as an 
independent choice or decision made by an individual as the final authority in medical 
decision-making. This approach is so dominant that one can fail to see the merits of other 
traditional and cultural perspectives. In this dissertation, another approach to informed 
consent is considered -that of communal culture of Africa, a process used in African 
traditional medicine (ATM) wherein patients make medical decisions and give consent in 
consultation with the members of their community and the ATM doctor. Often, but not 
necessarily, the final consent rests on the consensus reached in consultation with the 
group rather than on that by the individual patient alone.  
This dissertation argues that the ATM form of consent constitutes legitimate 
informed consent based on the concept of relational autonomy, commonly called 
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relational autonomy in informed consent (RAIC) in this dissertation. To interpret and 
enlighten the significance of the ATM approach to RAIC, the analysis in this dissertation 
examines the ethics of care movement in Western bioethics which also advocates a 
relational approach to informed consent. This movement presents a concept of persons as 
relational beings who are socially embedded, thereby interpreting patient autonomy in 
their relationships with others. This movement provides the hermeneutic to enlighten the 
significance of the ATM approach as a legitimate model of RAIC.  
By comparison of the ethics of care approach with that of ATM to RAIC, this 
dissertation further provides a relational approach to informed consent in order to inform 
the restrictive emphasis on individual autonomy practiced in Western bioethics, all with a 
view towards fostering current discourse on global bioethics. The dissertation also 
provides an applied example of the contribution of ATM’s RAIC approach to ethics 
committees in Africa, focusing in particular, on the decision-making process for patient 
informed consent. 
This dissertation is distinct insofar as it focuses on informed consent in ATM, 
employs ethics of care as a hermeneutic to interpret ATM, advocates integrated model of 
healthcare ethics committees in ATM. Because ATM forms a large portion of the 
healthcare systems in Africa, it follows that ATM and its practices should receive more 
attention in bioethics in the present global era. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION: INFORMED CONSENT IN A COMMUNAL CULTURE 
In traditional African society, it is a duty to help those who are in need or are sick 
–family, relatives, and clan, all members of the community. Whoever fails to render such 
help incurs a reprimand. Despite urbanization and movement of people to cities, this 
obligation to help has survived in various ways. Community members -- family, relatives, 
and clan --continue to regard it as a duty to take care of a sick member. It has remained 
an enduring feature of the family in particular and of African society in general. Hence, 
the sick (the patient) rarely goes unaccompanied to consult the African traditional 
medicine (ATM) doctor. In some cases, the patient does not have to go at all. Instead, 
relatives go on the patient’s behalf. Generally, when an adult becomes ill, the head of the 
family and relevant community members consult among themselves to decide on a 
common course of action. If, however, the ill person is able, the group will discuss 
practical matters regarding the situation at hand with this person. Such practical matters 
may include: which ATM doctor to consult, how to finance treatment, whether the patient 
will be brought to the ATM doctor’s place, or whether the doctor will be invited to attend 
to the sick person within the family setting. The decision is reached by consensus. If the 
consensus is to take the sick person to the ATM doctor’s place, the group will proceed 
further to decide the following: who will accompany the patient, who will take care of the 
house as well as the children of both the patient and of those accompanying the patient. 
Some members of the community (relatives or elders) will sit in with the patient as the 
ATM doctor is consulted. If need be, they will help to describe or explain the history of 
the patient’s illness and what the sick person has experienced. If, on the other hand, the 
patient is seriously ill and weak, it is customary for community members to respond to 
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questions on behalf of the patient. Although consent may be given within this context, 
final approval for decision-making is made by group consensus rather than by the 
individual patient alone. The family, relatives, and elders continue to remain available for 
further meetings or consultation throughout the treatment period in order to assess the 
patient’s progress and continuing needs.     
The ATM practice described here differs markedly from the model of informed 
consent, practiced in the Western world which typically and legally gives full authority 
and responsibility for decision-making to the individual patient. Even though an 
individual patient may reach consent by consulting a clinician and, at times, close family, 
he/she has the final authority to decide and give consent in accordance with his/her own 
values and interests.  
Thus, the issue in this dissertation is whether the African practice described herein 
constitutes legitimate informed consent in biomedical ethics or whether it is paternalism. 
This problem is made even more complex by the fact that the Western liberal concept of 
informed consent is a perspective that dominates informed consent in bioethics.  
1. A.  Dominant Cultural Perspectives of Informed Consent  
 The various cultural regions of the globe, -- Asia, Africa, America, and Europe -- 
have their own long standing rich moral values, cultural norms, belief systems, and 
healing traditions. These cultural regions tend to approach the concept of informed 
consent -- and, indeed, bioethics --from the perspective of their moral and cultural 
traditions. For example, the Euro-North American tradition (Western cultures), which 
places more emphasis on individual and personal values, approaches informed consent 
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from the perspective of patient self-determination, or individual autonomy. On the other 
hand, the Asian tradition, which places more emphasis on family, approaches informed 
consent from the perspective of family-determination.1  
Ruiping Fan observed that although the Western model of patient autonomy has 
been introduced into East Asian countries, it has hardly been generally accepted.2 
According to Fan, the reason is that there is implicit in the cultural and ethical traditions 
of East Asian countries a different principle regarding the form of autonomy. Though this 
East Asian model -- “family-determination oriented principle” -- is not yet clearly 
articulated, it differs from the Western, patient self-determination model. This “family-
determination oriented principle” governs clinical ethics in Asia.3 Thus, the family rather 
than the individual patient has the final authority to make medical decisions. In other 
words, the care of the sick person is a family matter.4 The decision is made based on an 
objective concept that is supported by the “family-determination oriented” autonomy 
model, namely, what constitutes the greater good or the good objectively defined. Yet it 
is vital that one’s medical decisions “are made for one’s long-term good impersonally 
understood.” One’s medical decisions do not have to be made “by oneself in conformity 
with one’s present desires.”5  
African tradition, however, lays more stress on communal values (communal-
determination) and relationships. African tradition approaches informed consent from the 
perspective of a relational autonomy. A similar approach to ATM can be found in the 
Western bioethics understanding of the ethics of care. The ethics of care movement, 
although of Western cultural origin, canvasses for some communal values and 
relationships. For example, it advocates relational autonomy in keeping with African 
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practice. Nevertheless, of all these different models of autonomy as well as of informed 
consent, the Western liberal approach, which is personal rights oriented, is so dominant in 
bioethics that other practices and perspectives of informed consent are at risk for being 
lost. Furthermore, this dominance so overshadows alternative models that it tends to cast 
doubt and raises questions as to whether alternative practices constitute a legitimate form 
of informed consent or whether they constitute paternalism. Yet, one such alternative 
form of informed consent, namely ATM, is found in communal culture. 
1. B. Informed Consent in a Communal Culture  
 In the present age of global bioethics, (as a global field of inquiry) a concept of 
autonomy and informed consent from a communal cultural perspective can only enrich 
current ideas of bioethics principles of autonomy and informed consent. Global bioethics 
requires that care be taken not to silence ethical impulses and thereby constrict the moral 
life of other cultures. Rather, it necessitates that bioethics embraces or, at the least, 
respects the legitimate rich moral traditions, cultural norms, belief systems, and healing 
traditions of the various cultural regions of the world.6 Consequently, therefore, this 
dissertation examines one of the alternative approaches to informed consent arising from 
a communal culture. This approach is a process used in African traditional medicine 
(ATM) wherein patients make medical decisions and give consent in consultation with 
both the members of their community and the ATM doctor . Typically, the final consent 
in their decision-making process rests on the consensus reached in consultation with the 
group rather than by the individual patient alone. While the Western model also typically 
arrives at consent by the patient after consulting the clinician and, at times, close family, 
this model places the responsibility for decision-making on the individual patient. By 
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contrast, the process of consultation in ATM gives much more substantive weight or 
authority to the consensus decision-making process. This dissertation argues that the 
ATM focus on consent based on consensus constitutes legitimate informed consent. This 
approach is based on the concept of relational autonomy. Hence, the dissertation adopts 
the phrase relational autonomy in informed consent (RAIC). To interpret and enlighten 
the significance of the ATM approach to RAIC, the analysis in this dissertation examines 
the ethics of care movement in Western bioethics insofar as the latter also advocates 
RAIC. The ATM approach advocates relational autonomy from the perspective of 
African communal values and relationships adopting RAIC. With ethics of care as a 
hermeneutic to interpret and enlighten ATM, this dissertation argues that ATM practices 
RAIC in so far as the ethics of care practice of relational autonomy and interdependence 
are similar to those of ATM. If such is true, then, RAIC of ATM is a legitimate practice 
of informed consent and deserves recognition in bioethics on its own merits. 
Incorporating the ATM RAIC perspective into (Western) bioethics can only enrich the 
meaning and the practice of both autonomy and informed consent in the context of global 
bioethics.   
Yet, both the ethics of care movement and the ATM approach have been 
overshadowed by the dominance of the autonomy model in Western bioethics. However, 
by comparing the ethics of care approach with the ATM approach to RAIC, this 
dissertation aims to inform the restrictive emphasis upon individual autonomy in Western 
bioethics, to provide a relational approach to informed consent with a view to fostering 
and enhancing current discourse on global bioethics.   
1. C. Focusing on ATM  
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 To date, there is no known work done on the practice of informed consent in 
ATM. Some studies have been done on autonomy,7 and an unpublished MA thesis by 
Christopher Agulanna,8 have related autonomy to informed consent. Most of these works 
deal with informed consent in research and clinical trials in Western style medicine in 
Africa, but not in clinical or medical treatment in ATM.  
Ifeanyi Menkiti asserts that, in African thought, it is not some isolated static 
quality of rationality, will, or memory that defines a person qua person; rather, the 
community defines a person qua person.9 The individual is accompanied by a process of 
incorporation and assisted transformation into personhood.10 The individual is, therefore, 
embedded within the community by relationships with others. Community, Menkiti 
explains, is not an additive group, but a thoroughly fused group because of the existence 
of an organic relationship between the component individuals. He contrasts it with the 
Western notion of community, wherein community is understood as a non-organic atomic 
assemblage of individuals as a group that resembles more an association than a 
community.11 Menkiti’s assertion highlights the contrast between the Western view of 
person, as represented by Gert,12 and the African understanding of persons as relational 
and social beings, defined in relationship with the community.  
Kwame Gyekye in his work, Tradition and Modernity: Philosophical Reflections 
on the African Experience,13 takes issue with Menkiti’s thoughts on the determination of 
the individual. Gyekye concurs that the community helps to define the individual. 
However, Gyekye observes, and rightly so, that the individual plays a part in defining and 
determining the self. It is not the community alone that determines the self. Thus, Gyekye 
sees the individual as possessing some capacity for self-assertion as a result of which 
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individuals can and do sometimes critique and reevaluate communal as well as inherited 
values and practices.14 Polycarp Ikuenobe, tries to explain and resolve the conflict 
between Menkiti and Gyekye on the metaphysical concept of the person. Ikuenobe 
concludes that Menkiti’s notion of communitarianism leaves itself open to radical or 
strict communitarianism and that is why some people, such as Gyekye understands him 
as implying that the community vitiates the autonomy and freewill of the individual.15  
Agulanna’s work is the only other research related to the topic under study in this 
dissertation. He begins with a brief history of the principle of informed consent in the 
Western world, and he concentrates on informed consent in research and clinical trials in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. He surveyed the traditional methods of decision-making in three 
representative ethnic groups in Africa (Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and the Igbo) as well as 
the role of the individual in communal culture. In dealing with the communal nature of 
African culture, He provides a summary of the relationship between the individual and 
the community.  
Agulanna, however, focuses mainly on informed consent in the context of 
biomedical research in allopathic or Western-style medicine. His application of both the 
decision-making in African societies in Sub-Saharan Africa and of the relationship 
between the individual and the community is also in the context of biomedical research, 
with particular reference to HIV/AIDS. This section, which is the main thrust of his 
work, considered what he called a “multi-step” approach to informed consent in research 
and clinical practices in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
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In contrast, this dissertation will utilize the history of Western informed consent 
which emphasizes individual rights-oriented autonomy in order to establish a basis for 
comparing the ethics of care movement in Western bioethics and ATM, both of which 
emphasize relational autonomy in informed consent (RAIC). Furthermore, the 
dissertation will focus on informed consent in the context of African traditional medicine 
and not on allopathic medicine or medical research. Overlapping in both works is the 
exploration of decision-making and the relationship between the individual and the 
community in traditional African society. However, contrary to Agulanna’s work, this 
dissertation will focus on ATM and its practices and argue that consent arising via 
consensus constitutes a legitimate decision of informed consent based on the concept of 
RAIC. Thus, this dissertation can be said to extend Agulanna’s work to the area of ATM.     
In addition, furthering Agulanna’s work, this dissertation clarifies certain facts 
and conclusions incorrectly perceived by Agulanna in his study. For example, with 
respect to decision-making in an African communal culture, Agulanna writes  
But in my opinion, … collective decision in a communal culture is more often than not, 
the decision of a few elders who have appropriated for themselves authority to legislative 
rules for other members of the community who have been rendered helpless by the 
sleight-of-hand  methods of the elders.
16  
This dissertation hopes to show that Agulanna’s position is a misunderstanding or an 
exaggeration of the traditional decision-making system in Africa. In the first place, the 
elders do not abrogate powers unto themselves. They are either chosen or emerge through 
a culturally defined system. Secondly, there is a broad consultation (of men and women 
alike) in traditional decision-making. Thirdly, decisions are made by consensus often 
only after lengthy discussion.  
9 
 
Moreover, in speaking of women in traditional African societies, Agulanna 
glosses over matriarchal societies where women are chiefs, queens, and even military 
leaders of men. Scholarship bears testimony to the active role of these women: N’Dri 
Thérèse Assie-Lumumba, Ivan Van Sertima and F. C. Steady.17 Moreover, Joseph 
Thérèse Agbasiere, Kamene Okonjo, and Harry A. Gailey all show that, in pre-Colonial 
African society, women had economic, socio-political and religious powers and functions 
similar to those of their male counterparts.18 Women were in the forefront of opposition 
to the colonialists and, in many cases, they championed the revolt. The Baoulé of the 
Ivory Coast, the Igbo, and the Ibibio women of Nigeria are typical examples. One can 
argue that the inferiority of women or the mistreatment of women as second-class 
citizens reflected the colonial values of Europe rather than those of Africa. Assie-
Lumumba asserts, therefore, that it was transmitted by colonial masters, their women, and 
through the religious and education system as well as the policies of the Colonial Era.19   
Effectively, the area of African traditional medicine has been ignored in these 
studies. Yet, ATM forms a large portion of the health care delivery in Africa. World 
Health Organization statistics show that as much as 80% of the population in Africa uses 
traditional medicine for primary health care.20 With such a large constituency, it follows 
that ATM and its practices should receive more attention in bioethics. This dissertation 
argues that, based on the concept of RAIC the ATM focus on consent via consensus 
constitutes legitimate informed consent.  
It has been valuable to apply the work of these African scholars to various aspects 
of informed consent in ATM. This dissertation utilizes the insights of Menkiti and 
Gyekye to understand and interpret the norms and practices of ATM, the nature of 
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person, relationships with the community, and autonomy. By bringing the works of 
Menkiti and Gyekye to bear on ATM, the dissertation extends their findings, and 
proposes a relational autonomy in informed consent (RAIC) model from the perspective 
of ATM.   
1. D. Scope of the study   
In setting the historical context, the dissertation concentrates on the Western 
liberal idea of informed consent, especially as practiced in the USA. Also arising from 
the Western ethos is the ethics of care movement and its concept of informed consent, the 
understanding of human person, and autonomy.  In the discussion of ATM and African 
cultures regarding the constitutive concept of person, decision-making, autonomy, and 
informed consent, the dissertation focuses on four representative ethnic groups in African 
continent: the Akan, the Hausa-Fulani, the Igbo, and the Yoruba. The dissertation 
acknowledges that both ATM and allopathic or Western-styled medicine exist in Africa. 
The aim of the dissertation is neither to compare both strands of healing nor to seek 
which is superior.   
1. E. Focusing on Ethics of Care   
 The dissertation focuses on ethics of care rather than communitarianism proposed 
by scholars such as Ezekiel Emmanuel, Michael Walzer, and Alasdair MacIntyre.21  
Communitarianism, like ethics of care, makes a similar contrast between individual and 
community, emphasizes communal values, personal relations and communal ties, 
including particularism as opposed to universalism. Likewise, both ethics of care and 
communitarianism assert that we forge relationships --personal relations and communal 
ties-- and we experience ourselves more as related and interdependent beings.22 The 
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above scholars also propose an alternative form of autonomy, namely, relational 
autonomy, which differs from the liberal individualistic autonomy of the Western 
model.23  
 However, ethics of care goes beyond relational autonomy to consider the relation 
between reason and emotion, a contrast that is not made by communitarianism. Because 
the proponents of ethics of care consider this relation between reason and emotion, ethics 
of care scholars such as Virginia Held,24 Jennifer Nedelsky,25 and Grace Clement26 reject 
the liberals’ overemphasis on impartiality and reason over emotions in moral decision-
making. This consideration of the relation between reason and emotion in moral decision-
making draws ethics of care closer than communitarianism to African morality. An early 
advocate of ethics of care and feminist ethics, Carol Gilligan articulated this close 
connection by noting that African men showed some of the same tendencies –caring, in 
interpreting moral problems as the women she studied.27 Gilligan, a psychologist and one 
of the prominent figures in the history of feminist ethics and ethics of care, hypothesized 
that women speak in a voice different from that of traditional moral theories, namely 
liberal, Kantian, and utilitarian. She maintains that the moral development of women is 
different from that of men. According to her, while men tend to understand morality in 
terms of reasoning, impartiality, and justice, women tend towards caring and empathy. 
She also indicates that African men share this caring and empathy but with less emphasis 
on reasoning and justice.28 
1. F. Focusing on Ethics Committees  
 The final chapter of this dissertation focuses on ethics committees rather than on 
research committees. The rationale is that the dissertation considers ATM as a form of 
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clinical care and does not address research, research ethics committees, or institutional 
review boards. The goal is to focus on consent of the patient for medical treatment, which 
is the purpose of ethics committees, and not consent of subjects for research. Consent of 
subjects for research and clinical research in general is dealt with by research ethics 
committees or institutional review boards, and, therefore, they are not within the scope of 
this dissertation.  
 Finally, the dissertation is divided into four major chapters. The analysis begins 
with an historical overview of informed consent in Western bioethics, followed by a 
systematic analysis of the ethics of care, a comparative analysis of ATM and ethics of 
care, and last, an applied analysis to ethics committees in Africa. Thus, the analytical 
progression moves from a discussion of the historical context to a systematic analysis, a 
comparative interpretation, and an applied example (historical, systematic, comparative, 
and applied analyses). More specifically, the chapters discuss the following points. 
Chapter One provides a brief Introduction to the dissertation. Chapter Two presents the 
historical context by discussing the liberal approach to informed consent in Western 
bioethics which emphasizes individual and rights-oriented autonomy. Chapter Three 
presents a systematic analysis of ethics of care as a hermeneutic to interpret ATM. The 
discussion examines the emphasis in ethics of care upon relational autonomy as a 
foundation for enlightening the meaning of relational autonomy in informed consent 
(RAIC). The discussion also considers the emphasis in the ethics of care movement on 
relationships by presenting a concept of persons as relational beings who are socially 
interrelated, thereby interpreting patient autonomy in relationships with others. Chapter 
Four provides a comparative interpretation of ATM with ethics of care. The overall 
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analysis provides an explanation of ATM as adopting a relational approach to informed 
consent (RAIC). In this discussion, the ethics of care movement provides the hermeneutic 
to enlighten the significance of the ATM approach as a legitimate model of RAIC. That 
is, ATM exhibits practices similar to those of ethics of care, these include focusing on 
relationships, and also maintaining that persons are relational beings who are socially 
interrelated in a community, and exercising autonomy in relationships with others in the 
community. Chapter Five presents an applied example that discusses the contribution of 
the ATM RAIC approach for ethics committees in Africa, focusing especially on the 
decision-making process for the informed consent of patients. Finally, Chapter Six 
provides a brief conclusion to the dissertation.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 
 
1. G. Endnotes 
                                                 
1 Fan, “Self-determination vs. Family-determination,” 309-22. 
2 Fan, “Self-determination vs. Family-determination,” 313. 
3 Fan, “Self-determination vs. Family-determination,” 313 
4 Fan, “Self-determination vs. Family-determination,” 316. 
5 Fan, “Self-determination vs. Family-determination,” 317. 
6 Tristram H. Engelhardt, Jr., The Foundations of Christian Bioethics, (Lisse, NL: Swetz and Zeitlinger, 2000), 
Cited by Po-Wah, “Global Bioethics, Global Dialogue,” 3.  
7 Gyekye, Tradition and Modernity, 35-76; Ezeome and Marshall, “Informed Consent Practices in Nigeria,” 
138- 48. 
8 Agulanna, “Informed Consent.” 
9 Menkiti, “Person and Community,” 171-72; also Menkiti, “On the Normative Conception of a Person,” 
324-31. 
10 Menkiti, “Person and Community,” 172-80. 
11 Menkiti, “On the Normative Conception of a Person,” 324-31. 
12 Gert, Common Morality. 
13 Gyekye, Tradition and Modernity. 
14 Gyekye, Tradition and Modernity, 35-76. 
15 Ikuenobe, Philosophical Perspectives on Communalism, 77. 
16 Agulanna, “Informed Consent,” 41. 
17 Assié-Lumumba, Les Africaines Dans la Politique; van Sertima, ed., Black Women in Antiquity; and 
Steady, ed., Black Women Cross-Culturally. 
18 Agbasiere, Women in Igbo Life and Thought; Okonjo, “Women’s Political Participation in Nigeria,” 79-
106; and Gailey, The Road to Aba. 
19 Assié-Lumumba, Les Africaines Dans la Politique; van Sertima, ed., Black Women in Antiquity; and 
Steady, ed., Black Women Cross-Culturally.  
20 World Health Organization, Traditional Medicine.  
21 Walzer, “Communitarian Critique of Liberalism,” 6-23; Emanuel, The Ends of Human Life; and 
Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 6th Edition 2009), 356-67.  
22 Held, Feminist Morality, Ch.3; Held, The Ethics of Care, Ch.3; and Clement, Care, Autonomy, and Justice, 
Ch.2.  
23 Held, Feminist Morality, Ch.3; Held, The Ethics of Care, Ch.3; and Clement, Care, Autonomy, and Justice, 
Ch.2.  
24 Held, Feminist Morality; and Held, The Ethics of Care.  
25 Nedelsky, “Reconceiving Autonomy,” 7-36.   
26 Clement, Care, Autonomy, and Justice.  
15 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
27 Held, The Ethics of Care, 27, and 173 endnote no. 66. See also Harding, “The Curious Coincidence of 
Feminine and African Moralities,” 360-72. Harding has a nuanced explanation of Gilligan’s 
assertion.  
28 Gilligan, In a Different Voice, 20ff; also Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 6th ed., 
36-37.  
 
 
 
16 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
 
HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE WESTERN BIOETHICS APPROACH TO 
AUTONOMY 
 
 The principle of informed consent, which includes informed refusal (hence both 
will be represented in this dissertation as informed consent), is a vital principle in 
biomedical ethics. In Western bioethics, the emergence of this principle has been 
influenced by the concept of autonomy that is grounded in rights-oriented liberal 
individualism. Such an understanding of informed consent has served American society 
well.  However, in other continents, for example Africa, informed consent is used with 
less success and raises more questions than in Western medical practices. In other socio-
cultural groups, alternative approaches to informed consent emerge. These alternative 
forms of informed consent are based on how socio-cultural groups understand the human 
person and on how they traditionally make decisions. They are also influenced by how 
much emphasis a group places on communal culture. This is evident in, but not restricted 
to, the ethics of care and to African bioethics.   
This chapter examines the history of the liberal approach to informed consent in 
Western bioethics. It shows that this approach emphasizes individual rights-oriented 
autonomy and advocates a subjective concept of the greatest good. Using the historical 
analysis of informed consent in Western bioethics as a starting point brings the entire 
discussion into context and helps to underscore the contrast in various approaches to 
informed consent --liberal, ethics of care, and ATM. The discussion begins with the 
history and origin of informed consent.  
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2. A.   History and Origin of Informed Consent 
 There is some argument as to when critical discussion of informed consent 
began.1 However, there is a consensus that informed consent became an issue in the 
American medical practice in the late 1950s and early 1960s.2 It was at about this time 
that the expression “informed consent” became more widely use.3 In their study of the 
history of informed consent in the USA, Ruth R. Faden, Tom L. Beauchamp, and Nancy 
M. P. King used the following criteria to determine whether or not informed consent 
existed in a particular era: a) a patient or a subject must agree to an intervention based on 
an understanding of (usually) disclosed relevant information, b) consent must “not be 
controlled” by influences that would engineer the outcome, and c) the consent must 
involve the intentional granting of permission for an intervention.4 For Faden, 
Beauchamp, and King, the three conditions combined specify what they called “informed 
consent” as they examined historical evidence for the practice, policy, and theory of 
every era. If any of the three criteria was lacking in a particular situation, depending on 
the circumstance, Faden, Beauchamp, and King considered such a practice or policy an 
example of consent or refusal of disclosure, but not informed consent.5  
The three conditions are reminiscent of Beauchamp and Childress’ elements of 
informed consent: competence, disclosure, understanding, voluntariness, and acceptance.6 
While Faden, Beauchamp, and King adduced three conditions or criteria for informed 
consent, Beauchamp and Childress set out five. Faden, Beauchamp, and King were 
constrained by their bid not to employ over demanding criteria in identifying informed 
consent in their interpretation of historical writings and practices. Thus, they limited the 
criteria to three. They argue that employing over demanding criteria “would render it 
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impossible to find any theory or practice of informed consent at any time.”7  Moreover, 
Faden, Beauchamp, and King are open to more criteria or elements of informed consent. 
They considered the three points necessary for informed consent but they do not commit 
to their sufficiency. A closer look at the wordings of the three criteria reveals a much 
closer similarity to the Faden, Beauchamp, and King’s. One can deduce the following 
criteria from Faden, Beauchamp and King’s three elements: understanding, voluntariness, 
intentional or acceptance, disclosure and permission.  For instance, their first criterion 
reads thus, “the patient or subject agreeing …based on understanding of (usually 
disclosed relevant information) ….”8 It embodies acceptance, understanding and 
disclosure of information. Then the second element would be voluntariness etc. What 
appears to be missing in their criteria is “competence.”  
Bernard Gert, Charles Culver, and K. Danner Clouser like Faden, Beauchamp and 
King, discussed three conditions or criteria of informed consent in their book. These are 
adequate disclosure of information, competence and absence of coercion. They do not 
disagree that understanding the information is necessary to informed consent even though 
it is not a heading or sub-title in their book. However, Faden, Beauchamp, and King 
emphasize the degree of autonomy, understanding, coercion etc. more than Bernard Gert, 
Charles Culver, and K. Danner Clouser.9  
In their project, Faden, Beauchamp, and King discovered that from 1930-1956 
there were only nine articles published on the issue of consent in the American medical 
literature.10 They drew the following conclusions: first, that informed consent did not 
become an issue in American medicine until the twentieth century; and second, that, even 
though in the nineteenth century there was some evidence of seeking consent as well as 
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respect for a patient’s refusal, prior to the mid-twentieth century, the beneficence model 
trumped other principles.11 Thus, before the widespread adoption of informed consent, 
the principle of paternalism was dominant. The principle of paternalism presupposed that, 
because of experience and expertise, the physician knew best what the patient needed.12 
However, Jessica W. Berg, Paul S. Appelbaum, Charles W. Lidz, and Lisa S. Parker 
found two medical instances where consent and disclosure of information regarding the 
risks and benefits of the treatment or trial were operative. The first was in Prussia in the 
1890s, after public outcry about trials on unsuspecting patients inoculated with the 
spirochete which causes syphilis. As a result, the government of Prussia required consent 
for further experimentation involving human subjects.13 The second was in Cuba where 
Walter Reed carried out a research on yellow fever. He devised a contract similar to the 
modern consent form for the volunteers to sign. In addition to the contractual form, there 
was a discussion, about the risks and benefits to volunteers. However, public outcry in 
Germany led to development of guidelines requiring “clear explanations of innovative 
treatment.”14  Albert Jonsen appears to support Faden, Beauchamp, and King’s view. 
Jonsen noted that it was only in 1957 that informed consent, emphasizing the relevance 
of information to consent, was given “judicial blessing.”15  It has both legal and 
bioethical origins. Its emergence was, in part, a reaction to paternalism. 
2. A. 1.  Legal Origin  
Based on the above, it is evident that informed consent was solicited long before 
it was legally required in the physician-patient relationship. The legal origin of informed 
consent was precipitated by various litigations and court decisions over the years. 
Although there are some early court cases dealing with consent and privacy, these cases 
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were not strictly about informed consent. Nevertheless, they helped in its development. 
Such cases include the 1767 English decision, Slater v. Baker and Stapleton,16 Mohr v. 
Williams 190517 and Pratt v. Davis 1905/06.  The first legal case involving informed 
consent per se was the 1914 landmark opinion of Justice Benjamin Cardozo’s opinion in 
the Schloendorff v Society of New York Hospital case.18  
Slater v. Baker and Stapleton 1767 
  Doctors Baker and Stapleton were hired by Slater to remove a bandage from a 
partially healed leg fracture. Doctors Baker and Stapleton therapeutically re-fractured the 
leg and inserted an experimental apparatus to promote stretching and strengthening it 
during the re-healing process. They did it against Slater’s protest. Mr. Slater sued, 
claiming that the doctors breached the contract by “ignorantly and unskillfully” fracturing 
his leg thereby injuring him. Other physicians testified that both the medical approach 
and the apparatus used were unorthodox and contrary to standard practice. Because 
Slater’s complaint was that his leg was re-fractured without his consent and without 
regard for his protests, the defendant argued that the case was brought under the wrong 
“writ” (contract writ) or liability theory. It should have been brought under trespass vi et 
armis, that is, what today is called “battery” especially in the USA. The court did not 
want to dismiss the case because of being brought under the wrong “writ.” Consequently, 
it held the doctors liable under the contract writ, just as Mr. Slater prayed. The court 
explained its ruling as follows:  
In answer to this, it appears from the evidence of the surgeons that it was improper to 
disunite the callous [bony material in healing] without consent; this is the usage and law 
of surgeons: then it was ignorance and unskillfulness in that very particular, to do 
contrary to the rule of the profession, what no surgeon ought to have done; and indeed 
it is reasonable that a patient should be told what is about to be done to him, that he 
may take courage and put himself in such a situation as to enable him to undergo the 
operation.19  
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One of the ancient presumptions of English law is that individuals should be 
secure in their bodies against unauthorized touching by others. In the Magna Carta of 
June 15, 1215, there is a prescription offering individuals a general protection against 
unwarranted use of force by the government, “No freeman shall be taken or imprisoned, 
or disseised, or outlawed, or banished, or any ways destroyed, nor will we pass upon him, 
nor will we send upon him, unless by the lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of 
the land.”20  
The law or the right to be free from others’ molestation is rooted in “ancient 
pagan Germanic traditions.” In Germanic law free individuals were immuned from 
torture which were regularly used in the Mediterranean world. This torture was later used 
in the famous Spanish Inquisition of western Christendom. It was, therefore, a crime to 
use violence against a free person.21  
It is this unconsented touching as unlawful or battery that is exemplified in Slater 
v Baker and Stapleton. The 1767 decision given above, namely, that it is reasonable that a 
patient should be informed of what is to be done to him or her, was to enable the patient 
to take the necessary courage to undergo the surgery.22 Engelhardt is of the opinion that 
the ruling is not necessarily grounded in a view of the patient as the source of authority. It 
is rather grounded in concerns regarding the reason “why it would be useful to gain 
consent.”23  
The Mohr v. Williams 1905 
The second case that was not strictly about informed consent but helped in its 
development is found in Mohr v Williams 1905. This case is intertwined with Pratt v 
Davis 1906 in reasoning and chronology. Even though Mohr was the first of the two to 
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make it to the lower courts, the final opinion of Pratt comes before that of Mohr. The 
ruling in Mohr cites Pratt extensively.24 Mohr consented to her physician, Dr. William to 
perform surgery on her right ear. Williams later discovered that the left ear is actually the 
one that needed surgery. He went on to perform the surgery on Mohr’s left ear without 
additional consent from her. When the hearing in Mohr’s left ear later became further 
impaired by the surgery, she sued Williams for battery.25 Because the original impairment 
to the left ear was not life threatening, the court ruled that Dr. Williams should also have 
obtained his patient’s (Mohr’s) consent to the surgery on her left ear.  
If a physician advises a patient to submit to a particular operation, and the patient 
weighs the dangers and risks incident to its performance, and finally consents, the 
patient thereby, in effect, enters into a contract authorizing the physician to operate to 
the extent of the consent given, but no further.26  
 
When a physician obtains consent for a specific treatment or surgery the physician 
may not treat or perform additional or different surgery on another body part without the 
patient’s consent. A consent may be implied or applied to another part in case of 
emergency in the course of the treatment/surgery, that is, if the new issue is life 
threatening.27 In general, however, the patient had the right to bodily integrity without 
unauthorized intrusion. Violation of this right was viewed as justification for liability for 
battery.  
In the case of Mohr v Williams, the court made two assumptions about valid 
consent: first, that valid consent requires knowledge about risks and dangers; second, the 
opportunity to weigh knowledge about risks and dangers in the course of decision-
making is necessary for a valid consent. As Faden et al. noted, the court in Mohr’s case 
examined consent not simply as a simple permission to touch but as a “full decisional 
process,” even though the facts in the case required the court to decide only whether a 
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patient had given consent to the medical procedure performed.28 This point was 
supported by the sources that the court utilized in arriving at its decision, namely the torts 
treatise which recognizes that the essence of requiring consent “is not simply to authorize 
what would otherwise be a battery,” but rather to ensure that patients make effective 
treatment decisions. The patient must be “the final arbiter” as to whether or not one shall 
take one’s chances with the treatment.29 The court also showed that, like contracts, 
consents are products of informed consideration and reflection. The court did that by 
drawing an analogy between consent in the patient-physician relationship and the 
entering into contracts in other professions or trades.30 Finally, the last case that was not 
on informed consent per se but which helped in its development is that of Pratt v Davis of 
1905/06. 
Pratt v. Davis 1905/06  
This is a case of hysterectomy without consent. Kelly Pratt had been told that she 
required only medical treatment, and not surgery, for her care. Eventually, the surgeon 
Susan Davis, removed Pratt’s uterus while Pratt was under anesthesia. Thus, the 
hysterectomy was performed without obtaining consent prior to surgery from the woman 
herself or, if necessary during the surgery from the husband. Pratt sued. The surgeon’s 
attorney argued that, when a patient consents to (or places oneself in) the care of a 
surgeon for treatment without instructions or limitations, the patient by law implicitly 
consents that the surgeon may during surgery carry out any such surgery or treatment as 
in the surgeon’s best judgment is deemed proper and essential to the patient’s health and 
survival.31  
24 
 
In its judgment, the court rejected the defendant’s argument that the patient could 
not give consent because of her epilepsy. And because of the lower court’s decision 
regarding Mohr v Williams in 1906, which had just discussed at some length the 
requirement for consent, the higher court followed Mohr v Williams and specifically 
restricted “implied consent to emergencies” as well as to situations where the patient 
knows and understands the consequences of yielding to “the physician’s exercise of 
professional judgment.”32  
The cases of Mohr v Williams and Pratt v Davis are not only intertwined in 
reasoning and in chronology, but they are also memorable for other reasons as Faden, 
Beauchamp, and King have shown. According to them, Mohr v Williams, and Pratt v 
Davis are significant because they required “physicians to obtain consent to particular 
procedures.”  These cases are also important for restricting “implied consent” to “limited 
exceptional circumstances” such as emergencies.33 Finally, they are memorable for their 
strong language about “the nature and importance of self-determination.”34  Historically, 
more recent legal cases which further advanced and directly impacted the development of 
informed consent are those of Schloendorff v Society of New York, Salgo v Leland 
Stanford Jr. University Board of Trustees (1957), and Canterbury v Spencer a 
Washington, D.C.  
Schloendorff v Society of New York 
In the case of Schloendorff v Society of New York,35 Mrs. Mary E. Schloendorff 
consulted a physician in a New York hospital in January, 1908 for some stomach 
disorder. After some weeks of treatment, the house physician, Dr. Bartlett, found a lump 
which proved to be a fibroid tumor. Dr. Bartlett consulted Dr. Stimson, the visiting 
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surgeon, who advised surgery. According to Mrs. Schoendorff’s testimony, the 
physicians informed her that the character of the lump could not be determined without 
examination under ether. She consented to such an examination, but notified Dr. Bartlett 
that she did not want surgery. However, on the following day she was anesthetized, and 
the tumor was removed. Following surgery she developed gangrene in her left arm, and 
some of her fingers had to be amputated. She suffered intensely. She sued the hospital for 
the wrong. She testified that the surgery was done with neither her consent nor her 
knowledge. She was contradicted by Dr. Stimson, Dr. Bartlett, as well as by many of the 
attendant nurses. Justice Cardozo stated that “her narrative, even if improbable, must be 
taken as true” because the verdict issued in her favor, concluded that the complaint was 
not merely negligence, but trespass. Justice Cardozo ruled that every adult human being 
with sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his or her own body. If 
a surgeon performs an operation without the consent of the patient, the surgeon commits 
an assault, for which the surgeon is liable in damages.36  
The consent requirement here is justified on the grounds of the right of self-
determination. The right is the equivalent of the moral principle of respect for 
autonomy.37 The case focused on the liability of the New York hospital as defendant for 
torts committed by surgeons using its facilities. Consequently, the court did not find that 
there was a violation of informed consent or that the hospital intentionally withheld 
information that the patient might need to exercise the right of self-determination.38 
However, the opinion of Justice Cardozo is considered as a “classic statement” of the 
right of self-determination of a patient.39 It draws great attention to the fact that patients 
have “the right to protect the inviolability of their persons” by deciding and dictating their 
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medical treatment. Any interference with this right may be considered unauthorized 
bodily invasion or battery, notwithstanding both the skill with which the treatment was 
administered and the ultimate benefits of the intervention.40 The court also held that it is 
the responsibility of the patient to solicit information relevant to consent. It meant that a 
physician is negligent only when he performs a procedure against the express wishes of 
the patient. The physician was not under obligation to communicate all the risks and 
benefits in advance.41 Most legal cases hinged on this landmark case, Schloendorff v 
Society of New York. However, the judicial “blessing” began with the California 
Supreme Court ruling in Salgo v Leland Stanford Jr. University Board of Trustees 
(1957).  
Salgo v Leland Stanford Jr. University Board of Trustees 
Martin Salgo had undergone translumbar aortography without being told that 
paralysis was a risk, which in fact he did suffer as a result of the surgery. In granting 
relief to Martin Salgo, the court ruled that physicians “have the duty to disclose any facts 
which are necessary to form the basis of an intelligent consent.”42 The Salgo v Leland 
Stanford Jr. University Board of Trustees (1957) case is the first to use the term 
“informed consent.”  Salgo began the long effort to establish precise disclosure and other 
requirements that physicians are required to provide to patients. 
Three years later, the Kansas Supreme Court, in Nattanson v Kline, weaved a new 
concept of informed consent into the legal framework, namely, the negligence theory 
instead of the battery theory.43 The battery theory or a tort is the unlawful touching of 
another person, unconsented physical contact even if the contact is nonviolent. It had 
been the legal basis for enforcing informed consent requirements until the case of 
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Nattanson v Kline. The decision in this case also impacted on informed consent theory by 
establishing that true informed consent required a “thorough-going self-determination”44 
instead of a reasonable physician standard that had been in use. The reasonable physician 
standard was defined by the court at Schloendorff v. Society of New York, as noted 
above.45 The first expanded description of the new legal requirement of informed consent 
was not to come till 1972 in the case of Canterbury v Spencer a Washington, D.C.46  
Canterbury v Spencer a Washington, D.C. 
Mr. Canterbury, a 19-year-old male with severe back pain, underwent a successful 
laminectomy without complications. Later, while voiding, he fell off his hospital bed and 
developed severe paralysis from the waist down. To remove pressure on the spinal cord, 
surgery was again performed but was only partially successful in restoring movement to 
his legs. It also resulted in urinary incontinence. He sued his surgeon to court for failure 
to inform him of the possibility of paralysis. Ruling in Mr. Canterbury’s favor, the court 
noted that such information was material to Mr. Canterbury’s decision to have the 
surgery.47 The court observed thus,  
True consent to what happens to one’s self is the informed exercise of a choice, and that 
entails an opportunity to evaluate knowledgeably the options available and the risks 
attendant upon each. 
48  
 
The court argued that, because the typical patient has little or no comprehension of the 
science and art medicine, one ordinarily has only one’s physician to consult for 
information and explanation which will assist in making an intelligent decision. In light 
of this, the patient’s dependency on the physician for enlightenment, the court concluded 
that this compels the physician to make reasonable divulgence of risks to a patient in 
order to arrive at as informed a decision as possible.49 What this ruling recognized is that 
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the amount of information to be disclosed is established not by medical practice or 
standards but by the patient's need to know.  
Supporting this point of view, Jerry Menikoff argues that the patient’s right of 
self-decision should shape the boundaries of the duty to reveal. The scope of the 
physician’s communications to the patient must be measured by the patient’s need. That 
need is the information material to the decision. It means then that the test for 
determining whether a particular danger should be disclosed or not is its materiality to the 
patient’s decision rather than standard care. All risks that potentially affect the decision 
must be divulged. The law must itself set the standard for adequate disclosure in order to 
protect the patient’s interest, instead of leaving it to the practice of medical community.50  
 Menikoff further observes that the Canterbury v Spencer case in addition to 
establishing adequate information as per the need of the patient, demonstrates how 
physicians or professionals can define for themselves the standard of care. The court, by 
basing the standard of disclosure of information required by the patient on the standard of 
care, or on good medical practice, or what a reasonable physician will do, was leaving it 
to the physicians or professionals to define for themselves the standard of care. Menikoff 
suggests that, rather, the scope of the standard should not be subjective as to either the 
physician or the patient; it should remain objective with due regard for the patient’s 
informational needs and with suitable leeway for the physician’s situation.51   
The fruits of these legal wrangling in the area of (battery) malpractice and 
negligence were not only incorporated into the statutory laws of many states in the United 
States of America, but they also helped in the development of informed consent and its 
requirements in the realm of bioethics. Barring a few exceptions, the law currently 
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requires informed consent before any medical intervention and requires physicians, as a 
professional duty, to notify their patients of the following: the nature of the intervention, 
the condition and its expected course, the benefits and risks of any proposed treatment, 
and alternative treatment or non-treatment. In addition to its contributions to legal history, 
the development of informed consent was enhanced by the introduction of language 
regarding patient’s rights.  
Patient’s Bill of Rights 
In 1973, the American Hospital Association was instrumental in publishing a 
patient’s Bill of Rights which was adopted by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of 
Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO). Commenting on the American Hospital Bill of 
Rights, Faden, Beauchamp, and King noted that it “was one of the earliest signals of the 
place of an autonomy model in medical practices.”52 This Bill of Rights introduced the 
language of “rights” into the discourse and practice of patient autonomy. It became the 
most influential of several patients’ rights statements to appear in the 1970s.53 The 
Patient’s Bill of Rights incorporated and strengthened some of the fruits of previous legal 
wrangling.  For example, it endorsed the patients’ rights to obtain from their physicians 
information necessary to give informed consent before any procedure or treatment.54 It 
also recognized the individual patient’s right to refuse medical treatment to the  
extent permitted by law and to be informed of the medical consequence of his action. … 
The patient has the right to obtain information as to any relationship of his hospital to 
other health care and educational institutions insofar as his care is concerned.55 
Prior to the adoption of Patient’s Bill of Rights, medical codes and didactic writings had 
traditionally emphasized the physician’s obligations or virtues. Trust rather than 
commerce was the theme of the doctor-patient relationship. As a result, the language of 
rights suddenly shifted the focus in a different direction.56  Right, for example, is about 
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entitlement, that is, a demand made by someone regarding the conduct of others. When 
rights are turned in the direction of medical decision-making, they literally invite or, at 
least, encourage the replacement of the beneficence model with the autonomy model.57  
2. A. 2.  Bioethical Origin  
While the legal formulations were in process, the importance of informed consent 
was also being critically examined and discussed from a moral perspective in the area of 
medical experiments and research.58 There were, for instance, events at Nuremberg, 
Helsinki, the National Institutes of Health (NIH), and the Federal Drug Administration 
(now known as Food and Drug Administration) that began to have a cumulative ground-
breaking effect on medicine, especially on research ethics. According to Faden, 
Beauchamp, and King, these events, more than anything drew and directed the attention 
of scholars in law, theology, history, and biomedical and behavioral sciences to the 
subject matter of informed consent.59  
The Nuremberg code declared consent “absolutely essential.” It insists that the 
patient or the subject who is giving consent must not only possess sufficient knowledge 
of the intervention but must also sufficiently comprehend the information in order for that 
patient or subject to make an “enlightened decision.”60 In view of this insistence, Jonsen 
surmised that consent was required to go beyond mere permission. In 1972, the year 
several courts in USA included informed consent in medical practice, the Tuskegee 
syphilis study scandal occurred. Shockingly, it was discovered that the subjects of the 
Tuskegee syphilis study were not fairly consulted, not given information regarding the 
study, nor were they asked to give consent to the study. For example, they were not 
furnished with the reason why the government doctors were collecting their blood 
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samples. Dr. Jay Katz, a member of the Tuskegee panel, noted that “the most 
fundamental reason for condemning the Tuskegee Study … [is that the subjects] were 
never fairly consulted about the research project, its consequences for them and the 
alternatives available to them.”61 Bioethicists of the time held that consent to therapy or 
experimentation “is the external manifestation of the moral values of freedom and 
loyalty” that makes the relationship between doctors and patients (and or subjects) a 
moral one.62 The Tuskegee Study showed that doctors in USA as well as Nazi war 
criminals could disregard the Nuremberg code requirement for voluntary consent.63  
Finally, there was the study of informed consent to experimentation initiated by 
the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects. The study led to the 
production of the Belmont Report which classified informed consent under the general 
topic of “Respect for Persons.”64 One of the contributing essays to this project was from 
Robert Veatch. His article, “Three Theories of Informed Consent: Philosophical 
Foundations and Policy Implications,” set the path for an in-depth exploration of 
informed consent. He posited three possible philosophical grounds for informed consent: 
one, that the beneficent duty of physicians requires them to warn patients of possible 
harm associated with treatment; second, that “the utilitarian principle recommends 
consent as a means of maintaining the general trust between the scientific profession and 
society;” third and last, that possible philosophical grounds for informed consent is the 
right to self-determination. Veatch was critical of the first two although he approved the 
third. In defense of the right to self-determination, Veatch argued that an informed 
consent that is grounded in the right to self-determination means a standard of disclosure 
that is centered on the need of a reasonable person for information to make a decision and 
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is not based on professional judgment65 Veatch’s exposé shaped the Belmont’s 
commission Report on informed consent.  
Later, in November 1978, the Congress in the USA asked the President’s 
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and 
Behavioral Research to examine the issue of informed consent. As a result, in 1980, the 
Commission was convened and informed consent was its agenda.66 In its study, the 
commission chose to go beyond the legalistic scope of informed consent in order to 
consider how to nurture a relationship between patients and medical personnel 
“characterized by mutual participation and respect and by sharing decision-making.”67 
The Commission published its study as: Making Health Care Decisions: the Ethical and 
Legal Implications of Informed Consent in the Patient-Practitioner Relationship and 
Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment. Its appendices contain two volumes of 
documents, scholarly papers, and empirical research.68  
In the Report, the Commission observed that, in spite of the fact that the concept 
of informed consent is a product of legal history; the requirements are not legally-
oriented. Rather, they are basically “moral and policy-oriented.”  Emphasizing self-
determination, the Commission69  further noted that informed consent is ultimately 
founded on the principle that competent adults are entitled to make their own decisions in 
keeping with their own values and goals; that the context of informed consent and any 
claim of valid consent must derive from active, shared decision-making. The report 
supported its statements with “a philosophical argument based on the principle of 
autonomy…” that is, that persons have an intrinsic right to direct their lives; and on the 
principle of beneficence, that is, that care is improved when patients collaborate in their 
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care.70 Although the primary goal of health care, in general, is the maximization of each 
patient’s well-being, to act simply in a patient’s best interest without recognizing the 
individual as the essential decision-maker would fail to respect each person’s interest in 
self-determination.”71  
In its later report, the Commission concludes that “the right to autonomous 
choice” implies the choice to forego life-sustaining treatment. This conclusion contradicts 
the usual “presumption in favor of sustaining life,”72 and the Commission recognized that 
this fact could have “a pervasive and unsettling effect” on medical facilities, where such 
practices are generally looked at “as suspect and disruptive.” According to the 
Commission, such a view undermines patient self-determination.73 These public 
discussions about the moral and legal obligation to obtain consent for therapeutic 
interventions have shaped the private discourse that is supposed to take place between 
physicians and patients. What should be an improvised interaction tailored to suit each 
situation and the personalities involved has been usurped by legal and moral obligations.  
Moral and legal obligations require a conversation about certain elements prescribed that 
have been dictated by the public discourse which took place in commissions and in 
courts.74 All these bioethical and legal insights, especially those regarding self-
determination directly helped the development of the informed consent theory and 
indirectly raised awareness and re-evaluation of paternalism in the physician-patient 
relationship.   
2. A. 3.  Reaction against Paternalism 
Finally, informed consent emerged, in part, because of a reaction against 
paternalism. Paternalism is the intentional overriding of an individual’s known wishes 
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and choices or actions by another person. The one overriding justifies the action by 
arguing that it is to benefit or to prevent harm to the one whose preferences or actions are 
overruled.75 In healthcare, paternalism was based on the view that, because a health 
professional has superior training, knowledge, and insights, that authoritative position is 
used to determine what is in the patient’s best interests. Throughout the history of 
medical ethics, both principles of beneficence and nonmaleficence have produced a basis 
for paternalistic actions towards patients. Joel Feinberg distinguishes between weak (soft) 
and strong (hard) paternalism. In weak paternalism, an agent intervenes on grounds of 
beneficence only to prevent substantially nonvoluntary conduct, that is, to protect a 
person against his or her own substantially nonautonomous action (s). Substantially 
nonvoluntary or nonautonomous actions include cases of consent or refusal that are not 
adequately informed, severe depressions that preclude rational deliberation, and 
addictions that prevent free choices and actions. In weak paternalism a person's ability is 
compromised in some way.76  
Mill, despite his stringent opposition to paternalism, considered temporary beneficent 
intervention in a person's action to be justified on certain occasions. An example is a 
person who is ignorant of a significant risk such as starting to cross a dangerous bridge. It 
is justifiable to restrain the person in order to ensure that he or she is acting intentionally 
and with adequate knowledge of the consequences of this action. 
In fact, in ancient Greece, a patient’s participation in medical or treatment 
decision-making was seen as undesirable. It was accepted practice not to disclose 
possible risks or difficulties of treatment or procedure to the patient because such 
disclosure was believed to erode patient trust. Physicians were required to stimulate and 
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foster patient confidence in the treatment.77 According to Albert Jonsen, Plato noted that, 
when a free physician attended to patients who are free citizens, the physician conversed 
with them and attempted to understand their problems. Then, having gained their 
confidence, he went on to administer the prescription or the treatment. On the other hand, 
when treating slaves, the physicians dispensed with the conversation and went directly to 
prescription, giving orders like tyrants.78 The distinction between the treatment method 
for slaves and that for free citizens melted into Hippocratic aphorism: if a patient is under 
orders, that patient will not stray; whereas, if the patient is left to his or her own 
discretion, that patient will give up the struggle and die. Hippocrates advised, therefore, 
that the physician should take the patient in hand. They (physicians) should “assume 
authority,” “give orders firmly,” “urge obedience” and reproach the “delinquent.” 79 For 
example, Hippocratic ethics required physicians not to reveal anything of the patient’s 
future or current condition. The reason was that, on learning the prognosis, patients 
would take a turn for the worst.80 These practices of the beneficence model of 
Hippocratic medicine encouraged and fostered beneficence and paternalism. 
Consequently, by following this beneficence model of Hippocratic medicine, physicians 
traditionally took the general view that disclosing certain forms of information can cause 
harm to patients under their care and that medical ethics obligates them not to cause such 
harm. The principle of autonomy is more a product of the traditions of Kant and the 
Liberal political philosophy than of the Hippocratic tradition.81 
According to Peter Murray,  in medieval times physicians were encouraged to 
utilize their conversations with the patients to foster “comfort and hope while 
emphasizing the need for the doctor to be manipulative and deceitful.”82 In Medieval 
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Europe, Henri de Mondeville (1260-1325), a French surgeon and teacher of anatomy, 
upheld the Hippocratic beneficence model of medicine and ethics. In truth-telling, for 
example, beneficence was the criterion. He encouraged physicians to promise a cure to 
all patients and to tell patient’s relatives or friends if there is any risk.83 The prevailing 
view of medical moralists supported that sort of therapeutic privilege, namely, 
paternalism, which is an offshoot of beneficence.  Physicians and medical professionals 
directed the conversation and sanctioned what today would consider to be ethically 
suspect, such as the withholding and distortion of truth.  
Later, in the Eighteenth Century, in reaction to such paternalism, medical opinion 
was divided with some in favor of disclosure and patient participation in medical 
decision-making, others were not.84 Some medical moralists of the time, for instance, the 
Rev. Thomas Gisborne and Samuel Johnson contested the practice, arguing that 
physicians should tell patients the truth unless, of course, a patient demanded not to be 
told. Subsequently, medical ethicists and moral philosophers joined to condemn the 
practice of medical paternalism. They argued for the respect of the autonomy and wishes 
of the patient. Others such as Dr. Percival strongly contested the idea of abandoning 
paternalism.85 Ultimately, the advocates of ending paternalism triumphed, thanks to the 
influence of the self-determination and informed consent theory championed by both the 
legal and the bioethical sectors. Through these combined three-pronged forces of legal, 
bioethical events, and reaction against paternalism, the principle of informed consent 
gradually emerged.  
 
 
37 
 
2. B.   Autonomy and Informed Consent  
There are four commonly used principles in bioethics: autonomy, beneficence, 
non-maleficence, and justice. They were principally formulated by Beauchamp and 
Childress. Informed consent was, however, anchored in self-determination, especially in 
autonomy. Autonomy became the driving force. To understand informed consent better, 
therefore, it is necessary to take a hard look at autonomy.   
2. B. 1.  Meaning of Autonomy  
Autonomy, one of the four principles of bioethics, is the driving force of informed 
consent in Western liberal society. Etymologically, the word “autonomy” has its origin in 
two Greek words: autos meaning self, and nomos meaning, rule, governance, or law. 
Autonomy stands, therefore, for self-rule or self-governance of independent city-states.86 
It was originally advocated in the context of states being sovereign. Personal autonomy, 
by analogy, is said to be self-rule that is free from both coercion and controlling 
interference by other people, and from limitations such as inadequate understanding or 
illness that mitigates meaningful choice. Liberty and agency have been posited as the two 
essential conditions for autonomy. According to Tom Beauchamp and James Childress, 
while there is agreement on the necessity of the two conditions, there are disagreements 
about the meaning of the two conditions and about whether or not more conditions are 
required.87 The understanding of autonomy in Western thought has been greatly 
influenced by the Kantian and liberal rights moral theories.88 In the USA, it has also been 
influenced by Amendments to the national Constitution. It has been noted, for example, 
by J. B. Schneewind that Kant devised the conception of morality as autonomy, partly in 
support of conceptions of morality as self-governance that developed in competition with 
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conceptions of morality as obedience.89 Human beings are self-governing because they 
are autonomous. They legislates the moral law themselves. It is only because of the 
legislative action of the human will that human beings are subject to the moral law, and it 
is the same action that “always enables everyone to be law-abiding.”90 Consequently, 
Kant focused on autonomy of the will, which is a property the will has as being a law 
unto itself. This property of being a law unto oneself is referred to by Kant as the “dignity 
of man as a rational creature.”91  
While Kant spoke of autonomy, John Stuart Mill adopted individuality rather than 
autonomy. For Mill, in possessing “individuality,” human beings are autonomous in a 
very strong sense. They reflectively choose their own plans of life and make their own 
decisions without coercion or manipulation by others. They exercise certain “firmness 
and self-control in acting on their decisions.”92 For Mill, to do something because it is the 
custom is to make no choice.93 Although autonomy is very important to Mill and the 
Utilitarians, their interest in autonomy varies from the Kantian. For the Kantian, respect 
for autonomy of the rational agent “serves as a limiting criterion for all moral conduct.” It 
puts limits on what a person can do to another without behaving immorally because one 
cannot use another person as a means to an end. One cannot use another as a subject in 
medical studies without one’s consent, irrespective of the potential benefits for society. In 
the case of Utilitarians such as Mill, however, respect for individual autonomy possesses 
“utility value.” A society that encourages respect for individuals as autonomous agents 
will be a more progressive and, on balance, a happier society because the citizens will 
possess opportunities to foster their capacities in order to act as rational, responsible 
moral agents.94  
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On the other hand, Thomas E. Hill, Jr., argues that the following notions of 
autonomy are not Kantian. The notion of autonomy as a particular feature of 
psychological maturity possessed by some people and not by others, is seen as a trait 
attributable to people in various degrees and circumstances on the basis of empirically 
discernible evidence. Thus, according to Hill, autonomous persons are understood as 
possessing independence of judgment which others, such as children, unthinking 
conformists, compulsive gamblers, do not have; or that autonomous persons are 
understood as being emotionally independent of other people, being self-reliant and 
secure in their own self-esteem. Hill maintains that blindly following one’s parents’ 
wishes, peer pressures, traditional norms, church authorities, for example, is regarded in 
this psychological notion of autonomy as lack of autonomy.95 For Hill, Kant sees 
autonomy as an “idea of reason, attributed on a priori grounds to all rational wills.” It is 
for Kant an “all-or-nothing trait” that grounds a basic respect due to all human beings, as 
opposed to an exclusive respect earned only by the most conscientious, human beings. 
Because human beings possess autonomy of will, “all (minimally) rational human beings 
have basic moral obligations.” Being under moral obligation (at all) “presupposes 
autonomy as a universal condition of moral agency” and “not as the special achievement 
of the few.”96  
Likewise, Hill believes that the notion of autonomy as a right, that is, to have a 
moral right to make certain decisions for oneself, to control certain aspects of one’s life 
without interference, rather than autonomy as an empirical trait, is not Kant’s. Autonomy 
as a moral right arose from the concept of the autonomous states. Hill argues that, even 
though Kant believes in rights, especially as being grounded in human autonomy, 
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autonomy itself is not a right but a property of all rational wills. A convicted murderer on 
the gallows, for example, may have lost most of his rights to determine his future; 
nevertheless, he has not, therefore, lost his Kantian autonomy.97 Whatever the case, and 
as Hill himself admits, even if the aforenamed concepts of autonomy are not Kant’s 
concept of autonomy, they must have been inspired by Kant’s concept of autonomy.98 In 
other words, they have roots in Kant.  
2. B. 2.  Informed Consent and the Principle of Respect for Autonomy 
The understanding of autonomy as an empirical trait, and as a right, that is, to 
have a moral right to make certain decisions for oneself, without interference, have been 
said to have roots in Kantian thought. Similarly, the Kantian thought influences the way 
the principle of respect for autonomy and therefore informed consent is understood in the 
USA and in the Western bioethics.   
a) Informed Consent 
Informed consent is a legal doctrine with an ethical foundation. It is based on 
values such as dignity, individualism, respect for autonomy, and beneficence in the 
liberal societies of the USA and Europe. There are, therefore, two meanings of “informed 
consent:” the first sense and the second sense. The first sense can be analyzed in terms of 
an individual’s autonomous authorization of a medical treatment or of participation in 
clinical research. This first sense requires a substantial comprehension, absence of 
substantial external control, intentionality, and authorization of a professional to do or not 
to do something.99 It is, therefore, a particular kind of action by an individual or a subject. 
The second sense of informed consent involves the social rules of consent practiced in 
institutions that have to obtain consent that are “legally or institutionally valid” from 
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individuals before performing medical intervention or before allowing a subject to 
become involved in medical research. According to this second sense, the informed 
consent may not necessarily be an autonomous act or a meaningful authorization. It 
mainly requires satisfying the institution’s prevailing policy or legal criteria. It is policy-
oriented in the sense that conditions are neither derivable solely from analysis of 
autonomy and authorization nor even from broad concepts of respect for autonomy.100 
Every consent is informed consent in this second sense provided it satisfies the operating 
rules used by the institution in question in its practice of informed consent. For example, 
according to a North Carolina statute, a signed consent form constitutes a “valid consent” 
in the second sense provided a reasonable person would have comprehended the 
information provided in the consent form, even if the individual involved did not 
understand.101 An individual can autonomously authorize a medical treatment and give 
informed consent in the first sense, while not effectively authorizing the treatment and 
without giving an informed consent in the second sense.102 Likewise, informed consent 
obtained in the second sense may not satisfy the criteria of informed consent in the first 
sense. Informed consent in both senses is acceptable within certain limits, namely, where 
the purpose is to offer the patient or the subject the opportunity either to grant or to refuse 
authorization for medical treatment or research.  
Besides these two senses, Franklin Miller and Allen Wertheimer have proposed a 
third sense, the Fair Transaction (FT), which is another context in which consent is 
morally transformative. This form requires going beyond valid consent. In other words, it 
requires going beyond the first two senses discussed above. The central concern for 
Miller and Wertheimer is whether a consent transaction between x and y is morally 
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transformative, and specifically whether a consent transaction makes it permissible for x 
to proceed. Miller and Wertheimer assert that the informed consent commonly used in 
bioethics is quite special. They argue that while valid consent as given in the two senses 
above captures much of what is important, and is an eminently serviceable notion for 
most purpose; it is not quite right. In addition, Miller and Wertheimer believe that the 
view of consent embraced by bioethics is a parochial one. The reason, according to them, 
is that bioethics has been under the clutches of “a specific historical legacy and an 
associated set of canonical statements and legal doctrines.”103 Consequently, bioethics 
has not been able to locate its own principle of informed consent within the more general 
field or contexts in which people alter their moral and legal status by consent. Moreover, 
the idea that morally transformative consent needs to be “informed” is very unique to the 
context of medicine. After all, in other aspects of life where people make decisions, we 
speak of “consent” and not of “informed consent,” and the standard for a consent 
transaction is an intercourse between two people x and y with y pledging consent to x to 
do something. Often times and in most aspects of life, the two people or group will 
mutually consent to an interaction. The two become both consenters and recipients of the 
consent. 104   
Continuing, Miller and Wertheimer argue that a theory of consent transaction has 
got to account for both standard consent transactions as well as flawed ones, wherein it is 
reasonable and fair for x to believe that y has pledged consent despite the fact that y has 
not actually given consent. In other words, Miller and Wertheimer’s contention is 
whether the consent transaction makes it permissible for the recipient of consent to go on, 
or continue even when an examination of the transaction would show that valid consent 
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was not given. Their contention is not about whether the consenter gives valid consent. 
Likewise, Miller and Wertheimer contend that there are situations where even though a 
valid consent is given, the consent transaction may turn out not to be morally 
transformative. However, according to Miller and Wertheimer, both moral transformation 
or permissibility to proceed and valid consent should go pari passu or hand-in-hand. 
When they do not go pari passu, moral transformation rather than valid consent should 
be of fundamental moral importance.105 Using the example of the lock-and-
key/autonomous authorization (LK/AA) model of consent transactions, Miller and 
Wertheimer explain that lock-and-key asserts that valid consent is the key that opens the 
lock of moral transformation. Identifying what constitutes a valid consent, Miller and 
Wertheimer posit the Theory of Faden, Beauchamp, and King as one possibility. That is, 
where valid consent is defined by the concept of autonomous authorization.106 Here 
consent is valid provided it reflects the consenter’s autonomous will and the consenter is 
substantially voluntary, competent to make such choices, is well informed, and 
comprehends what is being consented to.  
Furthermore, Miller and Wertheimer contend that the lock-and-key/autonomous 
authorization model of consent has serious practical and theoretical difficulties. For 
instance, they assert that lock-and-key/autonomous authorization makes an excessively 
narrow conception of the values at stake by tying morally transformative consent to the 
consenter’s autonomous choice. Specifically, they stress that a morally defensible theory 
of consent transactions has to account for the interests of the consenter as well as the 
interests of those soliciting consent in possessing “clear, practicable, and fair standards by 
which recipients can determine when they are entitled to proceed with cooperative or 
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transactional activities.”107 Thus, Miller and Wertheimer propose an alternative: the “fair 
transaction” model (FT) of consent transactions. This model holds that x is morally 
permitted to proceed on the basis of a consent transaction if x has treated y fairly and 
responds in a reasonable manner to y’s voluntary expression of consent or that which x 
reasonably believes is y’s expression of consent.108 Miller and Wertheimer believes too 
that fair transaction model of consent is a more superior moral conception or paradigm of 
consent transaction than others; that it (fair transaction) serves both to protect and 
promote the interests and autonomy of the consenter. For them, any approach which 
makes valid consent central fails to do justice to the bilateral nature of consent 
transactions.109  
b) Elements of Informed Consent  
As was mentioned above, the following elements have been identified in informed 
consent: competence, disclosure, understanding, voluntariness, and acceptance. That is to 
say that one has to be competent; one has to receive a detailed disclosure; one has to 
understand the disclosed information; and one has to voluntarily accept or refuse the 
intervention in question.110  
i. Disclosure  
Physicians are required to divulge the following: those facts that patients normally 
consider material in deciding whether to consent or to refuse the proposed intervention. 
These include the nature and purposes of the intervention, risks and benefits involved, 
diagnoses, prognoses, and alternative interventions available as well as their risks and 
benefits. Other requirements are information the physician believes to be material, the 
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physician’s recommendation, the purpose of seeking consent, as well as the nature and 
limits of consent as an act of authorization.111  
Bernard Gert, Charles Culver, and K. Danner Clouser agreeing that there is a need 
for adequate disclosure of information to patients identified two sets of information: 
morally required and morally encouraged information disclosures. According to them, at 
least three kinds of information are morally required to be divulged to patients. These are: 
of significant benefits and harms that might occur or result from the planned treatment 
and tests; plausible alternative treatments possible in the current situation, as well as their 
benefits and harms; and the nature of the patients’ sickness and the risks and benefits of 
not taking any action or intervention.112 Gert, Culver, and Clouser believe that these sets 
of information should essentially always be disclosed in the consent process. However, 
the inclusion of the other sets, the morally encouraged, which they did not enumerate, in 
the information to be disclosed, is not morally required but encouraged. Gert, Culver, and 
Clouser argue that physicians who fail to disclose such information have not acted 
immorally but they “have failed to act as helpfully and virtuously as they might.”113 
Believing that most physicians want to know and disclose information critical to patients’ 
medical decision-making, Gert, Culver, and Clouser observed that the problem is that all 
health care codes of ethics do not make distinction between information that is morally 
required and information that is morally encouraged. Therefore, Gert, Culver, and 
Clouser agree with Clarence H. Braddock III, Kelly A. Edwards, Nicole M. Hasenberg, et 
al,’s empirical research evidencing that vast majority of physicians and health care 
practitioners do not conduct adequate consent process, and even sometimes they carry out 
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medical interventions and diagnostic tests with “almost no accompanying information” 
and disclosure.114   
ii. Understanding  
Informed consent requires that the patient understands the information disclosed, 
at least the essential information. Such understanding does not have to be complete since 
a grasp of the central facts is generally sufficient. A patient or the surrogate usually ought 
to understand at least what a healthcare professional considers as relevant to authorize an 
intervention.115 These include the nature and purposes of the intervention, risks and 
benefits involved, diagnoses, prognoses, and available alternatives.  
 iii. Competence 
Competence to consent to or refuse medical intervention is a central concept in 
health law and bioethics in the USA. It encompasses being legally of age to exercise a 
legal right including rights to make healthcare decision and decisional capacity. The 
person needs to have the ability to communicate choice, understand relevant information, 
appreciate the situation as well as possible consequences, and manipulate information. 
Thus, when individuals “lack the ability to make decision that promotes their well-being 
in keeping with their own previously expressed values and preferences,”116 we say they 
are incompetent.  Being competent to make a decision is different from willingness to 
make a decision. Being competent or having the capacity enables, but, it does not 
obligate a patient to act autonomously or independently.  Besides, a person can be 
competent in one thing and not in another. It is task specific. For instance, a patient may 
be competent in deciding what to drink or wear but not in making medical decision. 
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Thus, lacking the ability to make medical decision does not mean that one is incompetent 
in other things.117  
Furthermore, even though Gert, Culver, and Clouser assert that there are various 
definitions of competence, they agree that the various definitions have in common the 
stipulation that one necessary element of competence is that the patient must comprehend 
at least the minimal amount of factual information that would count as adequate 
information for validly consenting to or refusing the proposed medical treatment. 
Otherwise, the patient is considered incompetent to make medical decision.118  
iv. Voluntariness   
While Beauchamp and Childress speak of voluntariness, Gert, Culver, and 
Clouser talk of coercion/ absence of coercion or according to Faden, Beauchamp and 
King, acting without controlling influences.119 Voluntariness or acting without coercion 
or controlling influences, entails that after the patient has received the information and 
understood the core message, one “acts voluntarily to the degree that one wills the action 
without being under the control of another’s influence.”120 Sickness, psychiatric 
disorders, drug addiction or substance abuse can diminish voluntariness.  Nevertheless, 
this analysis is restricted to control by other human beings. For instance, if a doctor 
instructs a reluctant patient to undergo dialysis and coerces the patient to comply by 
threatening to abandon that patient, then the doctor’s influences appear like control.  
While, if a doctor persuades the patient to undergo the procedure when the patient is at 
first reluctant to do so, then the doctor influences, but does not control, the patient.121 
According to Gert, Culver, and Clouser, the doctor can justifiably influence a patient to 
consenting or refusing an intervention when the patient is in a situation when acting 
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paternalistically towards that patient is justified.122 Otherwise, it is neither morally nor 
legally justified to coerce a patient even if it is done by the patient’s family.  
Finally, Beauchamp insists that voluntariness and autonomous choice rather than 
disclosure of information are the central elements to the notion of consent. Because of the 
name, “informed consent” the understanding of consent has been skewed towards 
providing information and being informed. Thus, the legal system emphasizes the 
supreme importance of disclosure of information to patients and subjects.” In fact, he 
thinks that disclosure is not a necessary condition of informed consent, “and is only 
remotely connected to consent per se.”123   
v. Acceptance  
After receiving and comprehending the disclosed detailed information, the 
competent patient is expected to voluntarily either decides in favor of the planned 
intervention and authorizes it or refuses to go on with it and, therefore, declines to 
authorize the proposed intervention.124 
c) Respect for Autonomy 
Respect for autonomy involves recognizing that individuals have the freedom to 
make choices based on personal values and beliefs and to accept or refuse medical 
treatments that affect their life as well as their well-being. It is embedded in common 
morality that one ought to respect the autonomous choices of individuals even if there is 
little or no agreement about the nature, scope, or strength of this respect for autonomy.125 
Respect for autonomy arises in part from a special fiduciary obligation between the 
patients and the health care professional. As a positive obligation for autonomy, respect 
for autonomy includes enabling individuals to act autonomously, and in some contexts it 
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involves the obligation to build peoples’ capacities for autonomous decisions and 
choices. It also involves the duty to assist in preventing and warding off conditions that 
might mitigate or destroy autonomous choices or actions.126 It requires healthcare 
professionals to assist the patients to overcome their sense of dependence and achieve as 
much control as possible as they desire.  
The obligation to respect autonomy does not extend to those individuals who are 
unable to act in a manner which is sufficiently autonomous or individuals who cannot be 
made to be autonomous, because of their immaturity, incapacitation, or ignorance. An 
example of such persons includes infants, irrationally suicidal individuals, as well as 
those dependent on drugs. These people are psychologically or legally incapable of 
giving valid consent. They are unable to communicate preferences or choices, to 
comprehend information, their situation and its consequences. In addition, they are 
unable to give reasons, to risk benefit-related reasons or to reach any reasonable 
decision.127  
Immanuel Kant offers us a reason to respect autonomy, namely, because 
autonomy is the basis for a human being’s moral standing as a rational being. Every 
person has unconditional worth and the capacity to determine his or her own moral 
destiny. As free moral agents, individuals have the capacity to choose and to act in 
accordance with their own reasons and motives without external constraints and 
manipulative influences.128 For Kant, to contravene a person’s autonomy is to treat that 
person merely as a means, without regard to that person’s own goals or end, that is, to 
treat the person in accordance with someone else’s goal or end.  Kant requires that one 
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rationally and impartially evaluate one’s choice. He noted that decisions based on 
particular relationships or emotions are not autonomous but heteronomous.129  
However, even some liberals believe that respect for autonomy is not absolute; 
rather, it has only a prima facie standing. Sometimes it can “be overridden by competing 
moral considerations.” Beauchamp and Childress offer the following considerations 
which can override the principle of respect for autonomy: 1) when one’s choice will 
endanger the public health; 2) when respecting one’s autonomy can harm others; 3) when 
it requires scarce resources for which no funds are available; and 4) when for any of these 
reasons others can justifiably restrict a competent adult from exercising autonomy.130 In 
her own critique of autonomy and informed consent, Onora O’Neill introduces the issue 
of trust in the discussion. The next sub-section presents O’Neill’s thoughts on the issue of 
autonomy and trust. 
2. B. 3. Autonomy and Trust  
O'Neill opines that the conceptions of individual autonomy which is widely relied 
on in bioethics are philosophically and ethically inadequate, and that they undermine 
relationships based on trust instead of supporting them. In her books Autonomy and Trust 
in Bioethics, she acknowledges that much of medical ethics has very much emphasized 
individual patient autonomy and rights.131 On the contrary, she thinks that literatures on 
the second principal domain of bioethics --environmental ethics-- (for her, the two 
principal domains of bioethics are medical and environmental ethics), have focused more 
on public benefits and public harms wherein individual autonomy is taken as source of 
harms. For instance, environmental ethics hardly see autonomous life-style choices of 
individuals as adequate for the protection of the environment. Rather it increasingly 
accentuates the importance of stewardship of the environment advocating local or 
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international public regulation and enforcement. Consequently, it emphasizes the need to 
limit individual autonomy. However, medical ethics and environmental ethics have 
recently found a convergence and common language by concentrating on rights, thus 
bracketing issues of agency and obligation in favor of a primary focus on recipience and 
entitlement. Thus, medical ethicists consider human rights including patients’ rights, as 
securing the right kind of respect for human agents and their autonomy, environmental 
ethicists view the rights of animals, plants ecosystems, landscapes and etc. as safeguard, 
protection, and respect for the non-human world.132  
Juxtaposing autonomy and trust, O’Neill notes that while it might be expected 
that the increasing emphasis on individual rights and autonomy would have increased 
public trust, rather it undermined it as well as the relationships based on trust.133 O’Neill 
believes that trust is a major theme in sociology, but a minor theme in ethics. 
Consequently,  
a large amount of discussion of trust focuses on empirical studies of perception of others 
as trustworthy or untrustworthy, and rather little addresses the practical demands of 
placing trust. The topics are connected, but they are not the same. The connection is that 
those who see their world as a ‘risk society’ often find placing trust problematic: but it 
does not follow that they do not place trust, or even that they place no trust in those 
whom they claim to think untrustworthy.134  
Continuing O’Neill rightly argues that people do place trust on others in various cases. 
Sometimes only with respect to a specific range of action, especially actions for which 
those people have explicit responsibility. For instance, patients may trust their physician 
to act in their best interests in deciding on their treatment, while they might not trust the 
physician to drive safely. Other times trust is unrelated to role as in trusting strangers in 
giving us reliable information. Likewise, people cannot avoid placing various sorts of 
trust in others with whom they have close and complex relationships. Other times trust is 
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often reciprocal in personal relationships.  From all this, O’Neill concludes that we often 
trust others to play by the rules and to “do something properly without the slightest 
assumption that they have any good will towards us”  or even knowing that they do not 
have any good will toward us.135  
O’Neill also believes that just as there are various cases on which people place 
trust on others, there are various conceptions of both autonomy and trust. Some 
conceptions of trust and of autonomy are compatible, and even mutually supporting, 
while others are not. While all these conceptions of autonomy and trust do not have to be 
adopted, however, embracing conceptions of autonomy and trust that cannot be 
reconciled will result in inability to have both. In other words, to have and enjoy both 
conceptions of autonomy and trust, reconcilable conceptions of each of them must be 
adopted. For O’Neill, the physician-patient relationship presents a paradigm of a 
relationship of trust. A patient goes to the physician being aware that the physician is 
bound by professional oath and integrity to act in the best interests of the patient. She 
thinks that this physician-patient relationship ought to trump any other considerations of 
self-interest and gain, in spite of the contractual and financial benefits connecting 
physician and patient, or physicians and their employers or medical institutions. The 
physician-patient relationship is supposed to last long, be intimate, trusting, and 
disinterested.136  
O’Neill observed that some scholars criticize the physician-patient relationship as 
not being of reasonable trust because patients placed their trust on physicians as children 
blindly put trust on parents. It is based on lack of an alternative and on inability to 
distinguish and to discriminate between well-placed and misplaced trust. It was 
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paternalistic initially. However, the realization of the defects of paternalism of the 
physician-patient relationship, for instance, that it could not offer an adequate context for 
reasonable trust. The idea that relations of trust are in themselves enough to safeguard a 
weaker, dependent was declared naïve. A more adequate basis for trust was explored, -a 
model where the patients were on a more equal footing with professionals/physicians, 
hence, patients have to be better informed and less dependent. In other words a well-
placed trust is only the one “given by those who understand what is proposed, and who 
are in a position to refuse or choose in the light of that understanding.”137 Consequently, 
there is the need for informed consent, and autonomy. In this model, autonomy is 
believed to be a pre-condition of genuine trust, and informed consent “a ritual of trust that 
embeds it in properly institutionalized respect for patient autonomy.”138 This model is 
seen as a relationship between equals and trust is properly combined with patient 
autonomy. Legal developments and abuse of research subjects by Nazi and Nuremberg 
code helped to bring about this model.  
Nevertheless, with recent developments and changes in health care technological 
developments, there arose many teams of professional in the hospitals most of whom are 
not a known and trusted face, but are what some have called “strangers at the bedside.”139 
To the patient these are powerful strangers, and functionaries of medical facilities whose 
structures are opaque to most patients, even though they ought to look out for the best 
interests of the patients, preserve confidentiality, and to respect privacy. The change for 
the patient is loss of trust even though autonomy and respect for autonomy was 
emphasized. From the patient’s point of view every development in the post-World War 
II period distanced the physician and the hospital from the patient, disrupting social 
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connection and severing the bonds of trust.140 Conversely, viewed from the physicians 
and practitioners’ side, there is increase of codes, complex professional codes, more 
formal certification of competence to perform specific medical interventions, audits, 
patients’ rights to complain and sue in case of mistakes or improper treatment.141 These 
new relationships may yield better billing by replacing traditional forms of trust with a 
new and better basis for trust. The new structure may afford reasons for patients to trust 
even though they do not know their physicians personally, and even though they do not 
understand the details of the rules and codes that constrain physicians’ action. O’Neill 
reinforces and re-iterates her basic argument: that implementation of the kind of 
principled autonomy she derives from Kant must be complemented by considering a 
social context of trust. Employing the use of human tissue in medical research as an 
example, O’Neill contends “that emphasis on informed consent can hardly be sufficient 
without a more general contextualization of those principles alongside the obligation not 
to deceive and the need for a context of trusting relations between medical professionals 
and those with whom they interact.” 142 In this way, an ideal of trust and autonomy might 
be achieved, reshaped and made compatible.  
But in a situation where patients have limited options, and where cognitive and 
decision-making capacities are limited, and the healthcare professionals, strangers at 
bedside who “certainly do not seem to be exercising a million autonomous experiments 
in living,” and “a medical system that increasingly presents itself to its consumers as an 
industrial process,” makes it seem a façade.143 Thus, informed consent procedures might 
seem a burden or a ritual. In such a situation, ideas of patient autonomy might become 
“more inflationary than liberating.” The physician would set out the options and show the 
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patients to sign and where to sign, while at same time the patient is still being told that 
s/he is autonomous, and an equal partner in treatment and that s/he is about to give free 
consent, while the reality is virtually different. This model shows neither traditional trust 
nor newer and better grounded trust with respect and autonomy, rather it depicts 
semblance of trust, and autonomy.144  
Finally, the following conclusions can be drawn. O’Neill reinforces the argument 
of this dissertation, which is that there is too much emphasis on individual patient 
autonomy to the near exclusion of family and community contribution. It is a call to 
balance the emphasis on individual patient rights and autonomy with some communal 
values.  
Likewise, O’Neill makes a significant contribution to the understanding of the most 
important task confronting those responsible for the National Health Service (NHS) and 
medical practice to maintain and strengthen trust where it exists and to restore and foster 
trust where it has atrophied. Finally, it calls for the recruitment and training of more and 
better health care professionals, instead of the tendency to quick fix issues by setting up 
more regulatory bodies.145  
The concept of “person” in liberal thought impacts on the way the principle of 
respect for autonomy and informed consent is understood. It will be seen in subsequent 
chapters that this concept of autonomy differs from the understanding of autonomy in 
African thought. It has also been challenged by the Ethics of Care Movement. However, 
this dissertation will first explore how Western liberal notions of person influence the 
concepts and practice of autonomy and informed consent in Western bioethics.    
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2. C. The Concept of Person and Autonomy  
There are various ideas of what constitutes a human person in Western culture. 
For instance, the existentialists146 believe that human beings are relational, that to be is to 
be in relationship. They also believe that human beings are co-existent and 
interdependent beings and not independent isolated beings. There is no statement that one 
can make about a person that is not referential.147  “Existence is co-existence,” one’s 
being is a “being-through-others.” “Making-one-another-be is the indispensable condition 
for an authentic, personal existence.”148 Aristotle too held that human beings are by 
nature social and political animals. “A social instinct is implanted in all men by 
nature.”149 The state or society is a creation of nature and it precedes the individual. 
Aristotle argues that the proof that the state or society is prior to the individual is that the 
individual is not self-sufficient when isolated. An individual who is unsocial (has no state 
or society) naturally and not accidentally, is either a bad person or above humanity. An 
individual who is either incapable of the common life or is so self-sufficient as not to 
need to live in society, is either a beast or a god.150  
However, rather than existentialist understanding, it was the Kantian and liberal 
Protestant concept of the human person that laid the ground and very much impacted the 
concept of the human person that is at the root of autonomy in the USA and in Western 
tradition in general. Kant, for instance, was influenced by Aristotelian tradition. 
Aristotle’s ideas correspond to the Judeo-Christian tradition that described human beings 
as sacred, possessing dignity and the sanctity of life which are derived from our being 
created in the image and likeness of God. This notion also maintained the idea of a 
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divinely inspired universal hierarchy, with man at the top. The Judeo-Christian Scripture 
proclaims thus:  
Then God said: “Let us make man in our image, after our likeness. Let them have 
dominion over the fish of the sea, the birds of the air, and the cattle, and over all the wild 
animals and all the creatures that crawl on the ground.” God created man in his image; in 
the divine image he created him; male and female he created them.151  
 
Then God ordered them to be fruitful and multiply, filling the earth and subduing it.152  
 The book of Genesis does not necessarily give a historical account of creation. 
Rather it is a symbolic or theological history that requires interpretation. Ancient readers 
and the Fathers of the Church have their interpretations of the account of creation. 
Origen, for example, using his “allegorical” method of interpretation, takes the two 
accounts of the creation of man and woman together and understands them as 
representing the “dual structures of human existence,” that is, the “incorporeal, rational 
nature” possessing the ability to entertain perfect infinity, and as “embodied physical 
beings” who must strive in life to satisfy their needs and fulfill their desires.153 For 
Origen, man and woman created in the image and likeness of God means that they 
received the honor of God’s image in their first creation while the perfection of God’s 
likeness is reserved for them at the consummation.154 Created in the image of God depicts 
the “intrinsic spiritual dignity” that God has conferred on humanity; however, that dignity 
awaits perfection as the “likeness.”  Thus, Origen sees in the “image” and “likeness” an 
eschatological salvation. He finds support for his point in the First Letter of John:  
Beloved, we are God’s children now, what we shall be has not been revealed. We do 
know that when it is revealed we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is. (Jn 3:2)  
  
Though modern biblical scholars155 may neither use the same vocabulary as 
Origen nor read the salvation motif into the phrase created in the “image and likeness of 
God,” their interpretation of the creation of man and woman is similar to Origen’s. Like 
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Origen they parse the two accounts of the creation of humanity but, unlike him, they 
identify them as belonging to two different traditions: the “Priestly” known as “P” and 
the “Yahwistic” known as “J.” For modern biblical scholars, the account of the creation 
of man and woman in Genesis, Chapter 1 belongs to “P,” whereas the account in Genesis 
Chapter 2 comes from “J.” Modern biblical scholars such as R. R. Reno, Robert Jenson, 
Robert Wilken, Ephraim Radner, Michael Root, George Sumner, Bruce K. Waltke, and 
Cathi J. Fredricks agree with Origen that being created in the image of God seals man 
and woman, that is, human beings, as those destined for communion with God. The 
image of God is engraved into our human nature, which is precisely why human beings 
experience their desires and capacities as fit for more than animal survival.156  
Commenting on the image of God, Waltke and Fredicks noted that the expression 
“image of God” is used in a unique way in reference to human beings.157  This image set 
human beings apart from other creatures who are created according to their own kind. 
Being created in the image of God facilitates the role of human beings as rulers of the 
Earth in place of God. “Likeness” depicts that humans are distinct from God; “humanity” 
is a facsimile of God. Image of God is equated with God alone.158  
In the Ancient Near East it was widely believed that a god’s spirit lived in any statue or 
image of that god, with the result that the image could function as a kind of representative 
of or substitute for the god wherever it was placed. It was also customary in the ANE to 
think of a king as a representative of a god; obviously the king ruled, and the god was the 
ultimate ruler, so the king must be ruling on the god’s behalf. It is, therefore, not 
surprising that these two separate ideas became connected and king came to be described 
as an image of a god.159  
 
The passage (Genesis 1:26-27) lends credence to the idea of the dignity of the 
human person as a derivation of being created in the image and likeness of God. It 
(Genesis 1:26-27) further supports an idea of a divinely inspired universal hierarchy with 
human beings (man) not only being at the top of the ladder but also possessing a divine 
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mandate to subdue and dominate all other creatures. Some commentators such as Francis 
of Assisi, Albert Schweitzer, Darryl C. Macer, and Thomas More give a nuanced 
interpretation to this passage by de-emphasizing the subduing and domination of creation 
by humans. They, rather, emphasize stewardship and care for creation, in which case, 
humans are required to treat creation and other creatures as fellow creatures of God and 
worthy of some respect.160     
Aristotelian tradition maintained the universal hierarchy, although it incorrectly 
taught that women, children, and slaves were inferior and lacked immortal souls. Those 
who cannot participate in a rational principle to apprehend it sufficiently are by nature 
slaves and inferior, almost equal to tamed lower animals. The lower animals cannot 
apprehend a principle; they use their instincts.161 The Fathers of the Church saw the 
divine element in human beings as rationality, hence the “rationality thesis.”162 Human 
beings are special because they are rational. Augustine of Hippo asserts that human 
reason is the essence of the soul.163 In relating the rationality thesis to the image of God 
thesis, and the importance for the idea of the human dignity, for example, Thomas 
Aquinas argues:  
Of all parts of the universe, intellectual creatures hold the highest place, because they 
approach nearest to the divine likeness. Therefore, a divine providence provides for the 
intellectual nature for its own sake, and for all others for its sake.164  
 
Borrowing from this tradition, Kant believed not only that human beings occupied a 
special place among other creatures, but that they also have intrinsic worth or dignity that 
“makes them valuable above all price” or end.165 This dignity, according to Kant, derives 
from a person’s ability to be an autonomous, rational agent able to make his or her own 
decisions.166 Kant believes that God owns human beings, and because human beings are 
God’s property, they are bound to regulate their activities in conformity with God’s 
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intention to preserve life. He also saw the secular idea of human beings as rational beings 
closely linked to the religious idea that they are made in the image of God. These are 
evident in his discourse on suicide. Kant noted thus:  
But as soon as we examine suicide from the stand point of religion we immediately see it 
in its true light. We have been placed in this world under certain conditions and for 
specific purposes. But a suicide opposes the purpose of his creator; he arrives in the other 
world as one who has deserted his post; he must be looked upon as a rebel against God.167  
 
Like Aristotle and Plato, Kant believed that animals (non-human animals) and 
plants are not rational beings and, therefore, they are not worthy of any moral status or 
respect. They are there just as means to an end, especially as means to serve the ends of 
human beings.168 In other words, animals may have rights in so far as they are at the 
service of human beings, for example, in research. Otherwise, in and of themselves, 
animals and plants have no worth. They are outside the realm of the rights and 
responsibilities that define our moral order. Thus, in defining a human being, Kant 
exalted reason and autonomy. One of the disadvantages of emphasizing reason in 
defining a human person is that individuals such as newborn infants, and the severely 
mentally challenged who are incapable of exercising rational thought or making choices, 
would not be considered within such a notion of “human person.” Furthermore, Julia Tao 
Lai Po-wah, in contributing to the critique of the Western notion of person, notes that it is 
not appropriate “to delineate descriptive properties of individuals in order to draw 
conclusions about moral standing.” To be rational and to act freely and purposively is 
insufficient “for establishing any form of moral standing.” Po-wah’s reason is that 
“capacities of rationality, self-consciousness, and the like” do not possess any inherent 
“connection to moral properties such as moral agency, moral judgment and moral 
accountability.”169 Po-wah thinks emotions are very much involved because thinking 
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rationally bears on moral decision-making. If one is only rational or only emotional, one 
can arrive at different moral decisions on the same subject.170 Po-wah’s comment, 
especially the latter, is in keeping with recent research results on emotions and moral 
decision-making. That emotions play roles in moral decision-making will be 
demonstrated later.  
It is, however, in the Eighteenth Century and during the Enlightenment, that the 
full emergence of the autonomous self-determining individual as an ideal in Western 
culture took place. John Christman, for example, noted that placing moral weight on an 
individual’s ability to govern oneself, independent of one’s position in the metaphysical 
order or one’s function in social structures and political institutions was produced by the 
“Enlightenment humanism of which contemporary liberal political philosophy is an 
offshoot.”171 According to Robert Veatch, the full emergence of the autonomous self-
determining individual was enhanced mainly by the writings of David Hume (1711-
1776), Rousseau (1712-1778), and Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), and, to some extent, by 
John Locke (1632-1704) as well as Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). The latter were the 
precursors of the former.  Some of these men, such as Kant, were nurtured by Protestant 
thinkers including Martin Luther and John Calvin.172 The Founding Fathers of USA, 
Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and Alexander Hamilton, in addition to crafting the 
Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, expressed in a general way the spirit 
of Liberalism. They also integrated the language of rights into the American ethos and 
strengthened the importance of the individual as decision-maker as an American ideal.173 
We have, therefore, the Patient Self-Determination Act whereby the wishes of a 
competent individual patient override every other person’s. Furthermore, the notion of 
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person that emerged emphasizes individual independence. It emphasizes reason as 
opposed to emotion, individual patients’ rights, individual autonomy, and a subjective 
conception of the good (life).  
2. C. 1.  Individual Independence   
When one comes to the issue of who decides treatment in a liberal society, it 
really depends on the individual and on the values that shape and give meaning to the life 
of the individual in question.174  Two reasons offered for this are the lack of a common 
understanding among individuals and across communities, and a lack of one authoritative 
view of what constitutes the “good life” or a concrete goal of medicine.175 At the heart of 
Liberalism is the belief that the individual is the seat of moral judgment as opposed to the 
community or family. This means that one has to recognize much more diversity of views 
concerning moral issues. One has to adopt a political structure that is neutral among the 
diverse views regarding moral questions, irrespective of whether one or more of those 
views is correct. A plurality of values co-exists. No one of these values is, for social 
purposes, given a privileged position.176 Thus, liberal societies promote a social system 
that delineates value as determined in substance or content by individuals in that society. 
Thus, Thomas May concludes that it is only by accommodating this plurality of moral 
views that individual’s unique value system will be respected and protected within a 
liberal constitutional framework. May, however, does not think that societies such as 
those in Russia and in Africa which emphasize communal values more than individual 
values are wrong or uncaring. On the contrary, he sees them as portraying a different 
political perspective centered on collective good rather than on individual good.177  
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The liberals, especially the Utilitarians, advocate for individual interest, desire, 
and happiness as the good. There is, for instance, the notion of aggregate individual 
happiness as the good (utility) to be maximized by utilitarianism. Individuals are allowed 
to construct their own life plan independent of family or society and, by so doing, their 
happiness is maximized. John Stuart Mill justifies this by arguing that, even though 
individuals may sometimes make poor decisions, it is still the individual who is in the 
best position to judge what constitutes one’s own good.178  
Mill rejects paternalism. However, he concedes that prevention of harm to others 
may be sufficient justification for interfering with an individual’s autonomy. 
Nevertheless, an individual’s own good is never a justification for interfering with that 
individual’s autonomy, because individuals are better judges of their own interests more 
than anyone else. The high utility value Mill ascribes to individual autonomy leads him to 
reject paternalistic interventions.179   
This line of thought is supported by Kantian liberals who believe in broad rights 
of individuals such as broad rights of non-interference or privacy, free speech, and 
association.180 May substantiates this assertion with the example of the situation in his 
country, the United States of America. He writes that the “cultural history and political 
institutions of the United States are decidedly focused on liberal individualism.” This 
liberal political framework, May insists,  
is vital, and nonnegotiable, as a starting point in our discussion of bioethics decision 
making in the United States. Be we liberals, communitarians, communists, or other in 
ideology, we find ourselves in a liberal constitutional society. This context governs our 
social relations. Healthcare as a social practice is bounded by the fundamental political 
context within which it exists. In short, the role moral beliefs play in bioethics will be 
limited, in a social context, by the political rights of individuals.181  
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There is little wonder, then that the Western liberal individualism has a concept of 
autonomy that places much emphasis on rational and individual self-determination, thus, 
leading to the individual right-oriented concept of informed consent in liberal societies, 
especially in the United States of America today. In a clinical setting, the tradition of 
medical ethics in Western liberal society emphasizes the individual. It focuses on the 
patient and on the patient’s interests and autonomy as isolated from the patient’s social 
context such as family or relationships that may not count as families, but yet, count as 
intimate. These, as described by James Lindemann Nelson, are lasting relationships in 
which the interests of the people are complexly intertwined, and in which people care 
intensely about each other.182 Families and enduring relationships tend to offer the 
contexts that support “moral values of intimacy,” and tend to be the spot at which 
medicine often encounters intimacy.183 
The resultant effect of this emphasis on reason and individual rights-oriented 
autonomy and informed consent is that not only is the patient as an individual the best 
judge of these needs, but also the patient is expected to be strong and independent even in 
illness or vulnerability in order to make sound decisions in healthcare situations. 
Likewise, the patient is expected to make choices according to one’s own interests and 
preferences. John Hardwig rightly observed that, in another aspect of life, no one would 
argue that a family man should decide to take a sabbatical or a new job solely on the basis 
of what he wants for himself, or to make the decision alone, no matter how responsible he 
is.184 The question is: Why it should be different in making medical treatment decisions?  
It could not be because medical decisions are matters of life and death because 
most or many of the medical treatment decisions are not matters of life and death.185 
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Perhaps part of the reason for the difference in medical treatment decision-making is the 
misconception and preoccupation with the biophysical model of disease. This probably 
has led people into thinking that and acting as illness is something that happens simply 
within the patient’s body and does not affect their relatives and other people except for 
contagious disease. Consequently, healing and treatment has come to be seen in the same 
manner as taking place simply in the patient’s body.  
Of course, this is not the reality because sickness as well as cure and care of the 
patient can and do affect the family members and others.186 More often than not, family 
members, relatives, or close friends who have deep concern for the patient’s health are 
suspected as interfering in the patient’s autonomy or self-determination. The Western 
clinical milieu overlooks the fact that self-determining patients exist basically in relation 
to others. Their interests involve a dynamic balance among interdependent people who 
possess overlapping considerations; rather, the healthcare setting appears to consider 
illness as a problem of a particular patient.187 It neglects the disruptive effects the 
patient’s illness may have on family members especially close members who are 
expected to provide diverse forms of care. In patient care, for now, basically, families are 
only a means to patient’s ends. They (families) “may be important as sources of 
information about the desire” and wishes of incompetent patients’ or as “reservoirs of 
emotional support.”188 Likewise, as Susan Sherwin rightly observed, individual patient 
self-determination oriented medicine as well as  bioethics requires health medical 
personnel to “ensure that individual patients have the information they need to make 
rational decisions about their healthcare, yet it does not ask the necessary questions about 
the circumstances in which such decisions are made.”189  
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  There is a need, therefore, to broaden the understanding of the effects of illness, 
its medical care and practice of ethics of medicine. There is a need to look beyond the 
medical personnel and the patient to family members, those involved in other intimate 
and enduring relationships with the patient as well as their interests. Lawyers and 
teachers, as Hardwig noted, consider more than the legal and educational consequences 
of their actions respectively.190  
Furthermore, proffering an answer to why decision-making is different in clinical 
situation, Nelson points to the peculiar situation of patients. Because they are ill, patients 
are vulnerable; and, being in healthcare facilities such as hospitals, means being 
displaced, plucked from their homes and placed into an unfamiliar milieu --hospital. They 
are in a weak position to guide and protect their own interests fairly. Moreover, patients 
will directly suffer if denied medical attention in favor of other family needs.191 Hardwig 
agrees that these considerations highlight the importance and implications of “fairly and 
fully representing” the interest of patients in decision-making. Yet, Hardwig doesn’t 
think that attending to patient’s interests “disenfranchises” the interests of the relations of 
the patient and other people. Nelson responded that it does disenfranchise the family or 
others.192 Following the points made above, this dissertation agrees with Nelson that 
attending exclusively to patient’s interests can and does disenfranchise the interests of the 
families, those involved in other intimate and enduring relationships with the patient and 
others.  
Certainly, the sick are vulnerable and do not lose their autonomy, thus, should be 
dully cared for, respecting their interests and wishes. Granted that the need to defend the 
vulnerability and privacy of patients is a powerful reason; yet, the interests of the patients 
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should not always be considered exclusively over those of their families, those involved 
in other intimate and enduring relationships with them and other peoples. The idea of 
treating patients, their autonomy, and their interests in isolation from their social context 
needs to be re-examined. Equally requiring re-examination is the Western liberal 
understanding of the role of emotion in decision-making and, thus, in informed consent.   
2. C. 2.  Reason as Opposed to Emotion  
René Descartes, Immanuel Kant, and John Stuart Mill ennobled reason over 
emotion in moral decision-making. Kant and the Kantian moral theory, for instance, 
emphasize abstract reasoning or rationality over emotions and desires. For Kant, reason is 
the arbiter of truth in all judgments. Reason is the faculty of principles or the faculty of 
unity of the rules for understanding principles because reason is the source of certain 
concepts and principles.193 Kant holds that, for one to act morally, one ought to be able to 
recognize sufficient reasons for action.  These reasons are supposed to arise from the will 
and not from one’s desires, or needs, or inclinations, or from what Kant calls heteronomy 
of the will.194  This recognition of sufficient reasons for action is accomplished through 
the exercise of pure practical reason. This is the idea of the Categorical Imperative, that 
is, the law of reason which commands unconditionally, necessarily, and universally, 
requiring human beings to act in ways consistent with reason and logic, devoid of 
emotions, wishes, and feelings.195  
Thus, for Kant and Kantian moral theory, emotions and desires do not play a 
positive role in moral decision making; emotional inclinations and desires are in conflict 
with our rational wills and are not conducive to moral analysis. They are not able to 
function as a foundation for moral laws.196  Consequently, Kant defends the stoic 
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principle of apathy and detachment. “The prudent man must at no time be in a state of 
emotion, not even in that of sympathy, with the woes of his best friend.”197 As a result of 
this, Kantian moral theory requires us to divest ourselves of passion and emotions, and 
instead, arm ourselves with abstract reason, which Kant calls pure practical reason, in 
order to act as reason recommends in moral decision-making or moral analysis. For 
Kantians, reason should help people resist yielding to emotional inclinations and desires 
that are in conflict with their rational wills. Yielding to them is not autonomy but 
heteronomy, which is unacceptable to Kant.198 One acquires the impression, therefore, 
that a person is just a rational being who is unfortunately saddled with emotions, and to 
be autonomous is not to be a slave of one’s emotions and passions but a slave of one’s 
reason.  
Kant’s thoughts and his repudiation of emotions very much affected Western 
“philosophical tradition of moral decision-making.”199 Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., for 
example, argues that affirmations of one’s feelings are “irrational,” people should strive 
instead to become an impartial reasoner “whose only interests are in the consistency and 
force of rational argument.” He does not, however, believe that this is achievable.200 In 
view of the fact that in moral judgment, people are supposed to be impartial, which is a 
critical component of justice, Rawls proposed that a judgment in the name of justice be 
made behind the “hypothetical veil of ignorance.”201 Beneath this veil of ignorance, 
emotional attachment and personal relationships do not affect deliberations and 
conclusions. Within this reasoning, emotions are said to be events that occur or happen to 
people, events that are experienced passively. Their influence on judgment lies outside 
the sphere of voluntary control. Therefore, their influence over judgments or behavior 
69 
 
cannot be regarded as assisting in moral reasoning.202  The underlying assumptions here, 
as David Pizarro indicated, are: first, that there can be a thorough detachment of reason 
from emotion; second, that reliably objective reasoning is only a detached reasoning; and, 
third, that emotions will “only bias, cloud, and impede moral decision-making.” Contrary 
to such assumptions, as will be discussed below, emotions, passions, and empathy can 
help in moral decision-making or moral judgments.203  
Joel Feinberg, for his part, appreciates moral emotions seeing them as essential to 
our culture, “but only if they are always and everywhere evaluated, monitored, and 
tutored by reason.”204 This is an improvement of Engelhardt’s position. There is an 
acknowledgment of the importance of emotion in moral decision-making even though 
Feinberg subsumed emotion under reason.  
The Utilitarian moral theory, like the Kantian, depends entirely on reason in its 
process of determining what we ethically ought to do or not do. It presents a similar 
understanding of a person, as an abstract rational, self-sufficient individual who is, 
nevertheless, endowed with emotions. There is no doubt that this understanding colors 
the concept of Utilitarian autonomy, that is, individualistic autonomy that is independent 
of others. The Utilitarian approach, like ethics of care, acknowledges that persons have 
desires, interests and reasons. However, unlike ethics of care, the Utilitarian proffers rules 
of rational choice for maximizing the satisfaction of these desires and interests. 
Utilitarianism begins with the assumption that morally relevant things are the gains and 
losses of utility to theoretically isolated individuals. In such a case, it is a rational 
calculation about an outcome that will make moral recommendations available to steer all 
our choices.205 It, thus, relies on abstract general principles and sets of laws to be applied 
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to particular cases. What is more, even though the Utilitarian moral theory recognizes 
that emotion is the font of our desires for some objectives, Utilitarianism still requires us 
to disregard emotional attitudes towards moral issues because, according to Utilitarian 
moral theory, such attitudes interfere with the pursuit of rationality, which is the ultimate 
objective. Accordingly, morality is supposed to teach us how to seek objectives rationally 
and abstractly.206 Thus, Utilitarianism presents an understanding of the person similar to 
the Kantian: an abstract, rational, self-sufficient individual, albeit endowed with 
emotions.  
In following the thoughts of Aristotle and Plato, as shown above, Kant held that 
non-human animals are not worthy of any moral status because, although they possess 
emotions, they are not rational beings. Thus, because they possess no dignity, they, 
therefore, command no respect. If non-human animals are not rational beings, they are 
not autonomous agents capable of making their own decisions. Human animals, however, 
because they possess the faculty to reason, occupy a special place among other creatures. 
They possess an intrinsic worth or dignity that makes them valuable above any price or 
end. This dignity derives from their ability to be autonomous rational agents who are 
capable of making their own decisions.207 The worth of non-human animals is predicated 
to humans. Otherwise, non-human animals are outside the realm of rights and 
responsibilities that define the moral order. Thus, Kant and liberal secular morality 
exalted reason and autonomy. Individuals, such as newborns infants, and the severely 
mentally challenged who are seen as incapable of making rational thoughts or choices, 
would not be recognized according to such a concept of the human person defined mainly 
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by rationality. Kant, of course, was influenced by Descartes and his “cogito ergo sum” 
meaning “I think, therefore, I am.”  
Scholars are increasingly recognizing that emotions, passions, and empathy are 
responsible for arousing partial moral judgment. Contrary to the belief of the Kantian and 
liberal secular common moralities that emotions and desires do not play any positive role 
in moral decision-making, it is known that emotions can direct or alter reasoning, just as 
reasoning or reasons can inform and modify emotional responses.208 Emotions shape 
thinking/reasoning and “information processing.” “Thinking about death may activate sad 
feelings, but feeling sad may also activate thoughts of death.” When one is happy, one 
recalls happy things and makes optimistic predictions regarding the future and other 
people.209 Emotions are consciousness, and are interwoven with self-consciousness and 
moral thinking.210 They provide people with personal and social values that offer 
directions and purpose to rational thinking. In reference to emotion in ethical decision-
making, the French philosopher-mathematician Blaise Pascal (1623-62), remarked that 
“The heart has reasons that reason knows not of.” Moreover, emotional responses reflect 
internalized past choices and the use of attention.211 Being able to listen to and read our 
emotions as well as those of others involved in a case aid moral decision-making. These 
ideas are also echoed by David Pizarro. In his research, Pizarro surveyed the 
psychological literature on emotions and emotional processes and he concluded that the 
belief that emotions are antagonistic to moral judgment is untenable. He presents “a 
theoretical model of emotive moral judgment that takes a closer look at how emotions,” 
empathy in particular, “play an integral role in the process of moral judgment,”212 or 
moral decision-making.  
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John Christman also recognizes the importance of emotions in moral decision-
making. He noted that in generalizing one’s judgment in accordance with the Categorical 
Imperative, one needs not commit oneself “to valuing only the cognitive capacities of 
humanity but also its (relative) subjective elements,” that is, emotions, desires, affect, felt 
commitments, sense of attraction and aversion, alienation and comfort. He goes on to 
asserts that emotions and desires are objects of our judgments and partly constitutive of 
them.213 It makes sense, then, to recognize with Callahan that “emotions, reason, and 
intuition should be fully integrated and engaged to produce a complex approach to moral 
decision-making. We need to make decisions in a holistic way that does justice to all our 
moral resources.”214  
From his own study, J. J. Gross observes that human beings are endowed with the 
capacity to regulate their emotions and that, most of the time, they effectively induce or 
suppress emotional reactions through various tactics; and, in doing so, people are able to 
engender and employ emotions, such as love, when appropriate, thus, providing 
“flexibility to their emotional lives.”215 Pizarro agrees with Gross and offers an example 
of such regulation of emotion. One’s “underlying beliefs moderate the very presence of 
emotion” and make one’s emotional reactions a reflection of earlier cognitive 
deliberations.216 He concludes that emotions “are not vacuous reflexes devoid of rational 
influences.” Rather, they “reflect our pre-existing concerns, such as our moral beliefs and 
principles, making them less capricious than may appear.”217 Even if sometimes emotions 
really arise for arbitrary reasons, Pizarro believes that one’s ability to control these 
emotions is to a large extent what makes one responsible for one’s emotional reactions. 
Thus, it makes one an active agent in one’s emotional life. It means that people are not 
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“merely passive recipients of reflexive emotional responses.”218 The control people 
possess over their emotional reactions permits them to make use of the influences of 
those emotions as source of energy for actions such as moral decision-making, and thus 
serves our “higher-order moral belief.”219 This brings out the advantage of a human being 
as “a complicated multisystem organism.” In this multisystem organism, a system is able 
to correct, check, supplement, and compensate for another. Therefore, human beings can 
and do suppress, shape, control, direct, and produce emotions by all the other functioning 
subsystems available to the self as a self-conscious agent.220  
Modern psychological research shows that the emotional system interacts with 
other “specialized human subsystems” meant for perception and thinking, for drives and 
physiological maintenance, as well as for motor activity. Emotions have come to be 
regarded as “the primary motivating system for all activity.”221 Interestingly, Callahan 
reckons that, if there are no “emotions or affects to amplify physiological drives and 
infuse cognitive processing with subjective meaning,” human beings will not feel 
interested or concerned enough to stay alive, not to talk of mating, nurturing offspring, 
creating kinship bonds, or pursuing art and music, politics, science and technology, and 
moral philosophy.222 
Emotions, especially empathic arousal are a “first alert” that signals moral 
relevance. When someone feels empathy in the presence of a person in anguish, the 
empathic response draws one’s attention to the possibility that an event of moral 
relevance is taking place.223 The arousal might even be able to inform the person that 
something is wrong, in which case one can use emotional arousal as a source of 
information for subsequent appropriate judgment regarding the situation.224  
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Pizarro further notes that emotions can assist reasoning by “acting as a 
centralizing agent, focusing our attention and cognitive resources on the problem at 
hand,” instead of defeating or destroying the reasoning process.225 It is the “very negative 
and extreme intense or regressed affective states” such as “extreme depression, extreme 
panic, or extreme rage” that disable as well as impair reasoning and appropriate 
actions.226  
Such focusing of attention and acting as a centralizing agent characteristic of 
emotions allow one to pay attention to the features of a situation that may otherwise have 
been missed. Pizarro concludes that these characteristics, in combination, “make 
emotions desirable for the process of moral decision-making.”227  
 
2. C. 3.  Individual Patient Rights 
Besides the emphasis on reason over emotions and desires in moral decision-
making, the liberals emphasize also individual rights in their understanding and practice 
of autonomy leading, therefore, to individualistic right-oriented informed consent. 
Liberty of the individual has dominated the philosophy of Western liberal thought since 
the Eighteenth Century. From the time of Thomas Hobbes, liberal individualists have 
used the language of rights to buttress moral and political arguments. Likewise, the 
Anglo-American legal tradition relied heavily upon rights language. Robert Veatch noted 
that, since the 1970s when the radical rethinking of medical ethics began, liberal political 
philosophy has, in turn, dominated medical ethics in the USA as well as in the rest of the 
Western world.228 Liberalism, which embodies within it a respect for liberty, utilizes and 
promotes the language of rights: whether it is natural rights or human rights or economics 
and social rights. Rights are central to the liberalist and to libertarians.  
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Rights are defined as justified claims made by an individual or a group against 
other individuals or upon society.229 Human rights flow from nature. To claim a right is a 
rule-governed activity, whether it involves legal, moral, or institutional rules. Whereas 
legal rules and principles justify legal rights moral rules and principles justify moral 
rights. In other words, moral rights are justified claims or entitlement defensible by moral 
principles and rules.230 Liberal Individualism holds that rights provide important 
protection of life, liberty, expression, and property, as well as protection against 
oppression, unequal treatment, intolerance, and arbitrary invasion of privacy. Some 
scholars, such as philosophers and framers of political declarations, see rights as the basic 
language for expressing the moral point of view. For instance, the language of rights has 
served to oppose the status quo, to assert claims that call for recognition and respect, to 
promote social reforms which aspire to gain legal protection for individuals such as 
freedom of religion, freedom of expression, and freedom of the press.231 The concept of 
rights can be traced back to the ideas of Natural Law seen in the ancient Greek, 
Roman,232 and Judeo- Mesopotamian traditions, for example the lex talionis, the right to 
retaliation.   
When one make claims against other people or against society, the rights-claims 
place corresponding duties or responsibilities on those other people or on society. For 
instance, Mrs. A’s claim against Mr. B for non-interference places a burden of duty on 
Mr. B not to interfere in her business. Because rights-claims attach corresponding duties 
in such a way as this, a liberal society faces great difficulty in safeguarding autonomy 
through rights. For any right granted to protect the autonomy of one individual, the 
autonomy of another individual is limited through corresponding duties. As a result, Mrs. 
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A’s claim to non-interference restricts Mr. B from acting in ways towards Mrs. B that 
would constitute interference, irrespective of Mr. B’s views regarding the justifiability or 
desirability of such interference.233 To balance these rights-claims under which autonomy 
is protected, the liberals often distinguish between two types of “liberty” namely, positive 
and negative liberty.234 
In emphasizing the freedom and rights of the individual, liberals give primacy of 
place to individual rights to life, liberty, and property. Rights can be either negative (such 
as rights to non-interference, individual rights to life, liberty, and property) or positive 
(entitlement rights). Autonomy is chiefly related to negative rights.235 The negative rights 
theory posits that the overriding moral principle is noninterference,236 a right to be left 
alone, not to interfere with one’s liberty of thought, or action. It requires people or the 
State not to deprive one of life, property, or the free use of property.237 Thus, in 
healthcare, the individual has the right to autonomy and/or self-determination. The 
individual, not the family or the community, is invested with the authority to make one’s 
own medical decisions.  
In making individual liberty central to their political theory, liberals advocate that 
democratic political institutions include a set of basic civil rights in order to limit the 
powers of the government by Constitutional means.238 More so, the language of rights 
has, among other things, served as a vehicle to fight any unjust status quo and to affirm 
and defend claims that demand recognition and respect. It has also served as a means of 
promoting social reforms that aim to secure legal protections for individuals, in 
particular, protecting individuals from governmental and societal intrusions.239  
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In a liberal rights framework such as the one described here, the issue of who 
makes medical decisions is not only contingent upon the individual; it is, in fact, the 
individual’s right. The principle of autonomy in Western liberal culture upholds the 
patient as the final authority in medical decision-making. This claim is made clear in 
Justice Cordozo’s 1914 ruling on Schloendorff v Society of N.Y. Hospital. The law 
insists that every human being of adult age and sound mind have a right to determine 
what shall be done with his or her own body. If a physician treats a patient without the 
patient’s consent, that doctor commits an assault and is liable for damages.240 The 
President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine, and in 
Biomedical and Behavioral Research supports the idea that the patient has the final 
authority to decide.241 
Moreover, among individuals and across communities in a liberal society, there is 
no common understanding of the good life. Similarly, one authoritative view of the good 
life or a concrete goal of medicine is non-existent.242 Thus, liberal societies promote a 
social system that delineates value as determined in substance or content by individuals 
in that society.243 This upholds a climate of self-interest for all citizens in society. For 
example, for a liberal rights theorist, the collective goal is not enough justification for 
denying individuals their rights or denying people what they wish, as individuals, to have 
or to do. Likewise, the collective goal is not enough justification for imposing some loss 
or wrong upon individuals.244 A liberal negative right theory tends to discourage 
community and interrelationship; it is mostly about what is good or best for the individual 
irrespective of others’ needs, provided that individual does not interfere in theirs. 
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Autonomous choice is then a right, and for the liberals it is more about individual rights 
protecting individual autonomy.  
2. C. 4.  Individual Autonomy  
From René Descartes to contemporary theorists, many philosophers consider the 
self as individualistic, isolated, and ahistorical. As demonstrated above, the Western 
liberal tradition emphasizes individual independence, and individual patient rights. 
Consequently, these lead to their understanding of autonomy as individual autonomy, 
which is contrary to family or relational autonomy practiced in other cultures. According 
to the Western liberal tradition, to act autonomously is, first and foremost, to act 
independently of other people and/or their interference. It is to isolate oneself even, as it 
were, from family or close friends because of any suspicion that they are interfering or 
manipulating the individual.  Secondly, it is to be free of any external influences, 
interests, or coercion. Such influences, it is thought, mitigate autonomy.  
In the USA this concept of autonomy is strengthened by the Patient Self-Determination 
Act.  
The Patient Self-Determination Act (PSDA) is a measure passed by Congress in 
1991 to amend the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990. The Patient Self-
Determination Act requires many healthcare facilities (Medicare, Medicaid providers, 
hospitals, nursing homes, hospice programs, home health agencies, and HMOs) that 
receive federal funds to give adult individuals, at the time of inpatient admission or 
enrollment, certain information about their rights under state laws governing advance 
directives, including the following: the right to participate in and direct one’s own health 
care decision; the right to accept or to refuse medical or surgical treatment; the right to 
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prepare an advance directive; information on the provider's policies that govern the 
utilization of these rights. The Patient Self-Determination Act further requires institutions 
to document patient information and provide community education about advance 
directives. The intent of the Act is to protect and promote autonomy and self-
determination in medical decision-making. The Act also prohibits institutions from 
discrimination against a patient who does not have an advance directive.245 Even though 
informed consent is often classified in law under the right of privacy, “the leading legal 
decisions in informed consent tradition appeal fundamentally to the right of individual 
self-determination.246 Thus, it boosts autonomy and informed consent. 
Autonomy so understood is self-sufficient, self-directed, and rationally 
controlling. It is based on the model of an independent rational will that is inattentive to 
emotions, communal life, reciprocity, and the development of a person over time.247 The 
liberal tradition suggests, therefore, that the most perfectly autonomous person is the 
most perfectly isolated person, and that what enables the individual to be autonomous is 
this isolation from others. However, it is in relation to others that one develops one’s 
autonomy.248 In health care or within a clinical setting, the Western liberal tradition gives 
the individual patient the final authority to make decisions according to his or her own 
values and interests. The patient is not necessarily required to consider others’ interests or 
the common good in making any personal medical decision. The emphasis on individual 
autonomy or patient autonomy in clinical care assumes that patients consider family 
involvement or their respective interests as being in conflict. The reason is that the wide 
acceptance of patients’ interests as priorities has marginalized the concerns and well-
being of relatives and families as morally irrelevant. The healthcare setting, as Susan 
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Sherwin noted, appears to consider illness as a problem of particular patients and neglects 
the disruptive effects a patient’s illness may have on family members especially close 
members who are expected to provide different forms of care. The Western clinical 
milieu overlooks the fact that self-determining patients exist basically in relation to other 
people. Their interests involve a dynamic balance between mutually dependent people 
who possess overlapping considerations. Rather, the focus of autonomy in contemporary 
Western bioethics, especially in the USA, is “on the autonomy of patient to the exclusion 
of the interests of anyone else.”249  
Reacting to this sort of overemphasis on patient autonomy, Carl Schneider 
remarked that autonomists are more concerned with what patients “should want” from the 
patient’s understanding of autonomy than what patients “do want.” Based on his medical 
sociology and psychological research, Schneider concludes that although patients largely 
wish to be kept abreast of their medical circumstances, a considerable number of them 
such as the elderly and the very sick, do not want to make or wish even to participate in 
their own medical decisions in any considerable way.250 Moreover, as Sherwin rightly 
noted, the emphasis on traditional individualistic understandings of autonomy reinforces 
the healthcare providers as well as ethicists’ tendency to pay less attention to the 
“exploration of the deep social causes and conditions that contribute to health and 
illness.” Similarly, an emphasis on traditional individualistic understandings of autonomy 
encourages patients to consider their own healthcare decisions in isolation from those of 
other people, including their relatives, thereby “increasing their sense of vulnerability and 
dependence on medical authority.”251  
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It is true that self-determination and patient autonomy were aimed at eliminating 
the image of patients as passive care receivers and at curbing paternalistic influences on 
patient decision-making processes especially from family members who might have 
values and priorities other than those of the patient. It was also aimed at curbing 
paternalistic influence of coercion of patients by healthcare personnel. However, self-
determination and patient autonomy have gradually led to suspicion of family members 
who are heavily involved in a competent patient’s decision-making. Any semblance of a 
patient deferring to the family or giving any weight to family preferences is sometimes 
considered as undue family pressure and is, therefore, frowned upon.252 When family is 
allowed to become involved in a patient’s medical decision-making, medical personnel 
tend to be cautious regarding boundary-crossing, both in the way of challenging 
professional authority and intervening in patient decision-making. The role of family is 
restricted often to assisting the patient in enduring the healthcare experience, in relaying 
patient information to medical personnel, and in providing long term care if the patient 
returns home. In this case, family members are viewed as a means to the patient’s 
medical or clinical ends.253  
Thus, because the Western liberal concept of autonomy is focused narrowly on 
self as independent and self-sufficient being, the concept leads to individualistic 
autonomy. This Western liberal approach to informed consent privileges the independent 
decision of the individual patient and defers to subjective concept of the good.  
2. C. 5.  Subjective Conception of the Good  
The idea of a common good goes back as far as Plato and Aristotle. It has been 
understood and formulated in various ways by various scholars. Plato, for example, 
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identified the common good with the total virtue of the citizenry. Society is natural and 
the polis, or city/state has primacy over the citizen because the polis is divinely 
“sanctioned by Hermes’ gifts of justice and reverence.”254 The worth and dignity of 
individual citizens are ensured by virtue of their living within a political community that 
is intrinsically just. Thus, the “common good is the virtuous life of the entire 
community,” a set of conditions for individual self-fulfillment. “A virtuous life is the end 
of man.”255  
Plato also envisaged human beings as citizens, social and political animals, whose 
worth as individuals is to be subordinated to the good of the community.256 Based on 
Plato and Aristotle, the common good was defined in the Middle Ages as “a good proper 
to and attainable only by the community, yet individually shared by its members.”257 This 
definition establishes the common good as both individual and communal. It, however, 
exceeds inter-individual transactions and does not coincide with the aggregate of 
particular goods.258 The question has been raised as to the possibility of identifying the 
common good or the public interest in contemporary historical and cultural conditions.259 
It is the issue that Robert Bellah, Richard Madsen, William M. Sullivan, Ann Swidler, 
and Steven Tipton explored in their book, the Habits of the Heart. The book calls for a 
revival of a strong commitment to the common good in USA while not losing or giving 
up the commitment of modern freedom and rights.260 Louis Dupré in his article The 
Common Good and the Open Society, proposes, more or less, the same idea as Bellah et 
al.: the restoration of the notion of the common good incorporating “individual rights 
without separating them from their social context.”261 These scholars are not alone in the 
call for the revival and adoption of the common good in Western society and especially 
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in the USA. Besides the incorporation of the modern individual rights and freedom, the 
communitarians of Western society262 hold dearly the idea of the common good, as is the 
case with the Ethics of Care Movement. Daniel Callahan, while retaining common good 
and community, calls for the eradication of rights, especially, in the enactment of public 
policy.263  
Bellah and his colleagues argue that there is a growing tide of individualism 
emanating from both the traditional style of entrepreneurship and the therapeutic models 
of self-realization. This rising tide of individualism has suspended communitarian ideals. 
It has also suspended the emphases embodied by the biblical religion of the early Puritan 
settlers and the classical republican commitments of some of the founders and framers of 
early American institutions.264 Bellah et al. call for immediate recovery of the emphasis 
on community and the common good contained in both biblical and republican traditions. 
They contend that Americans have lost the ability to talk to one another in a public way 
regarding the public moral good, the common good, even though they (the Americans) 
retain some sense of the importance of these goods. There is a need to recover the 
language and the tradition of the common good latent in cultural memory for precisely 
and clearly expressed public use.265 Bellah et al. further note that individual rights and 
freedom have made major moral contributions that need to be preserved. The problem, 
according to Bellah et al., is that “when liberated and autonomous ‘selves’” are severed 
from any connection to the larger public or common good, society tends to move toward 
anarchy or some form of “authoritarian tyranny.”  In cases where citizens “lack the vision 
and virtues” required to sustain a genuine human community, the end result is either 
Hobbes’s state of nature, where life is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short,”266 or a 
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situation ruled by Hobbes’ sovereign Leviathan.267 In retrieving the common good or its 
language and tradition as well as in preserving individual freedom and rights, Bellah et al. 
suggest that it is not simply recovering past traditions but having a “hermeneutic 
suspicion” toward “the oppressive power” exhibited by such traditions. It also calls for 
the exploration and adoption of new meanings of community and common good made 
possible by experience of other traditions and cultures.268 Caution should be taken not to 
identify the common good with military victory, and virtue with military might as had 
been done in the past.269  
As indicated above, Western liberal societies promote a social system that 
delineates value as determined in substance or content by individuals in that society. 
According to John Stuart Mill, even though sometimes individuals may make poor 
decisions, the individual is, nevertheless, in the best position to judge what constitutes 
one’s own good.270 Mill taught that the good consists of human “happiness,” and it 
requires the maximization of the aggregate happiness of individual living in a society. To 
achieve this aggregate happiness of the individuals in society, individuals, not the 
community, are allowed to construct their own life plans. The emphasis here is on 
individual good and not on communal or common good. In the framework of a liberal 
society, there is a lack of agreement about what constitutes the good life or the common 
good among individuals and across communities. Likewise, there is no one authoritative 
view of the good life or of a uniform concrete goal of medicine.271 In such a situation, a 
plurality of values co-exists. No single one of these values for social purposes is given a 
privileged position; hence, there is a subjective conception of the good and the good life. 
Moreover, in societies such as the USA, both the political institutions and the cultural 
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history are “decidedly focused on liberal individualism.” It is the framework which 
governs the social relations and its understanding of the good. The good is subjectively 
defined according to values each individual defines for oneself.272 The basis for 
individual self-decision-making follows, therefore, the principle of autonomy in Western 
liberal society and advocates a subjective conception of the good. One is considered as 
having made a good decision if that decision satisfies one’s prudent desires, preferences, 
and expectations. It does not matter whether the individual’s desires and preferences are 
or are not in conformity with a set of impersonal values objectively defined.273 Allen 
Buchanan and Dan Brock explored this issue in their discussion of medical decisions 
made for children in relation to the good of these children. They observed that the goal of 
a child’s development into adulthood is to equip the child with the necessary 
opportunities and required capability to exercise self-determination as an adult in 
choosing and pursuing one’s own view of values. It is not to foster a child to lead a life in 
accordance with a certain notion of the good life objectively understood or communally 
defined. Even when we think an individual’s decision-making is defective, our basis of 
making such a judgment is that the individual’s choices are incompatible with his or her 
settled aims and values.274 Our basis is hardly a common good or a concept of a good life 
objectively understood.  
2. D. Summary 
 In order to lay out the historical context of the discourse on autonomy and 
informed consent, Chapter Two undertook the examination of the history of the liberal 
approach to informed consent. The Western liberal concept of autonomy and, thus, 
informed consent has served Western societies and bioethics well so far. The liberal 
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tradition (individualism) emphasizes individual independence, individual rights and 
autonomy, autonomy understood as non-interference from others in one’s self-
determination, self-rule, and rational control. Furthermore, the liberal tradition 
emphasizes reason over emotions in moral decision-making; and upholds a subjective 
concept of the good or the good life. The Ethics of Care Movement, which also arose 
from the Western traditions, has a different position and emphasis on the understanding 
of the human person: namely, that of a relational and interdependent being. 
Consequently, it proposes a different concept of autonomy --relational autonomy and 
informed consent--, what in this dissertation is referred to as RAIC.      
Therefore, the Western liberal approach to autonomy and informed consent which 
privileges the decision of the individual patient sharply contrasts with the concept of 
autonomy and informed consent in ethics of care which advocates relational autonomy. 
This contrast will become the focus of the next chapter as this dissertation progresses 
from a discussion of the historical context to a systematic analysis of ethics of care.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
SYSTEMATIC ANALYSIS OF ETHICS OF CARE 
 In Chapter Two, a historical analysis of informed consent in Western bioethics 
was presented with a discussion of the liberal approach to informed consent which 
emphasizes individual and rights-oriented autonomy. In this Chapter, the discussion now 
considers a view opposing liberal individualistic rights-oriented autonomy in informed 
consent. It presents a systematic analysis of the ethics of care as a hermeneutic used to 
interpret African Traditional Medicine (ATM) and its practices. The chapter also explores 
the emphasis in the ethics of care movement on relationships that posit a concept of 
persons as relational beings who are socially interdependent, thereby interpreting patient 
autonomy in relationship with others. The analysis further considers the emphasis in 
ethics of care on relational autonomy as a foundation for enlightening the meaning of 
Relational Autonomy in Informed Consent (RAIC). And in turn ethics of care forms a 
hermeneutic to interpret ATM in the next chapter. However, to facilitate the analysis of 
ethics of care, this chapter has been divided into three sections. Section A traces and 
delineates the origin of ethics of care from the works and activities of feminist 
movements, some male ethicists, and the alternative feminist moral theories. Section B 
explores the meaning of ethics of care, identifying care as labor, practice, value, caring 
relations, and as justice. Section C considers the ethics of care concept of person, or 
human being, and autonomy in informed consent, noting the essence of both emotion and 
reason in moral decision-making, the place of rights and of relational autonomy arising 
from human relatedness, and the interdependent nature of human beings.   
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3. A.  The History and Origin of Ethics of Care   
Howard Curzer, a professor of philosophy at Texas Technical University in 
Lubbock, attempted in his paper to identify some germs of ethics of care in the works of 
Aristotle. He observed that Aristotle uses the Greek terms philesis and its infinitive, to 
philein, to express caring and care. For Curzer, the meaning of these terms approximates 
the way the scholars of ethics of care understand care and caring today.1 Philein includes 
substantial familiarity with the other person. This familiarity is gained through 
meaningful personal interactions with the person. The interactions imply compassion and 
sympathy which are the essential elements of care.2 Aristotle’s discourse on friendship 
contains much of his thoughts on care. Mutually caring relationships are friendships 
although not all mutually caring relationships are friendships. For Aristotle, friendships 
are wider than our notion of friendship. Aristotle’s understanding of friendship includes 
families. He does include some “significant portion” of care within his list of virtues 
although care and its components such as sympathy, empathy, and compassion are not 
listed as virtues.3  
Aristotle, according to Curzer, expounded ten core doctrines of ethics of care 
which are also stated by moderate modern proponents of ethics of care. Aristotle 
proposes that ethics of care is particular, passionate, partial, etc.4 He argues that human 
beings are and should be partial with relationships because individual responsibilities 
grow from these relationships.5 However, while it is interesting to identify some 
similarities between Aristotle’s works and the modern proponents of ethics of care, it 
does not necessarily mean that ethics of care originated from Aristotle’s thoughts. The 
origin of ethics of care has not been traced to Aristotle, but, and rightly so to the 
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revolutionary critique of dominant moral theories: Kantian, Utilitarian and deontological, 
as well as liberal individualist moral approaches advanced by women and feminist 
movements. This strand helped to bolster the development of alternative feminist moral 
theories through which contemporary ethics of care emerged.6 It is these last two sources 
of origin that will be discussed in detail in this work. From these simple beginnings, 
ethics of care has developed as a promising alternative to the dominant moral approaches 
utilized in the last two centuries. Today, ethics of care has emerged in the public forum, 
in medical practice, law, political life, organization of society, and in international 
relations.  
3. A. 1.   Feminist Movement and Some Male Voices 
Feminist movements generally promoted gender equality and rejected the 
perpetuation of gender discrimination in all its forms, and in all areas of life -economic, 
legal, political, and social. The ideals of feminism inspired a series of women’s world 
fairs (1925-1928). In these fairs, women exhibited their achievements in science, 
literature, arts, and industry. The fairs also served as loci where women shared 
information regarding jobs and career opportunities.7 The feminist movement is a 
concern for justice and a celebration of the ordinary lives of women, children, and men 
from all races, religions, and “ethnic backgrounds.” It has been a part of a global wave of 
movements for liberation that marked the second half of twentieth century.8   
However, morally and academically, the feminist movement was a revolution 
against the hierarchy of gender and a rethinking of practically all disciplines. Part of the 
aim was to include and establish that the experience of being a woman is as important, 
pertinent, and as philosophically motivating as the experience of being a man.9 The 
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experiences of women, just as those of men, are what literature, art and science are 
currently concerned about. Feminist experience is the lived experience of feeling as well 
as thinking of performing action and receiving impressions and awareness of our 
connections with other persons as well as our own sensations. It is the experience of 
actual women in all their racial, cultural, and other diversity.10  The validation of 
women’s experiences by feminists led to the fundamental critical assessment of the moral 
theories that were dominant at the time. Eventually it culminated in calling into question 
the adequacy of dominant moral theories and the emergence of a feminist approach to 
morality. The dominant moral theories were seen as having been fashioned according to 
men’s experience in public life and in the market arena.11  
Some male voices joined women’s movements in questioning the adequacy of 
dominant moral theories.  Among these voices were those of Lawrence Blum, Bernard 
Williams, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Michael Slote.12  
  Lawrence Blum showed how the dominant theories neglected friendship. 
Friendship, according to Blum, is an altruistic phenomenon, and an atmosphere in which 
altruistic emotion occurs.13 Friendship is also a relationship founded solely on mutual 
advantage. Because one is another’s friend, one desires and acts for the good of the 
friend, not simply because the friend is a human being but because the friend is a 
particular person: a friend. Friendship, therefore, is “personal” and altruistic. For this 
reason, Blum criticizes Kant’s concept of morality wherein impersonality and 
impartiality are central notions. In Kantian morality, taking a moral point of view in one’s 
action and judgment means looking at issues from an impartial perspective, giving equal 
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weight to the interest of all, without partiality. To act beneficently towards one’s friends, 
one does not typically violate a duty of impartiality. 14 
Bernard Williams raised serious doubts as to how such dominant theories could 
have handled some of the most vital questions human beings faced. He questions:  
How could it be that a subject, something studied in universities (but not only there), 
something for which there is a large technical literature, could deliver what one might 
recognize as an answer to the basic questions of life? It is hard to see how this could be 
so, unless, as Socrates believed, the answer were one that the reader would recognize as 
one he might have given himself. But how could this be? 15 
 
Alasdair MacIntyre laments and criticizes the deterioration of Western morality 
with its subsequent fragmentation and rising incoherence of ethical theory. He observed 
that moral crisis springs from the historical rejection of an Aristotelian morality wherein 
the function of virtues is dominant, thus, representing a society of shared goods.16 This 
society of shared goods has been supplanted and replaced by individualism -liberal 
individualism- where people are seen as atomistic individuals with private desires and 
objectives. According to MacIntyre, virtue has dwindled and is fast disappearing. 
Honesty, truthfulness, and loyalty barely form part of people’s pattern of living. Shared 
goods are replaced by the development of the individual as a social institution, and life 
has become competitive. The self has come to lack any inherent moral ties or social 
relations.17 This idea and critique of liberal individualism spurred the emergence of an 
ethics of care that values relationships.  
Like MacIntyre, Michael Slote laments the disparaging of virtues in contemporary 
philosophers’ works. He argues that, when confronted with actual phenomena of the 
moral life, it becomes clear that the ideal of personal goods and virtues proffered in some 
current works of philosophers is wanting. He advocates that virtues be understood as 
more relative and dependent as goods than they have been in recent works on ethical 
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theory.18 Furthermore, Slote criticizes dominant moral theories for placing much 
emphasis on reason, universality, impartiality, and absolutes in morality. Slote also 
criticizes the stoic presumption that the best way to decide what is good for human beings 
is by reference to the measure of an ideal being who is self-sufficient, independent, and 
free from human limitations.19  Slote’s critique of the morality of impartiality, 
universality, absolutes, and reason links him with the ethics of care advocate whose 
thoughts his writings propagated and encouraged. In this way, he is a significant 
contributor to the development of the ethics of care.   
Through their works, these male voices not only led the renewal of the virtue 
theory that had been largely obscured,20 but they also assisted in the development of the 
ethics of care movement. Therefore, while the ethics of care movement emerged and 
progressed in the late 1980s, in part, through the activities of the feminist movement, it 
was also advanced through the works of some male ethicists described above, and, in 
addition, by alternative feminist moral theories.  
3. A. 2.   Ethics of Care and Alternative Feminist Moral Theories  
 From the feminist movement and critique of dominant or traditional moral 
theories emerged alternative moral theories such as feminist ethics, feminist 
contractualism, a feminist form of liberal individualism, Kantian, and Utilitarian moral 
theories. Although the feminists supported some form of these moral theories, they 
adapted them to include feminist thinking and ideology.21 The proponents of these 
alternative moral theories applied the perspective of women, caring for minorities, and 
families to these theories while focusing on justice, equality, and freedom. They argue, 
for instance, that the principles of justice should be met in the division of labor and 
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availability of opportunities within the family, not only in public life. This implies an end 
to domestic violence, marital rape, and patriarchal dominance.  On the other hand, non-
feminist proponents of dominant moral theories had paid little or no attention to the 
perspectives the feminists were raising. The alternative moral theories only extended the 
traditional moral theories in non-traditional ways. However, another form of alternative 
moral theory, namely ethics of care, emerged taking a distinctive direction.22  
Held specifically locates the beginnings of ethics of care with the pioneer essay 
“Maternal Thinking” by the female philosopher, Sara Ruddick, in1980.23 Ruddick 
showed that giving attention to the experience of women in a caring practice not only 
could change how people think about morality, but could also alter people’s views of the 
values appropriate for the given activities.24 Women possess maternal power, yet, at the 
same time, they are powerless. They are powerful in two ways. First, for example, for a 
child, the mother is the primary and uncontrollable source of goods, love and affection. 
She is also a judge and a disciplinarian. Therefore, she is the one to be placated and her 
approval must be secured. Second, she possesses power that comes from her capacity to 
give birth and nurse babies.  Ironically, women are powerless, especially in the very 
reproductive capacities that also hold the key to their being powerful. They often stand 
powerless before the husband, physicians, judges, the landlord, and the world.25  
Continuing, Ruddick maintains that “maternal” is a social category, and maternal 
thinking emerges from actual child-caring practices, that is, mothering. Therefore, 
women possess maternal thinking, which is a way of thinking that is different from 
reasoning that arises from other contexts. Even though some men may express maternal 
thinking, in various ways of working and caring with others, Ruddick believes that 
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maternal thought “does exist for all women in a radically different way than for men.” 
According to her, the reason is that women are daughters who early in life receive 
maternal love with special attention to its implications for their bodies, their passions, and 
their ambitions. They are alert to the values and costs of maternal practices whether they 
are determined to engage in them or to evade them.26 “Thinking is governed by the 
interest of the practice out of which it arises.” “Maternal practice” responds “to the 
historical reality of a biological child in a particular social world.”27  For her, out of 
practice of mothering come values such as humility -“a metaphysical attitude one takes 
toward a world beyond one’s control”- and cheerfulness. From the resilience of good 
humor and humility, maternal thought is critical of dominant moral theories for their use 
of principles in moral justification.28 Ruddick’s work forms and fosters strong association 
between motherhood and care ethics. Like Ruddick, Held utilizes a maternal perspective 
to espouse care ethics as a moral political theory.29  
In 1982, Carol Gilligan published In a Different Voice which lent great impetus to 
the development of ethics of care. Gilligan explored the various social scientific studies 
and concluded that men tend to adopt a different perspective in morality, than women. 
She argues that men are more likely to take a ‘justice-based’ approach to ethics, whereas 
women tend to adopt a “care-based” approach.30 Men’s moral thinking is described in 
terms of justice, right, abstraction, rationality, and impartiality. On the other hand, 
women’s moral thinking is characterized in terms of care, relationships, and particularity, 
focusing on particular cases instead of on abstract general principles. However, Gilligan 
does not maintain that all men think or reason in one way while all women think and 
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reason in another way. For her, then, although there are different styles of moral thinking, 
there is none which is exclusively male or female.31   
Other significant works that spurred the development of ethics of care include Nel 
Noddings’ book, Caring; the collection of papers: Women and Moral Theory; and 
Science, Morality and Feminist Theory.32 Noddings who is the first to use the term 
“ethics of care,” concurs with Gilligan that caring involves an emotional or motivational 
sensitivity to particular other people. It focuses on the individual herself or himself and 
not just “on any abstract or general moral principles that someone might want to consult 
in order to determine how to act towards that individual.”33 For Noddings, one is not 
simply concerned but actually engrossed in the particular other person. She explains 
engrossment as “thinking about someone in order to gain a greater understanding of the 
person.”34  According to her, engrossment is necessary for caring because an individual’s 
personal and physical situation must be understood before the one caring can determine 
the appropriateness of any action.35 Michael Slote agrees with this view, but he observes 
that the same idea of weighing the personal and physical situation of the one cared-for 
applies to the Utilitarian or Consequentialist. The difference between the Utilitarian or 
Consequentialist, on one hand, and ethics of care, on the other, is that “any ethics of care 
will be avowedly partialistic in a way that Utilitarianism or Consequentialism, more 
generally, decidedly are not.”36  
Discussing the particularity and the partiality of the ethics of care, Noddings 
argues that one cannot have an attitude of caring towards people one is likely never to 
meet. Likewise, David Hume believes that a person’s generosity seldom extends beyond 
one’s native country. He questions the existence of such a thing as the love of 
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humanity.37 These views reflect the way that ethics of care emerged, developed, and grew 
through the ideas and activities of the Feminist movement, those of some male ethicists, 
alternative feminist moral theories, and the works of early scholars like Ruddick, 
Noddings, Gilligan, and later scholars like Slote, Grace Clement, Tronto, and Held. 
Initially, ethics of care was confined to the private sphere and care was regarded as a 
morality for women. Currently, not only has it been brought to the public sphere by the 
analysis of ethicists such as Tronto and Held, but another form of ethics of care has also 
emerged, namely a narrative ethics of care by Jens Erik Paulsen, for example.38 
   3. B. The Meaning of Ethics of Care  
Ethics of care is a form that constructs an entire approach to ethics based on one’s 
daily activities and universal experience of care or caring. For Tronto, to change the 
moral boundaries and the unjust and unbalanced moral ideals they include, one must 
account for a moral life that should provide people with a means “to respect and deal 
justly with others.” According to Tronto, the way to achieve that is to “honor what most 
people spend their lives doing: caring for themselves, for others, and for the world.”39 
Therefore, in ethics of care, the moral point of view is the caring point of view. Care 
encompasses caring for somebody, caring about somebody, or being concerned about 
somebody; in which case, one does something about what one cares for. In all these 
cases, care or caring involves some form of activity or work and expenditure of energy on 
the part of the one caring.40 Care also involves empathy. Slote speaks of empathic caring. 
Diemut Bubeck defines caring as the meeting of the needs of one person by another 
person, where face-to-face interaction between the one caring and the one cared for is the 
crucial element of the overall activity. The need is of such a nature that it cannot possibly 
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be met by the person in need him/herself.41 For Bubeck and for most ethics of care 
advocates, care almost always entails addressing or meeting a need which the particular 
others are incapable of fulfilling by themselves as well as a face-to-face encounter 
between the carer and the cared-for. Bucbeck’s definition makes the interaction between 
the carer and the cared-for central, even though the interaction may or may not cover the 
whole activity or set of activities that is or are described as caring. For Tronto, the 
definition of care is more embracing: “a species activity that includes everything that we 
do to maintain, continue, and repair our ‘world’ so that we can live in it as well as 
possible. That world includes our bodies, ourselves, and our environment, all of which 
we seek to interweave in a complex, life-sustaining web.”42  Like Slote, and Bubeck, 
Tronto speaks of care in the context of human beings, but she also extends caring to the 
environment and to non-human beings. While Tronto’s definition is broad, leading Ruth 
Groenhout, to observe that it “is so extensive that it does not provide much specificity in 
thinking about care;”43  Bubeck’s definition is dependent on the function of the activity 
concerned. That is, the delineation of an activity as caring depends on the function the 
activity performs, not on the activity itself. This definition is, therefore, said to be 
functional. In “caring for others” and in a “daily caring of people for each other is a 
valued premise of human existence.”44 “Caring for others” clearly suggests that the 
“degradation” of caring activities is a problem not only of sexism, but includes that of 
racism as well as classism, all of which can occur among women or men alike.45 Tronto 
goes further to identify four phases of care as follows:  
i. ‘Caring about’: this consists in recognizing the need and necessity of care.  
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ii. ‘Taking care of’: this involves taking some responsibility for the recognized need 
and deciding how to respond to it.  
iii. ‘Care giving’: this is the stage at which the need is met.  
iv. ‘Care receiving’: this is the stage where the recipient of the care begins to respond 
to the care received.46  
Tronto translates these four phases of care into what she sees as the elements of 
ethics of care that she and Fisher had identified, namely, attentiveness, responsibility, 
competence, and responsiveness of the being cared-for and integrity of care, which 
requires that the four moral elements of care be integrated into an appropriate whole.47 
Furthermore, the particular other is important to ethics of care, and thus particularity is a 
central feature of ethics of care and an essential element of the ethics because it defines 
the distinctiveness of interactions in close personal relationships. Relationship confers 
particularity on those involved in the relationship.48  
The face-to-face aspect of caring is also central to care and makes it difficult to 
imagine caring for more distant others.49 However, contrary to the emphasis on face-to-
face meeting as a necessary part of care, or Hume’s belief that a person’s generosity 
seldom extends beyond one’s native country, Bubeck thinks that the face-to-face 
encounter does not restrict care to the context of the relatively personal. The reason is that 
she understands face-to-face interaction in a broad sense. It includes “ear-to-ear” 
telephone conversations, letter writing and reading, “eye-to-eye” or similar cases based 
on modern means of telecommunication.50 She asserts that care can and should be 
publicly provided, as in public healthcare and in activities of the welfare state -childcare 
centers and centers for the elderly- which can but may not involve face-to-face 
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encounters. Similarly, she thinks care should be widely spread beyond face-to-face 
encounter because that is the way ethics of care can offer just political and social 
programs. The problem with Bubeck’s idea is that, although ethics of care can offer just 
political and social programs by not requiring the second aspect of caring, namely face-
to-face encounters, it advocates a generalization of the moral principle of meeting needs.  
And if Bubeck is advocating a generalization of this moral principle (of meeting needs), 
it means that Bubeck rejects the particularistic aspects of ethics of care.51 Bubeck also 
does not think that care requires an emotional bond between the caregiver and the one 
cared-for.  Caring need not be an expression of love or friendship. If caring is 
accompanied by or creates an emotional bond and attachment, that is acceptable, but, in 
her view, the most important aspect of caring is that needs are being met. This suggests 
that she sees care as almost entirely composed of the objective fact of needs being met, 
rather than as the attitude of the caregiver. According to her view, if a caregiver is 
meeting the needs of a hungry child, but, at the same time, is wishing that the child be 
sold into slavery, the caregiver would still be engaged in caring.52 Held disagrees with 
Bubeck, and rightly suggests that a strict Utilitarian might agree with Bubeck’s idea in 
the sense that, if the child is fed, clothed, and hugged, the intention behind the acts may 
not be morally significant. Held believes that intentionality (intention) should be of moral 
significance.53 Of course, intentionality is significant in morality. Denying intentionality 
and simultaneously rejecting particularity in ethics of care as Bubeck advocates, detracts 
from and misrepresents ethics of care. For Held, the denial of intentionality and the 
rejection of particularity in ethics of care is tantamount to “collapsing the ethics of care 
into Utilitarianism.” 54  The reason is that in ethics of care, “care” involves meeting 
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objective needs, attitude, motive, and value. In caring, one focuses on the situation of the 
individual in question, on relationships, and on particular cases, not just on abstract or 
general moral principles which one would like to consult in order to establish how to act 
towards that other person.55 Likewise, caregivers also care for themselves to maintain 
their own capabilities. If they do not care for themselves and no one takes care of them, 
then, they will be unable to continue to offer care.56 Thus, care requires that one attend to 
the needs of both oneself and others. To attend to one’s needs while not excluding others 
is to be honest to oneself. One is, as such, able to take responsibility for one’s decisions.57 
This issue of particularity involves relationship with the other and, therefore, it will be 
further discussed below, under Section B. 3. Caring Relations.  
Continuing, Bubeck makes a distinction between caring for and providing a 
service. Held illustrates this by explaining that to prepare food for a child is care, whereas 
it is not care if a man cooks a meal for his wife when she could well do so herself.58 A 
man cooking a meal for his wife who is capable of doing it herself is not providing care 
but a service, because the wife can meet the need herself. Care is, therefore, a response to 
human need that the one cared-for cannot meet. As seen above, Noddings would say that, 
in caring one is not simply concerned but actually engrossed in the particular other 
person. For Noddings, engrossment is thinking about someone in order to gain a better 
understanding of the person. The caregiver receives the ones being cared for on their own 
terms, without projecting oneself onto the cared-for. In outlining the moral values, virtues 
as well as dilemmas arising from caring, Noddings focuses on caring in the 
psychological-moral sense and acknowledges caring more as an attitude than as an 
activity. She insists that care-taking given grudgingly is not care. 59 It would seem that 
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she sees caring as attitude as distinct from caring as activity, both being independent of 
each other. In this case, Noddings’ views would seem to conflict with Bubeck’s 
understanding of care as an activity. However, as Bubeck notes, it is not a serious issue 
because both aspects of care --as activity and as attitude-- go together and are present in 
most typical cases. Moreover, in those typical cases, “the attitude of care is systematically 
related to the activity.”60 Like other ethics of care advocates, she rejects universal 
principles for prescribed action and judgment, and insists that care must always be 
contextually applied.61  
Gilligan divides ethics of care into three levels in accordance with their increasing 
order. At the first level, one cares for oneself to make sure one survives. The second level 
begins with one’s realization of the connection between oneself and others. One begins to 
shift the center of attention more to others and less to the self. Thus, one realizes that 
one’s actions under level one were selfish and, therefore, begins to eliminate actions that 
hurt other people. Gilligan also believes that in this second stage people adopt a feminine 
conception of goodness as self-sacrifice.62 Care is, therefore, essentially a relationship, 
and ethics of care focuses on relationships and communal ties.63 Furthermore, care can be 
seen as labor, as relational, as practice, as value, and in relationship to justice.  
3. B. 1.  Care as Labor  
Caring in ethics of care involves labor or at least implies an activity such as taking 
care of someone. However, an activity has to have purpose to be considered labor or 
work. Most scholars writing on care, among whom are Held, Ruddick, Slote, and Eva F. 
Kittay, concur that care involves work, labor, or some form of work or activity and the 
expenditure of energy on the part of the one providing the care.64 For Ruddick, care is 
work or labor, and inasmuch as care is labor, it is a relationship: “Caring labor is 
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intrinsically relational.”65 According to Kittay, ethics of care “develops and refines the 
normative characteristics in the labor, the attitude and the disposition.”  
Thus, the moral subject is understood as the relational self, embedded in 
relationships, and moral relationships are not necessarily among equals but also among 
unequals. Similarly, moral deliberation is understood as involving not just reason alone 
but, in addition, emotional responsiveness, empathy, and perceptual attentiveness. Moral 
harm is seen more as the consequence of failures in responsibility and responsiveness and 
less as an issue of the violation of rights.66  
3. B. 2.  Care as Practice and Value 
Care, which is the central value in ethics of care, is both a practice or a cluster of 
practices and a value or a cluster of values. Care as well as ethics of care is a practice and 
not a set of rules or principles. That is why the moral qualities of care take a more 
ambiguous form than a list of carefully designed moral precepts.67 As a practice, care 
involves both the work of care-giving and the standards of evaluating the practices of 
care. It is important to evaluate care because, according to Held, care ought to be 
concerned with both the effectiveness of its efforts to provide needs as well as the 
motives for providing care. Care as practice not only draws our attention to the reason for 
responding to these needs, but it also demonstrates to us how to respond to such needs. It 
promotes trust and mutual concern and, thus, leads to connectedness between people; in 
other words, it leads to interrelationships.68 Care as practice involves more than good 
intention. It requires a deep thoughtful knowledge of the situation, including the situation 
of all the actors: care givers and care-receivers, their needs and competencies.  In fact, 
care as practice assists us in avoiding over-idealizing care.69 Caring is so much a matter 
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of the relations between persons and refers to the disposition of individual persons. By 
thinking of care in both ways we resist the tendency to limit care to a virtue.70  
Practices of care are not devoted solely to the values of care. Most often, they 
require justice. As Held observed, parenting is the ultimate practice of caring because the 
emotional tie between the care-giver and the care-receiver is very strong. The primary 
value of this practice is caring well for the child. The adequate understanding of practice 
of care should include normative guidance, such as how to avoid tendencies that parents 
may have to unduly interfere and control justice in requiring the fair treatment of multiple 
children in a family and in fairly distributing the burdens of parenting. Thus, justice and 
care complement each other. Responding to needs, as economic and social rights do, is 
part and parcel of the concerns of justice. The difference between economic and social 
rights of meeting basic needs is that of motive. If the motive of meeting needs is care, 
then the needs are responded to because the persons with these needs are cared for.71 For 
instance, a social program may fulfill the requirements of justice and equality but still be 
lacking in caring if it does not seek the actual well-being of the one cared-for that the 
program was meant to provide.   
Values provide normative standards which can be utilized in the evaluation of 
practices. Just as justice is needed as a value to help evaluate actual practices of justice, 
care as a value is needed to isolate the appropriate cluster of moral considerations, such 
as sensitivity, trust, and mutual concern with which to evaluate or assess actual practices 
of care.72 To think of care only as a work describable empirically as using “good” and 
“right” providing all the normative evaluation of actual practices of care is general and 
insufficient. The reason is to say that Mr. X is a caring person ought to include that Mr. X 
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has a characteristic that is morally admirable (honesty, trust, sensitivity). It includes a 
normative judgment, just as when a virtue like generosity, trustworthiness, etc., is 
attributed to a person. This not only expresses a disposition, but, also makes a normative 
judgment. According to Held, caring instead of merely identifying the characteristics of 
persons or societies as good or bad, and as morally admirable or not, identifies a more 
specific value to be found in the characteristics of persons and societies, for example, 
trust, sensitivity, and mutual concern. Furthermore, Held asserts that the relevance of care 
to ethics of care is that one incorporates values which feminists decided to find 
acceptable. Ethics of care evaluates practices of care in the way they “evolved under 
actual historical conditions of patriarchal and other dominions.” The aim of the 
evaluation is to recommend what the practices of care ought to be like morally rather than 
simply to accept and describe such practices of care as they originated and evolved.73 It 
follows, then, that care is seen as both practice and value.   
3. B. 3.  Caring Relations  
Besides being purposeful, labor, practice, and value, care is intrinsically a 
relationship.74 There are relationships with the particular other, within the family and 
relatives, and between friends. As Gilligan’s stages of care show, one advances from the 
first stage to the second level on realization of the connection between the self and others. 
The self is seen as “responding to perceptions, interpreting events, and governed by the 
organizational tendencies of human interaction and human language. It is not so much 
“self” as “self-governed.”75 The values of caring are best expressed by caring relations, 
instead of in persons as individuals. Caring relations establish small societies of family 
and friendship. Larger societies, including the state and nation, rely on these small 
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societies created by caring relations. Likewise, caring relations between more distant 
others, albeit weak but evident, enable those involved to develop trust in one another. It is 
a trust that is enough to enable them live in peace and respect each other’s rights.76 This 
trust is seen also in relationship between mother and child. As Held noted, these kinds of 
relationship, especially the relationship between a mother and a child, can hardly be 
comprehended in terms of their respective individual states taken in isolation. Again, the 
reason is that the self is connected to others. They are interdependent. In this context, 
detachment, isolation from self or from others poses a problem morally because it 
generates moral “blindness or indifference” which is a failure to determine and respond 
to need.77 For Carol Gilligan and Nel Noddings, however, detachment is a moral concern 
for ethics of care and caring does not permit the termination of a relationship. For 
instance, Noddings argues that, it is not caring or moral to terminate a relationship. 
Ending a relationship may be required for one’s physical or psychological well-being.78 
Grace Clement disagrees with both Gilligan and Noddings. She argues that “the view that 
sustaining one’s relationships is the top priority of an ethics of care is based on faulty 
reasoning. It is based on a conflation of a relational ontology with a relational ethics.”79 
In addition, she notes that the focus on sustaining one’s relationships creates an 
impediment to autonomy.  For her, autonomy requires that one critically examine one’s 
choices. Thus, if an ethics prevents one from critically examining a relationship in order 
to decide whether to remain in the relationship or to leave it, such an ethics does not 
provide for autonomy. She, therefore, concludes that because ethics of care or feminist 
ethics of care do not permit a critical perspective on relationships, then “the care 
orientation seems to rule out autonomy.”80  
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If the feminist ethics of care prevents women from taking a critical look at their 
relationships and from terminating harmful relationships, it is not acceptable. However, 
while ethics of care places emphasis on relationships, it does not insist that one always 
remain in a relationship that is deleterious, for example, an abusive relationship. This idea 
is supported by Noddings’ response to Sarah Lucia Hoagland, who believes that the 
ethical self is improved when one withdraws from relationships in which one’s partner is 
guilty of gross wrong-doing. Her reason is that, because one would not commit such an 
offence, one should show one’s superior morality by withdrawing from the guilty other. 
Noddings responds that such a divorcing of oneself from the guilty other does not help 
much to alleviate the evil, even though it tends to make the one withdrawing feel 
righteous. Noddings believes that “at every level -personal, group, nation- it is better to 
saturate the alleged evil-doer with our presence than to withdraw” because withdrawing 
often aggravates the evil as the guilty other “is left to find companionship and support 
among like-thinkers.” However, for Noddings withdrawal from the wrong-doer is 
permitted in instances of “direct personal abuse where physical withdrawal is necessary 
for self-protection.”81  
The comprehension of one’s interconnectedness helps one to realize that the 
apparent conflict between oneself and others comes from “a faulty construction of 
reality.” Gilligan advises, then, that a right understanding of our connectedness leads one 
to reconstruct reality such that, caring for self and caring for other people are connected 
rather than disconnected.82 Recognizing the depth of one’s interdependence to other 
people can also help overcome the apparent conflicts between self and others. One 
establishes a relationship in caring for a particular other. Held speaks of caring relations 
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especially when it comes to forming a political entity and developing civil society.83 She 
compares relations of care and of justice as discussed in the next section.    
3. B. 4.  Care as Justice  
Care, namely responding to human needs, is justice. For Michael Slote, caring or 
“empathic caring” as he prefers to call it, is the parameter or criterion for evaluating the 
justice/injustice of actions, law, institutions, etc. Ethics of care pertains to an evaluation 
of the actions or situations in terms of whether or not they express, exhibit, or reflect 
empathically caring motivation.84  
Held has discussed how the feminist understanding of care and justice shows that 
both are different values and each involves different ways of both “interpreting moral 
problems and expressing moral concern.”85 However different they are, both are values 
that are important and needed for morality. The value of either justice or care may be 
primary in a given situation, depending on the need of the situation and the practices 
involved. For instance, the primary value in the practice of childcare by employees in an 
orphanage is caring even though justice --treating the children fairly and with respect-- 
should be involved. Or, as Ruth Groenhout noted, caring parents are expected to be just 
and seen as doing justice if they are to be caring parents. Adequate caring requires a 
strong sense of justice. However, without room for care, “or a caring concern for the 
well-being of those affected by the principles of justice, the principles become harsh, 
unforgiving, and frequently misapplied.”86 In the distribution of amenities in society, 
justice value is primary, but care value should not be absent or neglected. A program may 
accomplish the requirement of justice without meeting the demands of caring. Take, for 
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example, when people offer somebody what is due to him/her, but, the offering is made 
with disdain and grudge.87  
Both care and justice are appropriate for the public sphere of the political as well 
as the market domain. Contrary to what is often expressed, justice is required in the 
public domain as well as in families in the same way as care is required in both spheres. 
It is erroneous to limit justice to the public domain only, whereas care is required only in 
the family sphere. Justice is needed in the family domain for a more equitable division of 
labor between women and men, for the protection of vulnerable family members from 
domestic violence and abuse.88  In a state, for example, it is needed in the distribution of 
amenities, in protecting the citizens from government, and the weak from the strong and 
the rich. Care is needed in the public sphere and in welfare. As a criterion, care works in 
both the individual or private sphere of life as well in the social, public, political, and 
international sphere. Both care and justice are required in society as two different values 
and ways of interpreting and dealing with a moral situation. Thus, they need not be 
regarded as two polar opposites, even though when justice is the guiding value, it requires 
deferment to or respect for individual rights.89  
Similarly, ethics of care deals with personal morality and relationships, be they 
social, legal, political, economic, and distributive justice, each on its own terms. It is not 
confined only to personal morality and relationships.90 Ethics of care evaluates the 
actions of individuals, society, groups, or a nation in terms of how their actions exhibit or 
reflect caring motivation. For example, the actions of an individual person reflect the 
motives and/or belief of the person as an agent. Similarly, the laws, customs, practices, 
and institutions of a given society, groups, or nation reflect the motives and belief of that 
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society, groups, or nation because these laws, customs, practices and institutions 
resemble the actions of that society, groups, nation.91 Therefore, a society is just to the 
extent that its laws, customs, practices, institutions, and attitudes are just; that is, they 
reflect and express caring motivations (or “empathic caring” motivation, according to 
Slote). A society or community with just laws and institutions will not be indifferent to 
the interests and good of people in other countries, just as caring individuals are not 
hostile to the interest of others. A society that upholds justice and expresses caring or 
empathy will consider the well-being of other people and countries in its legislative 
institutions, practices etc.92  
Comparing relations of care with those of justice in the formation of political 
entity and the development of a civil society, Held believes that it is on the basis of care 
rather than on that of justice that people can sufficiently identify with others to form a 
political entity and develop a civil society.93 She further observes that relationships of 
care are wider and deeper than relationships of justice. Her reasoning is that, within 
relationships of care, people can treat others justly, as if they were liberal individuals 
agreeing on mutual respect. It is seen in more personal contacts as when parents care for 
their children equally or when friends compete fairly in games they seek to win. In 
public, political, and social contexts, relationships of care occur when people see each 
other as fellow affiliates of a group that is forming a political body which acknowledges a 
legal system. Contrarily, if justice is the guiding value, it requires that people defer to or 
respect individual rights.94  
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3. B. 5.  Criticism of Ethics of Care 
Nevertheless, ethics of care has been criticized, in particular by proponents of the 
justice-based moral theory and by some feminist ethicists themselves. Some find the 
paradigm for mothering a limited and problematic framework. Ruddick proposes that 
mothering is logically peaceful even though some mothers support military undertakings 
and tend to undermine peace movements. Some critics reject Ruddick’s idea of 
mothering asserting that it can require “violent protectiveness and fierce response.” 95  
Other critics see the motherhood paradigm as “a too narrowly dyadic and romantic 
paradigm,” because the model “mistakenly implies that characteristics of a mother-child 
relationship are universal worldly qualities of relationship.”96  
The motherhood paradigm may be limited and involves unequal relationships, 
namely those of mother and child. However, if the mothering context offers an 
appropriate and acceptable context to investigate and explore moral values, as both 
feminists and ethicists of care are doing, then a different moral voice may emerge, a 
voice worth listening to, as Held noted:    
If such valuations emerge from mothering, and if on reflection they are endorsed as 
evaluations appropriate to mothering, we can assert that moral understanding of 
persons who mother, and not only their attitudes and activities, is different from that 
of persons who do not mother, because such values are the values of a distinct 
practice. And if we acknowledge that a mothering context is an appropriate one in 
which to explore moral values --an acknowledgment only prejudice could lead us to 
deny-- then paying attention to this context, as feminist moral philosophy does, can 
lead to different moral theories than ignoring it.97  
 
Moreover, as has been noted above, moral relationships are not always between equals. 
Sometimes, they are between unequals, and, therefore, the mother-child relationship of 
the mothering paradigm reveals an unrecognized alternative valid moral relationship.     
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Furthermore, some female ethicists have questioned the validity of an ethics 
arising from the very work or labor commonly attributed to women only, works that have 
been associated with or are part of female subjugation; that ethics of care neglects the 
oppression of women and emphasizes women’s experiences as caregivers in traditional 
roles of self-sacrifice.98 Kittay provides a good answer to this criticism. She insists that, if 
an ethic emerges from the work and activities of subjugated people, it means that the 
subordinated “do have a voice.” That voice needs to be heard because it can indicate 
value where none was previously recognized. It can also assist a newly empowered group 
to avoid colliding with or playing into the hands of values that formed the very basis of 
their subjection.99 
Finally, Per Nortvedt observed that the hallmark of ethics of care is its insistence 
on the interdependence of all humans and that relationships make them vulnerable and 
dependent.  “Relationships can fail and they can be oppressive, but they are also the only 
way through which we can shelter and protect our human vulnerabilities. To live in a web 
of significant relationships is for many persons the central part of human flourishing.”100  
Consequently, Noddings concludes that, although justice-based ethics, which is supposed 
to be more masculine, is a genuine alternative to ethics of care, however, ethics of care, 
which she refers to as “relational ethics” and describes as “caring, 'rooted in receptivity, 
relatedness, and responsiveness',” is a more basic and preferable approach to ethics.101  
3. C.  The Concept of Person and Autonomy  
As noted in Section 2. C, Kantian philosophy greatly influenced the Western 
concept of the human person that shaped the concept of autonomy and informed consent 
in Western bioethics. However, although ethics of care has its origin in Western society, 
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it rejects and challenges some aspects of the concept of the human person in relation to 
autonomy and informed consent found in Western concepts. Whereas Western dominant 
moral theories -Kantian, Utilitarian, Liberal Individualism- emphasize the human person 
as a rational, independent, self-sufficient, autonomous individual, ethics of care 
acknowledges the rational character, and in addition, highlights the relational and 
emotional aspects of a human being. Persons are in relationship with others and are 
constituted to large extent by their social ties. Human beings are not fundamentally 
separate and isolated individuals.   
Consequently, ethics of care characteristically views persons or human beings as 
relational, interdependent, rational, and emotional beings who are historically situated. 
Ethics of care maintains a conception of the human person wherein human lives are 
“grounded in a web of care with other people, so that each person is able to give care to 
and receive care from others.”102  The care is for the comprehensive well-being of the 
particular other, the one cared-for -physical, spiritual, emotional and intellectual. Ethics 
of care draws from our experience of caring to give a better account of persons as related, 
interdependent beings who make moral decisions by taking into consideration both their 
emotions and their reason.103  
Ethics of care also emphasizes the notion of personhood as being dependent 
merely upon connectedness in particularistic relationships, instead of being dependent 
merely upon the capacity for rationality. Part of the intrinsic notion of personhood 
includes particularity. Every person is unique and particular, not just rational or 
autonomous. In other words, for ethics of care, the intrinsic conception of personhood 
includes particularity, autonomy, rationality, and emotions. Julia T. L. Po-wah notes that 
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the idea of particularity means that individuals are unique and that particular implies that 
a person is irreplaceable. Essentially, one cannot be substituted. Po-wah, therefore, argues 
that, because particularity implies irreplaceability and non-substitutability, ethics of care 
scholars are, in effect, establishing that persons possess value simply because of their 
irreplaceability. 104  However, Kant proposed that human beings are an end-in-themselves 
possessing dignity by virtue of their rational will or law-making capacity (i. e., 
autonomy). Beyond the dominant moral theories or principle-based approaches that 
follow Kant’s thoughts, ethics of care questions whether rationality is sufficient in 
defining personhood.  
Held understands persons as moral subjects who are capable of action, and 
shaping their lives, institutions, and societies over time. She sees persons achieving this 
shaping by cultivating in themselves as well as in others certain characteristics, practices, 
and values. Persons are to experience themselves or have the self-awareness of being 
expected in order to possess moral responsibility, a moral agency, namely, relational 
agency. To be a moral person “is a status conferred on human beings as biological 
entities, by law, morality, as well as by other different human practices.105 For Held, 
children are potential moral subjects. When children do not behave as they should, adults 
tend to disapprove of their actions with the intention of gradually “steering” or directing 
them to comprehend the moral significance of their action. This understanding is not 
quite different from the Western understanding of person. However, Held upholds, as do 
other ethics of care advocates, the relational and interdependency character of the human 
person.  
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In ethics of care, the concept of person wherein every person is particular 
implying irreplaceability and non-substitutability, and the concept of person as relational, 
both help to bring to the fore that the fact a “patient’s autonomy does not have to be the 
overriding principle to guide ethical and bioethical decisions;”106 that long after one’s 
capacity for autonomy has waned or disappeared, “relationship ties continue to exert a 
normative force.”107 This highlights the need to understand autonomy in the context of 
relationships. Besides emotion, dependency, interdependency of person, and human 
existence, ethics of care also emphasizes family as the unit of society, and relational 
autonomy which is considered below.  
3. C. 1.  Relational Being, Family, and the Patient  
By contrast with the Liberal emphasis on the individual as a self-sufficient, 
independent being, ethics of care centers on personal relations, family, and communal 
ties. Based on the experience of care being relational, our experience of caring and being 
cared for, that is, ethics of care, identifies the idea of persons as relational and 
interdependent, as well as emotional and rational beings. It maintains that human beings 
experience themselves as relational and interdependent beings. Persons are involved in 
relationship with other persons and are very much affected by these relations. Indeed, to 
be a person is to be in relationships. Each person enters into a complex web of 
relationships, ranging from family, friends, neighbors, community members, and fellow 
citizens. These social relationships help to shape, develop, and constitute the human. 
Persons are constituted to a large extent by their social ties.108 Marilyn Friedman 
summarized the description of humans as relational beings thus: being relational beings 
means that persons  
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are fundamentally social beings, who develop the competency of autonomy…in a context 
of values, means, and modes of self-reflection that cannot exist except as constituted by 
social practices.… It is now well recognized that our reflective capacities and our very 
identities are always partly constituted by communal traditions and norms that we cannot 
put entirely into question without at the same time voiding our very capacities to reflect.  
We are each reared in a social context of some sort, typically although not always that of 
a family itself located in wider social networks such as community and nation. Nearly all 
of us remain, throughout our lives, involved in social relationships and communities, at 
least some of which partly define our identities and ground our highest values.109  
 
Held commends Friedman’s idea as a more developed conception of the human 
person. However, some other scholars criticize Friedman for interpreting social relations 
as merely causal instead of being constitutive elements.110 Of course, social relations are 
both causal and constitutive. Persons are causally affected and partly and importantly 
constituted by social relations.111 Diana Meyers describes various influential conceptions 
of the relational self as  
the interpersonally bonded self.…As relational selves… people share in one another’s 
joys and sorrows, give and receive care, and generally profit from the many regards and 
cope with the many aggravations of friendship, family membership, religious or ethnic 
affiliation, and the like. These relationships are sources of moral identity, for people 
become committed to become central moral concerns.112  
 
It follows that a relational self or selves-in-relation cannot adequately be 
described as independent, isolated entities and their states. Similarly, contrary to what the 
communitarian view would have people believe, relational selves are what they are not 
simply because of the communal, class, or historical context in which they are embedded. 
Rather, relational selves can radically change. They can make their own changes for 
better or for worse. It is insufficient to value relational beings in terms grounded only in 
the values of independent, isolated individual or in terms of values grounded only in the 
social entireties with which communitarians are concerned -nations, ethnic groups, or 
local communities, and in terms of changes which occur at these levels. The “values of 
the relation must not be reducible to the values of individuals in the relation” -as claimed 
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by individualist. Additionally, the claim that persons have value only in so far as they 
contribute to the value of communal relations can be rejected as untrue. Both persons and 
relations can have value.113  
Contributing to the discussion, Tronto identifies three implications of care as a 
fundamental aspect of human life: Dependence and autonomy, needs and interests, as 
well as moral engagement which emphasize the social nature and relatedness of human 
beings.114  
Explaining the first implication, dependence and autonomy, Tronto argues that 
one of the implications of care being a fundamental aspect of human life is that “humans 
are not fully autonomous.” They must always be understood in the context of 
interdependence. It is part of the human condition that our autonomy occurs only after a 
long period of dependence, and, in many ways, we remain dependent upon others 
throughout our lives.”115 At the same time, we are often called upon to help others, as 
well as to care. She, therefore, concludes that because “people are sometimes 
autonomous, sometimes dependent, sometimes providing care for those who are 
dependent, humans are best described as interdependent.” Dependence implies that those 
who care for those who are dependent can exercise power over them. For her, this is why 
we speak of relational autonomous persons.116 Slote thinks it is reasonable to hold that 
the mere fact that one has been influenced in one’s thoughts or decisions does not 
demonstrate a lack or absence of autonomy. Obviously, it can sometimes be reasonable, 
for example, to take someone’s advice, but there is a difference between taking advice 
and feeling compelled to do or to think whatever a certain other person or institution 
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advises you to do. To freely take someone’s advice can be an exercise of autonomy, 
whereas being compelled to follow someone’s or an institution’s wish is not.117  
Proceeding to implications of care, Tronto criticizes liberal theories that do not 
see dependency as a natural part of human experience. These political theories see and 
emphasize dependence as a character-destroying condition. For liberals, to be dependent 
is to lose one’s autonomy. It is to “lose the ability to make judgments for themselves, to 
end up at the mercy of others on whom they are dependent.”118 She thinks that, when 
liberal political theorists such as Jean Jacques Rousseau and Adam Smith, condemned 
dependence, they did so because of their understanding of dependency. Rousseau 
believed dependence to be a threat to human authenticity.119 Similarly, Smith sees 
dependence as a danger to citizenry virtues. He asserts that factory work dulled workers, 
making them less willing to serve in citizen armies.120 Other liberals say that dependence 
allows the powerful to have undue influence over other people.121 However, dependence 
does not necessarily imply loss of autonomy, as will be discussed later in Section 3.C.3.  
Relational Autonomy in Informed Consent (RAIC) 
Furthermore, in looking at the second implication, “needs and interests,” Tronto 
notes that, while interest connotes and depicts human activity in terms “either logically or 
culturally individualistic,” needs “is necessarily inter-subjective.” The way someone 
arrives at a need is an issue of social concern because it evokes dependence. Both need 
and its fulfillment imply dependency and vulnerability. On the other hand, how someone 
comes to an interest is not a matter of social concern, at least, not as need.122   
Finally, addressing the third implication, “moral engagement,” Tronto notes that, 
from the perspective of care, individuals are seen as being in a state of moral 
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engagement, rather than as being in a condition of detachment. If people’s activities of 
care are taken as instances of moral action, it, then, means that everyone engages in moral 
actions a lot of the time. For Tronto, understanding “moral engagement” in this way, 
namely, from a care perspective, changes our political ideas of persons and 
relationships.123  
In evaluating and valuing relations of care, especially relations between persons, 
ethics of care rejects some of the theses of the social contracts, for example, that 
relationships relevant to morality have been entered into voluntarily by free and equal 
individuals.   
i. Ethics of Care Critique of the Social Contract Theories  
Before further addressing ethics of care criticisms of the social contract theory, a 
brief description of the thoughts of the social contract theorists is in order. The social 
contract theory states that human beings originally were isolated individuals in the state 
of nature. Later, these individuals came together and made a pact or a contract to live 
together as a society and as citizens with some form of government in authority. In a 
sense, the social contract theory can be traced to Socrates who employed it in his 
argument to convince Crito that he, Socrates should remain in prison and embrace the 
death penalty.124 As a modern theory, the social contract theory is very much associated 
with Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau.125  
ii. The Social Contract Theories  
Hobbes hypothesized the state of nature where persons exist as self-interested 
individuals. The individuals are reasonable and possess the rational capacity to pursue 
their desires and individual interests efficiently and maximally. In Hobbes’ State of 
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Nature everyone is equal, and there are limited resources. There is no power to force 
people to cooperate. Hobbes foresees a brutal State of Nature, where everyone is afraid of 
losing one’s life to another.126 He, therefore, proposes a justification for individuals to 
surrender to form a society or government. Hobbes reasoned that humans can and need to 
enter a social contract that will offer them a life better than the one available in the State 
of Nature. To form such a society, they must agree collectively and reciprocally to 
renounce the rights they had in the State of Nature. They also have to confer on some 
person or group of persons the authority to enforce the initial contract.127  
 Unlike Hobbes, however, Locke (1632-1704) does not see the State of Nature as 
utterly brutal. Consonant with other social contract theories, Locke uses Hobbes’ 
methodological device of the State of Nature but, to a different end. Locke’s State of 
Nature is a state of perfect and complete liberty to conduct one’s life as one best sees fit. 
One is free of interference from others. However, one is not free to do anything that one 
pleases and/or what one judges to be in one’s own interest. It is not a condition of 
individuals, but it is populated by mothers, fathers, and their children or families –a 
conjugal society.128 However, these societies are based on voluntary agreements to 
nurture and raise children together but not on a political society. Society will come into 
existence if individuals representing their families in the State of Nature assemble and 
agree to give up their executive punitive power to form a civil government. Although 
there is an absence of government, in the Lockean State of Nature there exist morals and 
the law of nature (law of nature is for Locke, the basis of all morality, liberty, health, or 
possessions).129 Likewise, for Locke, the State of Nature is not the same as war, but war 
can start especially because of disputes over properties. Should war begin, there is a 
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likelihood that it will not stop because there is no civil authority. That is why there is a 
need for social contract and civil government. A civil government is even more needed, 
because in Locke’s State of Nature, people have liberty. Locke can envisage conditions 
under which people would fare better rejecting a particular civil government by returning 
to the State of Nature to regroup and form a better civil government in place of that 
rejected.130  
Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) posits a State of Nature in which people 
lived solitary, uncomplicated lives, with their needs easily satisfied. There would be 
reduced human population but an abundance of nature. Individuals would hardly see one 
another. Given this background, there would be neither competition nor reason for 
conflict or fear. However, with time and changes, human populations would increase and 
resources for satisfying the needs would also change. People would gradually begin to 
live together in small families, and then in small communities. Then, development and 
invention of private properties, greed, competition, inequality and vice would ensue. 
Rousseau sees the invention of property as the catalyst of “fall from grace out of the State 
of Nature.” Those who have property realized that it would be in their best interests to 
have a government, an authority that can protect private property from those who do not 
but might aspire to acquire it by force. “Man is born free and everywhere in chains.” This 
is the conceptual bridge between the two works of Rousseau in his search for a social 
contract wherein people can live together without yielding to the force and coercion of 
others. Rousseau determined that this kind of condition can be achieved by people 
submitting their individual or particular will to the collective or general will; that is, that, 
such a society would be created by agreement with other free and equal persons.131  
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iii. The Critique   
Advocates of ethics of care, especially Annette Baier and Held contend that social 
contract theory does not give an adequate account of our moral or political obligation.132 
The Hobbesian society, for example, is composed of a number of relatively equal and 
self-sufficient adult individuals (males) entering into contract. First of all, as Baier points 
out, the “conditions of social cooperation, whether in families or in communal decision-
making, are not always chosen. Such conditions of social cooperation are intimate and 
involve unequals in relational network.133 Moreover, humans do not come into being as 
adults fully grown and competent to struggle against each other. They are born as babies 
and infants who are cared-for and who later care-for others. Infants and small children 
need and do take a very different type of context for survival and development. Usually 
babies are not born as Hobbesian individuals. Rather “they are born reaching out and 
expecting care, they continue to expect care even when raised by harsh or negligent 
parents.” Consequently, Baier concludes that the primary move in human life is not away 
from others but towards others.134   
Thus, the social contractists and the dominant moral theories’ idea of person give 
and nurture the impression that society is “composed” of free, equal, and independent 
individuals who can choose to relate with one another or not. This idea does not ring true 
of the human experience wherein exists dependency for every human being when he or 
she is young, for most people who are disabled, old, ill, and infirm at various periods in 
their lives. Likewise, the social contract theory and the dominant moral theories’ ideas of 
equality obscure the very real facts about those involved in unpaid “dependency 
work.”135 Otherwise, people and groups are interdependent in society or in the world. 
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Different groups possess various levels of dependence, vulnerability, or special needs. 
Whichever ethical framework seeks to gloss over or assign uniformity to these 
differences should be regarded as irrelevant.136 Kittay asserts that a conception of society 
viewed as an association of equals hides inequitable dependencies, those of infancy and 
childhood, old age, illness, and disability: “While we are dependent, we are not well 
positioned to enter a competition for the goods of social cooperation on equal terms.”137  
Therefore, according to care ethicists, social contract theory goes only as far as 
distinguishing rights and obligations. They argue that this account is not enough to 
demonstrate adequately the full extent of what it means to be a moral person. Social 
contract theory also does not show “how fully to respond” to other people “with whom 
one interacts through relations of dependence.138  
Not all morally important relationships can or are freely chosen and entered into. 
Thus, moral obligations do not always arise from freely chosen association or between 
equals. For example, “vulnerable future generations do not choose their dependence on 
earlier generations.” The unequal infant neither chooses its place in a family nor in a 
nation. Likewise, the unequal infant is not treated as one free to do as he/she likes until 
some association is freely entered into. Parents do not always choose their parental role 
or freely assume their parental responsibilities any more than people utilize their power to 
affect the conditions in which later generations will live.139  
For Baier, the work of social contract theorists, such as that of Gauthier, does not 
represent the fullness of human psychology and motivations because Gauthier portrays 
the affective bond between persons as voluntary and non-essential. Thus, Baier rightly 
observed that this leads to a crucial flaw in social contract theory. The affective bonds 
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between persons are not always voluntary and non-essential.  She proposes that we 
defend the liberating idea of a society that does not impose affective bonds on its 
members, and, at the same time, she distinguishes this affective liberty from moral and 
political chaos, “and a free society from an all-embracing market.”140 Affective liberty in 
a free society is the pilgrim’s Promised Land.141  
Furthermore, ethics of care insists that human beings are relational beings, and 
people must first be in relationship, for example, a mother-child relationship, in order to 
develop the very capacities and qualities that liberal and social contract theory praises or 
exalts. Certain relationships of dependence or interdependence, is required, ab initio, to 
become the very sort of persons who are capable of entering into famous contracts and 
agreements proposed by the social contract theorists.142  
Held observes that the ‘economic man” model presented by the social contract 
theorists does not “capture much of what constitutes meaningful moral relations between 
people.” Economics operates on the belief that people will decide what to do on the basis 
of self-interest. Studies show that being repeatedly and intensively exposed to such a 
model encourages economic students to be less cooperative and more inclined to free ride 
than students in other disciplines. To see human relations in purely contractual ways is to 
“hold out an impoverished view of human aspiration.”143 Thus, Held asserts that, other 
paradigms of human relationships should be explored. Like other advocates of ethics of 
care, Held proffers the model of the mother-child relationship suggesting that at least, the 
paradigm of this relationship will “supplement the model of individual self-interested 
agents that negotiate with one another through contracts.”144  
134 
 
Finally and in conclusion, in their assessment of liberal and dominant moral 
theories, which include the social contract theory, Gilligan and Baier are critical of the 
relative weight that these moral theories place “on relationships between equals, on 
freedom of choice, and on the authority of intellect over emotions.” Gilligan and Baier 
argue that the dominant moral theories are primarily concerned with and tend to regulate 
relationships between equals or those thought to be equals in some important sense. They 
ignore other relationships such as those between parents and their children, earlier and 
later generations, states and citizens, doctors and patients, the healthy and the ill, as well 
as large states and small states. These are obviously unequals. To express some moral 
regulations for these unequals, the dominant moral theories find a way of making them 
equals: virtual equality. One way of achieving this is to categorize all of them as some 
types of weaker person or entity needing protection. As a result, citizens collectively 
become equal to states, children are described as adults-to-be, “the ill and dying are 
treated as continuers of their earlier more potent selves,” in order to portray their rights as 
“the rights of equals.”145  Baier concludes, therefore, that this kind of virtual equality 
veils the issue of what people’s “moral relationships are to those who are their superiors 
or their inferiors in power.” Baier therefore declares:  
A more realistic acceptance that we begin as helpless children, that at almost every 
point of our lives we deal with both the more and the less helpless, that equality of 
power and interdependency, between two persons or groups, is rare and hard to 
recognize when it does occur, might lead us to a more direct approach to questions 
concerning the design of institutions structuring these relationships between unequals 
(families, schools, hospitals, armies) and of the morality of our dealings with the more 
and the less powerful.146  
 
Against this background, Baier argues that liberal rules or theories do not do much to 
protect the young, the dying, the starving, or any of the relatively powerless against 
neglect. Also the rules do little to insure that there is an education that will nurture people 
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to be “capable of conforming” to both ethics of care and responsibility. In other words, 
liberal theory may make people nothing but persons “who have no interest in each other’s 
interests.”147 Furthermore, she notes that the proponents of contract theory, especially of 
dominant theories, for example, Rawls, do not attend to or deal with wrongs to animals 
and wrongful destruction of the physical environment.148 In answer to this situation, Baier 
insists that any serious moral theory has to take interest in the next generation’s interests, 
that is, caring for the children and the weak, as well as caring for the environment. For 
Baier and other ethics of care advocates, the morality proffered by ethics of care fulfills 
these requirements. The experience of caring as typified in women’s traditional work of 
caring for the less powerful, such as the young and the sick, as well as the environment, is 
socially vital and a definite interest in the future generation’s interests.149  
For ethics of care, the family is the unit of society. It is the primary domain for 
teaching and understanding ethical behavior. The same is true of Asian society and 
similar in some way to African culture, as shall be explained later in Chapter 4. In health 
care decision-making, ethics of care gives much greater recognition to the place of 
family, friends, and professional care-givers than in the liberal individualist approach to 
ethics.150 Against the legal prescription supporting the patient’s independent decision in 
Western liberal moral theory, ethics of care argues for a relational autonomy whereby the 
family can morally and legitimately participate in and influence the medical decision-
making process of the patient. Moreover, ethics of care is well-suited to discussions, 
disclosure, and beneficence in decision-making in health care “which typically becomes a 
family affair, with support from a health care team.”151 More still, one cannot assert too 
much independence from parents, family or community. “For many years in a person’s 
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life, years in which childhood experiences shape the adult person” the individual 
becomes, one does not exercise much independence. Even as adults, “it is part of what we 
are to be the children of given parents, with all the genetic and cultural history this 
involves, all the gender expectations or class advantage or racial disadvantage that 
attaches to it,” as well as all the obligations and moral sentiments that the relationship 
brings with it.152 Of course, this is not all that a person is. Individuals have their thoughts 
and capable of shaping their life amidst these external and biological influences. 
However, it is absurd to deny the dependency on one another.  
3. C. 2.  Dependency and Interdependency of Persons and Human Existence  
Caring highlights the element of dependence that is in relationships and which is 
part of the human condition.153 In caring relationships, we are dependent on one another; 
that is, there exists interdependence. Each human being goes through a process of 
dependency according to age, physical or mental condition. One of the implications of 
care being a fundamental aspect of human life is that human beings are born into a 
condition of dependency. They stay dependent upon others throughout the course of their 
lives. In their interdependence, they manage to learn to become autonomous. Writing 
about people with disability who require care by others, who are dependent on their 
caregivers, Kittay insists that it is not abnormal but natural to all humans to be dependent 
on others in some stage of their lives.  
If we conceive of all persons as moving in and out of relationships of dependence 
through different life-stages and conditions of health and functionings, the fact that the 
disabled person requires the assistance of a caregiver is not the exception, the special 
case. The disabled person occupies what is surely a moment in each of our lives, a 
possibility that is inherent in being human. From this perspective, we reason that our 
societies should be structured to accommodate inevitable dependency within a dignified, 
flourishing life—both for the cared for, and for the carer.154  
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Likewise, defining human beings by their relationships implies that caring cannot 
be totally self-sacrificing. If one gives to one’s relationships, it can only be to one’s 
benefit. After all, if we are constituted by our relationships to one another, our well-
beings “cannot be at odds.” One does not give and receive in kind as a totally separate 
individual. Rather, one’s individuality, one’s social self, is defined in relationships. 
Therefore, when one does something for someone else, one enhances oneself through the 
relation that defines one as well as the other.155  
Tronto chides liberal theorists for holding that being “dependent is to be without 
autonomy” and for not seeing dependency as a natural part of human experience. For her, 
these liberals do not see that human beings remain dependent upon others throughout the 
course of their lives, and, simultaneously, other people depend on them. Often, people are 
beckoned to help and to care for others, to care for each other.156 In ethics of care, 
dependence is a “conviction that one is able to have an effect on others, as well as the 
recognition that the interdependence of attachment empowers both self and the other, not 
one at the other’s expense.157  
Generally, the possibility of and presupposition for human life lies in the care and 
support human beings offer each other. Parents possess a moral responsibility to care for 
their offspring. Children, in turn, have a moral responsibility to care for the elderly. In 
this way, human beings exist in interdependent relationships that entail ethical 
responsibilities.158 Human interdependence is also highlighted in caring relationships of 
friendship. Here, friends voluntarily care for each other and, at the same time, they are 
dependent on each other.  
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Interdependence has to do with limitation. Human beings are finite and limited. 
They are not self-sufficient. As embodied beings, they enter into life as infants requiring 
great care. Throughout their lives, they require care, albeit of varying degree. They do not 
go through significant portions of their lives without some dependence on others for one 
thing or another. This dependence is not simply material or physical. It includes 
emotional, psychological, spiritual, and intellectual dependence. To be human, so to 
speak, is to be interdependent on all kinds of fellow human being for all sorts of things.159  
This notion of an interdependent being and moral agent in ethics of care contrasts 
markedly with the Kantian inspired moral theory or the dominant moral theories where 
the moral agent is like an isolated, independent (self-sufficient) individual. The human 
experience of life demonstrates that human beings are not isolated, independent, or self-
sufficient individuals because they have and are dependent on others, and on one another 
through most of their lives for emotional, psychological and physical nurturing at various 
times.160  
This idea is at odds with the contractists’ theory. For example, as noted above 
under 3. C. 1a – c, Jean-Jacques Rousseau who wrote extensively about the danger of 
dependence, regarded dependence as a threat to the authenticity of human beings.161 He 
viewed dependence negatively and did not consider dependence or interdependence as 
being autonomous.  
In conclusion, if humans are interdependent being rather than isolated, self-
sufficient individuals by nature, then it does not make much sense to emphasize 
individual patient independence or autonomy as if patients are isolated, self-sufficient 
individuals. Furthermore, it does not make sense to expect patients who are in a weak 
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position not to seek the help of other people, especially, in treatment decision-making. If 
anything, patient circumstances, ill and weak, call for dependence on relatives, friends, 
and healthcare givers. Therefore, ethics of care values the ties people have with particular 
others, as well as the concrete relationships that partly constitute peoples’ identity. Ethics 
of care is hospitable to the relatedness of persons. It does not understand many of 
peoples’ responsibilities as freely entered into. Rather, ethics of care sees them as made 
manifest by the accidents of people being embedded in a familial, social, and historical 
context. People motivated by ethics of care will tend to seek to become more admirable 
relational persons in better caring relations, rather than seek to more closely resemble the 
unencumbered abstract rational self of the liberal political and moral theories described in 
Chapter Two  above.162  
 
3. C. 3.  Relational Autonomy in Informed Consent (RAIC)   
Having asserted the caring interdependence in human existence, Tronto argues 
that those who care for dependents can exercise power over them leading to temporary 
loss of autonomy. Thus, human beings are not fully autonomous. And because human 
beings are only sometimes autonomous, at times dependent, sometimes caring for the 
dependent, they are, therefore, best described as interdependent. Tronto suggests, then, 
that, in reconciling the caring interdependent relationships with self-determination, 
people temporarily lose their autonomy.163  In this way, she speaks of the relational 
autonomous person. Some other ethics of care scholars, such as Clement, Nedelsky and 
Held, develop more than Tronto this idea of relational autonomy. They proffer analyses 
to explain autonomy in the context of relationship. This dissertation will consider the 
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following two such scholarly views, namely, Grace Clement and the Jennifer 
Nedelsky/Held attempts.  
 For Clement, because ethics of care holds that human beings are to a large extent, 
socially constituted, only a non-individualistic account of autonomy is compatible with 
ethics of care.  Ethics of care must allow for the autonomy of both the care-giver and the 
cared-for. She argues that being socially constituted implies that autonomy is not simply 
an internal or psychological characteristic, but it also includes an external or social 
characteristic. She points out that this idea is contrary to most discussions on autonomy 
wherein autonomy is presented as a psychological attribute related to free will. Such 
discussions concentrate on impediments to psychological autonomy.164  She further notes 
that in the dominant moral theories people are asked to engage on critical reflection or 
rational reasoning, that is, higher-order desires. The primary reason for requiring higher-
order desires, rational reasoning or critical reflection, is that our ordinary desires --the 
first order desires-- are often socially determined. A critical reflection on these first-order 
desires reveals that they are not really our desires. That is why autonomy requires that 
people assume a critical perspective of their socialization.  However, Clement argues 
that, when one reflects on the higher-order desires, one may realize that they too are not 
really one’s desires. One begins to recognize that, perhaps, it is not only the first-order 
desires that are socially constituted but the higher-order reflections as well. Thus, perhaps 
the critical reflection is itself a social product, just as the first-order desires are socially 
constituted. Should this be true, then, Clement concludes that there are no grounds to 
speak of a “true” self, because a “true” self is generally understood to mean an innate or 
“self-generated self.” If there is no true self, that is, no self which is not determined by its 
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social context, then, it would seem to follow that there is no autonomy.165 On the 
contrary, Clement regards critical reflection as allowing people to be more autonomous 
than usual. It attests to our “social constitutiveness,” that is, the fact that human beings 
are socially constituted. We, humans, learn to become autonomous from others, through 
relationship with them and not by isolation from them. A person’s autonomy is nurtured 
through other’s care. Isolation might nurture the negative component of autonomy, 
namely, absence of coercion in one’s decision-making. It, however, will not promote the 
positive component of autonomy which is critical thinking about one’s motive. The 
reason that Clement offers is that what fosters the skills of self-examination permitting us 
to be autonomous is the support and guidance of our family, friends, and teachers. 
Relationships with others teach us to be ourselves.166 Some relationships nurture skills 
better than others whereas some relationships even undermine the skills of autonomy. 
However, fundamentally, the fact is that relationships, especially caring relationships 
certainly, are a necessary precondition for autonomy. Relationships are the social 
conditions that make it possible for us to develop the capacity to be autonomous.167 In 
this case, autonomy is practiced in relationship; thus, the label “relational autonomy” is 
used for what Clement proposed, although Clement herself did not use the term.    
Much in keeping with Clement’s thesis is Nedelsky’s proposal which Virginia 
Held adopted in her own work. Both Nedelsky and Held see relational autonomy as an 
effort to relate human beings’ experience of relatedness and being socially constituted in 
relationships to others with “the value of self-determination.”168 Nedelsky begins by 
asserting that the term “autonomy” is so linked to the liberal tradition that it seems to be 
synonymous with “individualism.” She speaks of “becoming autonomous,” or of 
142 
 
becoming able to find and live in accordance with one’s own law. She adopts the word 
“becoming” because autonomy is not a quality that can be simply imposed on human 
beings. It has to be developed and sustained. Everyone has to develop and sustain that 
capacity for finding one’s own law. One finds this law because one does not really 
choose or create it. Even what is truly one’s law, or autonomy, is shaped by the society in 
which one lives as well as by the relationships in which one engages in that society. Thus, 
autonomy may be one’s own, but it is not developed by the individual in isolation or 
without connection to others in the context of relationships.169 For these reasons, 
Nedelsky speaks of finding one’s law. Speaking of “finding” also allows the openness 
that an individual’s own law or autonomy might be revealed by spiritual sources, that the 
capacity to find one’s own law may arise from one’s spiritual nature. This idea of a 
transcendent source need not be like Kant’s Categorical Imperative with its exclusive 
reliance on human rationality.170 Nedelsky asserts, then, that the law may be one’s own, 
but not necessarily made or created by the person. The person concerned develops it, but 
in connection with other people. The capacity to find one’s own law can develop only in 
the context of relationships with other people. These other people include both an 
intimate and, more broadly, a social group. It is the relationship with others that nurtures 
this capacity. The content of one’s own law is understandable only in relation to shared 
social norms, values, and concepts.171 Thus, Nedelsky concludes that what really enables 
people to become autonomous are relationships and not isolation from others. It is 
relationship with friends, parents, teachers, and loved ones. This understanding is 
comparable to the African concept of person and the connection with humans and spirits, 
as is discussed in Chapter 4. These persons provide the support and guidance required for 
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the development and sustenance of autonomy. The implication of this proposal is that, in 
the emergence of autonomy in relationship with others, it becomes clear that relatedness 
is not the antithesis of autonomy as the liberal tradition asserts. Rather, relatedness is a 
literal precondition of autonomy, and interdependence is “a constant component of 
autonomy,” thereby fostering autonomy through relationships with others.172 Continuing, 
Nedelsky notes that autonomy is not a static quality that is or can be achieved simply in 
one day. Rather, it is a capacity requiring ongoing relationships that assist it to flourish. 
Autonomy can also wither or thrive at various times throughout a person’s adult life.173 
As a result of this analysis of autonomy in the context of relationships, Clement, 
Nedelsky, Held, and other ethics of care scholars advocate a relational autonomy which, 
in this dissertation, is referred to as RAIC (relational autonomy in informed consent).174  
Nedelsky also finds a dichotomy between autonomy and the collectivity or 
groups. The dichotomy is grounded in the deeply ingrained sense that individual 
autonomy is to be achieved by erecting a wall (of rights) between the individual and 
those around him. She sees the central symbol for this sort of autonomy as property. The 
reason is that property “can both literally and figuratively provide the necessary walls, of 
isolation.”175 Therefore, the most perfectly autonomous person is thus, the most perfectly 
isolated. This idea of the autonomous individual, as one perfectly isolated from one’s 
fellow human beings, has been promoted in Western society for many centuries.  
In conclusion, by following these analyses of autonomy in relationships, one can 
infer that ethics of care adopts an RAIC approach; therefore, ethics of care does not place 
too much emphasis on the individual patient as the sole authority in medical decision-
making or in the informed consent process. Ethics of care does not vest the individual 
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patient with the power to make medical decision based solely on his/her interests and 
needs.  
 
3. C. 4.  Emotion as an Essential Part of Human Nature in Moral Decision-Making  
Rather than reject or dismiss emotions in moral decision-making, ethics of care 
appreciates and gives passion and emotions a role. Virginia Held notes that caring 
relationships cannot be understood in terms of abstract rules or moral reasoning. Morality 
requires the development of moral emotions.176 It is a morally relevant factor to possess a 
certain emotional attitude as well as to express the appropriate emotion and passion in 
action. In the same way, it is morally relevant to possess an appropriate motive for an 
action. If one acts from rule-governed obligation and does not have appropriate feelings 
of emotions, such as in the face of a friend’s suffering, a dying son or daughter, one 
appears morally deficient. Ethics of care insists further that not only should people 
express their feelings in their responses, but they need also to attend to the feelings of 
persons towards whom they act, because “insight into the needs of others and considerate 
attentiveness to their circumstances” often arise more from emotions than from reason.177 
This is exemplified in the relationship between parents and their children. Annette Baier 
argues that parents need to love their children and not just control their irritation when 
their children’s screaming enrages them. Parents and guardians need to develop desirable 
forms of emotions required for nurturing their children rather than simply harken to the 
Kantian emphasis on rational control of emotions.178 Another example is the assertion 
that, in the history of human experimentation, it was those who were able to feel 
compassion and empathy for human suffering who first recognized that the research 
subjects were subjected to misery or being brutalized. The people who were able to feel 
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disgust and outrage through insight into the situation of the research subjects were the 
ones who in their research challenged inhuman practices. Even the act of imagining 
someone else’s experience of suffering is capable of inspiring moral action.179 The 
resultant moral could be to respond to the suffering or to shy away. By no means does 
this emphasis on the emotional dimension and on the moral life convert moral response 
into emotional response. Rather, contrary to liberal theories, it brings out the importance 
of emotions in moral judgment. Philosophers of history, Plato, and Kantians argue that 
emotional attitudes towards moral issues themselves interfere with rationality and should 
be disregarded. “They encourage people to discipline themselves against desires, 
impulse, and inclination in order to ensure a more rational course of moral deliberation 
and action. For these philosophers, while decision and action based on emotions -
impulse, inclination, and passion might be good, but they are not morally good because 
they are not based on an “appropriate cognitive framework.” Persons and emotions are, 
therefore, seen as impediments to moral judgment by Kant and these philosophers.180    
Because in a moral analysis, ethics of care embraces emotions, Held and scholars 
of ethics of care have a problem with the Kantian Categorical Imperative: the Law of 
Reason that requires us to act in a manner consistent with reason and logic, devoid of 
emotions, feelings, wishes, and circumstances in order to act autonomously.181 For ethics 
of care advocates, Kant’s Categorical Imperative suggests that every moral problem can 
be handled by applying an impartial, pure, rational principle to particular cases. One 
seeks the general features of the moral problem at hand and applies an abstract principle 
or rules derived from the Categorical Imperative to the issue. This procedure is supposed 
to be adequate for all moral decisions. In using the Kantian Categorical Imperative, one is 
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able to act as reason recommends and resist yielding to emotional inclinations and desires 
in conflict with our rational wills.182 Although Utilitarians recognize emotions as the 
source of human desires for certain objectives, they believe that the task of morality 
should be to instruct people on how to pursue those objectives most rationally. They 
suppose that one highly abstract principle, the principle of utility, can be applied to every 
moral problem no matter what the context. Having and exercising emotional attitudes 
towards moral problems interferes with rationality and should not be encouraged. Ethics 
of care advocates, such as Held, conclude, therefore, that both the Kantians and 
Utilitarians share a reliance on a highly abstract, universal principle as the appropriate 
source of moral guidance. Additionally, both the Kantians and Utilitarians hold the view 
that moral issues are to be resolved by applying such an abstract principle to particular 
cases.183  
  Questioning this reason intensive method, ethics of care asserts that emotions 
provide, at least, a partial basis for morality itself and surely a basis for moral 
understanding.184 As was noted in Chapter Two above, this view is also supported by 
Callahan, Fritz, and Pizarro who maintain that emotions can direct or alter reasoning, just 
as reasoning or reasons can inform and alter emotional responses. Emotions are 
consciousness, and they provide people with personal and social values that offer 
directions and purpose to rational thinking.185 Emotions, especially empathy, play an 
integral role in the process of moral judgment or moral decision-making.186 Thus, 
emotions have come to be regarded as “the primary motivating system for all activity.”187  
According to Martha Nussbaum, the “liberal tradition holds that emotions should not be 
trusted as guides to life without  being subjected to some sort of critical scrutiny and 
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urges people to ask whether their emotions are appropriate.188 According to her, such 
critical scrutiny would help women avoid or end some of the injustices and oppression 
that follow excesses of emotional commitment; that love and deep caring are fine, so long 
as you think first. She is critical of Noddings’ view on caring for recommending 
emotional attitudes that are not sufficiently self-critical and for regarding the critical 
attitude recommended by liberalism as involving “one thought too many.”189 On the other 
hand, Slote does not believe that Noddings used that expression, “one thought too many” 
or that she made explicit reference to William’s view that certain attitudes involve “one 
thought too many.” However, some caring ethicists like Noddings idealize or command a 
critically unselfconscious form of love or caring.190  
Over and against liberal ideas about emotions and morality, ethics of care 
recommends a focus on relationships and on particularities of the context in which a 
moral problem arises, as well as its general context. In addition, ethics of care 
recommends that people pay attention to feelings of empathy and caring to help decide 
what is to be done (morally) rather than relying solely on abstract rules and reason. This 
implies a respect for emotions rather than a dismissal of emotion in the process of gaining 
moral understanding. It is a procedure that involves approaching moral consideration 
with “embodied, gendered subjects” who possess “particular histories, particular 
communities, particular allegiance, and particular visions of human flourishing.”191 
However, caring can be said to possess a cognitive aspect because it “involves insights 
into and understanding of another’s circumstances, needs,” as well as feelings. While 
emotions motivate people, and reveal much about somebody’s character, human 
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understanding directs people in choosing a path of action.192 This means that both reason 
and emotion are necessary and play their part in moral judgment.  
Similarly, while acknowledging the role of emotion in moral judgment, principles 
should not be rejected outright. They should be acknowledged while caution should be 
exercised in not using them in such an abstract way that neglects particular relations and 
personal moral judgments. Moreover, as Held rightly observed, the absence of principles 
can lead to a capricious and fickery moral situation. Consequently, caring may be a weak 
defense against arbitrary decisions. Perhaps then, if both the cared-for and care-giver, but 
especially the carer, “are guided to some extent by principles regarding rights and 
obligations,” the cared-for may find the relationship more satisfactory in several different 
aspects.193 Principles may be for the care-giver a reminder not to be capricious or 
domineering. Considering children and the disabled, Curtin noted that people, who are 
essentially defined as having an inborn defect, find it hard to challenge or contest the 
labels others especially their care-givers, have given them. Consequently, these children 
can come to the awareness of their disadvantage only if they can “make evaluative 
judgments based on the practices taking place out there” in the wide world and beyond 
dyadic caring relationships. Thus, Curtin concludes that principles or rule-based 
approaches offer helpful avenues for finding “elements of cross-situational identity.”194  
One can conclude with Beauchamp and Childress that “we should be prepared for 
situations in which our actions are overly partial and need correction by impartial 
principles. We are likely to treat more favorably persons who are close to us in intimate 
relationships; although on some occasions those who are distant from us deserve even 
more favorable treatment.”195 In addition, as Beauchamp and Childress point out, while 
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acknowledging the need not to place too much emphasis on justice, impartiality, rights, 
and obligations, ethics of care has to confront contexts wherein bona fide requirements of 
impartiality conflict with acting partially from care. Just as ethics of care demands that 
acting impartially gives way to acting partially, it has to admit that sometimes acting 
partially must yield to acting impartially. There are some occasions when impartial 
judgment is required to arbitrate between conflicting moral judgments or feelings.196  
 
3. C. 5.  Individual Patient Rights  
As seen in Chapter Two, in addition to the rejection of emotions in moral 
decision-making, the liberals define, employ, and emphasize rights, individual rights, in 
their concept of autonomy in informed consent and medical decision-making. Moral 
judgments in liberal practice follow principles defining rights and duties of the individual 
(sometimes without due considerations of specific circumstances, and costs particularly).  
Against this background, ethics of care advocates call for the evaluation of the concept of 
rights. They seek to understand rights from the perspective of caring relationships and 
connectedness. They also seek to delineate the value of rights in the context of family, 
friendship, and political or civic organizations such as the state, or communities. Recall 
from above that the ethics of care asserts that there are social relationships holding the 
individual person together, whether in a family, among friends, or in political entities. In 
these relationships and connectedness, there is a sense that what happens to others in the 
group (family, state, community) matters and that it plays important roles. The 
relationships or caring relationships and affection are, however, much stronger in the 
context of families and friends. Because of the greater affection, empathy, and caring 
relationships in family and among friends, ethics of care is more suited for family and 
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among friends than ethics of rights and justice or traditional ethics (including liberalism) 
which emphasizes justice and rights. Consequently, the value of rights is said not to be 
quite appropriate in relationships in family and among friends but is more suited for other 
civic or social groups such as the state, or communities. For example, Held thinks that it 
is appropriate and more sensible to have care as primary in the family, because the most 
important things are the caring relationships that nurture the family, seeing that the family 
is the provider of care, barring which infants will not survive or which children will not 
grow. Held further insists that there can be no human life or family in the absence of the 
actual practice of care. The issues of rights and justice should also be considered in caring 
relationships of the family, although this pursuit should not be done in such a way that it 
“sunders family relations.”197 For instance, as Held rightly argues, girls should be 
supported in seeking equal and fair treatment in education, feeding, and freedom just as 
boys. Uma Narayan has an example of female infanticide in India introduced for the 
purpose of promoting the care of male children. But, as a result of the practice, female 
children compared to their male counterparts are unable to grow up and become bearers 
of rights.198 Claudia Card speaks of possible instances where care-givers themselves are 
seriously abused by the cared-for as well as by members of the family who are neither 
care-giver nor cared-for.199 This sort of practice is unjust and it leads to failure of care. 
Nevertheless, it is not always possible for a member or some members of the family to 
assert their rights and remain within relationships which form individuals into a family. 
For instance, when a parent threatens to cut ties with a son or a daughter who refuses to 
marry the spouse chosen by the parent, or when parents threaten to severe the ties if a 
child refuses to follow the career path chosen by the parents. The child in each case may 
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be morally justified to choose his or her rights over family ties. However, to expose a 
family member to such a situation where a choice has to be made between family ties and 
one’s rights is uncaring and unjust. In good caring relationships among family or friends, 
it should be possible to resolve such issues through civil discussion.200  
Rights as non-interference can amount to neglect, especially for the powerless, 
and even among equals it can be isolating and alienating. Therefore, rights are not quite 
good for relationships of family, friendship and, to some extent, civic organizations.201 
However, there can certainly be room for competition, the pursuit of self-interest, and for 
the assertion of rights requiring equal treatment and respect in the caring relationships of 
family and friends. The problem arises when this pursuit of self-interest and the assertion 
of individual rights overcome all interactions within the family. The group might 
disintegrate but, if it survives, the people will no longer be genuine friends or members of 
the caring families.202  
 Concerning rights in the context of civic or political organizations, that is, rights 
in the context of the state or society, there is a consensus that rights are suitable for caring 
relationships of these civic organizations.  However, some care ethicists, such as Held 
and Joy Kroeger-Mappes, argue that caring relations and social connectedness are 
prerequisites and are required as both a base and a context for rights (ethic of rights). 
Other care ethicists, such as Nedelsky, proffers an understanding of rights as relationships 
and as a conditio sine qua non for rights in the context of caring relationships of civic or 
political entities as well as families and friendships.  For Kroeger-Mappes, ethics of care 
and ethic of rights (as she prefers to call “rights”) are an integral part of one system of 
ethics wherein ethics of care is a necessary base or foundation for the “ethic of rights.” 
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Kroeger-Mappes argues that ethics of care being a necessary base for ethics of rights is a 
philosophical thesis which reveals “at a theoretical level, moral relationships within 
social reality.”203  
Held critically challenges the understanding of rights in liberal and dominant or 
traditional moral theories. She set out to delineate an account of rights that will fit within 
a globalized ethics of care. In the process she considers the preconditions of rights and 
what rights presuppose. She argues that to have respect for rights, especially human 
rights of all persons everywhere, first and foremost, there has to be a feeling or sense of 
social connectedness with other peoples whose rights are being recognized. Likewise, 
there is need for the development of the capacity for and the practice of caring about all 
other fellow human beings in order to recognize and respect their rights.204 Even to 
recognize others as members of a society or citizens, the members of the society have to 
trust each other and care enough about one another. Having recognized others as fellow 
citizens, as part of “the group of us,” the group can fight together for their rights. It 
follows, then, that for “a working legal system to protect their rights, citizens must 
acknowledge others as also citizens of the same system.” Held thinks that this has an 
analogy in normative priority and not simply a mere empirical pre-condition. If the 
members of society, or citizens, give priority to the assertion of individual rights against 
those of others, and to the pursuit of economic, political, and cultural interest, over and 
above the citizens’ interactions, that society will disintegrate. It will cohere no more.205 It 
is necessary, then, that the pursuits take place within social relationships of a sufficiently 
caring kind, as well as with enough recognition of the moral values of such relationships. 
A caring society creates practices that foster “caring activities, considerate discourse 
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throughout the society,” and reduces the “pressure for political conflict and legal 
cohesion,” and the “commodification of and the commercial competition over much that 
has value.” Thus, Held concludes that rights presume a background of social 
connectedness or solidarity based on caring that has value.206  
 While Held asserts that rights and respect for rights work only in the context of 
caring relationships or in the context of relationships of social connections, Nedelsky 
goes beyond that. She calls for a rethinking of the concept of rights and of all rights. She 
proffers the understanding of all rights as wells as the concepts of rights in terms of 
relationship. She argues that seeing all rights and concepts of rights as relationship offers 
a better way of solving rights problems.207 However, she does not advocate abandoning 
the use of the term “rights.” Rather, she thinks that it is not only useful to continue using 
the term “rights,” but that there is also an institutional commitment to use it. Nonetheless, 
if rights were to be employed to constrain democratic outcomes, Nedelsky asserts that 
people should use rights in a way that “is true to the essentially contested and shifting 
meaning of rights.” She insists on the need to confront the history of rights and 
acknowledge the depth of the changes that have occurred in both legal and popular 
understandings of rights. These changes include the understanding of equality rights few 
years ago wherein the great restrictions on both legal rights and actual opportunities for 
women were taken to be consistent with the basic equality for all.208  
 Thus, a good working concept of rights is to encompass any ongoing 
disagreement and discussion in a given society regarding the meaning of rights and its 
concept; for instance, the meaning of equality and how it fits with the understanding of 
property, contract, and the legal foundations of equality. According to Nedelsky, rights 
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always construct a relationship of power, of responsibility, of trust, and of obligation. 
Similarly, rights as in property rights, contracts, and family law all structure relationships. 
She exemplified her assertion with property rights, arguing that they are about relations 
and limits on the use of things rather than about things. They draw attention to how 
people can use their power of ownership and their responsibilities with respect to others’ 
well-being. They define fiduciary relationships: 
…property rights are not primarily about things, but about people’s relation to each other 
as they affect and are affected by things. The rights that the law enforces stipulate limits 
on what we can do with things depending on how our action affects others…and what 
responsibilities we have with respect to others’ well-being (for example, tort law and 
landlord tenant law). In the realm of contract, the law takes account of relationships of 
unequal bargaining power, and it defines certain parameters of employment and of 
landlord-tenant relationships.209   
  
Nedelsky admits that rights have been criticized as “undesirably individualistic,” as 
obfuscating “the real political issues,” and as serving “to alienate and distance people 
from one another.” However, because Nedelsky asserts that all rights -indeed, the very 
concept of rights- are best understood in terms of relationship, she, therefore, concludes 
that conceptualizing rights in terms of the relationships that they foster and structure will 
radically transform the problem of individualism and other criticism levied on rights.210 
The problem with individualism which rights are accused is that “it fails to account for 
ways in which our essential humanity is neither possible nor comprehensible without the 
network of relationship of which it is a part.”211  
 Furthermore, Nedelsky continues to bring to bear on the concept of autonomy the 
idea of rights as relationships. The Anglo-American or Western liberals’ concept of 
autonomy and rights are such that they are described in terms that fits into the idea of 
autonomy as independence, requiring protection and separation from other people. Rights 
are seen as defining boundaries that other people cannot cross. These are boundaries that 
155 
 
are enforced by the law to guarantee individual freedom and autonomy. Nedelsky thinks 
that this is a misguided view of autonomy, because, as she noted above, 3. C. 5. 
Individual Patient Rights, what makes autonomy possible is not separation or isolation 
but relationships.212 Seeing rights as relationships shifts the interest from protection 
against other people to structuring relationships in order that they foster autonomy.  “The 
human interactions to be governed are not seen primarily in terms of the clashing of 
rights and interests, but in terms of the way patterns of relationship can develop and 
sustain both an enriching collective life and the scope for genuine individual 
autonomy.”213 This means, therefore, that the constitutional protection of autonomy is no 
more an effort to carve out an area into which the collective other people cannot intrude. 
It becomes a means of structuring the relationship “between individuals and the sources 
of collective power” in order that autonomy be nurtured instead of undermined.214  
Although some theorists canvass for group rights, rights --legal or moral-- are 
“usually thought to attach to persons as individuals.”215 In liberal thinking, and in 
dominant moral theories, rights draw attention to individuals, albeit the respect for rights 
may presume a social context. Annette Baier testifies to this: “the language of rights 
pushes us…to see the participants in the moral practice as single, clamorous” 
individuals.216 Thus, there is emphasis on individual rights to decision-making in health 
care. Western liberalism privileges decisions of informed consent by the individual. 
Ethics of care on the other hand, focusing on caring relationships between persons and 
families instead of on individuals and their rights and possessions, questions the emphasis 
on the individual in decisions of informed consent. The legal system has used rights -
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individual rights- to institutionalized power of men over women, and rights authorize the 
male experience of the world. As Catherine Mackinnon observed:  
 In the liberal state, the rule of law --neutral, abstract, elevated, pervasive-- both 
institutionalizes the power of men over women and institutionalizes power in its male 
form … Male forms of power over women are affirmatively embodied as individual 
rights in law … Abstract rights authorize the male experience of the world.217  
 
Rights are seen, especially, by some feminist ethics of care advocates, as 
“inherently abstract and reflective of a male point of view.”218 They note that the law 
helps to build and enshrine rights. The law considers and treats persons as self-contained 
individuals rather than as the relational persons of ethics of care.219 This is the type of 
person whose rights the law projects as reflecting social reality and which able to 
decrease actual oppression and injustice. This is seen in the elevation of the rights of 
women. However, rights are not fixed but are contested. Political and social “struggles” 
are often staged, rather well, around “indignation,” that is, dissatisfaction and widely felt 
over clear denials of rights and persuasive reasons to recognize new rights. Some of the 
rights guaranteed by law are yet to be granted or accorded to women, or minorities. 
While the discourse of rights, justice and equality should not be abandoned, it should be 
borne in mind that these form one framework among other frameworks of moral 
discourse. They should not be the privileged or the dominant framework because there is 
the caring relationship of ethics of care.  
The ethics of care concept of relational autonomy arising from the understanding 
of persons as relational and interdependent links it to the African understanding of 
autonomy and, thus, of informed consent. The next chapter examines this issue beginning 
with a general overview of African traditional medicine.  
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3. D.   Summary 
 In view of the next section, Chapter Four, the systematic analysis of ethics of care 
as a hermeneutic to interpret ATM was undertaken in the present Chapter Three, 
beginning with the origin of ethics of care from the Feminist Movement, Male Voices of 
their supporters, and Alternative Feminist Moral Theories. The meaning of ethics of care 
was described paying special attention to its relation to labor, practice and value, 
relationships, justice and particularity. Caring is shown to create and fosters relationships, 
thus elucidating the concept of person as a relational being who is interdependent and 
particular. Because ethics of care emphasizes relationships and interdependence, it 
understands autonomy in terms of relationships wherein autonomy is developed and 
fostered in relationships with others. Consequently, ethics of care explains informed 
consent in terms of relational autonomy, hence RAIC. This is contrary to liberal 
individualistic belief that autonomy is achieved in isolation from others. Furthermore, 
this Chapter examined ethics of care insistence that emotions play an important part in 
moral decision-making, also contrary to liberal individualistic belief that emotions are to 
be avoided in order to make a good moral decision, because, for liberals, emotions have 
negative influence on moral decision-making.  Finally, the Chapter examined ethics of 
care understanding of rights, including patient rights, in terms of relationships. As a result 
of RAIC and the concept of rights in terms of relationships, ethics of care does not place 
too much emphasis on individual patient rights and autonomy in medical decision-
making and informed consent. This, too, contrasts with liberal individualism’s emphasis 
on individual patients’ rights and autonomy in informed consent. Therefore, using ethics 
of care as a hermeneutic analysis of ATM, the subsequent Chapter will demonstrate that 
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ATM practices RAIC and places emphasis on relationships and understands autonomy in 
the context of relationships.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ATM WITH ETHICS OF CARE 
This chapter provides a comparative interpretation of ATM with ethics of care. 
The analysis provides an explanation of ATM as adopting a relational approach to 
informed consent (RAIC). In this discussion, the ethics of care movement provides the 
hermeneutic to enlighten the significance of the ATM approach as a legitimate model of 
RAIC. In order words, ATM exhibits practices similar to those of ethics of care, such as 
focusing on relationships, maintaining that persons are relational beings who are socially 
constituted in a community, and exercising autonomy in relationships with others in the 
community.  
As a preamble, it is worth noting that there are limitations in speaking of African culture 
as if it were one homogeneous culture. There is cultural diversity in Africa ranging from 
East to West and from North to South. However, there is a valid overall African ethos 
which characterizes the commonalities of societies within Africa. The areas of such 
commonalities include value systems, beliefs, and practices. There is a common belief in 
a Supreme Being, ancestors, emphasis on the values of communal living, on 
relationships, etc. These areas chiefly reflect the African worldview.1  
4. A. An Overview of ATM  
Long before the arrival of modern or allopathic medicine, there existed systems of 
knowledge and practice of medicine that are indigenous to different continents, countries, 
societies and ethnic groups of the world. In other words, these medicines and healing 
practices belong to the traditions of each country or continent or ethnic group, and are, 
therefore, called the “traditional medicine.” They are also referred to as “indigenous” or 
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“folk medicine,” although the name “traditional medicine” is used more than the other 
two. Thus, this dissertation uses the name: “traditional medicine.”  There are traditional 
medicines of Asia, Africa, Europe, Americas North and South. There are also Chinese, 
Korean, “Ayurveda, Siddha medicine, Unani, ancient Iranian medicine, Irani, Islamic 
medicine, traditional Vietnamese medicine … Muti, Ifá, traditional African medicine, and 
many other forms of healing practices.”2  Traditional medicine developed over many 
years and was passed on from generation to generation, often without documentations, 
but with sophisticated systems of knowledge. Although for thousands of years traditional 
medicine has been attending to the medical needs of large percentage of world’s 
population, for example, eighty percent (80%) of Asians and Africans utilize it for their 
medical care. Yet, it has been less studied or researched, especially for documentation. 
However, more recently, WHO is engineering interests in the study, documentation, and 
development of national policies for the “evaluation of practices and examination of the 
safety and efficacy of remedies, to upgrade the knowledge of traditional and modern 
health practitioners, as well as to educate and inform the general public about proven 
traditional health practices.”3  
4. A. 1. Representative Ethnic Groups  
 As stated above, (Section 4A), traditional medicines are indigenous to both 
countries and ethnic groups of a continent and the world. Because there are many such 
ethnic groups in the continent of Africa, and moreover, the scope of this dissertation does 
not permit the study of each and every one of these ethnic groups, four of them have been 
chosen. Therefore, this section focuses on the four representative ethnic groups of Africa 
as delineated in Chapter One: the Akan, the Hausa-Fulani, the Igbo, and the Yoruba.   
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i. The Akan  
The Akan are a broad ethnic group with a number of subgroups: Akuapen, Akyen, 
Asante, Brong-Ahafo, Fante, Kwahu, Nzema of Ghana and the Baule and Anyi of the 
Ivory Coast. In Ghana, the Asante and Fante are the two largest subgroups. The Akan 
possess a common language, Twi, which has coalesced with a large group that is part of 
the greater Kwa subfamily of West African languages. The Akan also possess a 
matrilineal system in which the ancestral line is traced through the mother. One’s father’s 
wealth is inherited by one’s cousin. In other words, one inherits not one’s father’s 
property but that of one’s mother’s brother.4 The lineages possess a symbolic stool or 
chair which is named after the female founder of the line. This stool is a mark of their 
social autonomy vis-à-vis other groups. Usually, there are two stools: the king’s stool or 
ohene adwa and the queen mother’s or ohemmaa adwa. Even though there are two stools, 
the queen mother’s stool is the senior stool and has priority of place over the king’s 
because the queen mother is believed to be the founder of the Akan community.5 
According to one of the women whom Fiona Araba Gibson interviewed during the course 
of her doctoral research:  
To explain further, in our Akan communities, for that matter, in this Fanti land, we 
believe that women are the owners of the land, the sole founders of the Akan 
communities. The old lady, simply is the Queen Mother, who is the founder of the Akan 
society, literally, this is the meaning of the word the ‘Old Lady.’6   
 
The culture of the Akan people of West Africa dates from before the 13th century. 
Similar to other long-established cultures the world over, the Akan have developed a rich 
conceptual system complete with metaphysical, moral, and epistemological aspects, and 
their universe is essentially spiritual. All animate and inanimate things within their 
universe are blessed with a varying degree of sunsum. They have a belief in a Supreme 
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Being, Nyame, or “Mother Earth,” or Asase Yaa, and a host of intermediary deities or 
abosom. The abosom, on the other hand, are messengers from the Nyame. They reverence 
the ancestors, Nzemanfo. Because of their belief that the universe is endowed with 
sunsum, the Akan consult the ancestors, Nzemanfo, prior to making and acting on many 
daily decisions. The Akan also believe that the ancestors maintain important functions in 
each person’s life, even though these ancestors no longer occupy physical space on earth. 
One of the ancestors’ most important roles is being direct messengers to Nyame, the 
Supreme Being. The ancestors are believed to bring good fortunes to the living, 
especially to members of their lineage. However, if the ancestors are dissatisfied with the 
lineage, they manifest their displeasure by causing ill fortune and/or sickness. Thus, 
illness has a spiritual dimension.7 Even though the Akan share several cultural traits, and 
the political, social, religious, and customary practices are similar, each clan has its own 
history and customs. 
ii. The Hausa-Fulani  
Traditionally, the Hausa-Fulani society consists of two different cultures that 
gradually combined after the Islamic Fulani conquest in the nineteenth century. In 1821, 
when the Islamic Fulani conquered the Hausa kingdom, there were intermarriages 
between the two groups and the consequent learning of each other’s language and culture. 
The Hausa-Fulani are found in West Africa: Northern Nigeria, Southern Niger Republic, 
Senegambia, Benin Republic, Ivory Coast, Chad, Cameroun, and Guinea. The Fulani 
population that is semi-sedentary and semi-pastoral are scattered over the West African 
Savannah belt, namely, Senegal, Gambia, Guinea, Mauritania, Sudan, Ivory Coast, Chad, 
Cameroun, Ghana, Bissau, Benin, Dahomey, etc. The sedentary communities are found 
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in Western Sudan, Senegal, Gambia, Nigeria, etc.8 Hausa-Fulani communities live in 
family groups in compounds’ or gida, in Hausa, with a compound head, a maigida, who 
is usually the oldest man.9  
The Hausa were in the process of expansion for many centuries. Much of the 
expansion was peaceful, because of Hausa skill at statecraft and commerce which was 
built on family relationships and negotiations. The web of relationships is linked by 
patrilineal family ties and is organized around male figures.10 In their political 
organization, the Hausa-Fulani are ruled by feudal kings called emirs, a title given to 
Muslim religious and political leaders. The emir has subordinate chiefs, alhaji (i.e. one 
who has done the haji) and local rulers, who are responsible for the administrative 
supervision of the communities. They also help to maintain social harmony and peace 
within the communities. While these rulers are predominantly males, the situation 
appears to be different in the pre-colonial era. Zainab Kabir noted that the status of 
women was high in early Hausa society because women were not confined and interacted 
freely with people. They married at a later age than is currently common among the 
Muslin Hausa. They were important members of the bori cult, possessed a significant 
role in both domestic and community religious rituals, and held titles such as bori 
magadjiya, that is, Bori cult leader. Some groups of Hausa had matrilineal inheritance. 
There were possibilities of women being queens or titleholders. An example is the 
famous warrior queen Amina. She was one of the many great queens, according to 
Kabir.11  
Furthermore, the Maguzawa or the Hausa that follow traditional religion allowed 
and still allow greater privileges for women. Their women are freer to go out in public. 
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The Maguzawa do not practice wife-seclusion at all, while the Muslim Hausa-Fulani do 
practice it. Wife-seclusion helps to distinguish the Muslim Hausa-Fulani from their 
neighbors, hence, serving as ethnic boundary marker. Historically, the Hausa-Fulani ruled 
over local ethnic groups, and these subject ethnic groups were not Muslims, thus, their 
women were allowed greater freedom. Wife-seclusion and control of women were 
adopted as essential in the structuring of ethnic relations and in the maintenance of ethnic 
boundaries.12  
Among the Fulani are the Holy men, barka, who act as intercessors. They earn 
their holiness by genealogy or from their teachers, prophets of Islam. Ultimate holiness 
comes from Allah, God. These holy men perform a variety of functions including trading, 
craftsmanship, divining, healing, and providing medicine, which includes amulets. The 
people use and respond very well to herbal medications such as lekki bhale and lekki 
porto, that is, black and white medicines, respectively. According to Gordon and Sall, the 
time and choice of treatment, shame and concern for others’ opinions contribute very 
much to the treatment decision of Fulani patients. In their time of illness and in seeking 
treatment, patients suffering from bluuri-mmhuuru, the mother of all illnesses, tend to 
focus on God and on other peoples’ opinions. Shame and fear trigger the desire to be 
discreet and dignified in order to live up to pulaaku. Pulaaku is the essence of being 
Fulani, or the foundation of the Fulani self-image, that is, dignity, self-control, patience, 
self-sufficiency, and religiosity.13  
The Fulani feel a close relationship with God, especially in times of sickness 
when there is no one else to turn to. In Gordon and Sall’s interview with Fulani patients, 
men recounted how they turned to God, Allah, when ill. According to Gordon and Sall, in 
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everyday conversations, one hears that the fate of events and healing is in God’s hands, 
insha Allah (Arabic) or si Allah dyabbi (Fulani-Hausa).14 Sickness, especially mental 
illness, is seen as a result of spirit possession, or bori possession.15   
iii. The Igbo  
The Igbo people are one of the major ethnic groups of Nigeria. The tropical forest 
areas of South Eastern Nigeria are their traditional home, but many Igbo people are in 
diaspora. They are patrilineal, although the filiation of physical life and heredity is bi-
lineal. The Igbo say, ndị igbo na-eri na nna, ma na-ebi, na-erikwa n’ibe nne na n’ibe 
nna, i.e., the Igbo share a paternal bloodline and also live and derive from both the 
paternal and maternal lines.16 They possess a common culture and language, Igbo or 
asụsụ igbo, which belongs to the Niger-Congo language cognate group with Yoruba, Tiv, 
and Effik. This is the Kwa language family of forest dwellers.17  Their society is arranged 
into families, villages, and lineages. The family is headed by the father assisted by the 
wife. Beyond the parental authority, the first born male, diọkpara, and the first female 
child, ada, possess authority over other siblings in the family.18 Groups of families form a 
village community, ụmụnna, that is, members of the same patrilineage, because they are 
descendants of the same founding ancestor after whom the community is often named. 
The community is the central social unit of Igbo society.  It is the realm of communal 
conduct of affairs independent of the elders or some distinguished group who convene in 
order to make decisions by consensus.19 The community forms the Igbo system of 
government in which the kinship functions bilaterally, that is, by making for ụmụnna 
politics as well as the expression of social democracy. 20  
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The Igbo people are deeply religious. This was testified to by a British Divisional 
Officer responsible for the Southern Nigeria in the 1900s. According to him, the Igbo 
people 
are in the strict and natural sense of the word a truly and a deeply religious people, of 
whom it can be said that they eat religiously, drink religiously, bathe religiously, dress 
religiously, and sin religiously.  In a few words, the religion of these natives as I have 
all along endeavored to point out is their existence, and their existence is their 
religion.21    
 
Today most Igbo are Christians with few traditional African religious worshipers and few 
Muslims.  
Besides the general Igbo who are patrilineal, there is a section of the Igbo that is 
matrilineal. Daryll Forde and Gwilym Iwan Jones refer to this group as the “Cross River 
Igbo.” They are located immediately to the west of the Cross River. The Cross River Igbo 
include the Ihe, Aro, Abam, Abiriba, Nkporo, Ada, and Ohaffia. They differ from the rest 
of the Igbo in their system of kinship and marriage, in their rules of inheritance and 
succession, and in the forms of their men’s associations and cults.22 There are two 
recognized descent groups or systems: the matrilineage and patrilineage. The 
matrilineage is an exogamous group as well as the main property-inheriting and land-
owning group, especially in the Ohaffia area. The matrilineal Igbo claim common 
allegiance from the ancestress for whom the group is named. The patrilineage is also an 
exogamous group, and their residence is patrilocal. The patrilineages are territorial 
units.23 Unlike the rest of the Igbo, there are no ritual staves of headship, ọfọ, ikenga, and 
other typical Igbo religious deities, as well as symbols among the Cross River Igbo.  
In governance and decision-making, there is dual headship in matrilineage. For 
example, the Ohaffia have two heads, a male and a female head. The male head performs 
secular duties, settling disputes, protecting the rights and interests of members in the land 
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or estate and resources. On the other hand, the female head performs sacred duties. The 
duties are ritual in character, such as making sacrifices to the sacred pot, ududu, among 
the Ohaffia. Each of the ududu represents an ancestress. In matrilineage, a male cannot be 
the ritual head of the ancestress. The women have their traditional law-keeping body, the 
ikpirikpe. It is responsible for handling of the affairs of the women (i.e., adult women) of 
the village. It operates independently of the men. Only ikpirikpe can deal with the affairs 
of women, especially the offences committed by women. For instance, according to 
Nsugbe, in the case of adultery, the men’s age grade/group, ụmụaka judges and penalizes 
the man involved but not the woman. It is the women who deal with the female 
accomplice to adultery.24  
In general decision-making and overseeing the family, the village and community 
revolve around the men. In Ohaffia, for instance, the most powerful body is the ụmụaka 
men’s age grade. They are recruited by the age grade immediately above (ndi ichin, the 
retiring elders). The members of ụmụaka are chosen on the basis of their character and 
achievement. No women are recruited into this group.25 However, the ikpirikpe women 
group can challenge the decision of the male age group. Though the village head, eze-
ogo, is male, he does not run the affairs of the community, at least not openly. He neither 
attends village meetings nor presides over them. As Nsugbe puts it, the primary function 
of the village head is “a fearless emissary: heading delegations, sometimes on behalf of 
the whole of Ohaffia, to government ministers, and high-ranking officials of his 
region.”26 One can say, therefore, that his function as the community head is external 
relations. In village and community meetings/assemblies, decisions are made by seeking 
and reaching consensus as is the case with the Igbo.27  
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iv. The Yoruba 
Like the Akan and Igbo, the Yoruba belong to the Kwa language group. The 
Yoruba are one of the largest ethno-linguistic groups in Africa. They are home to 
Southwestern Nigeria, South Eastern Benin, Togo, Sierra Leone, and Southeastern 
Ghana. But the main concentration is in Nigeria where they form the majority ethnic 
group in about a third of the thirty-six (36) states of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 
Because of the slave trade and migration, there are many Yoruba in diaspora. Such is the 
case of Brazil, Cuba, and the Caribbean.28  Similar to other Africans, the Yoruba are 
deeply religious people, believing in a Supreme God, Olorun, or Oludumare. For the 
Yoruba, everything is imbued with the sacred. Traditionally, right actions are to be 
achieved through ritual and sacrifice as recommended by the ifa oracular and divinatory 
corpus. The belief is that one should consult ifa prior to any of life’s major undertakings. 
Ifa will then prescribe the appropriate rituals and realization of the correct results. Ifa 
makes its prescription through the babalawo or the shaman.29 Like the Hausa-Fulani and 
the majority of the Igbo, the Yoruba are patrilineal. Today, most Yoruba are either 
Muslims or Christians. Islam is favored as more compatible with the traditional culture of 
the people, as, for example, in allowing polygyny. Similarly, Islamic medicine is seen as 
sharing characteristics with the religio-medical system of the Yoruba. Like the Akan, 
Hausa-Fulani, Igbo and other ethnic groups in Africa, there are dual medical systems, 
indigenous or ATM, and the Western medical system. Both systems have been in 
competition since the introduction of Western medical system by the European colonizers 
and the missionaries.30  
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4. A. 2. Meaning and History and Interesting Developments in ATM 
 
It was Bob Marley the great reggae musician who said in his song: Buffalo 
Soldier:  
If you know your history,  
Then you would know where you coming from,  
Then you wouldn't have to ask me,  
Who the 'eck do I think I am.31 
 
It makes sense, therefore, to spend some time in this section to trace the history and 
meaning of ATM. This will help situate and give foundation to the study of informed 
consent in ATM. This section will also explore some interesting developments that are 
helping to strengthen and foster ATM practices and better patient care.  
i. Meaning and History of ATM  
According to J. O. Mume, traditional medicine is the transmission verbally and 
“by example (of) the knowledge and practice based on customary methods of natural 
healing or treatment of disease.”32 Abayomi Sofowora understands traditional medicine 
as “the total combination of knowledge and practice, whether explicable or not, used in 
diagnosing, preventing, or eliminating a physical, mental, or social disease, and which 
may rely exclusively on past experience and observation handed down from generation to 
generation, verbally or in writing.”33 One can say that the term “African Traditional 
Medicine” (ATM), describes the medical practices and knowledge that existed before the 
arrival of the allopathic or modern Western style medicine on the African continent. It is 
transmitted either verbally, through practice, or in writing. The system incorporates the 
use of plants, animals, and mineral-based medicines, spiritual therapies, manual 
techniques, as well as exercises, diagnosis, treatment and prevention of illness, as well as 
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maintenance of health and well-being.34 ATM concern is for the well-being of both the 
individual and the community.  
For thousands of years a majority of the world’s population had used and 
continues to use the traditional method of healing and medicine. Similarly, the African 
people have used methods of healing suited to Africa. These methods evolved over 
millions of years interchanged with other regions such as the Mediterranean and these 
predate Western medicine in Africa.35 It is recorded that the ancient Egyptian medicine 
reflects African impulses, and has shaped ideas of neighboring civilizations, especially 
the medicine of classical Greek and Roman antiquity. Before colonization, ATM had 
come into contact with other medicines such as those of the early Christian faith healing 
that moved across North Africa and Egypt, the Mediterranean, Persia, Arabia, classical 
Greek and Roman antiquity, as well as those of Islam. Some of the medical practices 
associated with such contacts include hot/cold thermal (humeral) treatment, balance 
exercises, and homeopathy. By the early second millennium CE, these types of traditional 
medical practice were already known in the African Savannah countries.36  
By far colonialism brought about the largest contact between Europe and Africa, 
and between Western or allopathic medicine and ATM. This contact exposed Africa to 
the Western cultural socioeconomic system and to institutions such as education, health 
care, and legal systems. Unlike earlier contacts, intercourse with Europe via colonialism 
was unequal, forced, unbalanced, and protracted. Africans were subjected to Western 
cultural systems against their will. While colonialism had some positive effects, such as 
education, it, by and large, belittled, demeaned, and in some cases eroded existing 
traditional socioeconomic, religious, and medical beliefs and practices.37 ATM and its 
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practices were either forbidden or ridiculed by the colonizers as crude, unimportant, and 
devilish, even as witchcraft and quackery. Under colonial rule, ATM-practitioners in 
some areas were accused of practicing witchcraft and were, therefore, outlawed. 
Although modern or Western medicine was introduced to help the people, it was also 
designed to displace ATM and to eliminate the traditional healing system as a political 
and medical authority and advisor to the political leadership.38 For example, it has been 
noted that in Botswana, Tswana medicine was stamped out by the missionaries because, 
as a system, it was a major ideological, moral, and political force capable of inducing 
collective rejection of the missionaries and their ways.39 Consequently, doubts were 
raised about the authenticity of African traditional heritage and practices. David Lamb, an 
American journalist writing on the impact of colonialism on Africans rightly observed 
that,  
The colonialists left behind some schools and roads, some post offices and bureaucrats. 
But their cruelest legacy on the African continent was a lingering inferiority complex, a 
confused sense of identity. After all, when people are told for a century that they’re not as 
clever or capable as their masters, they eventually start to believe it.40  
 
After independence, while some African countries continued to look down on or 
even ban ATM, some African governments promoted and continued to promote ATM. In 
Mozambique, for example, after its independence in 1975, diviner-healers were sent to 
re-education camps. In South Africa, at the time of Apartheid, the 1974 Health Act 
together with “its 1982 amendments restricted traditional healers’ performance of any act 
related to medical practices.” These laws notwithstanding, ATM in its resilience, 
survived the Apartheid era. It was utilized at all educational and socio-economic levels.41 
When the African National Congress (ANC) became the ruling government in 1994, it 
formulated the White Paper for the Transformation of the Health System in South Africa, 
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which authorized traditional healers to form part of a wider primary health care group.42 
In 2007, the government promulgated the Traditional Health Practitioners’ Act 22 to 
inaugurate the Interim Traditional Health Practitioners’ Council of South Africa. The 
council was charged with the responsibility to regulate the registration, training and 
practice of practitioners, and to protect people who utilize ATM services.43 This 2007 Act 
was followed by the Traditional Healers Practitioners Code of Ethics of 2010. 
In spite of all the colonial hostility, the difficulties and banning, ATM has 
survived albeit with some struggles. Now it is flourishing and, according to the World 
Health Organization (WHO), ATM serves about 80% of the population of Africa.44 
Reasons have been adduced for the success of ATM. For example, there are few Western 
medical hospitals and clinics in proportion to the population, and most of these hospitals 
and clinics are poorly equipped. Also, ATM adopts a holistic approach to health and 
illness, an approach that is at home in the local culture.45  
ii. Interesting Developments in ATM  
Lately, WHO is promoting not only the practice of ATM but also the integration 
of both ATM and Western medical systems to serve the people better. People and 
governments in Africa are responding to WHO’s call. As a result, there are certainly 
some very interesting developments which include varying degrees of collaboration and 
integration of ATM and Western medical systems, political commitments, research 
institutes, and the formation of local, national and international professional organizations 
and associations of ATM practitioners. These have also been discussed by the author 
elsewhere.46 
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 Organizations and Associations 
Because of the call and campaign made by WHO, the status of ATM doctors was 
enhanced. They began to collaborate more and to form support groups and associations. 
Such organizations and associations now abound and include the Association for 
Scientific Identification, Conservation and Utilization of Medicinal Plants of Nigeria 
(ASICUMPON); the Ghana Federation of Traditional Medicine Practitioners Association 
(GHAFTRAM); Traditional Medicine Healers Associations in Bulamogi County, 
Uganda, etc. These groups and associations share information regarding their experiences 
in the practice of both ATM and the materia medica. Such information concerns new 
herbs, medications, their uses, their therapeutic potency, their side effects, the etiology of 
diseases, and their treatment. The groups also facilitate the regulation, monitoring, and 
evaluation of ATM doctors and their practices. In other words, they serve as peer review.  
Research Institutes 
In addition to the formation of associations of ATM doctors, there are 
establishments of ATM training and research institutes such as Pax Herbal Clinic and 
Research Laboratories, St. Benedict's Monastery, Ewu-Ishan, Nigeria; Centre for 
Scientific Research into Plant Medicine, Ghana; Noguchi Memorial Institute for Medical 
Research, Ghana; Centre Expérimental de Médicine Traditionnelle (CEMETRA); 
PROMETRA Traditional Medicine Research and Treatment Centers (Promotion de 
Médicine Traditionnelle)etc. CEMETRA was founded in 1989 and is located in 
Founiougne, Senegal, with the permission of the Senegalese government but is sponsored 
by a Dutch institution, Nederlandse Organisatie voor Internationale 
Ontwikkelingssamenwerking (NOVIB). The centre has carried out several 
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multidisciplinary and cross sector-based research studies, both independently and in 
collaboration with African and American institutions, organizations, and universities. The 
research studies are intended or designed to promote and develop ATM.   PROMETRA 
Centers, however, abound in various countries of Africa including Benin, Burkina-Faso, 
Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory 
Coast, Kenya, Mali, Mozambique, Senegal, South Africa, Togo, and Uganda. 
PROMETRA is a non-governmental organization whose mission, like that of 
CEMETRA, is to promote and protect traditional medicine and indigenous science. It 
accomplishes this mission through scientific research, provision of traditional medicine 
services, education, training and advocacy, as well as scientific, cultural, and spiritual 
exchanges.47 It serves as an instrument for African integration and international relations.  
The education and research centers and institutes bring ATM doctors and 
intellectuals together via seminars, studies, conferences, and various training sessions. 
There is a more intentional and controlled use of natural materials as well as laboratory 
analysis of medicinal plants. This has brought about more intensified use and an 
analytical understanding of the medicinal materials.48 There is also the classification 
(taxonomy), documentation, and publication of the medicinal plants as well as the 
resulting products. United Nations World Health Organization (UN WHO) is also 
involved and supports some of these organizations and centers in promoting ATM.  
WHO in collaboration with African member states has developed programs, policies, 
regulations, codes of ethics, and has published documents regarding ATM.  
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Political Commitments 
Following the call of the World Health Organization to member countries to 
foster relationships between Western style medicine and ATM, the African Union (then 
Organization of African Unity) became involved. Thus, the African Heads of State and 
Government that met in Abuja, Nigeria, in April 2001 as well as in Maputo, 
Mozambique, in July 2003 declared that research on ATM used for the treatment of 
malaria, HIV/AIDS, and other infectious diseases ought to be made a priority in the 
continent of Africa.49 Given such declarations, in July 2001 the African Heads of state 
convened in Lusaka and designated the period 2001-2010 as the decade for ATM. Then, 
when WHO developed a Regional Strategy on Promoting the Role of Traditional 
Medicine in Health Systems, the document was adopted in 2000 by the fiftieth session of 
the WHO Regional Committee for Africa in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. This 
strengthened the collaboration of WHO with the African Union and authorized WHO to 
develop and assist African committees in crafting and publishing model and real policy, 
regulatory and ethical codes regarding ATM. Consequently, many documents about 
ATM have been published and issued by WHO African Region. In addition, in response 
to the request of African member states, in 2002, WHO designated August 31st as the 
annual ATM Day.50 The first was commemorated with the theme: African Traditional 
Medicine: Our Culture, Our Future. Thus, there is a high level political interest in and 
commitment to ATM at both country, regional, (African Union) and WHO levels as 
noted above.  
Federal and/or local governments in some countries of Africa have established 
some regulatory and monitoring systems for ATM and its practices. Such regulatory and 
183 
 
monitoring systems include the code of ethics and standards of practice. For example, in 
Ghana there is the “Code of Ethics and Standards of Practice for Traditional Medicine 
Practitioners.” This was issued by the Ghanaian Ministry of Health in October 2004 and 
sponsored by the Ghanaian National Drugs Programme. In South Africa, there are the 
Traditional Health Practitioner’s Act Number 22 of 2007, and the Traditional Healers 
Practitioners Code of Ethics of 2010. All of these, the Plan of Action for the 
implementation of the decade for ATM, the declarations and resolutions by political 
leaders, associations of practitioners, training and research centers etc, and the support of 
WHO and its partners further boost the development of ATM to the benefit of the 
immense majority of Africans who use ATM in meeting their health care needs.  
However, there are also varying degrees of development in the relationship 
between ATM and the Western style medicine in Africa. There are countries where ATM 
doctors are not yet involved in the National System of Care, and there are no regulations 
for registration or licensing of ATM doctors. By 2001, some of these countries included 
Cape Verde, Comoros, Ivory Coast, and Seychelles.51 Then, there are countries that have 
established a system of registration for ATM doctors but do not officially legislate their 
practices. Likewise, these countries do not encourage participation by an ATM doctor in 
primary health care initiatives. As of 2001 the countries in this group were Angola and 
the Central African Republic.52  Finally, there are countries like Ghana, which have truly 
incorporated ATM into its primary health care. According to Mensah, about seventy per 
cent of Ghana’s population now depends exclusively on health care provided by 
approximately 45,000 ATM doctors.53 Most are recognized and licensed by various 
associations of ATM doctors. At the same time, these associations come under the 
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umbrella of the Ghana Federation of Traditional Medicine Practitioners’ Association. 
According to Romero-Daza, Ghana has not only incorporated ATM into its National 
Health Care System but has also passed decrees to regulate and ensure the safety of other 
traditional medical practices such as homeopathy, naturopathy, and osteopathy.  
Finally, what do these developments mean for informed consent? The 
developments confirm that ATM is not a quack or illicit practice but an effective health 
care service recognized locally, nationally, and internationally. Thus, there is the call for 
its integration into the National Health Care System. These developments also confirm 
that ATM has a scientific base upon which it can be evaluated in the same way as the 
Western medicine by using empirical science. Thus, the pharmaceutical products of ATM 
are tested, regulated, and monitored, accordingly.  
4. A. 3. ATM and African Traditional Religion (ATR)  
In Africa, it is believed that health and illness are inextricably linked with the 
supernatural as well as with the biological and the psychosocial spheres. Disease and 
misfortunes are often understood as religious experiences. They require, therefore, some 
religious approach in dealing with them.54 Among the Yoruba, for instance, people adopt 
a holistic approach to health, or Alafia meaning “peace.” It is a philosophy of life in 
which health and death are tied to the ATR.55 This section explores the very important 
intimate connection between ATM and (ATR). 
i. African Traditional Religion (ATR)   
ATR is more or less a way of life for the community and permeates every aspect of 
African life: farming, hunting, love and courtship, marriage, birth and death, funeral, life 
after death, and medicine. Therefore, some knowledge or understanding of African 
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traditional religion is necessary in order to understand ATM better. First of all, ATR is 
not a revealed religion, at least not in the sense of Christianity or Islam. It does not have 
historical persons through whom the revelations come. It deals with the meaning of being 
human, the correlation between the physical and spiritual world, between suffering and 
evil, and between human actions in the present life and in their fate in the afterlife.56 ATR 
allows a belief in a genderless Supreme Being as a creator, guider, and protector. This 
Supreme Being is worshiped by prayers, invocation, sacrifices, offerings, as well as by 
songs and dance. In addition to the Supreme Being, there are divinities, spirits, and 
ancestors who are also worshiped or venerated, and who are believed to play various 
active roles in the health and well-being of the African people. Mbiti expressed the 
relationship as follows,  
God is the originator and sustainer of human beings; the spirits explain the destiny of 
human beings; human beings are the center of the ontology; animals, plants, natural 
phenomena, and objects constitute the environment in which human beings live, provide 
a means of existence, and, if need be, human beings establish a mystical relationship with 
them.
57   
 
In ATR, it is said that the vocation and the power to practice medicine come from 
God, the spirits, or even from the ancestors; that the ATM-doctors are chosen either by 
the ancestors, or the gods, or the spirits.58 Among the Igbo people, for example, agwụ is 
the patron spirit of doctors, whose persistent possession of an individual is a sign that one 
is being called to be an ATM doctor. Northcote W. Thomas, an anthropologist who 
conducted one of the earliest studies on agwụ attests to this, saying “It is perhaps a little 
singular that agụ (agwụ) is a sort of tutelary deity of the doctors. If he pursues an 
ordinary individual with misfortune until the limit of his patience is reached and no 
remedy can be found, it is a sign that the man should become a doctor.”59 Cardinal 
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Francis Arinze in his work noted that “the clearest and indispensable sign of vocation to 
be a dibịa, is possession by the spirit of agwụ, who is the special spirit of ndị dibịa, the 
spirit of giddiness, rascality, discomposure, confusion, and forgetfulness (mmụọ mkpasa 
uche).”60   
There are instances of apprentices or doctors testifying that they came to the 
profession led by the spirit that possessed them.61 In some instances, the spirit continued 
to disturb its candidates for medical practice till they accepted the vocation. Some 
practitioners even employ the assistance of the gods and spirits in their medical practice. 
Some diviners, for example, are able to enter a sort of altered consciousness, a trance 
which helps them to commune with the ancestors.62 For others, the spirit continues to use 
them as mediums to communicate or give messages back and forth from the spirit world 
to the physical world. This will be discussed in detail below under “types of doctors.” 
These people are often called the diviner doctors or mediums.  
The Babalawo of the ifa tradition (that is, diviners) in Yoruba predict events by 
focusing not on the problem but on the individuals or the patients. They know themselves 
and their clients very well.63 The ifa receive their powers from Orunmila and act as its 
mouthpiece among the Yoruba. They utilize an opele (divining) chain, to communicate 
and interpret the 26 odu or sacred stories of ifa. In casting the specific odu for a patient or 
client, the ifa-priest is able to mesh the universal energy and wisdom of the particular odu 
with the specific circumstances facing the client. According to Epega and Neimark, it is 
the “marriage between the truth of the odu and the reality of the client that creates a 
unique and individual interpretation of current and future events.”64  
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ii. Community in Understanding ATM & ATR 
The notion of community helps to highlight the relation between ATR and ATM. 
Community for the Africans includes the living, the (dead) ancestors, as well as the entire 
invisible supernatural world embracing the spirits and God. Consequently, illness 
concerns both the living and the dead, ancestors and the spirits. Illness is believed to be 
caused not only by germs themselves but primarily by interpersonal relationships, such as 
a breakdown in human relationships.  Illness often signifies a malaise in the community 
of the living and the dead or spirit world. For example, mental and physical illnesses are 
believed, sometimes, to be the result of conflict between an individual and the ancestors, 
deity, or spirit. Therefore, the cure is not only achieved by means of herbs and other 
natural products but also by communicating with the ancestors, who in turn intercede 
with the Supreme Being. Thus, healing involves reestablishing the right relationships 
between the sick, and the community, and its ancestors. In such cases, the illness is cured 
by accepting responsibility to resolve conflicts with the concerned party and to make 
amends with the community, including its ancestors.65 According to Dr. Afolabi Epega, a 
Yoruba ifa priest, babalawo, and Philip Neimark an American babalawo, diviners utilize 
“the probabilities of future events by restoring harmonious balance” in the patient via 
ritual sacrifices, and prayer. Epega and Neimark point out further that the diviners foresee 
what is likely to happen if clients or patients remain in their current state or situation. 
Diviners understand that “restoring harmonious energy” by using the right divining tools 
to arrive at the right diagnosis, “enables them to alter unpleasant future events.”66 
Therefore, the diviners undertake the restoration of harmonious energy and alteration of 
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unpleasant future events in the life of their patients because they focus primarily on the 
patients and community and not only on the problems of the patients.67 
When the source of the illness is suspected to be of a supernatural cause, it brings out 
the close ties between the medical and the religious systems, ATM and ATR, Islam or 
Christianity. Because illness is seen as a religious experience, it therefore requires some 
religious approach to deal with it. For ATM in such a case, the sick person is drawn to the 
diviner priest doctor, babalawo, for the Yoruba, and dibịa afa for the Igbo. Thus, some of 
the ATM practitioners employ traditional African religious rituals and means in dealing 
with such illness.  
In addition to performing traditional African religious rituals, the ATM doctors 
spend much time with their patients giving them personal attention, which enables the 
doctors to penetrate deep into the psychological state of the patients. The importance of 
this action depends on the frame of mind of the African patients. As Mbiti rightly 
observed, if an African is told that she is suffering from malaria caused by a mosquito 
whose bite contains the malaria parasite, she would want to know why she rather than 
another person, her co-wife or her neighbor, was chosen by the mosquito. The patient 
often believes that someone by some mysterious means caused the agent of the disease, 
in this case the mosquito, to attack the sick person. Such line of reasoning brings about 
the magical connotation of ATM. Healing, therefore, includes finding and countering or 
uprooting the cause of an ailment as well as a misfortune. Treatment also involves 
medication, as well as psychological and spiritual interventions.68 Many ATM doctors are 
experts in psychotherapy, using various techniques to “probe deep into the hidden 
problems of a patient to bring them out to the open, and clear them from the patient’s 
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mind.”69 Speaking in reference to the ATM doctors’ expertise in psychotherapy, 
Professor Dopamu observed that  
The Yoruba have discovered with greater exactitude than the Western doctors that 
psychotherapy has always formed an essential and dynamic basis for effective methods of 
treatment. It enables us to know the relationship between the patient and the medicine-
man (or woman). The medicine-man … must first of all look into the social, cultural and 
intellectual environment and background of the patient. He can then evaluate and 
interpret the cause of the disease, and give the necessary help.70  
 
The ATM doctors employ an indigenous psychotherapeutic approach in the 
management of    patient care. It was Plato (420-348 B.C.) who said of the practice of 
medicine in the West that,  
As you ought not to attempt to cure the eyes without the head, or the head without the 
body, so neither ought you to attempt to cure the body without the soul; and this … is the 
reason why the cure of many diseases is unknown to the physicians of Hellas, because 
they are ignorant of the whole, which ought to be studied also; for the part cannot be well 
unless the whole is well… And therefore, if the head and the body are to be well, you 
must begin by curing the soul; that is the first thing.71  
 
This highlights the tendency in the Western medical doctors to treat the physical 
body without regard for the spiritual self, or the soul, and not focusing on the whole 
person. On the other hand, as noted above, from the beginning ATM focuses directly on 
the spiritual, or mystical, and psychological causes as well as the physical or organic 
causes of illness. Thus, ATM doctors speak of such causes of illness as punishment 
accruing from offended or aggrieved spirits, deities, or ancestors, as results of witchcraft 
or sorcery, and as pre-ordained destiny.72  
The idea of illness and misfortune being sometimes seen as religious experiences 
is currently rampant and popular within independent African churches. The use of 
religious rituals in dealing with illness and misfortune resonates with the Christian 
Sacrament of the Sick. Therefore, from the discussion so far, one sees that the ATM 
system considers and treats natural, supernatural, and psychological causes of illness and 
misfortune. It acknowledges the potential of dangerous people including witches and 
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sorcerers, as well as entities such as evil spirits, deities, and ancestors as ever-present 
dangers operative in the community.73  
4. A 4 ATM Doctors: Types, Vocation, and Training 
There are various African traditional healers or doctors. A survey of the literature 
shows the following: herbalists, diviners, magicians, rainmakers, and priests who offer 
sacrifices or conduct rituals and prayers.74 The ATM doctors are classified into five 
groups even though they may have various names in accordance with the respective 
different languages and ethnic groups in Africa. For instance, among the Yoruba there are 
babalawo ifa (priests and diviners), onisegin or adahunse (herbalists). The Igbo have 
dibịa afa (diviner), dibịa ọgwụ (herbalist), dibịa aja (priests who perform sacrifices), and 
ọghọnwa (traditional birth attendant), to mention but a few. Some doctors identify 
themselves principally as one type of healer. Others combine more than one type. For the 
purpose of this study, the following five categories of ATM doctors will be considered: 
diviners, herbalists, traditional birth attendants, priest healers, and traditional surgeons.75  
In the colonial and post-colonial periods, a new group came into being, namely, prophets 
or faith healers who divine and heal within the context of the African Independent 
Churches.76 These groups include both men and women, young and old. Gender does not 
constitute a problem in the practice of ATM as there are more women among the 
traditional birth attendants and in treatment of children than in other categories. In some 
ethnic groups, for example among the Yoruba, women are not allowed to treat mental 
illness and other conditions that require the use of powerful supernaturally charged 
medicines because of the fear that “exposure to such forces by the female ATM doctor 
causes infertility or birthing of deformed children.”77  
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The five categories of ATM doctors will now be described individually beginning 
with the diviners.   
i. Diviners  
Diviners form an essential link between humans and the supernatural. They 
customarily diagnose illness by throwing cards, bones or stones, and by drawing lines on 
the floor with chalk while consulting the ancestors. In common phraseology, this act of 
casting objects is sometimes referred to as a “floor X-ray.” It is so-called because the 
diviner is able to diagnose the problem from the pattern formed by the fallen bones or 
stones. Some diviners are believed to be able to enter a trance-like state of altered 
consciousness which allows them to commune with the ancestors. This form of 
divination is called the “mediumistic.”  
The medium falls into a trance and is able to communicate with both the spirits 
and the people. The body language and words of the medium must be interpretable. Thus, 
it is not simply mere spirit possession or madness but intermediary function, linking 
human beings with ancestors and spirits.78  Wim Van Binsbergen distinguished four 
major states of possessions: (1) extremely momentary but intensive; these are usually 
accompanied by drumming, singing, and sometimes smoking; (2) permanent with 
diffused, non-intensive manifestations; however, there are possessions at re-activated 
intervals; (3) others which are similar to the above in being non-intensive manifestations; 
that is, they are realized after “a short, unique period of more acute and intensive 
manifestations;” (4) possessions that are permanent throughout life. These have only 
diffuse, non-intensive manifestations.79 Mbiti tells a story of a medium activity he 
witnessed and taped-recorded near Kampala in Uganda.  
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A young man was dressed up in a backcloth; put on a ring made of a creeping plant, and 
held another plant half a meter long in his hands. He sat down in the diviner’s room 
where a crowd of twenty-five to thirty people gathered. One of the men started to sing a 
highly rhythmical song, and the rest of the crowd joined with singing, clapping and 
rattling small gourds. The medium-to-be sat quietly on the floor without even turning his 
head. The singing and rattling went on for about thirteen minutes when suddenly the 
young man’s hands began to tremble. Three or four minutes later he started talking in an 
entirely different voice. The singing stopped and the diviner could then talk with the 
medium for about fifteen minutes in the middle of which the medium (or spirit in him) 
requested another song to be sung. At the end, the medium jumped about like a frog, 
banged his head hard on the floor and with his fist hit his own chest very hard twice or 
thrice. Then he was ‘normal’ once more.80  
 
When Mbiti cross-examined this apprentice afterwards, he assured Mbiti that he was not 
aware of what transpired during the possession. It is an example of a medium working 
with an ATM doctor or a diviner.81  
ii. Herbalists 
Herbalists are people who have acquired an extensive knowledge and experience 
of herbal medicine. They are able to prepare various medicines with plants, roots, barks, 
leaves, flowers, seed, fruits, and parts or whole animals and birds. Besides parts of plants 
and animals, herbalists utilize inorganic materials for their trade. These inorganic 
materials include chalks of various colors, salt, sulphur, alum, camphor, shells, pieces of 
rocks, and steel. The herbalists are masters and solicitors of the forest, collecting and 
preparing many of their herbal materials in dried, charred, and pulverized forms. In order 
words they prepare and offer their herbal medicines in various forms which include 
powder that the patients can mix with other foodstuff or drink, or be prepared as broth 
which is consumed by the patient. The patients can rub the powder into cuts made with a 
sharp knife on any part of the body. The powdered preparation can also be mixed with 
native soap, which is then used for bathing. These sort of medicated soaps are usually 
used for skin diseases. Likewise, the pulverized herbal medicine can be made into pastes, 
pomades, or ointments in a medium of palm oil or local butter.  Otherwise, the medical 
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material is chopped and soaked for some time either in water or in local gin, or boiled in 
water and then left to cool. This can be strained or decanted as required before drinking 
it.82  
Furthermore, because of their in-depth experience of the herbs and their 
preparations, herbalists are seen as traditional pharmacologists. They take interest in 
developing the indigenous and cultural endowments of their people. Besides using the 
herbal medicines for direct treatment and prescriptions, the herbalists display them in the 
open markets for anyone to buy. Usually herbalists do not possess occult powers. 
According to Eleanor Ross, not only are they able to diagnose illnesses and prescribe 
herbal medications and enemas for a range of ailments, they “are expected to provide 
protection against witchcraft, to prevent misfortune, and to bring prosperity and 
happiness.”83 In addition to possessing good knowledge of herbs, their preparation, 
administration and virtue, true herbalists are familiar with the “workings of the Natural 
Laws, which are inseparable from the Laws of health.”84 They (herbalists) respect and 
cooperate with these laws for the well-being of their patients. Modern herbalists are 
trained botanic physicians possessing their own botanic gardens. Sometimes, the ATM is 
wrongly referred to as herbal medicine or herbalism. The reason behind this use of a part 
(herbal medicine) for a whole (ATM) is because a lot of materials used in ATM derive 
from plants or herbal materials. Even some of the ATM doctors’ instruments such as the 
sacred staff, (ọfọ in Igbo language), and the doctors’ mystic bags (akpa agwu in Igbo 
language) woven from a herbal fiber, the raffia palm, all derive from herbal materials.85   
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iii. Traditional birth attendants (TBA)  
TBAs assist with delivery of babies. The members are predominantly women, as 
mentioned above. Although the nature as well as the detailed function of TBAs may vary 
from one ethnic group or community to another, TBAs exist in most communities or 
ethnic groups of the world. WHO defines TBA as “a person who assists the mother 
during childbirth and who initially acquired her skills by delivering babies herself or by 
working with other TBAs.” TBAs are often older women and are generally illiterate.86 In 
a study conducted by A. O. Imogie, E. O. Agwubike, and K. Aluko, in Edo State Nigeria, 
which is home to the Yoruba among other ethnic groups, the following functions or 
duties of the TBAs were identified. There is of course their main role as TBAs, assisting 
women with the delivery of babies. Other roles include family planning, nutritional 
requirements, recommendations,  
screening of high-risk mothers, fertility/infertility treatment, determination of ailments or 
abnormalities relating to reproductive organs and reproduction. They also include care of 
childbearing mothers during pregnancy, labour, and post-natal periods, care of the infants 
in health and disease/sickness, recruitment of new acceptors into TBA practice, 
counseling responsibilities, and preservation and conservation of herbal plants and their 
derivatives.87   
 
The study also found that childbearing mothers have preference for TBAs over 
mid-wives of Western medicine. The reason is that the TBA services are relatively 
inexpensive, and easily as well as readily accessible and available.  TBAs are near to the 
grassroots and use familiar language. They are rated and regarded as more efficacious; 
therefore, people have more confidence in them. They utilize natural herbs, and there is 
mutual trust as a result of their assumed respect for the peoples’ traditions and customs.88  
iv. Priests Healers 
In addition to prescribing medicine, the priests offer sacrifice and prayers on 
behalf of the community in times of calamities, such as drought, famine, and wars. They 
195 
 
also intercede for women experiencing difficulties such being barren. Some are mediums 
performing the functions of a medium delineated above. Thus, they function as priests, 
physician, and psychologist.89 Stephen N. Ezeanya, writing on the functions of the 
African traditional healers notes that priests in the traditional medical system are mainly 
concerned with the performance of sacrifices resulting from “abominable offences 
committed” against the ancestors, the gods, and human beings. He argues thus,  
A person who has committed an abominable act detestable to the divinities and men is 
really a sick person. Such acts like stealing, particularly of commodities like yams, fowls 
and goats, murder, incest, adultery committed by a wife and such-like offences are 
abominable acts and call for the healing from ministry of the priest.90  
 
In general, the priests, who include men and women, are chiefly intermediaries, 
standing between God, divinities, and human beings. Their duties are mainly religious; 
however, because Africans do not make much distinction between religion and other 
aspects of life, priests perform non-religious functions as well. Mbiti calls them “ritual 
pastors” of their community or nation because they officiate at sacrifices, offerings, and 
ceremonies according to their knowledge.91 Lately, this group has been joined by the 
prophets or faith healers, a post-colonial syncretism of Christianity and ATR. This post-
colonial group divines and heals within the context of the African Independent Churches. 
They utilize prayer, candlelight, water, enemas, and inhaling the vapor of substances 
poured over heated stones.92  
v. Traditional Surgeons  
There is little written about the African traditional surgeons and bonesetters. 
Among the Igbo the traditional surgeons are called dibia nka. Ross and Gessler et al. 
classify them as belonging to a group of the specialists within traditional healing but say 
nothing no more about them.93 Unlike those authors, Steven H Miles and Henry Ololo 
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give some account of African traditional surgeons and bonesetters. They distinguished 
traditional surgery from scarification. Scarification is done to denote maturity, kinship, or 
tribal identifications, and is often performed by elders, parents or chiefs. These people do 
not claim to be healers.94 Surgeons include the bonesetters. They perform various 
procedures, including incising and draining abscesses, tonsillar abscesses, uvulectomies 
to treat or prevent sore throats or to treat chronic coughing, circumcisions, repair of 
inguinal hernias, intrauterine injections of a fecal fluid from pregnant cows to restore 
fertility, scarification for snake bite, non-invasive cataract luxation, adult tooth extraction, 
abortion, and cutting out the primary canine tooth buds of infants and toddlers, to treat 
diarrhea.95 Orthopedic surgery is performed for closed and open fractures and 
osteomyelitis.96 Comminuted fractures are opened and explored. Bony fragments or 
devitalized bones are excised. Implant grafts of goat bones are sometimes used to replace 
excised bones. Splints of parallel sticks woven together with grasses or traction may be 
used after internal or external reduction.97 Generally, surgery is performed without 
anesthesia. Like other ATM doctors, traditional surgeons enter the trade by divine call or 
passage from family. They receive training in keeping with that of other ATM doctors.  
In general, ATM doctors are within the reach of the members of the community 
and can be visited or consulted by any person at any time.  They have the obligation to 
observe and uphold community values. They are expected to be trustworthy, friendly, 
morally upright, and able to discern peoples’ needs, willing and ready to serve. They are 
not to be exorbitant in their rates.98 The ATM costs contrast with those of Western 
medicine where corporate norms of profit-making tend to supersede over other 
organizational and professional values.99   
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ATM doctors acquire their skill through one or more of the following: 
inheritance, spirit possession, apprenticeship, and, more recently, by formal classroom 
training programs.100 In traditional societies, ATM doctors undergo a lengthy initiation as 
part of the process of qualification for practice. The duration of training varies from one 
ethnic group to another and sometime within an ethnic group. For instance, among the 
Yoruba, R. Prince and Una Maclean independently note that the training lasts from three 
to twenty years.101 The students are expected to acquire knowledge of the medicinal 
value, quality, and use of all the different parts of plants and trees: roots, leaves, fruits, 
barks, and grasses. They are also expected to learn the medicinal value and quality of 
various objects such as minerals, dead insects, feathers, powders, bones, excreta of 
animals and insects, eggs, shells, and smoke from various objects.102 Likewise, they learn 
the causes, prevention, and cure of diseases, illness, and other forms of suffering 
including “barrenness, failure in undertakings, misfortunes, and poor crop yield in the 
field, magic, witchcraft and sorcery.” The candidates acquire the skills to handle and 
combat the spirits, deities, and ancestors (living dead). The candidates learn some other 
various secrets, some of which they are not at liberty to divulge to the uninitiated.103 It is 
believed that the ATM doctors’ knowledge of traditional medicine is given to them as a 
gift for the common good. Medical knowledge is not an individual’s personal privilege. 
Rather, it is transmitted by the ancestors to the individual for the well-being of the 
community.104  
4. A. 5. Health and Illness: The Need to Seek Healing  
The World Health Organization defines health as “a state of complete physical, 
mental, and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity.” 
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However, different cultures and traditions have their own concept of both health and 
illness. Some of these may be quite different from or a nuanced version of the WHO 
definition. This section seeks to explore the concept of health and illness and the 
necessity for healing in ATM.  
i. Concept of Health and Illness 
In ATM, health is viewed holistically. Good health includes mental, physical, 
spiritual, and emotional well-being for patients, their immediate and extended family 
members, as well as for the community. Good health is also a conscious harmony with 
God, creation, and all beings.105 This description of health is close to the definition of 
health given by the WHO.  However, what is meant by a whole person in the African 
context is to be understood in terms of “I am, because you are,” wherein “I am” is seen as 
the product of one’s fellow human beings, ancestor spirits, supernatural forces, 
represented by  “you are.”106 The Yoruba, for example, believe in a holistic approach to 
Alafia (health) which literally means peace. It embraces physical, social, emotional, 
psychological, and spiritual well-being in a total environmental setting.107 Explaining the 
holistic approach to health among the Yoruba, Norma H. Wolff articulated the literature 
on the issue as follows:  
Physical health (ilera), a prerequisite to achieving life goals, is negatively impacted by 
aisan, minor illnesses, such as fevers, headaches, diarrhoea, and vomiting that interfere 
with daily activities, and arun, which includes serious pathological conditions, 
communicable diseases such as smallpox and venereal diseases, infirmities, chronic 
tiredness, debilitating mental illnesses, and unexplained misfortunes.
108  
 
The term “disease” is commonly used to denote disorders that result from the 
presence of pathogenic microbial agents, such as microbes, viruses, bacteria, fungi, 
protozoa, germs, multicellular organisms, and etc.109 Illness, on the other hand, is a 
phenomenon in which individuals perceive themselves as not feeling well. Illness is a 
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subjective feeling or experience. It is possible for a person to be diseased without being 
ill. For instance some human carriers of disease HIV, Sickle cell etc. are diseased but not 
ill. One can also be ill without being diseased. One perceives a normal experience as a 
medical condition. The basic difference between disease and illness is that disease is an 
objective phenomenon which is characterized by altered functioning of the body as a 
biological organism, while illness is a subjective phenomenon in which individuals 
perceive themselves as not feeling well. Disease may be objectively evaluated with some 
degree of certainty.110   
In traditional African belief, it is accepted that the gods, spirits, and ancestors do 
influence human affairs, including health and disease. Therefore, the cause of disease and 
ill health in ATM is sometimes attributed to mystical forces or spirits. In other words, 
illness is said to be caused also by the intervention of a supernatural or a human being 
who possesses special powers. The human beings with special powers include witches or 
sorcerers. These are accredited with causation of witchcraft. Other evil forces may cause 
illness as a retaliation or punishment for moral and spiritual failings, such as a religious 
and cultural taboo. 111 Among the Igbo, an example of a moral taboo is Ahiajoku, the 
stealing of yam. The doctors are able to see in a given illness other forces at work in the 
patient other than germs, microbes, viruses and bacteria. Healing is not reduced to a 
“body-parts” approach but incorporates the integral person. ATM, on the other hand, is 
an approach that is contrary to that of Western medicine which does not always consider 
the wholeness of the person (patient) as integer but limits treatment to a specific body 
system. At the heart of the difference in the two approaches is their world view.  
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The Western world view approaches the human person as a material body and a 
patient merely as a sick body. It tends to overlook the image of the patient as “a complex 
whole, the psychological, social, spiritual and even moral dimensions of the one to be 
made whole (healed), due to its inherent materialist and reductionist philosophy.”112 
Continuing, Theophilus Okere noted that the difference in approach is also the result of 
the ATM doctors’ “reliance on a cosmology populated with a multitude of micro and 
macro forces, visible and invisible, natural, preter-natural and super-natural, creating a 
disease etiology that is more credible and effective because they are more comprehensive 
than Western medical practice.”113 Individual illness is fully explained in the two realms 
of existence: it is comprehended as a manifestation of broken relationships within the 
community of the living, and as the sign of an existential situation of dissonance between 
the communities of the living and their ancestors.114  
ii. The Need to Seek Healing  
The sick person is expected to seek healing either from the ATM-doctor or from 
allopathic medicine. If a sick person does not want to seek healing, he is firmly 
encouraged and even persuaded by relatives and community to seek medical care. This 
practice is acceptable so long as the treatment meets the Standard of Care - it is clear and 
certain that it is the proper medication for the illness being treated and something an 
average ATM doctor would recommend. This type of practice arises from the fact that 
the patient (the individual), as we saw above, is part and parcel of both a family and a 
community. The individual’s life is intricately intertwined with the life of other people in 
the community. The individual exists because the group is and because the group exists 
the individual is. Therefore, when an individual is sick, the whole community is sick. 
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What happens to the individual happens to the community and, therefore, an individual’s 
sickness affects other people. Members of the community urge and accompany the sick 
person to seek healing. 
Another scenario is the traditional African doctor (healer) –patient relationship. 
Here, the traditional doctor, who sometimes is also the religious leader, divines both the 
sickness and treatment for it. In other words, the gods working through the traditional 
healer assists him in diagnosing the illness and in prescribing the treatment required. As a 
result of the expertise and the assistance of the spirits, the healer is revered not just as a 
physician who knows best but also as a mediator between humans and gods. Sometime 
he does know best. For example, in many cases, especially in rural communities, the 
traditional doctor, being a member of the community, knows not only the customs but 
also the families and their history. He is in a position to speak for the family. At times, 
even the patient’s family is part of the divination for the cure. Thus, it is difficult to speak 
of paternalism, at least not in the sense of the Western individualistic autonomy.115   
Some people use both traditional and allopathic medicine. Some switch from one 
to the other. According to Gordon Chavunduka, a former President of African Traditional 
Medicine Practitioner in Zimbabwe, the change of therapy is more likely to happen in the 
following circumstances: when the African traditional medicine fails to cure the illness in 
question, when the suspicions of the patient and his/her social group about the disease in 
question are not confirmed by the ATM doctor or when the patient and the relatives and 
community are unable to accept the ATM doctor’s diagnosis, or when the symptoms that 
were initially thought to be strange or supernatural disappears. These will cause the 
possible shift from traditional medicine to allopathic and vice versa.116   
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4. A 6 Decision-Making in Traditional African Society  
At this juncture, it is necessary to take a look at the ways decisions are made in 
traditional African societies. For that, this section concentrates on the usual four chosen 
ethnic groups: the Akan, Hausa-Fulani, Igbo, and the Yoruba. This section will conclude 
with some comments on the place of women and children in decision-making.  
When, in African traditional societies, one has to make serious and important 
decisions, including those that are medical, it is customary to involve the community --
the family, relatives, and kinsmen -- because one’s wellbeing is intertwined with the 
wellbeing of the community. Decision-making is by consensus, but only after extensive 
consultation. Sheila Shaibu’s study in Botswana supports this view. According to her, 
family- and community-centered decision-making are more common than individual 
decision-making in Botswana. Decision-making is the prerogative of a group that might 
include the extended family or even community leaders.117   
African elders and statesmen, the one-time President of Zambia, Kenneth Kaunda, 
the retired President of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, and Kwesi Wiredu all confirm that 
decision is by extensive deliberation, consultation, culminating in consensus, and that it is 
an immanent approach to social interaction. According to Kenneth Kaunda, in the 
original African societies, people operated by consensus. “An issue was talked out in 
solemn conclave until such time as agreement could be achieved.”118  Nyerere also 
asserts that “in African society, the traditional method of conducting affairs is by free 
discussion.”119 And in approval he quoted Guy Clutton-Brock: “The Elders sit under the 
big trees, and talk until they agree...”120 My experience among the Igbo, my people, as 
well as among the Borena, and Guji of Southern Ethiopia where I lived and worked as a 
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missionary for nine years, confirms these assertions. People will sit under the trees, in 
community arena, or on family premises for hours or days discussing issues until a 
consensus is reached. They would consult every pertinent child, woman, or man, if need 
be. Confirming this assertion, Wiredu writes, “there is considerable evidence that 
decision by consensus was often the order of the day in African deliberations, and on 
principle.”121 According to Elochukwu E. Uzukwu, among the Manja, the chief is 
represented as a rabbit with large and broad ears, symbolizing the chief as a great listener. 
His ears are open to the opinions of all, humans and spirits alike. How well he listens 
impacts on his authority and power. It is believed that the ruler is “installed” for the good, 
peace, and prosperity of the community. The ruler has the duty to protect the interest of 
the community and its members. The respect people have for the authority of the ruler or 
for the elders are linked to this indispensable service to the community.122 The assertions 
are true also of the Akan, Hausa-Fulani, Igbo, and Yoruba, the four ethnic groups 
considered in this dissertation.  
i. Decision-making among the Akan 
For example, among the Akan, Kofi Abrefa Busia, a former Prime Minister of 
Ghana noted that decisions were also made by consensus and reconciliation of sectional 
and common interests for the good of both the community and the individuals. He writes 
When a council, each member of which was the representative of a lineage, met to 
discuss matters affecting the whole community, it had always to grapple with the problem 
of reconciling sectional and common interests. In order to do this, the members had to 
talk things over: they had to listen to all the different points of view. So strong was the 
value of solidarity that the chief aim of the councilors was to reach unanimity, and they 
talked till this was achieved.123  
 
It is evident that community and common interests as well as the interests of the 
individuals are emphasized in decision-making. Painful lengthy discussions are 
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undertaken to ensure that everyone is heard, and to achieve consensus and unanimity. 
However, Akan society is a gynocracy, meaning that power, wealth, and independence 
were allotted to women.124 The queen mother is seen as the founder of the community. 
Besides, the queen mother decides who becomes the chief or the king. The king never 
chooses the queen; rather the queen is responsible for the selection of the candidate for 
the filling of the king post when it is vacant. She plays an active role in any decision 
regarding the running of the community.125  This has implications for decision-making 
among the Akan. It means that women are the leading voice or, at least, very much 
involved in decision-making in the Akan communities. Certainly, this was true of pre-
colonial Akan society.126  
ii. Decision-making among the Hausa-Fulani  
Decision-making among the Hausa-Fulani appears to be more male centered than 
in the other ethnic groups under study. Women are very much under the control of men, 
especially among the Muslim-Fulani who practice wife-seclusion, and observe the 
cultural ideal of masculine superiority in which the maigida, i.e., household head, is the 
complete master of his family. However, with skill at statecraft, decision-making can be 
said to be reached by consensus, considering both community as well as individual 
interests and well-being.  
Among the Jelgobe Hausa-Fulani, the chief or jooro (that is a merger of jom 
wuro, literally meaning village chief) is usually the most senior genealogically of all 
those who see themselves as members of the same community. Thus, the chieftaincy is 
not contested because the genealogy clearly indicates the candidate. The jooro is in 
power but does not exercise power. He does not compel his subjects to do something. 
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Rather, he “advises them, he is their arbiter, and he represents them in their relations with 
the canton chief and with the foreigners.”127 One concludes, then, that decision-making is 
not the unilateral decision of the leader or jooro, but is possibly made by reaching 
consensus and by weighing the interest and the good of both the community and the 
individuals concerned.   
iii. Decision-making among the Igbo  
Among the Igbo people of Southern Nigeria, decisions are traditionally made at 
various levels, depending on the issue at hand. Elders, ọfọ holders or other title holders, 
umuada (that is, daughters of the kindred married into other village-groups) may be 
included in the decision-making process. However, no side or individual possesses an 
overriding authority in decision-making. Issues are debated, and weighed face-to-face, in 
order to arrive at a compromise or consensus, no matter how long it takes. This has been 
described as Igbo democracy. Even though the elders are the leaders of the community, 
they function more as facilitators/mediators. For example, in a community meeting, 
nzuko ọha, a general assembly may decide cases for disputants when the elders have 
retired for private consultation (igba-izu). Charles Meek further notes that the elders 
“were a body of mediators and referees rather than of prosecutors and judges, and the 
community was a republic in the true sense of that term, i.e. a corporation in which 
government was the concern of all.”128 If orders are issued by the elders about matters 
that affect the life of the entire community without having been previously discussed or 
negotiated, they are ignored. Thus, it buttresses the idea igbo enwe eze, meaning the 
“Igbo do not tolerate autocracy.”129 Also found in many communities are associations 
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such as ọfọ holders, age grades/groups, and ụmụada who are involved in decision-
making.  
The ọfọ holders is an aristocratic association that develops as a mark of success 
with increasing political privilege and responsibility. They are required to be people of 
integrity and reputable character. For one to qualify as a bearer of ọfọ, the village or 
community must acknowledge the person as somebody of probity of character, 
impeccable, and manifestly honest. The person must be one who prefers and chooses 
dignity over material profits. It is one who heeds the Igbo proverb -- aha ọma karịrị ego 
or “a good name is worth more than money.” This level of morality is expected of them 
because their decision or verdict, especially in cases of disputes, carries a great deal of 
weight. It is expected to be just and true. Moreover, it is believed that the failure to be 
just or to speak the truth brings the wrath of the god of ọfọ on the holder.130 Likewise, 
because of their age, elders are seen as symbols of truth and justice; they are expected to 
seek the good of their family and community and not to lie or speak untruths. Thus, they 
are viewed as fair and honest in their decisions, and maintainers of peace.131  
ụmụada (also known as ụmụọkpụ) is an institution of daughters of a community 
who are married into other communities. It is an important decision-making body of a 
community. It is also a disciplinary body and a guardian of social values. ụmụada 
counterbalances the council of elders that is often made up of men. They not only have 
power over their fellow women, but over men as well. For example, in my own 
experience,when my brother died, I was summoned (as the first born and because my 
father is deceased) to ascertain that my sister-in-law would be well cared for in the 
absence of her late husband. Therefore, as Iroegbu rightly observed, the ụmụada can 
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question a family or a kindred head if they feel he is not effective enough in his duties or 
responsibilities. Likewise, they can discipline housewives who misbehave. They mediate 
in cases, assist a bereaved or troubled family and foster cohesion and solidarity. 132 
Because the ụmụada are born in one community and married into another community, 
they form a very important link between their birth community and those into which they 
have married (that is, their husbands’ communities). This gives them an added advantage 
as mediator.  
Thus, for the Igbo, it is a situation where laws or decisions affecting the 
community at various levels and in various shades and forms are discussed in meetings of 
the age grade/group (youth), the married women and daughters or ụmụada, and titled 
men and women, ọfọ holders and elders.133  
This system of entrusting authority to the hands of people and groups is also 
found among the Tiv of Nigeria and, the Kikuyu of Kenya. When there is an issue of 
medical treatment of a member of the community, this will be discussed in a meeting of 
the family with the elder(s) representing the community or clan. Some other groups, such 
as the age grade/group of the sick person or the ụmụada may be involved in the decision-
making, depending on the nature or seriousness of the medical issue and illness. The head 
of the family or the assistant where the head is the one who is sick usually initiates the 
meeting or consultation with the appropriate members of the community. The head or the 
assistant can be the father, mother, uncle, or the first born child.134  
Among the Cross River Igbo, there is a dual leadership in matrilineage when it 
comes to governance and decision-making. For example, the Ohaffia have two leaders, a 
male and a female. The male leader performs secular duties, settling disputes, protecting 
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the rights and interests of members in matters of land estate, or resources. On the other 
hand, the female performs sacred duties which are ritual in character, such as making 
sacrifices to ududu, the sacred pot, a deity symbol among the Ohaffia. Each of the ududu 
represent an ancestress. A male cannot be the ritual leader of the ancestress in the 
matrilineage. The women have their traditional law-keeping body, the ikpirikpe. It is 
responsible for the administering the activities of the adult women of the village. It 
operates independently of the men. Only ikpirikpe can deal with the activities of women, 
especially offences committed by them. For instance, according to Nsugbe, in the case of 
adultery, the male age grade/group ụmụaka judges and penalizes the man involved but 
not the woman. It is the women who deal with the female accomplice to the adultery.135  
In general decision-making and overseeing the family, the village and community 
revolve around the men. In Ohaffia, for instance, the most powerful body is the ụmụaka, 
men’s age grade/group. They are recruited by the age grade/group immediately above 
(Ndi Ichin, the retiring elders). The members of ụmụaka are chosen on the basis of their 
character and achievement. No women are recruited into this group.136 However, The 
ikpirikpe women group can challenge the decision of the male age grade/group. Though 
the village head, eze-ogo, is male, he does not supervise the activities of the community, 
at least not openly. He neither attends village meetings nor presides over them. As 
Nsugbe says, the primary function of the village leader is that of “a fearless emissary: 
heading delegations, sometimes on behalf of the whole of Ohaffia, to government 
ministers, and high-ranking officials of his region.”137 One can say, therefore, that his 
function as the community head involves external relations. In village and community 
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meetings/assembles, decisions are made by seeking and reaching consensus, as do the 
Igbo.138  
iv. Decision-making among the Yoruba  
Although among the Yoruba the monarch or oba wields authority in decision-
making, there is extensive consultation with and listening to representatives.  The Yoruba 
society is organized with the oba as the king ruling over the kingdoms. The oba is 
assisted by the chiefs whose functions include serving at the oba’s council as well as 
helping to administer and maintain peace and harmony in the various communities of the 
kingdom. Backed by the oba, the chiefs also help in settling disputes between lineages, 
land disputes, and other local altercations.139  The oba and chiefs are mainly adult males 
owing to the Yoruba patrilineal and patriarchal society. Peter C. Lloyd observed that “in 
each town the lineage was a gerontocratic institution with a large membership, the adult 
males” with administrative authority over the people.140  
Even though only a male adult can be an oba, not every male descendant of a 
royal family can become an oba. The selection is deliberate in order to insure that a fair 
person ascends the throne. Anthony Okion Ojigbo notes that, among the Oke Ewi Yoruba 
of Ekiti in Nigeria, besides belonging to the royal family or lineage, three prerequisite 
conditions are required in order to qualify to contest the obaship. They are: first, the 
candidate has to be a prince born while the father was an oba. Even at that, the candidate 
is disqualified if he happens to be the first born. Second, the candidate’s mother must not 
be a slave but a free woman. Finally, and the point that interests us here is that the 
candidate must symbolize all that is good, virtuous and pleasant to behold. Thus, in 
addition to being free of any physical handicaps or limitations, he must be humble, and 
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just. For example, a prospective oba was rejected because he was too tall. The reasoning 
that disqualified him because of his height is that he could look down, literally and 
symbolically, on his people, something that a Yoruba oba or king and chief should never 
do.141  
Other mechanisms built into the system in order to ensure fair/just leadership are 
that the chieftaincy title rotates from one segment of the lineage to the other, and a son 
cannot inherit the title from or of his father. This is a safety measure to stop a family from 
consistently building “on its position by its occupation of the chieftaincy title and thus, 
arrogate a further amount of power to itself,” and usurping a title which is believed to be 
“a common property of the whole lineage.”142 These stringent rules and the balance of 
power between the oba and the chiefs ensure that rulers and elders are fair and just in 
order to earn the trust of the community.143 Eventually, the system ensures that 
community and common interests as well as those of individual subjects are considered 
in decision-making. Often painful lengthy discussions are undertaken to ensure that 
everyone is heard and that there is a consensus.  
It is worth noting that consensus goes beyond decision by majority opinion, and it 
is harder to obtain decision by consensus than it is to obtain decision by majority opinion. 
It is important too that all parties involved agree that proper and adequate attention has 
been given to their opinion and concern. The African choice for decision by consensus 
was a “deliberate effort to go beyond decision by majority opinion.”144  
v. Decision-Making and Women 
Christopher Agulanna and others have asserted that women had no say and still 
do not have any say in decision-making in African societies.145 However, studies show 
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that this is not exactly the case. Indeed, in pre-colonial African societies, women not only 
had voices in decision-making, but they also occupied leadership positions and took part 
in decision-making in the family and society.146  
Some early anthropologists, among them Johann Jakob Bachofen (1815-1887) 
and Lewis Henry Morgan (1818-1881), argued that many early societies were actually 
matriarchal.147 Some contemporary feminist theory has also suggested that a primitive 
matriarchy did in fact exist in the world, particularly in Africa and Asia. However, 
although some anthropologists deny such widespread primordial matriarchy, there are the 
Akan of Ghana, the Boule of the Ivory Coast matriliny, and the Cross River Igbo of 
Nigeria. Moreover, the subsequent absence of women in the corridors of authority and 
power in some cultures and societies is not solely because of male chauvinism. As has 
been noted, even in the presence of primitive matriarchy, women gradually relinquished 
their authority and power to men because of their other responsibilities such as 
menstruation, pregnancy, breastfeeding, and childbirth.148 For Haralambos and Holborn, 
pregnancy and breastfeeding had the most serious social impact on women even in 
matriarchal societies. Women gradually and eventually, although in varying degree, gave 
up their leadership position to their male counterparts, that is, their spouses, sons, and 
fathers.149  
Another school of thought is that the arrival of the colonialists and the 
missionaries on African soil helped to change the position of women vis-à-vis decision-
making. For this school of thought, if women have lost their voice in decision-making, it 
was largely because of the colonial regime and its system, which initiated and maintained 
the suppression of women, especially in the public forum. It was a transfer of what was 
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practiced in Europe to Africa.150 Ivan van Sertima writing about the women of old or of 
women in traditional Africa observed that  
The myth of female inferiority seems to have been far more developed in Europe and 
Asia than in Africa. This was due to differences in metaphysic and social structure, even, 
perhaps, in the very nature of the Indo-European male temperament itself. Whatever it 
was, the black queens, madonnas, and goddesses dominating the imagination of antiquity 
have few European or Asiatic counterparts. Yet it would be idyllic to assume that woman 
did not have to strive to achieve and maintain her equality in Africa, regardless of the 
countervailing myths…151  
 
  Colonization was the business of European men. Consequently, the women (their 
wives) who followed them had nothing to do other than to follow or succumb to the 
decisions of their men. This dependence and passivity also applied to the wives of 
administrators and colonial adventurers, as well as to the religious women of the time. 
According to N’Dri Thérèse Assie-Lumumba, the French women of the colonialists sat 
around the house most of the time doing little or nothing, dependent on their males. 
Seeing the African women working hard on their own, with much independence, the 
French women and men thought the African women were being used, and even made to 
suffer.152 That is the origin of myth of the suffering African women.  
Therefore, Ifi Amadiume insists that, although women had always struggled to 
conquer and to maintain equal place of power -- socio-economic, socio-political, and 
socio-religious -- the real Igbo history as it was and not as the Europeans interpreted it 
shows that women had a solid political base in this society. They were very visible to the 
Europeans who decided to relegate them to the home, using education and religion both 
in the figurative and in the proper sense of these words.153 According to Assie-Lumumba, 
the primary aim of colonial schools was to prepare men to be interpreters. Girls were not 
wanted. Even in France at the time, c.1910, girls were lagging behind in education. Out 
of a hundred graduates of secondary schools, there were only two girls. African parents 
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refused to send their female children to the colonial schools because they would be 
brainwashed. That would be dangerous because women are the guardians of the customs 
and traditions or African civilization. As a result, it was the men who were educated, and 
this, later affected women in social-political life. It was when the religious women 
founded their own schools to educate girls in the ways of motherhood that the parents 
began to send their girls to school.154  
Furthermore, the African women played an important role in the fight against 
colonialism. For instance, queen Ya Ashantewa of Ashanti of Ghana, who came from a 
culture where women are visible in both the political and the social sphere, was the chief 
of the army that fought the British. She was later exiled by the British in 1900.155 The 
Igbo and Ijaw women raised opposition against British taxation in the 1920s in Nigeria. 
They exhibited the usual power and status in Africa society.156 As a result of these active 
roles of women against the colonialists, and in keeping with the custom in the colonialist 
home countries, the selection for military service was restricted to men.157 Thus, women 
were disenfranchised.  
The colonial system also disenfranchised and deprived women of decision-
making powers through economic activities and Christianity. Assie-Lumumba argues that 
the initial economy of Africa was predominantly agriculture, and women assumed an 
active role in the production and processing of a product, as in the case of cotton in 
Baoulé. Women also had active part in weaving the cotton into clothes for the family and 
for sale. But with the introduction of cloth factories, for example, the economic power of 
women dwindled.158 Palm oil was another area in which women had an important role in 
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production and processing. With control of palm oil mills by the colonial administration, 
however, women lost their economic and bargaining power.159  
Furthermore, according to Assie-Lumumba, Christianity is yet another factor that 
disenfranchised women. Christianity, under the umbrella which most of the colonialists 
ministered, promoted the image of women as submissive to their men. God as father 
represented by male priests who lorded it over women; consequently, women were 
regarded as inferior to men.160 Assie-Lumumba noted that African women protested 
against this male-dominated religion. For instance, Dona Beatrice who was burnt, and 
Deime Marie Lalou who, following African tradition, founded her own church in 
opposition to the European male-dominated church.161  
Political power and associations were also masculinized during the colonial 
period as a result, women were also disenfranchised politically. Having lost their 
economic power, and avenues for education, they were denied membership. Even when 
women joined political associations, they were not able to aspire to public office. in Ivory 
Coast, it was not until the 1970s that women could become governmental ministers.162 
This is in great contrast to the pre-colonial era when women were chiefs, and leaders who 
were able to champion the opposition against the colonizers.  
In all these ways, loss of education, of economic, and political powers, and 
Christianity’s emphasis on male dominance over women, colonialism disenfranchised 
women and gradually tilted decision-making powers in favor of men. Therefore, the 
feeling of an inferiority complex among women was in part, the result of long treatment 
as inferiors in colonial times.163     
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On the hand, decisions regarding children considered to be underage and/or those 
who had not yet reached the age of traditional initiation, i.e., passage to adulthood, were 
made by their parents or guardians.164  
4. B.  The Concept of Person and Autonomy: ATM and Ethics of Care Contrasted  
The universe, in African ontology, is not considered as some discrete thing. 
Rather, it is seen in terms of interactions and interrelations. The same understanding 
applies to the concept of the individual in African thought. While the dominant Western 
thought views the self as something inside a person, or as a sort of container of mental 
properties and powers, the self in African thought subsists in relationships to others in the 
natural and social environments.  Anything that exists or is believed to exist must have 
some connection with the community. The idea of community serves as a conceptual 
base in which most African concepts, beliefs, values, ontology, cosmology, and ways of 
life are grounded.165 It is not that all ethnic groups of Africa share exactly the same 
normative conception of personhood. Rather, as Ikuenobe rightly remarked, the idea of 
community is the “logical and epistemic” basis of the “normative conception” of reality 
and “a person’s own view of self-identity”.166 This section considers the RAIC approach 
of ethics of care described in Chapter Three to interpret ATM comparatively in order to 
enlighten the significance of the ATM approach as a legitimate model of RAIC. In order 
words, ATM exhibits practices similar to those of ethics of care, such as focusing on 
relationships, maintaining that persons are relational beings who are socially embedded in 
a context of social relationships in a community, and exercising autonomy in 
relationships with others in the community: family members, friends, relatives, age 
grades/groups, teachers etc.  
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4. B 1 Relational Being: Individual (Patient) Versus Community  
In African culture, persons are defined both individually and communally; that is, 
they are defined in relation to themselves, to their community and to their personal 
creative spirit which embodies their destiny.167 The African ethos presupposes an existing 
community into which individuals are born. Aristotle asserted that man (the human 
being) is by nature a socio-political animal and that it is impossible for him to live outside 
society.168 Like Aristotle, Africans believe that community is natural to human beings 
and that community is a necessary condition for human existence. For instance, in the 
Akan proverb, Onipa firi soro besi a, obesi onipa kurom, “when a man descends from 
heaven, he descends into a human society,” descending from heaven is a reflection of the 
belief that human beings are created by a Supernatural Being in heaven (soro) as 
acclaimed by the Akan and indeed by other African ethnic groups.169 According to Kwesi 
Dickson, the sense of community is a “characteristic of African life to which attention 
has been drawn again and again by both African and non-African writers on Africa. 
Indeed, to many this characteristic defines Africanness.”170 Human beings are born into 
human society, or a cultural community. Community is founded on the belief of an 
intrinsic and enduring relationship among its members.171 There is in this community an 
organic relationship between the individual members. It is not an additive group but what 
Menkiti calls “collectivities in a truest sense.”172  
The community is characterized by either a belief in a common origin and/or a 
sharing of an overall way of life which includes “the existence and acknowledgement of 
common roles, values, obligations, and meanings or understandings.”173 The social 
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settings as well as the networks of a community are of varied forms and shapes. They 
include the following forms of community: family (both nuclear and extended), clan, 
village, ethnic group, city, neighborhood, and nation-state. Because individuals take part 
in various forms of these communities, they participate in a variety of social 
relationships. Gyekye makes a distinction between an ethno-cultural and a multi-cultural 
community, where ethno-cultural community is a community of people who see 
themselves as bound by some intrinsic ties, which can be of common origin or biological 
ties. An example of such a community includes the four ethnic groups chosen for this 
study: Akan, Hausa-Fulani, Igbo, and Yoruba. When various ethno-cultural communities 
merge, as in a city or state, the result is a multi-cultural community.174 In this dissertation 
which follows Gyekye, the concept of community as a cultural community is adopted 
because that culture constitutes the greatest portion of the necessary social context for the 
development and nurturing of the individual.  
The sense of community, whereby the individual is believed to be born into an 
existing community, indicates a conception of the person as a communitarian by nature. 
According to Gyekye, this communitarian nature implies the following six points 
outlined:  
1. That the human person does not voluntarily choose to enter into human community; 
that is, that community life is not optional for any individual person.  
2. That the human person is at once a cultural being. 
3. That the human person cannot -- perhaps must not -- live in isolation from other 
person.  
4. That the human person is naturally oriented toward other persons and must have 
relationships with them.  
5. That social relationships are not contingent but necessary.  
6. That, following from (4) and (5), the person is constituted, but only partly, by social 
relationships in which he/she necessarily finds him-/herself.
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Because the African community embraces the living, the dead, the unborn, and 
ancestors, individuals owe their existence to members of the community, including their 
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contemporaries and those of past generations. The African understanding of a person 
values connections with the past or ancestors, the present, that is, through family and 
community, as well as with other animate beings and even inanimate objects such as 
Earth, within a “web of relations” that Godfrey Tangwa calls the “eco-bio-communitarian 
perspective.”176 To a great extent, the community produces the individual.  For example, 
a child is taken to be the property of the community, and it is the community members 
who will see that the child grows to become a significant member of the community, an 
asset to all.177 Thus, every one joins in the training of the child as the child begins to walk 
and talk. The aunts, uncles, cousins, siblings, and neighbors are always available to 
encourage and instruct the child in matters of tradition. The child is never alone and 
grows to realize that he or she will always belong to the people of his family and 
community. The child experiences first-hand the meaning of and the emphasis on 
relationships. The whole process is achieved through a system of education which 
involves but is not limited to initiation, socialization, acculturation, experience. The 
community also provides the individuals with norms, virtues, beliefs, and values. The 
individuals internalize and apply these norms as guides for conduct.178 Individuals are 
evaluated by how much they have internalized, and displayed in their daily decisions and 
actions the virtues, beliefs, values, and attitudes that the community has taught them. This 
process of socialization imposes some moral constraint on the actions and behavior of 
those individuals, even on their personal actions. As the individuals accept the values of 
the community as their own, they become conscious of their responsibility to the 
community and of the community’s responsibilities to them.  
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The affirmation and emphasis on communal life and its values are not necessarily 
a negation of individuality or a denial of individual values. In order words, it would be 
wrong to assume or to conclude that, because African culture places emphasis on 
communal values, relationships, the collective good, and shared ends, it therefore 
considers the individual person as “wholly constituted by social relationships,” or that it 
belittles the moral autonomy, freedom of the individual members of the community, 
making the person totally dependent on the values, practices, activities and aims of the 
community, thus diminishing individual freedom. Rather, as Kwame Gyekye noted, it is 
the “recognition of the limited character of the possibilities of the individual which 
whittles away the individual’s self-sufficiency.”179  
Moreover, it is not the community alone that defines the individual or 
personhood. Rather, two other things help to define the individual: the self, i.e. the person 
him-/herself, and the individual’s personal creative spirit (chi, in Igbo, okra in Assante, 
ori in Yoruba).  As Kwame Gyekye has noted, the individual helps to define him-/herself 
and the community as well. The individual is both an autonomous and a communal being. 
It is recognized that besides being a social being by nature, the individual also possesses 
rationality, a moral sense, the capacity for virtue, emotions, and a capacity for free 
choice; therefore, the individual possesses the capacity for evaluating and making moral 
judgments. In order words, a person is capable of making a choice. This has the 
advantage of allowing the individual’s ability to take an objective view of the practices 
and the values promoted by one’s community. Sometimes some individuals are critical of 
values and practices inherited by the community and re-evaluate them. Through such 
self-assertion by which individuals are able to examine the community, its values, and 
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practices critically, positive changes in communal goals, values, etc., result. Thus, the 
development of communal culture and human culture is a product of the human 
community or of its members. The culture of the community is shaped through the 
agency of the person in the community, the visionary individual human being.180 It is also 
this self-assertion that makes possible some forms of autonomous individual choice, of 
goals and plans in relation to the community. The individual remains embedded in 
relationship with and in the life of the community because one is not detached from the 
communal values and practices. However, because the individual can take an objective 
view of the community’s existing values, re-evaluate them, and initiate new ones, it 
means that one has the capacity to and does, to some extent, set some of one’s own goals. 
By so doing, one partakes in defining one’s identity.181 Therefore, the individual is 
shaped both by the community and by him-/herself. Human beings possess these 
capacities by nature. The community discovers and helps its members to nurture them, 
but these individuals are endowed by nature and not by the community. Consequently, 
therefore, Gyekye maintains, and rightly so, that one cannot definitely posit that 
personhood is fully defined and constituted by the communal structure or social 
relationships.182 The community alone does not define a person but the self as well as the 
creative personal spirit helps in defining the individual, or the self.  
One must acknowledge that it is not easy to take an objective view of one’s own 
cultural and inherited values and practices. Yet, it is not impossible.  Alasdair MacIntyre 
and Michael J. Sandel attest to this in their works. MacIntyre, for example, observed that:  
For the story of my life is always embedded in the story of those communities from 
which I derive my identity, I am born with a past; and to try to cut myself off from that 
past, in the individualist mode, is to deform my present relationships. The possession of 
an historical identity and the possession of a social identity coincide. Notice that rebellion 
against my identity is always one possible mode of expressing it.183  
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Sandel wrote, “As a self-interpreting being, I am able to reflect on my history and in this 
sense to distance myself from it, but the distance is always precarious and provisional, the 
point of reflection never finally secured outside the history itself.”184  
Establishing that the community alone does not bestow personhood or define the 
individual seems to place doubt on some of Menkiti’s ideas of community, or communal 
life and person. Reflecting on Mbiti’s statement or dictum about African communal life, 
“I am, because we are; and since we are, therefore, I am,”185 Menkiti inferred that, “…as 
far as Africans are concerned, the reality of the communal world takes precedence over 
the reality of individual life histories, whatever these may be. And this primacy is meant 
to apply not only ontologically but also in regard to epistemic accessibility.”186 Thus, 
Menkiti concludes that, in Africa the community takes precedence over the individual, 
that it is the community that defines the “person as person, not some isolated static 
quality of rationality, will or memory,”187 and that it is not only that personhood is 
acquired188 but is also “something which has to be achieved, and not given simply 
because one is born of human seed.” Thus, he concludes that personhood is something at 
which an individual could fail.189  
Commenting on Menkiti’s thoughts, Gyekye argues that Menkiti’s assertions on 
the “metaphysical status of the community vis-à-vis that of the person” as well as his 
view of personhood in African moral, social, and political philosophy are exaggerated. 
He claims that the emphasis that Menkiti puts on the idea of community and the 
normative idea of personhood diminishes the intrinsic value of the individual.190 
However, as Ikuenobe absorbed, Gyekye stresses the metaphysical claims regarding "the 
free-willing and autonomous nature of isolated persons, which Menkiti’s view does not 
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make.”191 According to Ikuenobe, Menkiti rather “assumes some elements of such 
metaphysical claims as the basis for a normative claim about an individual who, though 
metaphysically free and autonomous, is nonetheless morally structured by the communal 
normative structures that circumscribe the substantive contents or objects of his 
autonomy.”192 The cause of this conflict between Gyekye and Menkiti on the 
metaphysical and normative understanding of person lies in the fact that “Menkiti does 
not explicitly account for a moral person as one who is metaphysically isolated, free-
willing, and autonomous….”193 Consequently, he leaves himself open to misconception. 
That is why scholars, such as Gyekye, misunderstand him as “implying that the 
community vitiates the autonomy and freewill of the individual;” thus, leading to the 
assertion that “Menkiti’s accounts of the African views of personhood and community, 
and the relationship between community and individuals involve radical 
communitarism.”194      
Furthermore, Menkiti’s views of African communal life and the individual person 
are incorrectly echoed by some of the founding fathers of African socialism, Kwame 
Nkrumah and Leopold Senghor. For example, Senghor observed that “Negro-African 
society is collectivist or, more exactly, communal, because it is rather a communion of 
souls than an aggregate of individuals.”195  And Nkrumah noted that “if one seeks the 
socio-political ancestor of socialism, one must go to communalism … in socialism, the 
principles underlying communalism are given expression in modern circumstances.”196 
These men were anxious to find support for their socialist ideology from the traditional 
African concept of society. They assert, therefore, that socialism is practiced in African 
traditional communitarianism. They suggested that social order translates into modern 
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socialism automatically. But, as Gyekye rightly noted, African communal living does not 
translate into modern socialism, and, as shown earlier in this section, personhood is not 
conferred by the community alone.  
Moreover, Menkiti’s argument is not really true that the pronoun “it” is used in 
Africa to refer to children and to the newborn because they have yet to become persons, 
that is, the community has not yet conferred personhood on them. According to Gyekye, 
the English neuter pronoun “it” for inanimate beings does not exist in the Akan 
language.197 In the Ga-Dangme language of Ghana, the “e” is used for all genders -- 
he/she/it -- animate and inanimate, it is gender neutral. Among the Hausa the “i” is also 
gender-neutral. For example, ina-zuah, translates “he/she/it is coming.” For the Igbo, the 
pronoun “ọ” is also used for “he/she/it.” It, too, is gender-neutral. For instance, ọ na-abia, 
means “he/she/it is coming.” Therefore, Menkiti’s argument that ‘it” used in the English 
language in reference to the newborn and children implies that they are not yet persons 
collapses when examined in the context of these African languages. “It” in Akan, Ga-
Dangme, Hausa, Igbo, etc., is used to address adults, older people, as well as children and 
the newborn. They are all persons.198 Therefore, the community and the self help to 
define the individual.  
However, even Gyekye moderate view of communalism or community does not 
capture the triad of entities, the community, the self or individual, and the Supreme Being 
who acts through the personal spirit in African cosmology. While his view recognizes 
that both the self and the community help to define an individual, and that the individual 
helps to shape the community, Gyekye does not account for the place of the Supreme 
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Being or God who acts through the creative person spirit vis-à-vis the individual and the 
community.  
Finally, besides the community and the self, God helps to define an individual 
through each individual’s personal and creative spirit. In Africa, the belief that human 
beings are created by God is expressed via a sacred myth which narrates the account of 
the pre-existence of each human being in the spirit world. Each human person is believed 
to be “a ‘re-incarnation’ into the human world through the creative act of a … personal 
spirit that embodies” an individual’s destiny.199 At creation, God assigns or each person 
chooses his or her destiny in dialogue with the creative spirit.200 Writing from the 
standpoint of Igbo cosmology, Achebe and Christopher S. Nwodo both acknowledge a 
principle of dualism that is complementary, especially among the Igbo, and not a 
philosophical dualism implying opposition. They note that a personal spirit may be 
visualized as the person’s other identity in a spirit land wherein that person’s spirit being 
complements his or her terrestrial human being. This is evidenced or supported by the 
aphorism that “… for nothing can stand alone, there must always be another thing 
standing besides it.”201 According to Achebe, “The world in which we live has its double 
and counterpart in the realm of spirits.”202 This implies that the human being is only one-
half of a person. The other half is in the spirit land. One receives or chooses one’s gifts or 
destiny from that spirit land. The whole idea finds support in the Akan proverb 
previously cited Onipa firi soro besi a, obesi onipa kurom, (“when a man descends from 
heaven, he descends into a human society.”) Thus, African mythologies postulate a re-
incarnation into the human world of each human person, through the creative function of 
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a guardian personal spirit. By the creative act of this personal spirit, the individual pre-
existent self is assigned a destiny by God or the individual chooses one.  
This personal spirit is known by various names according to ethnic groups. Chi in 
Igbo is considered a complex spirit that is dynamically related to individual destiny and 
to God. Among the Yoruba it is called Ori and is highly symbolic, evoking a multiplicity 
of images. Within the Akan ethnic group, it is known as Okra, or Kra in Assante, and 
Aklama or Kla in Ewe. Okra (Kra) like Chi or Ori, is believed to be a personal spark, or 
spirit from God, which resides in each person. It is the bearer of destiny; thus, only 
human beings have Okra. It is the undying part of a person which returns to God after 
death.203 Likewise, Aklama (Kla) determines both a person’s wellbeing and character, or 
destiny. If one deviates from character/destiny, Aklama (Kla) can penalize the individual. 
It also leaves the body after death.204 Last but not least, in Adja-Fon, which are major 
West African ethnic and linguistic groups found in the Republic of Benin and in 
southwest Nigeria, the personal spirit Se “is structurally related to a prenatal ‘democratic’ 
choice that each existent must follow in life; the choice is made before Marwu,” or 
Segho, the Great Se.205 
In general, therefore, the personal humanizing spirit from God has some special 
hold on the individual more than other beings can have on that person. It can dispense 
with and defeat the physical endowments as well as the terrors of the multiple-headed 
spirits.206  Onye chi ya na-ereghi onweghi ihe ga eme ya, (“if your personal chi does not 
betray you, nothing will happen to you.”) Or, as Achebe states it “No matter how many 
divinities sit together to plot a man’s ruin, it will come to nothing unless his chi is there 
among them.”207  Therefore, the personal spirit “constitutes the acknowledged and 
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unacknowledged link with God in the evolving destiny of the individual or in questions 
asked about fortunes and misfortunes by the individual and community.”208 In other 
words, destiny reveals itself in “patterns of individual lives, in “habitual or persistent 
traits…,” in “successes and failures, the traumas and enigmas of life; … the observed 
uniqueness of the individual….”209  
However, the power of this personal spirit is not absolute because the individual is 
not a puppet of the personal spirit or destiny. There is a dialogue between the individual 
and the personal spirit, a democratic choice, in the assignment of destiny. For instance, 
when somebody’s misfortunes (or sometimes fortunes) are thought to be beyond 
comprehension; when one tries one’s best but does not succeed, people say: ọ bụ etu ya 
na chi ya si kpa, (“it is the agreement the person made with his or her personal spirit.”) 
Among other things, it denotes an element of choice on the part of the individual in 
question.210 Furthermore, as seen above among the Fon and the Igbo, the exchange 
between the personal spirit and the pre-existent self in the assignment of destiny is seen 
as a “prenatal” democratic choice and dialogue.211 The proto-individual negotiates and 
chooses the kind of life he or she will live in the world, and the personal spirit fulfills it. 
Or, according to Achebe, the proto-individual bargains with God, Chukwu, while the 
personal spirit presides over the transaction.212 Thus, Achebe declares,  
And finally, at the root of it all lies that very belief we have already seen: a belief in the 
fundamental worth and independence of every man and of his right to speak on matters 
of concern to him and, flowing from it, a rejection of any form of absolutism which 
might endanger those values.213 
Consequently, Achebe noted that “it is not surprising that the Igbo held discussion 
and consensus as the highest ideals of the political process.”214 Indeed, it is not just the 
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Igbo, but most other ethnic groups of Africa hold discussion and consensus as the highest 
ideals of both decision-making and the political process. While Kofi A. Opoku claims 
that among the Akan destiny cannot be changed, Bishop Peter Sarpong, an anthropologist 
thinks otherwise. According to him, destiny can be altered by magic or religious 
means.215 Thus, Sarpong agrees with Achebe and Nwodo who also come from West 
Africa.  Agreeing with Opoku, Gyekye argues that the Akan proverbs he examined seem 
to suggest that destiny is unalterable and unavoidable. He argues that, because destiny is 
bestowed by a benevolent God, then it must be good; its basic attribute must be good, 
and, if so, people will not feel any need to change it. Gyekye adds that, because “destiny 
is determined by the omnipotent Supreme Being, it obviously cannot be changed.”216 The 
problem with Gyekye’s argument is that it presumes that people are always content with 
whatever good thing they receive, even from God, and that they will not seek to change 
it. The Igbo experience seems to be contrary to his argument. As has been shown, the 
Igbo concept allows for a negotiation and even an alteration of one’s destiny, thus taking 
care of those who might not be satisfied with their destiny.217 
Although Nwodo supports Achebe’s idea that the principle of dualism found in 
Igbo cosmology is not a philosophical dualism that implies an opposition, he offers more 
reasons to support the concept of the individuality of the human person. For him, it is a 
complementary principle of dualism, which is “essentially an antidote to absolutism, and 
all forms of extremism and obsession.” In its positive form, it is a metaphysical fluidity 
or resilience that both shapes and defines Igbo perception of being, and makes it both 
possible and “habitual for the Igbo to reconcile and accommodate contrary ideas and 
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experiences, as well as multiple demands while vehemently rejecting all forms of 
imposition even from their gods.”218  
The proverb which states that even siblings have individuality --otu nne na-amụ 
ma otu chi adịghị eke, (“siblings may be born of the same mother but they are not created 
by the same personal spirit”)-- expresses the following: a strong individuality or 
uniqueness of a person by the belief that each individual has his or her own uniquely 
created personal spirit; that the creative spirit which is assigned to each self by God in 
order to humanize the person varies from individual to individual; and that destinies 
differ from person to person. Destiny determines the individuality and uniqueness of a 
person.219 In view of this, Achebe believes that the form of individuality arising from the 
Igbo perspective about the creation of the human person is “as far as individualism and 
uniqueness can possibly go,” and that it goes even further than the Christian 
understanding of individualism embedded in the principle that God created all people 
unique and worthy in His sight.220  
Furthermore, a stronger support of the concept of independence of the individual 
deriving from the personal spirit is the proverb: onye kwe chi ya ekwe, (“if one agrees, 
one’s personal spirit agrees or follows;”) that is, if one is determined, one’s personal 
spirit concurs. It implies that the individual not only dialogues with but can also put limits 
on the exercise of power of his or her personal spirit, thus attesting to the person’s 
individuality and autonomy.221 One can renegotiate one’s destiny. Part of the concept of 
the Igbo complementary principle of dualism is the love of the concept of flow and the 
hatred for the concept of fixity. The Igbo love movements, travels. Fixity “constrains and 
limits their movement while flow allows them free movement in a free and yet 
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undetermined universe.” This free movement of flexibility extends to thoughts and 
actions. The hatred for fixity includes rejection of extremism and rigidity in the laws of 
logic.  
The boundary between two contradictories can be very fluid indeed such that thoughts, 
actions, and sentiments tend to flow, float and overlap. The fluidity of thought and 
action flows and overflows into the realm of logic, temporality and other area of 
existence. The rigidity of the sequence of lineal temporality that denies man the 
possibility of recalling a temporal past is relaxed and made less binding.222  
One who discovers that one had made an unacceptable choice of destiny can still 
“by strong effort of will” renegotiate one’s destiny; it is morning yet on creation day.”223 
Nothing is absolute in the infinitely flexible and fluid universe of Igbo cosmology. In that 
universe, one is “not totally helpless before” one’s personal spirit. It is a universe “where 
God consults man in matters that concern him and at crucial stages of creation that is an 
on-going exercise.”224 By no means does this mean that the personal spirit is a mere 
spectator in the drama of life or that God is no longer omnipotent. Rather, the Igbo have a 
belief and a way of keeping “a delicate balance in a situation of multiple demands.”225 In 
a normal circumstance, destiny is fixed and rigid and, therefore, unacceptable to the Igbo 
worldview which rejects fixity and rigidity. Thus, the Igbo make it possible for one to be 
able to renegotiate one’s destiny and, even literally, for one to accomplish anything 
within one’s capability. Moreover, “even if somebody has a good Chi, if he holds his 
hands and puts them between his thighs, no Chi can save him from a worthless life: And 
so the Igbo insist on a second ingredient to a fulfilled life: the thrust which a man makes 
into his environment.”226 This is the meaning of onye kwe chi ya ekwe, (“if one says yes, 
his personal spirit also agrees.”) Thus, the concept of personal creative spirit “unites the 
three interconnected principles of individuality, destiny, and achievement….”227 
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In conclusion, we see portrayed, in mythical language, the idea of each human 
person as “a unique creation, a unique concern, and an intimate of God,” a destiny that 
makes one what one is and influences one, and thus helps to define an individual. But the 
individual still possesses free will and volition. Therefore, Gyekye rightly affirms that 
destiny is general, not specific, and that it expresses only the basic attributes of the 
person. Hence, human actions are neither necessitated nor fated.  
This fact gives viability and meaningfulness to the concept of choice. Even if one 
considered free will not to be absolute in the light of human creatureliness, it must 
nevertheless be granted that the individual can make his or her own existence 
meaningful through the exercise of free will within the scope of destiny.228 
Experience bears out Gyekye’s assertion because an individual’s thoughts, volitions, 
deliberations, decisions, and actions often affect the result of events, and things, even the 
cause of others’ lives and one’s own. The activities of the personal creative spirit, the 
bestowal of destiny, help to define the individual. Therefore, in defining an individual, 
there is a triad of the self, the community, and God (through the personal spirit). That is, 
the community, the embedded personal creative spirit that embodies the destiny, and the 
self, all serve in defining the human person. All of this occurs out within the framework 
of the community to which the individuals (living and dead), ancestors, the spirits, and 
God are considered to belong. This means that both the self and the personal creative 
spirit that embody the destiny impact the community or the communal living, because the 
personal spirit helps to define the individual who is both a communal being as well as an 
assertive entity capable of evaluation and choice.   
4. B 2 Dependency and Interdependency of Person and Human Existence  
Closely related to the relational nature of human beings is the affirmation of the 
dependency and interdependency of persons and human existence. This concept of 
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dependency and interdependency of persons and human existence is captured and 
summarized by Mbiti’s dictum “I am, because we are; and since we are, therefore I am” 
and the resultant implication that the joys, sorrows or concerns of the individual are also 
those of the community.229 The community has a responsibility to the individual just as 
the individual has a responsibility to the group. The members of the community take 
mutual care of one another because their well-being is connected and somewhat mutually 
dependent. This interdependency of persons and human existence is also explained by 
maxims or proverbs from various African ethnic groups. Some proverbs will help to 
illuminate this discussion.  
Proverbs abound in every African language group studied, which is more than a 
thousand languages.230 Proverbs, in Africa, are short wise sayings, a repository of values, 
and moral messages used in the education and socialization of members, in the 
consolation of their suffering, and into explaining messages. For Africans, proverbs are 
an important expression of human wisdom, knowledge of nature, psychology, and reality. 
Although sometimes couched in flowery language, they represent the condensed 
experience of past generations. Proverbs are a vital part of everyday conversation.231 For 
example, the Igbo of Southern Nigeria affirm that proverbs are oil for lubricating 
conversation. The Yoruba say, “A wise man who knows proverbs can settle disputes.”232  
A few proverbs follow to illustrate the assertion of interdependence of persons and 
human existence in African thought. Ukọ kọwa anụmanụ ọ ga n’ukwu osisi ma ọkọwa 
mmadụ ọ gakwụrụ mmadụ ibe ya, (“When an animal feels itchy, it goes to a tree to 
scratch its body; whereas, the human being who feels itchy goes to a fellow human being 
to be scratched.”) Onipa yieye firi onipa, (“The well-being of man depends on his fellow 
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man”). These are from the Igbo of Nigeria and the Akan of Ghana, respectively. The 
point of the proverbs is that sometimes one needs the assistance, good will, sympathy, 
and compassion of others to achieve one’s goals or to fulfill one’s life. Other maxims 
expressing reciprocity and interdependence are: Onipa nye abe na ne ho ahyia ne ho, 
(“Man is not a palm-tree that he should be complete [or self-sufficient]”) --Akan. This 
proverb identifies the shortcomings of human beings that make one incapable of fulfilling 
one’s life whether socio-religiously, emotionally, psychologically, or economically. One, 
therefore, requires and depends on the assistance of others, that is, on one’s community, 
in order to be able to fulfill such needs. A Malian proverb also affirms interdependence: 
“the quiver hangs from the strap and the strap hangs on the shoulder.” It means that 
human beings depend on one another.233  
An Igbo proverb with an Akan counterpart i.e., Aka nri kwọọ aka ịkpa aka ịkpa 
akwọọ aka nri; and the Akan wo nsa nifa hohorow benkum, na benkum nso hohorow nifa, 
literally means “the right arm washes the left arm and the left arm washes the right arm.” 
The interdependency of the right and the left hands for each other’s cleanliness is a 
metaphor for reciprocity and interdependence of persons and human existence.234 The 
concept of “ubuntu” which signifies communality, interdependence, solidarity, respect 
for life and its dignity, well expresses solidarity in African societies. According to 
Mluleki Munyaka and Mokgethi Motlhabi, under ubuntu individuals manifesting 
qualities of individualism such as selfishness and lack of caring are said to lack ubuntu or 
akanabuntu, and therefore are akangomntu, ha se motho, i.e., they are not person-
oriented, not human. The Igbo will call such persons anụ ọhia, i.e., beasts. It might sound 
like a harsh judgment, but nevertheless, “it is a way of expressing displeasure at bad 
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behaviour.” 235 The individual concerned is said to have gone against human nature by his 
act. Such acts as self-centeredness, not being compassionate or cooperative, that is, anti-
community behavior, are “seen not just as failure to contribute to the well-being of both 
the person and the community, but as bringing about harm, misery, and pain to others.”236 
A person may have inherent dignity; however, part of being a person is being in solidarity 
with others, being compassionate, feeling sympathy for others. Being called akangomntu 
or anụ ọhia (a beast) does not necessarily remove one’s personhood, one’s intrinsic worth 
or dignity, but it depicts that one’s identity, goes pari passu, hand-in-hand with one’s 
responsibility or sense of duty towards others, the community.237 Or, as Gyekye says it, 
“The pursuit or practice of moral virtue is held as intrinsic to the conception of a person.” 
Calling the person a beast or non-person is not a descriptive judgment, but a normative 
one. Similarly, when someone behaves well and the people, the Akan and Igbo, for 
instance, are fully satisfied with, and appreciate the high degree of the person’s moral 
conduct, they would refer to the person as a real human person: I bụ mmadụ (Igbo), Oye 
onipa paa (Akan).238 Furthermore, this sort of normative judgment on the humanness or 
personhood shows that the Akan, Igbo, and indeed all other African cultures consider 
human nature essentially good and not depraved by nature. For instance, the Igbo word 
for a person or a human being, “mmadụ” literarily means that “goodness” or “beauty” 
exists. Finally, the normative judgment also implies that African cultures regard the 
human person as possessing “an innate capacity for virtue, for performing morally right 
actions,” and thus ought to be “treated as a morally responsible agent.”239  
In summary, these proverbs suggest and emphasize values of mutual helpfulness 
and interdependence, cooperation, collective responsibility, and reciprocal obligations.240 
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African society’s emphasis on such relationships and interdependent existence is similar 
to the assertions of the ethics of care movement that human beings are relational and that 
interdependent beings are socially embedded.  
Relying on the human experience of caring, ethics of care, like ATM, asserts that 
persons are relational and interdependent beings. Persons are by nature social beings and 
are embedded in the community by social ties. They are, therefore, to a large extent 
constituted and defined by their social or communal ties.241 This idea differs markedly 
from the notion of the nature of human being as asserted by social contract philosophers 
such as Locke, Rawls, and Hobbes (discussed in detail in Chapter 3, Section C.1). Suffice 
it to say, then, that these social contract philosophers claimed that, in their original nature, 
human beings were first isolated individuals but later decided to live together by contract. 
Consequently, in the dominant Western view, the tendency is to move from individuals to 
society; whereas, in the African view, there is a movement from society or community to 
individuals. There is an acknowledgment or confirmation of an existing community (“we 
are”), and the creative personal spirit which are the basis for defining the “identity of the 
existent and thinking self (‘I am’)”.242 There is also the a movement tow 
The African belief that, by their nature, human beings are embedded in social 
relationships is not only comparable to the ideas of ethics of care but it also resonates 
with existential phenomenology which asserts that to be is to be in relationship: I am part 
of a “we” before I am an independent “I”. We are not only existence, we are co-
existence. Thus, social ties are not something added, but something already constitutive 
of a human being.243 The African view, however, differs from the existentialist view 
insofar as the latter, especially the Sartreans, suggest that an individual alone defines the 
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self that one becomes.244 In African thought, however, the individual is also defined by 
the community and by the relationship entered into by the individual, by the personal 
spirit embodying the destiny, as well as by the self. Relationships create a web of 
dependency and interdependent human existence. Every one of us enters into a complex 
web of relationships and ties that include family, clans, kindred, friends, colleagues, 
fellow members of the community, and citizens. We are not fundamentally separate and 
isolated independent individuals of liberal individualists. Or what Polycarp Ikuenobe 
describes as “rational, autonomous solipsistic atomic and individualistic self as found in 
Kantian ethics and metaphysics.”245  
There is little wonder, then, that African traditional healing treatment or practice, 
especially for mental or psychological illness, is a community process that involves not 
only the patient and the healer in individual therapy, but also the family, relatives, or 
members of the patient’s community and the mythical supernatural world.246 This 
community-oriented process of healing raises patient expectancy of a cure, helps them 
harmonize their inner conflicts, and reintegrates them with their group and the spirit 
world. It also stirs them emotionally.247 Thus, Adeyemi Idowu insists that in counseling 
Nigerian students in the United States of America, group counseling and other techniques 
that emphasize significant client support groups and cultural identity are more 
appropriate.248     
In this relationship of reciprocity and interdependence, the individual exercises 
vigilance for the good of the group, and the group, in turn, seeks what is good for the 
individual. Both the future and the present health of individuals are intricately connected 
with those of other members of the community. Often, the ATM doctor is a member of 
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that community. The individual cannot but be confident (and trusting) to share and 
entrust major life decisions (medical decisions, for example) to members of the 
community. Sick individuals, the patients in this cultural milieu, trust members of the 
community to be part of their medical decision-making process. It is a decision made by 
reaching a consensus about what will be beneficial for both the patient and the 
community. If there is no agreement, the eldest member of the community or family 
present will resolve matters with the assistance of the sick person keeping in mind the 
ideas and opinions expressed during the discussion. It is in this context where communal 
values, relationships, and interdependency are emphasized that final consent in the 
decision-making process rests on the consensus reached in consultation with the 
community rather than with/by the individual patient alone that RAIC is realized.  
4. B 3 Relational Autonomy in Informed Consent (RAIC)   
 
The discussion in this chapter thus far has established the emphasis on 
relationships and communal life in African cultures. The chapter has also noted that the 
human person is a social being; the community alone constitutes the context, the social 
and cultural space, in which the actualization of the possibilities of the individual person 
can take place. The context, social or cultural space provides the individual person the 
opportunity to express his/her individuality, to acquire and develop his/her own 
personality, and to fully become the kind of person he/she and the community wants 
him/her to be.249 The individual is formed and defined by both oneself and the 
community, or the biological and social relationships. Even one’s capacity for social life, 
reasoning, moral sense, virtue for free choice and autonomy, though given by nature, is 
discovered and nurtured with the help of the community through relationships with 
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others. Just as in ethics of care, Clement argues that a critical examination of both our 
ordinary desires (first-order desires) and higher-order desires (rational reflection) show 
that they are not really our desires but are socially constituted.250 That both our ordinary 
and higher-order desires are communally or socially constituted would seem to imply that 
there is no autonomy; or that the individual is a slave of the community or social 
relationships. However, in African terminology one will say they are constituted by 
community or communal living.  
On the contrary, relationships with family, relatives, friends, members of the 
community, and others foster the capacity for critical reflection about one’s values, 
motives and practices, permitting one to be autonomous in relationships. In order words, 
being socially constituted and embedded in the context of communal living, humans learn 
to become autonomous from the members of the community through relationships with 
them. Therefore, autonomy in African context of community offers the social or cultural 
space for the development, nurturing, and sustaining of autonomy through relationships 
with others. One speaks then of RAIC. This resonates with accounts of relational 
autonomy given by ethics of care proponents such as Clement, Nedelsky, and Held as 
recorded in Chapter Three, Section B3 above.   
Consequently, ATM conceives and practices autonomy in relationships hence, 
relational autonomy and RAIC. Insofar as ATM emphasizes relationships, communal 
values, and practices autonomy in relationships, therefore, it follows that ATM adopts 
RAIC just as ethics of care does.251  
As noted before, because of the interdependency and interrelatedness in 
traditional African society, the entire family and community as an extended family are 
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affected when a person becomes sick. The entire group is sick because the individual’s 
illness or health is somehow crucial to the well-being of the community, in conformity 
with sayings such as: “we are because I am,” and “a tree does not make a forest.”  
The search for a cure and healing are also a community affair. As noted above, 
there is convocation or at least a consultation of relatives and elders regarding decisions 
about the care and treatment of the sick person. Although the initiator of the meeting or 
consultation, and the details of the procedure may vary among African ethnic groups, 
there is nevertheless, a consultation of the relevant members of the community, and some 
may even accompany the sick person to seek medical attention from the ATM 
practitioner/doctor.252 Generally, when children become sick, the parents, guardian, or 
their elder siblings champion the course of treatment and make the necessary decisions 
on behalf of the children. Children are considered underage if they have not undergone 
the traditional initiation to adulthood. In that case, their parents or guardians decide for 
them.253 Among the Igbo of Nigeria, for example, if the sick person is an adult female or 
a married woman, then the husband or the eldest child (if an adult) will take the lead and 
consult or convene a meeting of the relevant members of the community (elders, 
relatives) to decide the course of action. When the ill person is an adult male, then one’s 
siblings, spouse, or the eldest adult child takes the lead. That person will confer with or 
call a meeting of the appropriate members of the community (elders, relatives) to reach a 
consensus on the course of action.  
If the sick person is able to talk about practical matters regarding the situation at 
hand, the group will discuss them with the patient. Such practical issues may include: 
which ATM doctor to consult, whether or not the patient will be brought to the ATM 
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doctor, whether or not the doctor will be invited to the sick person’s house for the 
treatment, and how to finance the treatment. In some cases, the diviner doctor is the first 
to be consulted in order to determine the cause of the illness and the procedure for 
treatment or cure. The consultation includes the ancestors and the personal spirit of the 
sick adult if he has a shrine made. If the consensus is that the sick person is to be brought 
to the ATM doctor, the group will then decide the following: who will help nurse the 
patient if required, who will accompany the patient, who will take care of the house and 
children of both the patient and of those accompanying the patient. One or some of the 
relatives sit in with the patient as the ATM doctor is consulted. If need be, they help to 
describe or explain the history of the patient’s illness and what the sick person has 
experienced. In the event that severe illness has weakened the patient, it is also customary 
for them to respond to questions. Consent (including final consent) is given within this 
context. In other words, final consent to decision-making rests on the consensus reached 
in consultation with the group, not by the individual patient alone. Throughout the 
treatment period, the family, relatives, and elders also remain available for further 
meetings or consultation in order to monitor and evaluate the patient’s progress. They try 
to balance the health care needs of the patient and the needs of the family and of the 
community.254 In addition, other members of the community show their solidarity by 
visiting and/or bringing food, or fetching water and firewood. They may even offer 
financial aid to the patient or to the family. In general, assistance is provided according to 
ability and resources. Thus, the community is part and parcel of and essential to the 
decision-making and healing processes of a patient. The experience of an allopathic or 
Western medical physician working among the Africans in a village explains the 
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community involvement and concern in medical treatment of a sick member of the 
community. He observed that this group of people would always come to consult him 
with the patient. Narrating his observation, he said: “when they are confronted with 
illness, a group of people invariably comes so that they can listen. They come to listen for 
this person, or listen with this person. When they come out of the consulting room, what 
they doctor said is also the concern of those who are waiting. If you want to avoid 
distortion, you need to continue talking with them, too.” He acknowledged that it was a 
carryover from ATM practice. It is just as the way the ATM doctors, nyanga, were 
consulted. “A group of people left the village for the nyanga’s village” to consult the 
doctor.255  Moreover, for example, Peter Kasenene explains that, within the traditional 
African context, “one cannot regard even one’s own life as purely personal property or 
concern. It is the group which is the owner of life, a person being just a link in the chain 
uniting the present and future generations. For that reason, one’s health is a concern for 
the community, and a person is expected to preserve this life for the good of the 
group.”256 Saying that “a person is just a link in the chain uniting the present and future 
generations” may be too strong. However, it expresses the interdependence.  
The form of decision-making described here is not only followed in medical 
practice but is also used in other areas of life. Studies show widespread decision-making 
by consensus involving extensive consultation,257 as described earlier in Section 4 A5 of 
this Chapter.  
The African practice described in this dissertation is interpreted as RAIC because 
autonomy is exercised in relationship with others --family members, kinsmen, friends, 
and, indeed, the community. In fact, the individual not only exercises autonomy in 
241 
 
relationships, but also develops and nurtures autonomy in relationships with others, 
namely the community, as ethics of care advocates observed.258 These relationships 
enable the individual, the patient, to develop and achieve autonomy as the true socially 
constituted individual that one is: Motho ke motho ka batho; umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu, 
i.e., a person is a person through other persons. This is a Xhosa (a South African 
language) Ubuntu philosophy asserting that a person is complete only through humane 
dealing with other people. This whole idea and practice resonates with the notion of 
RAIC that ethics of care advocates. Thus, one can confidently assert that ATM adopts 
and practices a similar relational autonomy, namely, the RAIC approach as does ethics of 
care. This relational approach to informed consent fosters solidarity and an objective 
concept of the good.  
 
4. B 4 Support for the Objective Concept of the Common Good  
As noted above, in the African ethos, the individual or person is embedded in 
social relationships. Social relationships are an aspect of the cultural community. 
Community life elicits and fosters shared ways of life, responsibility, reciprocity, mutual 
sympathies, or mutual assistance and interdependency. These values, especially the 
shared ways of life, are basic to a community. The implication of this shared way of life 
is the existence and acknowledgement of common roles, values, obligations, and 
meanings. It also implies that individuals advance their interests in a way that is 
constantly respectful and mindful of fostering the good of the community and, therefore, 
the good of all, reflecting the objective concept of the common good.  
The concept of the common good is intrinsically linked to the idea of community 
and is symbolized in the Akan culture, for example, as a Siamese crocodile. This 
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crocodile possesses two heads but a single (i.e., common) stomach. The common 
stomach of this two-headed crocodile depicts that, somehow, the basic interests of all the 
members of the community are identical. It is, therefore, “interpreted as symbolizing the 
common good,” that is, the good of all the people within a society or community.259  
Western liberal individualism tends to think of the common good as a threat to the 
good of the individual. Yet, there is no conceptual tension or opposition between the 
good of the individual members of a community and the common good. Likewise, the 
common good is not a threat to individual liberty. The contents of the common stomach 
of the Siamese crocodile cannot conflict with the interests and needs of either of the 
crocodiles.260  
The practice of RAIC in ATM supports and projects the notion of the common 
good and, hence, the objective notion of the good life. (A good life is the good of the 
community and the good of the individual.) There is more or less a common notion of the 
good and the goal of medicine in ATM. The goal of medicine is the healing of the 
patient, the family, and the community, by restoring the balance that has been destroyed 
by the illness.  
Common good is not the aggregate of different individual goods or individuals’ 
goods. It is that which is essentially good for human beings as such. It embraces the 
needs or necessities that “are basic to the enjoyment and fulfillment of” each individual’s 
life.261 If it were an aggregate of individual goods, then it would not be fulfilled in such a 
way that would benefit all the individuals in a society. But, as that which is essentially 
good for human beings as such, its realization is also a realization of individual good. 
There is no conceptual tension or opposition between the good of the individual members 
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of a community and the common good. As we saw in Chapter Two, liberal individualism 
maintains that to pursue the common good in a liberal individualistic society such as the 
USA, will violate the autonomy and freedom of the individual by jeopardizing one’s 
ability to choose one’s own good and life plans. They argue that pursuing the common 
good will mean being intolerant to other conceptions of the good and improper use of 
political power to achieve this common good. Such arguments arise because the liberal 
individualism of the USA allows for a plurality of good.262  
From the African point of view, communal values require that the good of all 
determines the good of the individual. That is, the welfare of the individual is dependent 
on the welfare of all -- of the community. Individuals ought to work for the good of the 
community -- which also includes the individual’s good. The success and meaning of the 
life of individuals rest on identifying with the community. Gyekye insists that it is this 
identification which is the basis of the reciprocal relationship between the individual and 
the community. The identification with one’s community is also the reason for the 
overriding power of the group versus that of the individual. The individual’s “personal 
sense of responsibility is measured in terms of responsiveness and sensitivity to the needs 
and demands of the” community. All the members of the community “are expected to 
enhance the welfare” of the community as a whole. Because this sense of responsibility is 
placed “equally upon each member of the” community, the interests of all the individual 
members of the community are maximized.263  
Finally, the practice of RAIC in ATM does not only support the notion of the 
common good, but has further implications for health care ethics as can be demonstrated 
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in applying it (RAIC) to ethics committees. But, first, it is necessary to take a look at the 
relationship of rights and the communal values in traditional African thought.  
4. B 5 Individual Patient Rights  
The case has been made above in this section for the self as communal being, who 
also possesses the capacity to make choices, evaluate and re-evaluate the practices of the 
community. Every human person possesses also an intrinsic dignity of the human person. 
This dignity is traceable, in part; to the African belief that God is the creator of all 
humans and thus human beings possess something of God, the spirit (okra in Akan, 
mmụọ or Chi in Igbo). These compel the recognition of some form of rights. The 
communal life cannot and does not overlook or avoid the issue of rights, whether it is 
individual or communal rights. Gyekye insists that “communitarianism cannot disallow 
arguments about rights which may in fact form part of the activity of a self-determining 
autonomous individual possessed of the capacity for evaluating or re-evaluating the entire 
practice of his/her community.”264 The conception of human dignity or rights, no matter 
how it is derived, whether from theism or from natural considerations, independently of 
God, obliges the recognition of rights. Thus, it requires the communal cultures just as the 
liberal individualism to consider rights.  
However, communitarianism or communal living does not preoccupy itself with 
talk about rights. This is evident in traditional African cultures. There is no emphasis on 
individual rights or even on rights in their entirety because the stress is on communal 
values. Rather, the emphasis on the common good, the provision of social conditions 
which should “enable each individual person to function satisfactorily in a human 
society, does not and should not” subvert individual rights.265 Though some form of 
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individual rights may be recognized by communal cultures, they are not separated as such 
from the common values of the community and are not given a pre-eminent status. 
Likewise, individuals are not encouraged to insist constantly on their rights. As Gyekye 
correctly asserts, the reason is the assumption that rights, whether political, economic, or 
social, “are built into the ethos and practices of the cultural community.” Consequently, 
“the economic, political, and social needs of the individual members, which are the 
concern of most individual rights, would be expected to have been recognized” or even 
catered for, by the communal structure.266 There will be less need or urgency for 
individuals to insist on their rights. This is contrary to the practice of regarding rights in 
the USA and Western societies, as discussed in Chapter Three above. In this Western 
practice, as typified by the USA, individual rights and privacy supersedes the corollary to 
rights, namely, responsibility and duty, In other words, with every right, or privilege, 
there is a responsibility.  
Instead of emphasis on individual rights, traditional African cultures are prone to 
emphasizing the duties which individual members of the community ought to perform 
towards others and the community. Because of the African concern with the common 
good or communal welfare, there is a consideration of duty as “the moral tone,” that is, as 
the “supreme principle of morality.” In view of this stress on duty and responsibility, 
“duty” has been designated as one of the principles or characteristics of African morality. 
Some scholars have even described African morality as duty morality.  
Social or community life itself, a robust feature of the African communitarian society, 
mandates a morality that clearly is weighted on duty to others and to the community, it 
constitutes the foundation for moral responsibilities and obligations.267     
  
 Duty or obligation requires each individual to show concern for the interest and 
well-being of others. Communal existence and relationality denote a responsibility of the 
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community for the individual and the individual for the community. “Living in relation 
with others directly involves a person in social and moral roles, duties, obligations, and 
commitments which the individual person must fulfill.”268 The other characteristics of 
African communal morality, solidarity, interdependence, cooperation, compassion, 
reciprocity, and the social and ethical values of social well-being, primarily impose on 
individual members of the community a duty to the community as well as its members. 
People carry out their duties to others without necessarily thinking that those others have 
a right to it. The concept of rights is not commonly thought of, rather one’s responsibility 
or obligation is considered. In which case, the saying that duty begets right is not exactly 
true in the traditional African context. Gyekye lends support to this view as follows:  
Our positive duties toward others, then, are not based on their rights: it is not so much a 
consciousness of the rights of others as our moral responsiveness to their particular 
situations that impinges on our decision to carry out our duties toward them.269  
 
Menkiti reduces rights to a secondary position by asserting that in the African 
understanding, “priority is given to the duties which individuals owe to the collectivity, 
and their rights, whatever these may be, are seen as secondary to their exercise of their 
duties.”270 Some proponents of communitarian values in the Western societies also attest 
to the non-prominent and remedial value state of rights in a communal culture. Sandel 
asserts that rights would not be important, or insisted upon in a communitarian society in 
which a spirit of generosity exists and is effective. Thus, recourse is made to rights only 
when there is corruption of satisfactory communal relations.271 Charles Taylor rejects the 
idea of the primacy of rights and wonders why scholars would “find it reasonable to start 
a political theory with an assertion of individual rights and to give this primacy.”  He 
thinks that it is a misguided effort seeking to find a background for the arguments which 
commences from rights.272 Alasdair MacIntyre, goes even further than Sandel and Taylor. 
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He believes that natural or human rights are just fictions, and that it is a plain truth that 
there are no such rights. Thus, belief in them is the same as belief in witches and 
unicorns.273 While some of these claims are over exaggerated, they point to the fact that, 
in communal communities, emphases are not laid on rights, especially individual rights. 
Consequently, because communal values such as solidarity, interdependence, 
compassion, reciprocity mandate duties and responsibility rather than rights, does not 
mean that rights do not exist. It does not and should not amount to a denial of the 
existence of rights and their corollary, namely, responsibility as part and parcel of the 
structure of moral beliefs and values of a people.274 Rather responsibility and duty have 
an eminent place over rights in Africa communal cultures.   
4. C. Summary  
With ethics of care as the hermeneutic to interpret ATM, this chapter presents a 
comparative analysis of ATM with ethics of care. It began with the overview of ATM by 
tracing the meaning, history, and the important connection between ATM and ATR, 
observing that a proper understanding of ATM requires some knowledge of ATR. Health 
and illness are often seen as influenced or caused by supernatural beings and ancestors. 
Thus, the cure of illness and sickness in ATM is also associated with religious rituals and 
practices. Thus, it pays particular attention to four ethnic groups in Africa: the Akan, 
Hausa-Fulani, Igbo, and Yoruba. 
 Furthermore, through the analysis of the four ethnic groups, this chapter notes that 
decision-making in Africa is generally by consensus after wide consultation of 
community or the people concerned; and that, if women have lost their voice in decision-
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making, it was largely because of the colonial system and, to some extent, the work of the 
missionaries that came after the colonialists.  
Continuing, the chapter discusses the concept of person and autonomy, observing 
that, in Africa, persons are defined in relation to their community and to themselves. 
African thought presupposes an existing community into which individuals are born; 
consequently, persons are by nature social beings embedded in the context of social 
relationships, thus, indicating a conception of persons as communitarian beings. There is, 
therefore, emphasis on communal values, relationships, and recognition of 
interdependency of persons in human existence. The chapter observes then that 
autonomy, in such a communal context, is developed, fostered, and practiced in 
relationships, hence, relational autonomy and, thus, RAIC. This conception of person and 
autonomy is comparable to that of ethics of care.  
 Finally, the chapter examines the concept of the common good and rights in 
African thought, noting that the concept of the common good symbolized by the Siamese 
crocodile is intrinsically connected to the idea of community. Moreover, there is a 
common notion of the good and the goal of medicine. Thus, the practice of RAIC in 
ATM supports and fosters the concept of the common good, and the objective notion of 
the good life comparable to that of ethics of care. Because of the African emphasis on 
communal values and the common good, there is no emphasis on rights. Consequently, 
individual rights of patients are not prominent in ATM and in African cultures.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
APPLIED ANALYSIS OF ATM’S RAIC TO HEALTHCARE ETHICS 
COMMITTEES IN AFRICA 
 
This chapter presents an applied example of the contribution of ATM’s RAIC 
approach to healthcare ethics committees in Africa by focusing, in particular, on the 
decision-making process for the informed consent of patients.  
5. A.  General Description of Healthcare Ethics Committees  
A committee can be said to be a group of people officially chosen and delegated 
to perform a particular function which includes investigating, reviewing, considering, 
acting, or reporting on a subject or a particular matter. It can also be understood as a 
group of people appointed to perform a task on behalf of a larger group.1 For instance, a 
finance committee and a discipline committee for an organization would then be 
committees charged with the task of finance and discipline, respectively. Similarly, a 
committee charged with the task of handling the ethical issues of an organization would 
be an ethics committee. Thus, an ethics committee is not restricted to healthcare; rather, it 
can be found in non-healthcare organizations or facilities as well. There is, for instance, 
the ethics committee of the US House of Representatives. In this dissertation, however, 
the focus is on ethics committees in healthcare organizations or facilities, in other words, 
on healthcare ethics committees.   
5. A. 1. Meaning and Brief History of Healthcare Ethics Committees in the USA  
Within healthcare, various labels may also sometimes be applied to ethics 
committees. Often, a label does not necessarily depict an essential difference, it may 
instead, represent a variance of facility or institution. For instance, there are hospital 
ethics committees, institutional ethics committees, healthcare ethics committees, and 
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clinical ethics committees. They can all have the same meaning within healthcare but 
possess slight nuances. While the first two designations may refer to facilities, the last 
two refer to the function. Thus, clinical ethics committees and healthcare ethics 
committees, and to some extent, institutional ethics committees, embrace hospitals, 
nursing homes, hospices, etc. Each of these is essentially different from research ethics 
committees whose primary function is to make decisions regarding the advisability of 
undertaking a particular research study or not.2 However, research ethics committees are 
not within the scope of this dissertation.   
i. Meaning of Healthcare Ethics Committees in the USA 
A healthcare ethics committee is a group of diverse individuals, professionals, and 
laypersons appointed by a healthcare facility, such as a hospital, and formally charged 
with three main functions: education, consultation, and policy review. The committee 
meets regularly to address ethical problems and issues arising within a specific healthcare 
institution. The members of such a committee discuss, deliberate, and advise on ethical 
decisions that arise in clinical care situations.3 Thus, Ronald E. Cranford and Edward A. 
Doudera defined an ethics committee as "a multidisciplinary group of health care 
professionals within a health care institution that has been specifically established to 
address ethical dilemmas that occur within the institution."4  
ii. History of Healthcare Ethics Committees in the USA 
The history of ethics committees shows that they arose from the need of hospital and 
healthcare facilities for expert ethical advice in complex ethical situations. These 
committees sought to improve decisions in certain cases, for example, deciding whether 
to withhold or withdraw increasingly complicated life-support systems from patients 
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whose future quality of life is uncertain.5 Certain events influenced the emergence of 
healthcare ethics committees, especially in the USA.  
In the 1950s, Japanese and German physicians conducted a series of medical 
research experiments on captive populations without their consent. In the 1960s, the 
Americans followed suit. There was also the Tuskegee research in the 1970s by 
American scientists. During all these experiments, it was abundantly clear that some 
regulations were needed. In view of this fact, the US Congress established the National 
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral 
Research (Research Commission). The commission, in addition to developing three basic 
principles to guide research involving human subjects, endorsed a system of peer review 
of research. However, during the late1960s, federal agencies, such as the US Public 
Health Service, the National Institutes of Health, the Department of Health and Human 
Services (DHHS), as well as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the concept of 
peer review had already been developed. As a result, the Commission suggested that 
these federal groups or agencies be united into a single system. The resulting system 
required the establishment of Institutional Review Boards whose approval is needed prior 
to conduct of any research on human subjects. Later, the concept of such institutional 
ethics review committees was extended to the clinical setting, albeit with significant 
modification, leading to the establishment of healthcare ethics committees.6  
Another avenue of influence on the emergence of healthcare ethics committees 
was in the area of medical intervention. By their very nature, new medical technologies 
precipitated new ethical dilemmas. A typical example is that of organ transplantation, 
especially heart transplantation. Although heart transplantation is life prolonging, the 
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procedure necessitated a reconsideration of the traditional definition of death, a definition 
that was based on the irreversible cessation of cardiac function. Another example of new 
life-prolonging technology is the emergence of kidney dialysis, which, because at the 
time, was both expensive and in short supply, it raised the disturbing choices of who 
would live and who would be left to die. Subsequently, there were the new mechanical 
ventilators.7 These have the capacity of supporting biological life far beyond the 
permanent loss of consciousness. These life-prolonging and, thus, death postponing 
technologies presented ethical dilemmas and, in the public mind, triggered the feeling of 
loss of control. Chris Hackler and D. Micah Hester nicely expressed these dilemmas:  
New technologies continued to emerge that could further postpone the moment of death. 
The public sensed a loss of control over technology that was expressed not only in 
religious and philosophical terms, but in drama, fiction, and the visual arts. The moment 
of death was increasingly seen as a matter of human choice for which we seemed ill 
prepared.8     
 
Responding to this apparent loss of control, the US Congress established the 
President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical 
and Behavioral Research. In addition to producing reports on such topical issues as 
definition of death, making healthcare decisions, and foregoing life-sustaining treatment, 
the Commission recommended that hospitals “establish inter-disciplinary committees to 
provide guidance in difficult treatment decisions,” particularly around end-of-life 
decisions, to educate hospital personnel regarding ethical issues, and to formulate 
hospital policies and guidelines.9 The Commission also supported the New Jersey 
Supreme Court approach to decision-making for incompetent or incapacitated patients in 
the famed Quinlan case. In this case, the Court ruled that the decision regarding whether 
or not to withdraw life support systems should be made by the guardians of the patient in 
consultation with the ethics committee. In making this ruling, the Court seemed to take it 
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for granted that most hospitals had ethics committees.10  The reality, of course, was that, 
at that time, most healthcare facilities did not have ethics committees. Furthermore, the 
Court ascribed a prognostic role to ethics committees by requiring them to ascertain 
whether there is a reasonable chance of recovery for Quinlan and people in her situation. 
However, the New Jersey Supreme Court was not the first to propose the idea of ethics 
committees. The Court was quoting a Baylor Law Review article written by a 
pediatrician, Dr. Karen Teel.11 Nevertheless, by this pronouncement the Court fostered 
the development of ethics committees or healthcare ethics committees. In this way, the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey ruling on Quinlan and other court rulings helped to 
influence the development of healthcare ethics committees in healthcare institutions in 
the USA.12  
Furthermore, in the 1920s and 1930s, special committees were established in 
some hospitals to review sterilization decisions. They determined which persons with 
mental disabilities should be involuntarily sterilized or not. Later, from 1945 to the 
1960s, special committees were also formed to review abortion decisions. They were 
charged with the evaluation of women’s requests to terminate their pregnancies. At the 
same time, the committee determined whether therapeutic abortions were required to 
preserve the prospective mother’s life and health. Besides committees on sterilization, 
medical moral committees were also established. They (medical moral committees) 
functioned in Catholic hospitals where they dealt with issues related to reproduction, 
analgesia, and extraordinary medical interventions at the end of life, all from the 
perspective of Church doctrine. Clinical and administrative staff also started engaging in 
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interdisciplinary deliberations involving issues of high-tech care. They undertook self-
education and exhibited growing professional awareness of ethical implications.13  
In response to the New Jersey Supreme Court’s recommendation in the Quinlan 
case, healthcare ethics committees were founded in some healthcare institutions in the 
1970s.14 The report produced by the President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical and 
Biomedical and Behavioral Research in March 1983 intimated that many medical groups 
favored the experiment whereby some healthcare institutions utilized ethics committees 
as a means of improving decision-making in certain cases. These groups, which included 
the American Academy of Pediatrics and the American College of Hospital 
Administrators, found such an approach preferable to the method used by the Department 
of Health and Human Services in its first Baby Doe regulations. Therefore, after the 
federal judge disposed of the Baby Doe regulations, these groups formally encouraged 
the utilization of healthcare ethics committees. The Department of Health and Human 
Services partially agreed to the proposal while maintaining the possibility of making use 
of “Baby Doe Squads” in investigating claims of discriminatory failure to offer treatment 
to handicapped infants.  Some medical institutions formed the “Infant Care Review 
Committee” and received greater leeway from the Department of Health and Human 
Services. The Infant Care Review Committees were meant to review care plans for 
severely disabled newborns, for instance, the Downs syndrome.  
 A report released in 1992 by the American Hospital Association showed that of 
five thousand nine hundred and sixteen (5916) hospitals responding to a survey, three 
thousand and fifteen (3015) or fifty percent (51%) had a healthcare ethics committee. 
Some of these committees originated from a specific area of research.15 Similarly, other 
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healthcare ethics committees began in response to the recommendations of both the 
President’s Commission and the “Baby Doe” guidelines.16  
Other factors that later influenced and fostered the development of healthcare 
ethics committees in healthcare institutions in the USA include the requirement by the 
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) that ethics 
committees or a decision-making body be established and that State Legislations require 
the establishment of ethics committees as one of the criteria for accreditation.17 In 1991, 
the JCAHO began to require the establishment of a “mechanism” to examine ethical 
issues in patient care and to educate both healthcare professionals and patients in these 
issues. In response to JCAHO’s mandate, many hospital ethics committees were 
established. By the turn of the new century, most hospitals had ethics committees, at least 
in name.18 By 1994, states including Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Arizona, and 
Hawaii, had passed legislation requiring ethics committees in healthcare institutions, that 
is, hospitals and nursing homes.19    
5. A. 2.  Functions of Healthcare Ethics Committees  
Generally, ethics committees perform three traditional functions: the education of 
committee members, the staff of the facility, and the patients; ethics consultation; and the 
development and review of policies.20 The American Society for Bioethics and 
Humanities (ASBH) states that “Ethics committees and individual ethicists typically offer 
services that include education, research, policy development, and consultation.”21 Susan 
Derr carried out a study of ten healthcare ethics committees in New Jersey and observed 
that there were four main recurrent topics in their discussions: case reviews, policies, 
educational needs, and ethical updates. She relates these four topics to autonomy and 
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informed consent, advanced directives and values identification, futility and end of life.22 
A brief examination of the functions of healthcare ethics committees follows.  
i. Education  
This is the primary function of ethics committees: to educate its members and the 
staff of their healthcare institution, and, when necessary, the patients as well. The 
education function of healthcare ethics committees is imperative because most members 
of such committees have little or no formal formation in bioethics or healthcare ethics.23 
Moreover, these committees need to assist others in making complex ethical decisions. In 
the education of its members, care is to be taken to see that the entire committee has a 
common and similar knowledge, including an understanding of each member’s function 
or role as well as the goal and task of the group as a whole.24 The benefit of this is that it 
will reduce confusion and misunderstanding in the group. It will also help members to 
make meaningful and appropriate contributions to the discussions and at ethics 
consultations.  The education of ethics committee members can be fulfilled in various 
ways, such as self-education, seminars, conferences, short courses, and workshops. There 
are also resource books, casebooks, core competency materials such as those issued by 
the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities (ASBH) which are available for 
individual self-education or self-structured groups. Healthcare ethics committees can set 
apart some time in their meetings for an “educational component” in the form of 
discussion and/or presentation by a member on an important topic. Some healthcare 
ethics committees do not offer themselves for services until the members acquire some 
education or until a period of self-education is completed, while most begin services as 
they educate themselves. Whichever option a group adopts, it should avoid the tendency 
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to think that its education is ever complete or finished. The healthcare ethics discipline is 
vast and ever expanding. If the committee has access to funds, it can invite a guest 
speaker to assist in educating or creating awareness and addressing recurrent issues in 
healthcare ethics such as surrogate decision-making, allocation of scarce resources, and 
end-of-life issues. Such a move can prevent problems that emanate from lack of 
awareness and can foster the visibility and credibility of the committee.25 In addition to 
giving it credibility in the eyes of their colleagues, it will boost their confidence and their 
ability to help other people.26 
Besides being self-formed, healthcare ethics committees have the task of 
educating the entire hospital community about ethical issues involving clinical care. They 
begin with making their existence known to the hospital community, explaining their 
role, as well as how and when to contact them. Then, they facilitate the awareness of 
topical issues in clinical ethics. Part of the healthcare ethics committee function of 
educating the healthcare facility community is helping to articulate institutional moral 
vision where there is none, and, if required. In their encounter with ethical dilemmas in 
the facility, the healthcare ethics committee may discover the lack of a sufficient moral 
basis to resolve the moral dilemma at hand. Hence, the committee realizes the need for a 
morality or a common institutional morality to guide the behavior of the facility. 
However, where there is an existing institutional moral vision, the healthcare ethics 
committee assists in directing the application of that common institutional morality to 
new bioethical challenges.27  
The underlying aim of the education function in particular, and that of the other 
two functions in general, is the promotion of the patient rights and the promotion of 
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shared decision-making between patients, or their surrogates, and their clinicians. 
Furthermore, it is the fostering of fair policies and procedures that maximizes the 
likelihood of achieving good patient-centered outcomes and the enhancement of the 
ethical tenor of healthcare professionals and healthcare facilities.28  
ii. Ethics Consultation  
The most visible and often controversial function of healthcare ethics committees 
is to consult about tough clinical decisions. As medicine becomes more complex, fiscal 
and bureaucratic pressures mount, and governmental regulations expand, clinicians and 
administrators increasingly look to healthcare ethics committees for analysis and 
guidance in resolving healthcare dilemmas with ethical dimensions.29 Consultations can 
be done by a single person, that is, “single consultant model,” or by the whole committee, 
that is the “whole committee model” or by a sub-group of the ethics committee, that is, “a 
subcommittee model.” In the single consultant model, one person conducts the ethics 
consultation on behalf of the ethics committee or serves as the healthcare facility’s ethics 
consultant or ethicist. This model is often used in small healthcare facilities. The single 
consultant model allows for more flexible scheduling and, perhaps, for faster response to 
consult requests. It is a good model for bedside consultation. However, it lacks diversity 
of opinion and experience found in subcommittee and full committee models.30  
The problem with the “whole committee model” is that it is difficult to get 
everyone to attend a consult meeting on short notice and in a timely manner. 
Furthermore, if everyone were to attend, it would be overwhelming for the petitioner for 
the consult. It is generally intimidating and frightening for a patient or a family to walk 
into a room filled with professionals to hold a conversation, answering and asking 
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questions. It is daunting, no matter how caring and concerned the committee wishes to 
appear.31  
Therefore, a subcommittee approach is favored. The subcommittee is smaller, 
perhaps two to three members. It is less overwhelming for the patient or the family. It 
offers diversity of opinion and experience that enriches the consultation. Moreover, it is 
easier to convene a meeting of two to three people on short notice. The subcommittee 
model has become popular. For example, a study conducted in the United States in 2007 
shows that sixty-eight percent (68%) of the ethics committees use this model; twenty-
three percent (23%) utilize the full ethics committee approach, whereas only nine percent 
(9%) favor the single consultation model.32  
There are also different models of facilitating an ethics consult: the authoritarian, 
the pure facilitation, and the ethics facilitation models.33 The authoritarian model 
emphasizes the consultants as the primary moral decision-maker, by contrast with or by 
excluding the appropriate moral decision-makers, namely, the patients and relatives 
concerned.34 The authoritarian often fails to maintain a line of communication that is 
open with all those concerned and that does not seek to reach a consensus.  
The pure facilitation model, however, seeks to reach a consensus, but, often at the 
expense of ethical value. Sometimes a consensus is reached without paying attention to 
and clarifying the “implications of societal, legal, and institutional values for the case, 
…”35 The ethics facilitation model seeks consensus but does not place emphasis on the 
consultant as the moral decision-maker at the expense of patients, relatives, and others 
concerned. This approach is very sensitive to and pays attention to the context in which 
the ethics consult occurs; it encourages all concerned to speak. It also pays attention to 
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ethical, legal, and societal values and their implications for the case and for all parties 
involved. The consultants identify and analyze the nature of the uncertainty of these 
values while they clarify relevant ethics concepts such as best interest, informed consent 
or informed refusal, solidarity, futility, etc.36 This is a more appropriate model for ethics 
consultation, especially for integrated ethics committees. An ethics consult requires at 
least three categories of skill: ethical assessment, process, and interpersonal.37 Ethical 
assessment skills help to identify the nature of the conflict or value uncertainty that 
underlies the need for consultations. The members of healthcare ethics committees need 
the following abilities to enable their consultation work: the ability to 
discern and gather relevant data, assess the social and interpersonal dynamics of the case 
(e.g., power relations, racial, ethnic, cultural, and religious differences), distinguish the 
ethical dimensions of the case from other, often overlapping, dimensions (e.g., legal, 
medical, psychiatric), identify various assumptions that involved parties bring to the case 
(e.g., regarding quality of life, risk taking, unarticulated agendas), identify relevant values 
of involved parties.38  
 
In order to be able to analyze the value uncertainty or conflict, they need the ability to  
 
access the relevant knowledge (e.g., bioethics, law institutional policy, professional 
codes, and religious teachings), clarify relevant concepts (e.g., confidentiality, privacy, 
informed consent, best interest), critically evaluate and use relevant knowledge of 
bioethics, law (without giving legal advice), institutional policy (guidelines on 
withdrawal or withholding life-sustaining treatment), and professional codes in the case.39    
 
For a critical evaluation of and use of relevant knowledge, some members of the 
healthcare ethics committees need to possess the ability to  
utilize relevant moral considerations in helping to analyze the case, identify and justify a 
range of morally acceptable options and their consequences, evaluate evidence and 
arguments for and against different options, recognize and acknowledge personal 
limitations and possible areas of conflict between personal moral views and one’s role in 
doing consultation (e.g., this may involve accepting group decisions with which one 
disagrees, but which are morally acceptable).40   
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However, although process skills help in ethical assessment, they emphasize 
efforts to resolve the value conflict as it surfaces in any given healthcare situation. 
Process skills comprise the ability to facilitate formal and informal meetings,  
identify key decision-makers and involved parties and include them in discussions, set 
ground rules for formal meetings (e.g., the length, participants, purpose, and structure of 
such meetings), express and stay within the limits of ethics consultant’s role during the 
meeting, create an atmosphere of trust that respects privacy and confidentiality and that 
allows parties to feel free to express their concerns (e.g., skill in addressing anger, 
suspicion, fear or resentment; skill in addressing intimidation and disruption due to power 
and/ or role differentials).41  
 
Process skills also require the ability to assist people to critically analyze the 
values underlying their assumptions, their decision, as well as the possible 
consequences thereof. Likewise, process skills require committee members to be 
able to engage in creative problem solving, being able to “negotiate between 
competing moral views,” using the structures and resources of the institution to 
facilitate the implementation of the selected option.42   
Finally, the interpersonal skills, which are very essential to nearly every 
aspect of ethics consultation in individual patient cases are attained by “doing” or 
practice. They require members of the ethics committees to be able to  
listen well and to communicate interest, respect, support, and empathy to involved 
parties, educate involved parties regarding the ethical dimensions of the case, elicit the 
moral views of involved parties, represent the views of involved parties to others, 
enable involved parties to communicate effectively and be heard by other parties, and 
recognize and attend to various relational barriers to communication.43  
  
In the consult, the healthcare ethics committee, through its subcommittee, assists 
the parties concerned “to discern the ethical issues, the options for action,” and the course 
of action that is better in that given situation, having considered all circumstances.44 In 
this way, ethics committees assist decision-makers, albeit by advisory recommendations. 
Through the consult, healthcare ethics committees also serve as forums for airing and 
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resolving disagreements among staff, patients, and families about clinical care decisions 
and resolving difficult medical dilemmas.  
Healthcare ethics committees can make treatment recommendation. It is known 
that, when physicians request a consult, they are seeking for some kind of expert opinion, 
such as whether a given procedure would be ethically justifiable or not. Likewise, 
patients and families would ask similar questions. Through the ethics consultation, 
healthcare ethics committees provide ethics education to patients, their relatives, and the 
community. At the end of the consult, the subcommittee reports to the healthcare ethics 
committee where the case is reviewed by the entire membership. The case review serves 
to foster accountability, to provide information to enable the organization and healthcare 
ethics committees in their policy development and review function, as well as helping in 
quality improvement and better patient care.45 Finally, ethics consultations should be 
documented in an appropriate place such as in the patient record or in some other secure 
place. Documents of ethics consultations help foster accountability, communication, and 
improvement of both patient care and organization’s quality.46   
iii. Policies Development and Review  
The third function of healthcare ethics committees is the development and review 
of ethical policies concerning various aspects of the healthcare activities of the institution 
or hospital. Healthcare ethics committees are often responsible for creating policies to 
“effect the bioethical commitments that have been crafted or which are to be applied” to a 
facility’s healthcare activities. In such instances, the assumption is that “the general 
morality is clear” and that what is needed is simply an elaboration of particular policies.47 
Such policies include advance directives, orders regarding “do not resuscitate,” 
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identification of appropriate surrogate, policies pertaining to informed consent, and 
surrogate decision-making, confidentiality, futility, and framing of triage forms to direct 
clinical decision-making. Care should be taken to collaborate and involve particular 
departments or persons that are concerned with a policy under review. However, rather 
than the healthcare ethics committees, it is the administration or the board of trustees who 
promulgate the ethical policies developed or reviewed by the ethics committees.48 
Healthcare ethics committees make recommendations: “advice from a qualified third 
party, based on thoughtful examination of the case in the context of the ethical principles 
of justice, autonomy, beneficence, and nonmaleficence.”49 Although healthcare ethics 
committee judgments are recommendations, some courts use them as legal evidence in 
support of physician action.50 The importance of this function, that is, policies 
development and review, lies in the fact that the ethical climate of any facility is 
determined, to a large extent, by the policies it adopts and practices. Good policies assist 
people to make good decisions, thereby preventing ethical problems from arising.51    
5. A. 3.  Composition and Formation of Healthcare Ethics Committees  
The composition and formation of healthcare ethics committees vary according to 
places and situations. However, it is encouraged that members be drawn from various 
departments of the facility as well as from the local community which it serves.52 
Participation and membership is usually voluntary and non-salaried. The Society for 
Health and Human Values –Society for Bioethics Consultation Task Force published a 
position paper in 1998 in which it stated that healthcare ethics committee members “must 
have institutional support.” Members should be allowed sufficient time and excused from 
other duties to engage in healthcare ethics committee work such as ethics consultation. 
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The institution should also provide members with the necessary access to resources in 
order to further their ethics education.53 The committee can include physicians with 
different specialties, nurses, administrators and trustees, chaplain, social workers, 
technicians, security personnel, business department staff, representatives of the local 
community where the healthcare institution is located, and a person trained in bioethics. 
The interdisciplinary or multidisciplinary nature of healthcare ethics committees cannot 
be overemphasized. For example, membership on one of the healthcare ethics committees 
that I belong to, at Forbes Regional Hospital in Pittsburgh, has as members: physicians, 
nurses, nurse practitioners, a lawyer, ethicists, clergymen, a community representative, 
social workers, and administrators, etc., The selection of members of healthcare ethics 
committees should consider the individuals’ concerns for the welfare of the sick and 
infirm, the candidates’ interest in ethical issues, as well as their reputation in the 
community and among their colleagues or peers.54  
There are also some guidelines for the formation and training of healthcare ethics 
committees. Such guidelines include a two-page document, “Guideline on Hospital 
Committees on Biomedical Ethics,” published by the American Hospital Association. It 
is a general document that deals with the composition, function, and deliberations of 
committees. Another guideline is that of the American Academy of Pediatrics for 
seriously ill infants. There are also the core competencies for healthcare ethics committee 
consultation compiled by the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities. This 
document deals exclusively with ethics consultation. It recommends that every member 
of healthcare ethics committees acquire some competencies or skills such as those 
necessary to identify and analyze the nature of conflicts or value uncertainty, as well as 
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the ability to lead both informal and formal meetings. Likewise, it requires the ability to 
listen well and to communicate interest, respect, support, and empathy, and to elicit the 
moral views of those involved in consult. 55    
5. A. 4.  Integrated Healthcare Ethics Committees  
There has been a shift in the modus operandi of traditional healthcare ethics 
committees or healthcare ethics committees to what is now known as “Integrated” 
healthcare ethics committees. The integrated healthcare ethics committee model was 
occasioned by the idea of an integrated clinical and organizational ethics and consult. The 
primary reason for the new model was that the existing model in use at the time, and 
which is still in use in some places is primarily reactive and case-based. It concentrates 
on acute-care and individual-oriented patient care. In their journal article of 1999, C. R 
Seeley and S. L. Goldberger reject the distinction or dichotomy between clinical ethics 
concerns and those of organizational ethics. They posit that making such distinctions is 
similar to differentiating the concerns between psyche and soma, which for them is a 
false dichotomy.56  
When the healthcare ethics committee of St. Joseph Health System in California 
came to the conclusion that their healthcare ethics committees were in trouble or 
becoming more trouble than they were worth, they decided to attempt to reform the 
committees. The members concurred on the point that healthcare ethics committees exist 
for the primary purpose of fostering the care of patients by improving “the ethics of 
professional caregivers and caregiving organization.”57 The group reasoned that, given 
such a purpose, healthcare ethics committees felt the need “to make a demonstrable 
difference in how patients are actually cared for by making a demonstrable difference in 
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how the staff and the organization itself actually deal with ethical issues relating to 
patient care.”58 To achieve this goal, the group came up with four principles or values 
that healthcare ethics committees should adopt: 1) healthcare ethics committees should be 
“proactive and not just reactive, 2) they should be organizationally integrated and not 
isolated, 3) they should be accountable in accordance with measurable outcomes and not 
just in accord with the good intentions of their members, 4) finally, they should be 
“oriented by institutional values and not just patients’ rights.”59  
In their journal article of 2006, Mary B. Foglia and Robert A Pearlman showed 
that the traditional case-based approach to ethics consult and framing of ethics issues may 
result in solutions that attend to the immediate issue but do not resolve “the underlying 
systems and processes that contribute causally to the problem.” Consequently, the 
solution does not “prevent a recurrence of the same problem.”60 They contrasted case-
based response to ethics consultation with systems-oriented ethics consultation. Systems-
oriented ethics consultation would be the method attuned to the integrated healthcare 
ethics committees’ method. While a systems-oriented approach might agree with the 
ethical analysis of that of case-based, its (systems) perspective will, in addition, highlight 
the facets of a case that might otherwise have been neglected or ignored. In other words, 
a systems-oriented or integrated approach to consult widens the perspective. It enables 
“one to view the case through the widest possible lens.” It makes the healthcare ethics 
committee look constantly for “pre-disposing factors that contribute to the development 
of ethics concerns.”61 Thus, a systems-oriented approach places high emphasis on 
identifying strategies that will assist in preventing future recurrences of the problem. The 
strategies are supposed to target the organization’s systems and processes frequently.  
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The systems-oriented approach does not focus on interventions, whether educational or 
other, their sole purpose is changing individual behavior. The underlying understanding 
is that the capacity of the employees of the facility to come up with sound ethical 
judgments and later act on the judgments is powerfully shaped by the organizational 
environment, a factor which is external to the individual.62 Instead, systems-level 
interventions aim at making the ethical response virtually inevitable. An example would 
be employing “electronic reminders to update a patient’s advance directive upon 
admission to acute care.”63 The various aspects of the organization, for example, ethics 
consultants or quality improvement experts, and risk-benefit assessment, are involved and 
integrated in this approach. While the identified strategies target the systems and 
processes to prevent recurrences, the systems-savvy consultants are also at work. 
Applying a healthy skepticism to the proposed corrective strategies, they investigate the 
possibility that both corrective and preventive strategies generate their own set of 
unintended negative consequences. Therefore, healthcare ethics committees in their 
consultation are expected to question constantly whether the case being treated has 
“systems-level antecedents and implications.”64 
In brief, this requires healthcare ethics committees to move from being primarily 
reactive and case-based, to being primarily proactive and systematic in addressing ethical 
issues and integrating ethics consultation, preventive ethics, and ethical leadership 
(organizational ethics). Healthcare ethics committees will address and tackle ethics issues 
and concerns in advance before conflicts occur. In performing this preventive function, 
committees need to move beyond the context of individual cases and their management 
to that of system-oriented patient care. The committees seek and analyze the root cause of 
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ethical conflicts with a view not only to resolve but also to prevent future occurrence. In 
this way, the healthcare ethics committees become proactive agents of systemic change 
leading to improved patient care within the organization. By means of this root cause 
analysis, they also achieve organizational transformation.65 However, it requires, first of 
all, that the management hold the ethics committees accountable for the resources 
provided to them. Second, it requires some parameters for judging the performance of 
healthcare ethics committees and the success of the model. No doubt, both the 
management of the healthcare facility and the ethics committee themselves would be 
interested in knowing the impact of the venture, that is, of shifting from the old to the 
new model as well as the resource deployed. Thus, the need for a judgment standard with 
regards to how management should hold ethics committees accountable arises. Blake 
suggests that the good intentions of ethics committees are sufficient to judge their 
performance; that it might be entirely inappropriate to hold the ethics committees to 
“measurable outcomes” in judging their value to the organization, and ultimately to 
patient care. Blake’s reason is that ethics committees are staffed by some of the nicest, 
most sensitive, well-meaning members of the organization, and not the hard core business 
members of the organization or the physicians who are not very much interested in their 
healthcare facility. According to Blake, the character and temperament of most of the 
ethics committees’ members are typically volunteers-driven in nature.66 
However, the evaluation of how well or how bad the healthcare ethics committees 
are doing in improving patient care can be done in two ways: healthcare ethics 
committees can simply continue to advocate for patients’ rights as delineated by law and 
by the codes of professional organizations. Alternatively, healthcare ethics committees 
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can widen and deepen their view of their values of their foundation which is associated 
with the institutional values of the healthcare organizations. Examples of such 
institutional values are those of St Joseph Health System: Dignity, Service, Excellence, 
and Justice; or The Pittsburgh Mercy Health System: Help, Hope, and Healing; or the 
University of Pittsburgh Medical Center: Live Changing Medicine; or the Cleveland 
Clinic: Quality, Innovation, Teamwork, Service, Integrity, and Compassion; or those of 
the Sisters of Charity Leavenworth Health Services Corporation: Response to Need, 
Respect, Wholeness, Excellence, and Stewardship. These values point towards a 
framework which is beyond the individual and the individual’s particular interests and 
needs. By orientation and impact, these sets of values are more communitarian than the 
individualistic values of the rights of a patient.67 Hence, Black rightly recommends the 
adoption of the second option. In working from the standpoint of the communitarian 
traditions of their own organizations, healthcare ethics committees will also deal with the 
autonomy and rights of a patient, because it is unlikely that an organization will embrace 
values that explicitly deny patient autonomy and/or rights.68 The healthcare ethics 
committees should have a clear mission and vision articulated in line with the above four 
principles and in conjunction with the mission and values of their healthcare 
organizations. Integrating healthcare ethics committees and ethics into the management 
of the organization requires making a “difference for the better in how patients are 
actually cared for” and not just having interesting discussions or re-shaping a facility’s 
public opinion.69 It requires the jettisoning of the appearance of healthcare ethics 
committees as ‘volunteers’ working as ‘amateurs.’ Members must be serious, and the 
training of members must also be taken seriously and must be carried out in a systematic 
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manner. The selection and support of ethics committee chairs and members have to be a 
serious administrative responsibility.70 The advantage of placing healthcare ethics 
committees in the corridors of an administrative structure is that it will allow direct 
interaction with the power brokers of the institution and will potentially integrate “ethics 
activities with the administrative appendages in which core ethical issues arise.”71  
Aligning healthcare ethics committees with the administrative structure would mean that 
a senior operations officer would be made responsible for the healthcare ethics committee 
in the facility. The officer will assume the administration’s responsibility for the 
existence and effectiveness of the healthcare ethics committee. The committee will report 
its activities to the officer in a manner that is agreeable to both the committee and the 
officer, who may have only an ex officio role on the committee. Yet, the officer will see 
to it that the chairs of the healthcare ethics committees are properly supported to fulfill 
their function on the committee and to the facility.72  
The integrated healthcare ethics committees are expected to be formally 
integrated into the organization’s operations and to be internally structured in order to 
facilitate their own effectiveness.  Implementing the transposition from an existing 
healthcare ethics committee model to the integrated or proactive model requires time, 
possibly two to three years, depending on the facility. However, based on the above four 
principles, certain groupings of tasks are required to foster re-formation. These task 
groups are delineated by Blake in his article.73 Some scholars, for example, Wenger, 
Blake and their colleagues, propose a subcommittee ethics resource service as part of the 
healthcare ethics committees which conduct the valuable function of healthcare ethics 
committee accountability and evaluation for ethics consultation. If an institute can afford 
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it fine; instead, rather than being a permanent group, other members of the healthcare 
ethics committee can alternate in performing that function.  
In conclusion, therefore, integrated healthcare ethics committees should be 
proactive and not just reactive both in their constitution and work habits; they should be 
organizationally integrated, and not isolated in both their membership and design. They 
should be held accountable for performance, based on demonstrable outcomes, and not 
simply on good intentions. Finally, in both their analyses of issues and their activities, 
healthcare ethics committees should be oriented by organizational core values, as well as 
external legal, regulatory, accreditation requirements.74 In the words of Wenger:  
The ethical issues of hospitals and hospital systems today require integration of the ethics 
system into the administrative decision-making mechanism and a level of timing and 
power that is far different than the HEC of yesterday. Accomplishing these goals will 
require paradigm shifts such as those proposed in the Next Generation Model. However, 
in shaping a new institutional ethics structure, many of the troubling issues inherent in 
HECs (but less obvious in an informal structure) such as independence and quality 
control become clearly discernible problems to be tackled.75  
 
5. B.  Situation of Healthcare Ethics Committees in Africa  
 Now that the meaning, composition, and functions of healthcare ethics 
committees in the liberal Western societies, especially in the USA, have been established, 
the need for and how an integrated proactive model of healthcare ethics committee for 
better patient care can be realized. It now remains to explore the situation in Africa, in 
ATM, and to demonstrate which type of healthcare ethics committee is suitable for ATM 
in view of RAIC for better patient care and decision-making process of informed consent 
of the patient.  
5. B. 1.  A Brief History of Healthcare Ethics Committees in Africa  
In certain African countries, such as Nigeria, some healthcare facilities have what 
is called “grievance committees.” The members are generally selected by the 
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administration and are answerable to the administration. Their main function is to 
mediate disputes between patient and staff or disagreements between staff members. 
They are not really ethics committees per se, because the membership or composition is 
neither sufficiently diverse nor mixed to reflect facility demographics. There is usually no 
community representation in the group, and the facility does not receive or provide 
ethical training for its members or for the hospital community.  
In other countries, for example in South Africa where healthcare ethics 
committees exist, their organization and development were in response to regulations by 
the Council for Hospital Accreditation for Southern Africa (COHSASA) which requires 
their formation as a criterion for accreditation of hospitals or healthcare facilities.76 In 
2012, the Mulago Hospital in Uganda formed a healthcare ethics committee. More 
prominent than the hospital ethics committees in Africa are the many research ethics 
committees (REC) and, more recently, the national ethics committees. These arose, in 
part, because of the influence of international collaboration in biomedical research and 
are sponsored by international agencies such as the WHO and UNESCO. Some of these 
research ethics committees have a considerable history. For example, the oldest 
committee of the research ethics was formed in 1967 in South Africa. That of the Medical 
Research Council of Zimbabwe was established in 1974.77 Of course, research ethics 
committees are decision-making bodies which have a rigid protocol geared toward 
research projects. On the other hand, healthcare ethics committees are not decision-
making committees. The national ethics committees (also called national bioethics 
committees) are very recent and are supported by UNESCO. The plan is for every 
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country in Africa to establish one of these committees for discussions and consideration 
of issues in bioethics; they are not necessarily healthcare ethics committees.    
5. B. 2. Healthcare Ethics Committees in Hospitals 
With regard to the current situation of ethics committees in African countries, the 
existing data show that, with the exception of South Africa and Uganda, there are hardly 
any ethics committees in hospitals which consider patient care. As noted above, in South 
Africa, the Department of Health requires all hospitals to have ethics committees. In 
January 1998, an ethics committee was formed at Soroka Medical Center I Beer-Sheva.78 
After an exploratory meeting on February 28, 2003, an ethics committee was formed in 
March 2003, in Grey’s Hospital KwaZulu Natal of South Africa. The first meeting was 
held on March 14th, 2003.79 The reason for the lack of healthcare ethics committees in 
most African countries is that their functions, advantages, and the importance of their 
need have not been fully appreciated. Consequently, there is a need to create an 
awareness of the significance of healthcare ethics committees and to develop ways to 
establish them. In addition, lack of encouragement on the part of individual governments 
suggests the need to encourage and facilitate the establishment of healthcare ethics 
committees in their respective countries. In South Africa, where the government and the 
Hospital Accreditation Board have not only encouraged their establishment but have 
required them for the accreditation of hospitals, the response is different. Similarly, in 
most countries, for example, Nigeria, Ghana, and Uganda, where the governments have 
created the awareness of the importance of and their need, research ethics committees are 
booming.80 There are even Centers, such as the West African Center for Bioethics, 
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charged with the responsibility of assisting in the formation of such committees and in 
the training of members.  
5. B. 3. Healthcare Ethics Committees in ATM  
No healthcare ethics committee has been identified for ATM facilities. Even 
though there are laws and rules in some African countries for guiding, regulating, and 
monitoring the practices of ATM doctors and practitioners, none seems to require the 
establishment of healthcare ethics committees.81  Nevertheless, the need for such 
committees in ATM and other health care institutions cannot be over-emphasized.  
Some biomedical issues that gave rise to healthcare ethics committees in the USA 
and in Europe exist in Africa. These include issues arising from developing healthcare 
technologies, commercialization of medicine and healthcare, evolving societal, 
communal, institutional, professional, and individual values.  There is also a rising 
population of Christian fundamentalists who oppose traditional ways of life as satanic or 
evil, an expanding array of possible treatments that pose difficult decisions for patients, 
their relatives, and the community.  Some new issues arise from collaborations in 
healthcare technology and marketing between Africa, the USA, and other continents 
(Europe, America, Asia, etc.). Moreover, some ATM facilities are utilizing modern 
medical technology to augment and improve their medical practice. The influence of 
these technologies and developments has been recognized by the West and Central 
African leaders as well as by scholars who gathered in Dakar in 2005 for a meeting on 
ethics and bioethics: 
Aware of the advances in life sciences and the impact of their applications in Africa;  
Aware of the necessity to engage in appropriate reflection and to promote ethical debates 
and organized social movements that can help to deal with the issues as well as 
economic, social, cultural and health challenges which the continent is confronted with;  
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Aware of the complexity of these questions which require a multidisciplinary and 
pluralistic approach; ….82  
 
The group, therefore, called for the development of frameworks for the practice of ethics 
in healthcare and beseeched the governments of African countries to make a commitment 
towards the formation of ethics and bioethics committees, particularly by instituting legal 
frameworks aimed at specifying conditions for their creation and functioning. Uppermost 
in the mind of the group were both research ethics committees and national ethics 
committees. Because the ethical concerns which the group identified were also pertinent 
to healthcare ethics committees, its call to the governments applies to healthcare ethics 
committees as well. In addition to recognizing the need, the Dakar declaration also 
acknowledged the “urgency to put into place a Forum of Reflection, Dialogue, and 
Action concerning questions of ethics, bioethics, and life sciences for the continent and in 
particular for West and Central Africa.”83  
 Furthermore, it is not unknown that health professionals themselves experience 
ethical dilemmas in their work of caring for patients. In their separate surveys in the 
United Kingdom V. F. Larcher, B. Lask, J. M. McCarthy as well as A. Slowther, C. 
Bunch, B. Woolnough, and T. Hope demonstrate  that many healthcare professionals 
frequently encounter ethical dilemmas notwithstanding the many guidelines, regulations 
and recommendations issued by regulators, professional and government bodies. These 
studies also examined the frequency with which medical personnel experience ethical 
dilemmas, their nature, the mechanism for dealing with them, and the need for education 
and training.84 The surveys identified a need for clinical ethics consultation and support 
expressed by medical personnel directly involved in patient care.85  
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A number of other studies reveal that healthcare personnel find ethics 
consultations beneficial and educational. More than eighty-five percent (85%) of 
physicians surveyed who had previously sought the help of a healthcare ethics committee 
indicated that they would engage in an ethics consult again in the future. They also 
recommended ethics consults to their colleagues.86 A more recent survey shows that 
forty-one percent (41%) of physicians polled stated that ethics consultations were “often 
helpful,” thirty percent (30%) described them as “occasionally helpful,” whereas only 
fifteen percent (15%) saw them as “rarely helpful.”87 Patients and their surrogates 
likewise found ethics consultations beneficial. However, the level of satisfaction for 
patients and their surrogates was lower than that of healthcare personnel.88 Felicia Cohn 
and her colleagues analyzed proactive ethics consultations in ICUs and determined that 
families, patients, and healthcare personnel found ethics consultations to be informative 
and “helpful for analyzing and resolving ethical conflicts.”89 All these surveys and 
studies based on the testimony of patients, families, and healthcare personnel, found 
ethics consultations to be beneficial and educational, and help in formulating a 
compelling rationale for establishing healthcare ethics committees in ATM.  
Therefore, the need for healthcare ethics committees in ATM and even in 
allopathic medical facilities in Africa cannot be over-emphasized. Some of the typical 
issues that these committees will be addressing include those surrounding the beginning 
of life, namely, the utilization of reproductive technologies, abortion, infertility, spread of 
sexually transmitted diseases, misuse of traditional and allopathic medicines, 
confidentiality, informed consent, medical futility, and relationship between allopathic 
and ATM. Healthcare ethics committees will assist existing mechanisms in addressing 
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ethical issues arising in medical practice today. They will further attempt to integrate 
ethical analysis with medicine, such as an increased emphasis on ethics in medical 
education, organization of conferences and seminars, publications, and other forums 
dedicated to ethical issues.90 That healthcare ethics committees will be helpful in 
improving the functioning of healthcare institutions as well as the welfare of the patients 
is shown by the remarks of the administrators of Grey Hospital in Kwazulu-Natal, South 
Africa regarding their healthcare ethics committee:  
The Committee “has formulated ethical guidelines on some topics …posted its Vision 
and Mission and some documents relating to its activities on the Grey's Hospital website. 
The Committee has also organized regular Ethics Forum lectures … (usually four per 
year) … drawing a substantial audience of knowledgeable and enthusiastic participants. 
Unfortunately the younger members of the medical community (interns and registrars) 
have not shown a great inclination to participate in these activities. In the last year the 
Committee has become increasingly involved in considerations of the ethics of health 
care related research, and has recommended the establishment of an accredited Research 
Ethics Committee in the Pietermaritzburg Metropole, … it is becoming increasingly 
sophisticated in its debate on ethical issues and spreading the culture of Ethics in the 
Hospital Community….91   
 
Some general concerns regarding the need for healthcare ethics committees have 
been examined by Anne Slowther, Chris Bunch, Brian Woolnough and Tony Hope. They 
asked if part of the reason for requiring healthcare ethics committees is to introduce 
discussion of clinical ethics to a wider group in order to allow different perspectives to 
inform decisions, then could not the same objective be realized by making use of one of 
the existing committees such as the grievance committee? Likewise, the claim that the 
term “ethics committee” suggests that a healthcare ethics committee possesses a 
“particular ethical standing” then “its advice on ethical issues should carry more weight” 
than that of other groups such as the medical advisory committee or the grievance 
committee.92 Consequently, Slowther, Bunch, Woolnough and Hope examined how this 
can be justified. Addressing these two issues, they pointed out that it is not so much the 
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question of lack of expertise on the part of medical professionals as a lack of decision-
making support. Therefore, some of the circumstances in which healthcare ethics 
committees “can be of most value to professionals is when they are unclear themselves 
about an important decision and voicing this in a forum that is designed to aid them in 
thinking through this decision.”93 However, on issue of ethical credibility or the authority 
of healthcare ethics committees, Slowther and her colleagues argued that it depends in 
part on the procedures of healthcare ethics committees. In fact, simply by their 
procedures, the healthcare ethics committees will earn some authority should they 
(committees) appear “to represent a wide range of points of view, including those of lay 
members,” and should these points of view be perceived as being “respectfully, carefully, 
and reasonably considered.” 94 Slowther and her colleagues supported their argument 
with Norman Daniels’ claim that “establishing a fair process is easier than agreeing on 
principles.”95 As a result, there remains, at the least, the incentive to, establish a fair 
process. For Daniels there are three implications of establishing a fair process: 
“Transparency about the grounds of the decisions, appeals to rationales that all can accept 
as relevant to meet health needs fairly, and procedures for revising decisions in the light 
of challenges to them.”96 Daniels is of the opinion that these elements together guarantee 
“accountability for reasonableness.” In light of Daniels’ exposition, Slowther and her 
colleagues are confident that healthcare ethics committees are capable of being 
reasonable in similar ways, and that becomes surely an important source of the moral 
authority of healthcare ethics committees.97  
Furthermore, healthcare ethics committees have a history of working to improve 
the quality of healthcare by providing a forum for addressing ethical issues with a 
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multidisciplinary group of healthcare professionals. Formation of ethics committees in 
ATM will, no doubt, aid in improving the quality of ATM healthcare. Hence, the need for 
healthcare ethics committees in both ATM and in allopathic medical facilities is 
highlighted. In light of this, it is necessary to consider the type of healthcare ethics 
committee that would be appropriate for ATM, that is, among other things, the type that 
will improve patient care and work in accord with RAIC.  
5. B. 4.  The Type of HEC Suitable for ATM 
ATM is practiced in both the urban and the rural areas of Africa, albeit 
predominantly practiced in rural neighborhoods. Most ATM doctors practice from their 
family premises; therefore, most facilities are small. They attend to patients in their 
respective homes. It is not uncommon for this group of ATM doctors to travel from 
village to village treating and caring for their patients. Some practice from compounds 
other than their own family premises and these are often large facilities. A growing 
number of practices are following the latter form and some of them utilize both local and 
foreign medical technology to augment and improve their practices. Good examples 
would include Blackherbals at the Source of the Nile, Uganda Ltd.; Pax Herbal Clinic 
and Research Laboratories Ewu, Edo State, Nigeria; Pax Natural Medicine Hospital and 
Pharmacovigilance Centre in Ikeja, Lagos State Nigeria; Centre for Psychic and Healing 
Administration Awka, Anambra State, Nigeria; and the Spiritan Centre for Self 
Realization Awka, Anambra State, Nigeria.   
Blackherbals at the Source of the Nile (its motto: “We can make you healthy and 
wise”) is an African Traditional Herbal Research Clinic at Bukoto, Uganda. It is a 
modern clinic facility established with a three-fold purpose: research, updating ATM 
doctors, and patient treatment. Some of the therapeutic services it offers include African 
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herbal medicine, reflexology, acupressure, hot and cold hydrotherapy, body massage, 
herbal tonics, patient counseling, blood pressure checks, urine analyses (especially for 
diabetes), nutritional profiles, and spiritual counseling upon request.98   
Pax Herbal Clinic and Research Laboratories, was established in 1996 by the Rev. 
Father Anselm Adodo. According to him, it has grown from a two-room wooden hut to a 
gigantic edifice the likes of which are yet to be found anywhere in West Africa. It has 
developed from a staff of two in 1997 to 150 full-time and 50 part-time staff members 
today. It serves as a research complex comprising diagnostics, quality control, drug 
formulation, a chemistry laboratory, and a therapeutic clinic. It conducts both in-patient 
and outpatient services. In 2005, PAX had only two products listed by NAFDAC, but 
now the facility has 33 pharmaceutical products listed, the highest so far by any single 
medical organization in Nigeria.99  
Finally, the Centre for Psychic and Healing Administration (CPHA) located in 
Awka, Anambra State of Nigeria, has as its motto “Resolving the conflict between man 
and nature.” Early in the course of the research for this dissertation, I had an opportunity 
to visit this center and its founder and owner, Chief Dr. Mrs. Flora I. N. Ilonzo. The 
facility functions as both a production and treatment center; that is, it produces its own 
pharmaceutical medicine and offers both in-patient and outpatient services. According to 
a documentary, the CPHA Awka has offered medical or therapeutic services to about 
three million (3,000 000) people since its inception in February 1997.100   
In light of the situations described above, and considering the necessity for and 
importance of integrated and proactive healthcare ethics committees, the appropriate 
model of such committees for ATM would have to take cognizance of the various 
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situations, sizes, and locations of the ATM facilities. They would also have to be 
integrated and proactive ethics committees.   
Large facilities that have sufficient human and economic resources to afford their 
own ethics committees can do so. On the other hand, because small facilities, lack 
adequate human and economic resources, they can collaborate and have one healthcare 
ethics committee, what W. Nelson calls a “multi-facility ethics committee.”101 When 
facilities collaborate to form a healthcare ethics committee, it enables them to share the 
cost of administering and maintaining the committee, to share staff, ethics experts, and 
educational resources. Each participating facility assumes responsibility for the financial 
needs of its representative(s) to the committee, in addition to contributing to the general 
administration of the committee. Furthermore, when multiple healthcare facilities form a 
joint healthcare ethics committee, they benefit from exposure to problems that the other 
collaborating facilities are currently experiencing, but which they themselves have not yet 
experienced at their own facility. Thus, early exposure to such problems can be a 
precious aid to a healthcare ethics committee’s effort to deal proactively with an ethical 
dilemma in its own facility.102 Likewise, a healthcare facility, by virtue of its cooperative 
association with a multi-facility healthcare ethics committee, can procure valuable 
information from that committee about how to deal with certain problems its facility is 
facing by tapping into the experience of other joint member facilities, especially those 
that had already experienced similar issues. Furthermore, a multi-facility healthcare 
ethics committee can offer useful educational forum regarding different ethical issues 
commonly encountered in each member facility.103  
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It is also worth noting that a multi-facility healthcare ethics committee can be 
time consuming and strenuous for its members. If the facilities involved are 
geographically separated,, even though meetings venues may be rotated among member 
facilities, the distance that committee members must commute might be a source of 
concern or pressure. This can be a serious issue in view of the fact that committee 
members already have obligations where they regularly work. Another issue is that 
participating members must be careful in their deliberations that they are not perceived as 
outsiders telling other facilities what to do or how to operate their respective facilities. If 
some members perceive others in their way, there could be some resentment, which could 
ruin the relationships and the atmosphere at committee meetings.    
Another important point is the need to integrate healthcare ethics committees into 
the administrative structure of the joint organization. Whether these committees derive 
from large individual ATM facilities or from multi-facilities ethics committees, they 
ought to be integrated into the management structure of their particular facility and be 
proactive in their functions as they seek to improve patient care. Therefore, the following 
four main characteristics are recommended: i) being organizationally integrated, ii) being 
proactive and using preventive ethics, iii) ethical leadership, and iv) being accountable. 
i. Being Organizationally Integrated 
To be organizationally integrated and not isolated will align the committees with 
the administrative or management structure, and thus, afford them direct interaction with 
the director/owner of the ATM facility/practice. Integration also means that all facets of 
the organization will operate in unity or as a community and not in isolation or as isolated 
factions. Ethics will be integrated into the whole system, thus creating an ethics 
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environment and culture within the facility/ ties. This integrated model of a healthcare 
ethics committee is very much in harmony with African communal orientation and 
values: shared decision-making with patients, relatives, and community.  It provides an 
opportunity to examine how well the facility or facilities (i.e., for multi-facility healthcare 
ethics committees) promote collaborative decision-making between clinicians, patients, 
and members of the patient’s community.  
Furthermore, the integrated approach will enable the healthcare ethics committees 
to address the following ethical issues:  
 To explore the full range of ethical concerns that commonly arise in ATM, such 
as patient privacy and confidentiality.  Therefore, the committees can ask how 
well the facility protects patient privacy and confidentiality in light of the African 
tradition whereby members of the patient’s community, out of concern for the 
wellbeing of the patient, request medical information about their sick community 
member.  
 To examine how well the facility addresses ethical practices and aspects of caring 
for patients nearing the end of life.  
 And, finally, to see how well the facility promotes high ethical standards in 
business and management practices making sure that patients’ bills are 
commensurate with the treatment received; and that patients are not secretly used 
for research without their knowledge.  
In fact, the committees have an opportunity to examine ethical practices in the general 
daily work place, that is, how well the facility supports ethical behavior in everyday 
interactions in the workplace and in relationships with the local community. In these 
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ways, healthcare ethics committees can focus on the entirety of their healthcare 
organization rather than primarily or exclusively on the clinical ethics aspect.  
ii. Being Proactive and Using Preventive Ethics 
Healthcare ethics committees being proactive and not just reactive involves 
addressing the underlying systems and processes that influence behavior. Each committee 
will need to develop a systematic method for proactively identifying, prioritizing, and 
addressing concerns regarding the quality of ethics at the organizational level, thus 
targeting systems and processes. The USA Veteran Association National Center for 
Ethics in Healthcare uses some quality improvement methodologies which ATM 
healthcare ethics committees and, indeed, all ethics committees can benefit from. The 
approach is called “ISSUES,” which is a step-by-step method for dealing with ethics 
quality gaps in healthcare. The acronym “ISSUES” stands for: Identify an issue 
proactively, Study the issue, Select a strategy, Undertake a plan, Evaluate and adjust, and 
Sustain and spread. “ISSUES” assists ethics committees to “improve the systems and 
processes that influence ethics practices in a health care organization.”104 Being proactive 
and using preventive ethics involves engendering and garnering measurable 
improvements in an organization’s ethics practices and in patient care by implementing 
systems level improvements. Specific things that can be embarked upon are the adoption 
of checklists, reminders, and decision support; the undertaking of steady evaluation of 
organizational performance with regard to ethics practices; the formulation of policies 
and protocols that foster ethical practices and even offer incentives as well as rewards in 
order to motivate and boost ethical practices among physicians and staff. Further 
practical measures that can be adopted include designing education and awareness 
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campaigns for patients and staff, as the case may be, to deal with specific knowledge that 
the healthcare ethics committees wish to address, keeping in mind the high level of 
illiteracy among ATM users and the local culture of the place where the ATM facility is 
situated.  
iii. Ethical Leadership 
It is a known fact that leaders and owners of organizations or facilities “play a 
critical role in creating, sustaining, and changing the culture of their organizations” or 
facilities. They do that through the programs and activities they support and praise, those 
they neglect or criticize, as well as by their own behavior.105 This action of proprietors is 
pertinent to ATM because ATM is often a private practice. The facilities are established 
and owned by individual ATM doctors or a doctor’s family. It is important and 
imperative, therefore, to address ethics quality directly at the level of a facility’s 
environment and culture. Through integrated approach, ethics committees will help 
leaders of their facilities to adopt behaviors that nurture and promote its ethical 
environment and culture.  
iv. Being Accountable  
Healthcare ethics committees are required to be accountable in accordance with 
measurable outcomes and not just in accord with the good intentions of their members. It 
is necessary that ATM healthcare ethics committees be subject to this rule in view of the 
tendency for modern African societies and people to exploit their companies and 
organizations. Moreover, given the time and the resources invested in the facilities, both 
the members of the ethics committees and the administration of the facility will want to 
know how well or how bad the ethics committees are performing. The good intentions of 
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the members of the committees can be useful and even good in judging the performance 
of the healthcare ethics committees in ATM. As David Blake noted, the members of 
healthcare ethics committees are likely to be the nicest, most sensitive, and well-meaning 
staff of the facilities rather than selfish, rigid business members.106 However, a good 
intention is not enough. It needs to be augmented with measurable outcomes aimed at 
making an observable improvement in how patients are actually cared for as well as the 
making observable and measurable improvements in patient care and in the facility. 
Therefore, the standard by which the healthcare ethics committees are evaluated is 
crucial. Rather than following the old familiar autonomy and rights discourse that focuses 
solely on individual patient or family alone, the healthcare ethics committees will adopt a 
broader, deeper notion of African values, communitarian values, and RAIC. The 
committees will take their cue from the communitarian tradition of ATM that advocates 
the well-being of all involved, namely, the patient, the entire facility and the community. 
Ndụ mmịrị ndụ azụ, mmịrị atala ma azụ anwụla. Literally this means “The life of the fish 
and the wellbeing of the water, may the water not dry up and may the fish not die.” This 
is an Igbo proverb reminding anyone involved in settling disputes, for instance, to be fair 
and to seek the well-being of all parties to the case; to preserve both the life of the fish 
and the well-being of the water or river or sea, which eventually will sustain the fish.  
An aspect of accountability involves measuring the impact of the activities or the 
functions of the healthcare ethics committee on professional practices and quality of 
patient care. Although the old model of healthcare ethics committees has been minimally 
accountable to its respective facilities, the new model, the integrated model, seeks to 
devise methods of gauging effectiveness in all aspects of healthcare ethics committee 
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works, “from meetings through ongoing case consultation and education activities to 
process improvement initiatives.”107 This means taking practical steps to do something 
proactively as well as following up on cases and reviews. These steps bring about quality 
improvement of patient care, which in turn leads to positive change in the facility by 
concentrating on supporting the facility’s ethics “through measurement, assessment and 
improvement of practices, systems and processes.”108  
5. C.  The Implications of Applying RAIC to Healthcare Ethics Committee in Africa 
on Decision-Making Process for Informed Consent of the Patient  
 
Generally, in clinical ethics, autonomy serves primarily to evaluate decision-
making in healthcare and functions to identify actions which are protected by the rules of 
informed consent, informed refusal, truth telling, and confidentiality.109 It means that the 
concept of relational autonomy as practiced in ATM will definitely impact on informed 
consent and informed refusal, truth telling, and confidentiality in healthcare ethics. For 
instance, while the Western concept and practice of autonomy place responsibility for 
medical decision-making largely in the patient’s hands, the relational autonomy of ATM, 
that is, RAIC emphasizes community and relationships giving much more substantive 
weight to the consensus decision-making process. Because RAIC lays emphasis on 
relationships and interdependence, the integrated ethics committee model is a suitable 
model for ATM. The idea of all the aspects of an organization collaborating and working 
together to nurture ethical practices that foster better patient care resonates with the 
communal values espoused by RAIC of ATM. When applied to ethics committees, the 
RAIC approach will have the following implications for ethics committees in Africa, on 
the decision-making process for the informed consent of the patient.   
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5. C. 1.  Integration of Elements of Traditional Decision-Making Methods into 
Healthcare Ethics Committees  
 
 As noted in Chapter Four, in African societies, decision-making, including 
medical decision-making, involves reaching a consensus after extensive deliberation and 
consultation. This is what the RAIC approach of ATM portends for healthcare ethics 
committees, while at the same time it strengthens the process of decision-making for the 
informed consent of patients. Therefore, the decision-making process of healthcare ethics 
committees in Africa, particularly in ATM, should be by consensus, as is the norm in 
African culture. The extensive deliberation and seeking of consensus offer a suitable 
procedure and atmosphere for all members to contribute to the discussion. The 
composition of ethics committees already requires that a representative of the local 
community where the medical facility or facilities are located be a member of the 
healthcare ethics committee. This requirement is consonant with the spirit of RAIC of 
ATM, wherein the community is involved in the medical decision process of a patient. 
Therefore, some representatives of the community will be co-opted as members of the 
ethics committees in ATM. The elders (heads of families), titleholders, and experts, being 
the traditional representatives of the community, are naturally the people to be chosen to 
be community representatives to the ethics committees. However, other people, 
especially young adults and more enlightened or suitable persons, can be appointed to 
represent the community. They will be expected to report to the community because, 
customarily, the people want to be kept abreast of the proceedings of the meetings, and 
the health progress of the community members, the patients. This may create some issues 
of confidentiality and privacy. The issue of confidentiality will be discussed in the next 
subsection (5.C.2).  
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However, in line with African communal cultures and with the RAIC of ATM, 
the community as an extended family is involved in a patient’s decision-making process. 
It highlights the need to integrate family and relatives in this process. Healthcare ethics 
committees in Africa should uphold and foster this value. A patient may be well informed 
to make a better decision with the family’s and, indeed, with the community’s, or with 
other people’s assistance, and within the communal framework of consultation.110 
Moreover, patients are often frail, frightened, and vulnerable; therefore, they need the 
assistance of others. Thus, Mark Miller argues that in the West, North America, and 
Europe, bioethics “seems to presume that there is something called an ‘autonomous 
moral decision-maker’.” However, from Miller’s experience, such persons as patients 
seldom exist. Patients are frail, frightened, vulnerable, and often lonely. In view of that, 
they tend to “make decisions within conversations held with family, significant friends, 
and medical personnel.” Miller, therefore, concludes that the law, which makes the 
patient the decision-maker, is a helpful legal fiction. He insists that caregivers must 
always see patients in the context of their family and social world.111  
Supporting Miller’s line of thought, Jacquineau Azétsop and Stuart Rennie argue 
that both infectious and chronic diseases challenge the Western understanding of 
autonomy. First, the patient being a victim and a vector can no longer be understood as a 
“rational agent who has the final ethical word on his own decisions.” Second, the risk of 
getting infected by and transmitting infectious diseases reflects the patient’s 
interconnectedness with others and the environment. This interconnectedness is always 
present whether the infectious disease is there or not. Azétsop and Rennie conclude, 
therefore, that even though a patient’s values and desires need to be taken into 
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consideration, “the idea of the autonomous agent will remain a fiction unless the social 
context of the patient’s vulnerability is also considered.” Family and friends stand as 
important resources for decision-making and long-term daily care for chronic diseases. 
For that reason, there is a need to recognize that the family and community, both play an 
important role in patient care and that they too are part of the resources required by a 
patient to exercise agency.112 The exclusion of family and relatives -- community -- from 
the area of decision-making because of respect for individual autonomy does not 
necessarily serve a patient’s best interest.113  
Furthermore, Azétsop and Rennie posit that an autonomy-based bioethics which 
lays emphasis on individual autonomy tends to “distort the relationship between 
individuals and the world,” that it exaggerates the power and range of individual agency. 
Thus, unlike RAIC, individualistic right based autonomy lacks social rootedness, and 
underestimates the impact society, culture, and environment have on both individual’s 
decision-making and on health. Hence, Azétsop and Rennie conclude that atomistic 
autonomy is divisive, whereas relational autonomy “brings out trust and communality,” 
and “reveals our true self in society, presents the possibility of placing trust and 
partnership at the center of the patient-physician relationship.”114  The line of thought of 
Miller, and Azétsop and Rennie, lends credence to the African practice of involving 
family and community in patient care and informed consent in decision-making. 
Therefore, the ethical deliberations in healthcare ethics committees should be in line with 
the communal values of African cultures, taking cognizance of the risks/benefits for the 
community and not just for the individual patient.115 In that way, the members of the 
healthcare ethics committees will be seen as members of the community, a 
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communicative network of people caring for the patients along with ATM doctors and 
nurses.  
 Members of healthcare ethics committees need to understand that the RAIC of 
ATM as in ethics of care holds that moral agents are particular, concrete individuals with 
their own unique life histories, desires, and emotions.116 “Moral dilemmas are particular, 
unique situations in which all parties retain their identities, their life histories, emotions, 
feelings, and relationships.”117 Caring and relationships take place between particular 
concrete individuals. Like ethics of care, ATM’s RAIC emphasizes relationships, 
concrete situations, and theory that is contrary to principle-based ethics which maintains 
the universal and abstract principles wherein moral agents are not particular, concrete 
individuals with their own unique life histories, desire etc.118 Healthcare ethics 
committees adopting the above understanding does not mean that they should wholly 
ignore the theoretical contributions of traditional ethics. Rather, focusing on the situation 
or context at hand, the healthcare ethics committees struggle to apply the principles 
cogently and in a meaningful way or to what the principle will mean in that context. In 
trying to determine how a principle applies to the case at hand, healthcare ethics 
committees compensate for the narrative aspect of ethics in their deliberations. This is 
important because it has been said that “an authentic and appropriate ethical deliberation, 
whatever the task at hand, requires that which only narrative knowledge can give, that is, 
the coherence, the resonance, and the singular meaning of particular human events.”119  
5. C. 2.  A Flexible Understanding of Confidentiality  
Another impact of RAIC will be on confidentiality. Confidentiality is one of the 
essential elements in a therapeutic relationship, the relationship between the patient on 
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the one hand, and the physicians, nurses, the healthcare professional, and, indeed, the 
medical facility on the other hand. “Confidentiality is present when one person discloses 
information to another, whether through words or an examination, and the person to 
whom the information is disclosed pledges not to divulge that information to a third party 
without the confider’s permission.”120 Confidentiality is based on trust and the integrity 
of the healthcare professionals just as telling the truth is similarly based. Confidentiality 
is important and necessary because of the inherent respect for the patient’s privacy and 
autonomy, to prevent possible harm to the patient, and for the good of the society.  
The respect for the patient’s privacy in a liberal society is respect for the rights of 
the patient to control who gains access to his/her information. Moreover, the 
effectiveness as well as the quality of healthcare that is provided depends, in part, on the 
disclosure made by patients. Likewise, the quality of the disclosure is in turn dependent 
on the level of trust and assurance that the healthcare professionals and the facility will 
safeguard in confidence the information regarding their patients. Hence, the medical 
facility is duty bound to protect patient information and medical documents from 
unwarranted disclosure. Because of the gravity of the need for confidentiality of patient 
information, in the USA, for example, the federal Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 is stringent about confidentiality of patient information.  
However, there are some exceptions to the confidentiality issue such as when 
there is a need to prevent danger to a third party or a specific individual. This is reflected 
in the Tarasoff v. Regent of University of California, in 1976. Here the Court ruled that a 
psychotherapist, who had a prior knowledge of the intention of the patient to kill his 
unsuspecting girlfriend, had a duty to warn her.121 Further reason for exception to 
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confidentiality is when there is need to provide information for the sake of public safety, 
as in a public health issue. In such a case, the danger is to the general population rather 
than to a specific individual as in the above example, or in the case of HIV infection 
wherein the sexual partner(s) of the infected person is in danger.        
The ATM RAIC model necessitates a flexible understanding of confidentiality. In 
Western bioethics, confidentiality is based on atomic individualism where the patient is 
understood to have an inviolable right to deal with illness and to decide solely regarding 
one’s own treatment as per one’s choices and interests. What transpires between the 
patient and the doctor or the medical personnel remains with them and with whomever 
the patient decides should know. However, in the African context, the patient, as noted 
above in Chapter Four, is accompanied by family and/or a community representative to 
consult the doctor and to help make decisions regarding treatment, admissions, feeding, 
payment, etc. In some cases, these people have to give a situation report to the elders of 
the family. Thus, members of the community are often privy to the cause of treatment of 
the patient. After all, the primary aim of the ATM doctor is not only to bring healing to 
the individual patients but also to make sure that harmonious relationships are restored at 
all levels of existence: individual and community, ancestors and the environment. The 
Africans see life as continuous with no division of existence between the living and the 
dead.122 The sickness is also a concern to all the members of the community as well as to 
the environment. Even in allopathic medicine, community members who visit the patient 
tend to seek information from both the patient and the medical personnel out of concern 
for the patient. The information is shared back home. This sort of community 
involvement precipitates issues of confidentiality, and in such a situation, the 
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understanding of confidentiality assumes an entirely different meaning. Healthcare ethics 
committees, therefore, have to define confidentiality not just along the line of Western 
bioethics but also, by taking into consideration African cultural practices, communal 
values.  
Sequel to the issues of confidentiality is truth telling. In Africa, there is a widely 
shared understanding that healthcare providers should not provide information regarding 
diagnosis of terminal or serious illness to patients, especially those who are elderly or 
frail. Diagnosis associated with various forms of cancer, (AIDs) and terminal illness are 
closely linked to the common cultural norm that patients should not be fully informed of 
their illnesses. Disclosing such information in a frank, forthright manner is, in some 
cultural context taken by family members and seriously ill patients to undermine the 
health of the patient. It undermines the patient’s health by encouraging negative thoughts 
and condemns the patient to a form of “social death.”123  
 Bad news, in general, is thought to undermine the recovery or the health of the 
patient. Bad news plays a causal role in hastening the dying process. Against this back 
drop, a good compassionate health caregiver is one who protects the patient and supports 
the family in shielding the sick person from upsetting information. ATM doctors would 
convey negative or bad news to family or community members. The family or 
community members will, in turn, conceal the information from their seriously ill or frail 
relative.124 Such concepts and practices of confidentiality and telling the truth can be 
understood from the perspective of relationships. Traditional moral theories, such as 
liberal rights, concentrate on answering questions regarding whether to lie or to break 
confidentiality. On the other hand, the ethics of care and ATM (and African bioethics) 
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emphasize what the physicians do, that is, whether they break or maintain confidentiality; 
how they carry out those actions; the motives that underlie them; and whether their 
actions promote or thwart positive relationships. Furthermore, trustworthiness and the 
quality of care of the doctors and the healthcare personnel as well as their sensitivity in 
the face of a patient’s or the relatives’ request for (seeming) deception are integral moral 
factors of concern from the perspective of the ethics of care and the ATM.125 This sort of 
cultural model of health and illness in ATM and RAIC that tacitly allows the community 
members rather than individual patients to receive diagnostic and prognostic information 
differs from the right-oriented autonomy laws in the Liberal individualism of the West. 
The healthcare ethics committees have to take all these cultural nuances into 
consideration in their policy development and definition of confidentiality and truth 
telling or disclosure of bad news. In fact, these nuances should form the conceptual 
framework for the operation of the healthcare ethics committees.  
5. C. 3.  A Nuanced Understanding of Advance Directives  
Further conceptual nuance is found in the understanding of advance directives and 
surrogate decision-making. Advance directives and surrogate decision-making are 
usually written (or oral) future healthcare instructions, preferences and decisions of a 
competent person. They include the person’s consent to or refusal of specific medical 
interventions or treatments. Advance directives become effective when the person is 
judged to be incompetent or has lost the capacity to make healthcare decisions.126 In the 
USA, in particular, advanced directives and surrogate decision-making were crafted to 
correct the perceived excessive medical paternalism and in medical vitality, that is, the 
tendency to fight death at all cost to the very end; as well as to protect incompetent 
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patients from unwanted and futile medical treatments which only serves to prolong a 
painful dying process. The underpinning ethical framework for advanced directives and 
surrogate decision-making is the individual right-oriented autonomy of the liberal 
individualism. The patient’s own choices and interests override every other interest. In a 
situation where the patient’s choices and interests are not directly known, the appropriate 
surrogate (s) provides judgment regarding the best interests of the patient, and these hold 
sway.127  These concepts, legitimized and legalized by the Patient Self-Determination 
Act, which is a federal statute requiring healthcare facilities to provide written 
information for each adult patient when admitted, reminding the patient of his/her rights 
to make decisions concerning medical care, or to refuse medical interventions as well as 
to formulate advance directives.128 Even in the case of children or minors, and in cases 
where there are no advance directives, it would seem that the family would automatically 
take up the decision-making on-behalf of these minors, or adults in the absence of an 
advance directive. But some state governments have laws or regulations about who the 
surrogate is and how to choose one. The Pennsylvania Act 169 of 2006, for instance, 
stipulates that the determination of a healthcare representative of a patient who does not 
have advance directives follows a statutory list that generally gives priority in the 
following order:  
    spouse and adult child who is not the child of the spouse 
    adult child 
    parent 
    adult sibling 
    adult grandchild 
   close friend129  
The sequence of names on the list is followed, whereby the next in the list is sought for in 
the absence or inability to reach the one on top. If the list is exhausted and none of the 
people on the list is reachable, or all refused to assume the responsibility, then the case 
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may go to Court. Except for the healthcare agent whose power can be exercised at any 
time, for any other surrogate, the power kicks in when the patient becomes incompetent 
or permanently unconscious or has an end-stage medical condition.130  
Ho Mun Chan sees a role for the family in the surrogate decision-making in the 
liberal model. He supports this with the three reasons outlined by A. E. Buchanan and D. 
W. Brock:  
1. The family is usually more knowledgeable about the values, preferences and best 
interests of the incompetent patient. 
2. The family is more concerned about the patient’s best interests.  
3. The family needs to be protected from unnecessary intrusion.131   
The need to protect the family from unnecessary outside intruders, according to Chan, is 
evidenced in the Nancy Beth Cruzan’s case. Her father, after the lengthy legal battle to 
get Nancy removed from the life-support system, lamented that his daughter’s life had 
been interrupted by too many strangers including the doctors, the press, protesters, 
lawyers, and the judges. However, when the dust settles down, only Cruzan’s parents 
would be at Nancy’s bedside weeping, and only they would visit her grave long after the 
courts, the press, healthcare professionals, and the public had proceeded to another 
case.132  
Another factor that made the experience tough on the parent of Nancy was that 
the Court required clear and convincing evidence of Nancy’s wishes from him. The clear 
and convincing evidence is a stringent test for him without advance directive. Moreover, 
as John D. Arras correctly noted, the test does not include for consideration those 
‘reasons of the heart’ that ‘reason does not know’ and excludes the most persuasive 
“testimony of the family members based on years of experience and personal knowledge 
of the patient’s values.”133  
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Continuing, Arras proffers a more appropriate procedure whereby the surrogate 
would ordinarily have the final say barring a contrary proof by other people that the 
surrogate decision would clearly go against the prior wishes or the best interests of the 
incompetent patient. In other words, the burden of proof should rest on those who suspect 
or object to the propriety of foregoing treatment rather than on the family members or the 
surrogate. However, he adds that this shift of burden of proof, designed to safeguard the 
autonomy and the best interests of the incompetent patient should not debar the court, 
government protective agent, and the healthcare ethics committee from providing 
channels for other parties to challenge the surrogate decision of the patient’s family.134  
As has been noted, the two broad types of advance directives are a living will and 
a durable power of attorney for healthcare or proxy directives. In contrast to African 
understanding, in Western bioethics, durable power of attorney for healthcare is a 
document written by a competent individual authorizing or appointing another person of 
adult age to make healthcare decisions on behalf of the signer.135 Also, in Western 
bioethics, the advance directive presupposes the right of the individual to make 
independent medical decisions and to deal with illness on one’s own. It also envisages 
situations where an individual has no one at all to make healthcare decisions or does not 
trust those available. However, in the RAIC model, which presupposes a strong family 
and community role in patient care and medical decision-making, there is a substantive 
change in the concept of an advance directive. Culturally (and naturally), the family and 
relatives, i.e. the community, have the durable power of attorney for health care. They are 
the next of kin and therefore, by custom the surrogates- function considered as a fiduciary 
duty. Even in the cities within or outside Africa, it is not uncommon to find meetings or 
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gatherings of people from the same African community, whether it is people of the same 
ethnic group, e.g. the “Igwe bu ike,” i.e., Igbo association in Pittsburgh and other cities, 
the Igala peoples’ association of America found in various cities; or from the same 
village or town, for example, the Ehime group in the USA, or from the same country, the 
Ghana association of Pittsburgh; or even from the continent, for instance, the union of 
African students which is found in most colleges and universities in the USA and Europe, 
and the Pittsburgh Area African Professionals Organization. These are African 
communities, or their extensions, or vestiges. Even far away from home, they have in 
some ways carried on the African communal values in the midst of the liberal 
individualism of the USA and the West. These communities tend to rally around their 
members in times of celebrations, difficulty, and illness. They in some ways form part of 
the decision-making of the individual members, depending on how members have 
become assimilated into American culture.    
However, in traditional African societies, the bond of relationship among 
members of the family and the community is such that one is most of the time rest 
assured of one’s interests and needs being adequately taken care of, but in relation to the 
needs and interests of both the family and the community. One can have a list of medical 
intervention preferences or instructions; however, these preferences and instructions are 
adhered to within the confines of the needs and means of the family and within the 
confines of the tradition or cultural beliefs and practices of the people, the community. 
Chinua Achebe, in his book, tells a story of a man, Obiako from among the Igbos of 
Nigeria, whose father left a will demanding a cow for the funeral. When the will was 
communicated to Obiako, he remarked about the poverty of the family. His deceased 
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father did not leave much livestock behind, not even a goat, how could he ask for a cow 
for his funeral?136   
Also worthy of note is that advanced directives and surrogate decision-making are 
“largely a phenomenon of the US.” They are hardly found in the statute books of other 
countries besides Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and some 
Australian Canadian jurisdictions. The United Kingdom and Hong Kong, for instance, are 
reluctant to give advance directives greater force in law by legislation.137 The use of 
advance directives is very limited in Japan for several reasons. Culturally, patients are not 
told of their terminal illness by physicians. Therefore, the need to prepare advance 
directives is remote to patients. Truth telling would create a burden and discomfort 
among the family undermining the relationship between the patient and the family 
members because, once the truth is told, they could no longer act as if all were normal. 
Customarily, it is inappropriate to “articulate one’s wishes or interests in writing because 
written wishes are interpreted as not trusting one’s family members. In view of their, 
verbal communication is the norm; moreover, even a written choice or living will can be 
overridden by a family collective decision.138   
In the Catholic moral tradition, which to some extent has been incorporated into 
the philosophical bioethics, requests that the wishes of the patient be balanced against the 
needs and capability of the family and community. The Ethical and Religious Directives 
for Catholic Health Care Services, for example, states that one is obligated to use 
ordinary or proportionate means in preserving one’s life. Proportionate or ordinary means 
is defined in Catholic moral thought as those means “that in the judgment of the patient 
offer a reasonable hope of benefit and do not entail an excessive burden or impose 
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excessive expense on the family or the community.”139 Thus, one’s autonomy is not 
permitted to lay an excessive burden on others, whether it is according to a Catholic or an 
African conceptual framework. Therefore, the RAIC model implies a nuanced 
understanding of advance directives (living will, durable power of attorney for health 
care, proxy or surrogate directives, or health care proxy).  
Based on the Asian experience, if advanced directives were to be adopted in ATM 
and in African bioethics in general, their real purpose would not be seen or treated solely 
as a means for a patient to exercise his or her self-determination. Rather, it should, in 
addition, be utilized to express the patient’s concern for the family, the community, and 
the patient’s commitment to their wellbeing when the patient becomes incompetent. That 
is to say that, the directive becomes a vehicle of helping the family and the community to 
know the patient’s voice and to facilitate the ongoing dialogue with them when the 
patient lapses into incompetency. Although advance directives is important, and should 
help the family or community to arrive at a decision, the final decision does not have to 
be dictated entirely by the literal meaning of the patient’s advance directives.140  
Moreover, patient autonomy, as conceived by liberal individualism, does not have 
to be the overriding principle directing the ethical and bioethical decisions in patient care. 
This is supported by the idea of RAIC which arises from the concept of personhood that 
includes particularity in human relationships. And as Po-Wah rightly pointed out, the idea 
of autonomy not being the overriding principle endears bioethicists to move away from 
the over-emphasis on “higher brain function as the single most important criterion to 
define human personhood when assessing the mental capacity of brain-injured or 
demented patients.”141  
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5. C. 4.  Emphasis on Solidarity  
The ATM RAIC model requires laying emphasis on solidarity. Community living 
is about building relationships and fostering solidarity. Most often, what is right or wrong 
is about what builds and maintains community and solidarity among members. It is not so 
much about the individual rights of the patient as to the other characteristics of African 
communal morality: solidarity, justice, cooperation, compassion, and reciprocity. The 
social and ethical values of communal living, basically, impose on members of the 
community a duty to the community and to its members. People carry out their duties to 
others without necessarily thinking that those others have a right to it. Instead, people 
think of their responsibility to the community and to others, a responsibility of solidarity, 
which is described by Ubuntu in Southern Africa societies. Being a multidimensional 
concept, Ubuntu stands, among other things, for humanness in the sense of “a good 
disposition towards others and a moral nature. It describes group solidarity and 
interdependence in African culture.” It is a “collective solidarity whereby self is 
perceived primarily in relation to the perception of others, that is, persons are perceived 
less as independent of one another and more as interdependent of one another.”142 
Morphologically, the term “ubuntu” is made up of the augmentative prefix u-, the 
abstract noun prefix bu-, and the noun stem -ntu, in a Bantu language such as Nguni, 
meaning “person,” “personhood,” “humanness,”  etc. The concept of “Ubuntu” exists 
also in many other African languages albeit in variant forms. For instance, T. Yanga 
reports that Alexis Kagame identified the variants of the concept of “ubuntu” in other 
African languages as follows:  
umundu in Kikuyu and umuntu in Kimeru, both languages spoken in Kenya; bumuntu in 
kiSukuma and kiHaya, both spoken in Tanzania; vumuntu in shiTsonga and shiTswa of 
Mozambique; bomoto in Bobangi, spoken in the Democratic Republic of Congo; gimuntu 
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in kiKongo and giKwese, spoken in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Angola, 
respectively.143 
 
Writing on Ubuntu, Nkonko Kamwangamalu summarized its meaning as a concept that 
represents the “core values of African ontologies” such as solidarity, interdependence, 
communalism, caring and hospitality, respect for all human beings, their dignity, and 
respect for life.144 It follows then, as already stated above, that the saying that duty begets 
right is not exactly true in the traditional African context because people’s positive duties 
towards others are not based on those other peoples’ rights but on the moral 
responsiveness to their particular situations that impinges on their decision to carry out 
their duties towards them.145 This is important for both the members of ethics committees 
and for the conduct of consults in resolving conflicts.    
Thus, the RAIC approach fosters solidarity among family members and the 
community. The process of decision-making in RAIC allows members of the family and 
community to exercise their roles and to fulfill what is seen as a fiduciary responsibility 
toward the sick relative. By fulfilling this fiduciary responsibility, the family and 
community members have hope that such assistance will be extended to them when they 
themselves require it. Thus, the process expresses and strengthens the ties and the sense 
of responsibility to one another as well as respecting and fostering relationships. This 
solidarity or community participation in the individual’s sickness and treatment is, as 
Murove noted, “an authentication of the philosophy behind African bioethics that 
maintains that the individual’s experiences of suffering are also communal. The 
community is integral to the patient’s decision-making and healing process.”146 
Communal participation is indispensable to the quest for wholeness that is the healing 
process.   
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Furthermore, in the context of solidarity and relationships, RAIC requires the 
stressing of concrete situations, in patient decision-making. Thus, it endears the ethics 
committees to adopt an approach that emphasizes involvement in and consideration of the 
concrete situation, and relationality, with attitude of caring, and considering relations 
between people in their practical reasoning, instead of the often used approach that 
stresses abstract principles and individual right-oriented autonomy.147 Whereas RAIC 
considers relationships and particular, concrete situations in the patient decision-making 
process, the liberal individual right-oriented autonomy concentrates on rights, reason 
autonomy, emphasizing ‘higher-brain functions’ as the single most important criterion to 
define human personhood when assessing the mental capacity of brain-injuries or 
demented patients. This focus leads to the danger of equating loss of rationality with loss 
of personhood and thus, it can result in the conclusion that loss of rationality implies 
failure to count as a person and, therefore, “less entitlement to care, resources and 
treatment.”148 By implying solidarity, particularity, and relationships, RAIC helps people 
acknowledge that, “long after the capacity for autonomy has diminished or vanished, 
relationship ties continue to exert normative force.”149 RAIC implies that informed 
consent does not necessarily or always have to be a decision made by an individual 
person in isolation from others or from the community. 
By contrast, the Western liberal approach to informed consent tends to present 
autonomy as a decision made by an individual person in isolation from others, that is, as 
if relatedness is the antithesis of autonomy or as if interdependence is a rare or non-
component of autonomy.150 Consequently, the emphasis on the individual, individual 
autonomy, individual interests, and rights in Western liberal medical decision-making 
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tends to isolate the patient from the family and community. Often, one gets the 
impression that family members are seen as outsiders without any filial relationship to the 
patient, as though they are not affected by what is happening to the patient. Likewise, 
sometimes one gets the impression that family members are treated as intruders 
interfering with the autonomous decision of the patient.151 Focusing essentially on 
individual choices and interests tend to set up a false and deleterious opposition between 
individuals and the community (or family) to which those individuals belong. It is 
reasonable, on both a conceptual and an empirical basis, “to suppose that persons acquire 
their values through engagement with a concrete moral tradition,” instead of “through a 
private and self-directed process.” This over-emphasis on individual autonomy and 
interests tends to create what Richard McCormick refers to as a “moral vacuum” that is 
“the disappearance of the network of shared and established goods and values that make 
the choices of individuals right or wrong, moral or immoral.”152  
This moral vacuum arises as a result of making a single value the primary and 
exclusive criterion for deciding the moral worth. An example given by McCormick is the 
“absolutization of autonomy” whereby autonomy is taken as the primary and exclusive 
criterion, thus, excluding from consideration those other goods and values that make 
choices right or wrong; “they are the factors that support or undermine and promote or 
harm, the person.” Absolutization of autonomy reduces the rightness or wrongness of 
choice to a single factor, that is, the individual's choice; consequently, morality is been 
impoverished, hence creating a moral vacuum. McCormick appropriately pointed out two 
good examples where this sort of malaise is evident: in abortion and in physician-assisted 
suicide debates. The pro-choice position on abortion is presented in such a way that the 
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woman's choice is held out as “the sole right-making characteristic of the choice.” Even 
though it is known, even by feminists, that there are good and bad choices; and that 
“absolutizing autonomy represents a failure to wrestle with those dimensions of conduct 
that make choices right or wrong--in brief, a moral vacuum.”153 
In the discussions of physician-assisted suicide, McCormick noted that, in view of 
Jack Kevorkian, M.D’s belief and utterances, it is no accident that he, Kevorkian, is a 
cheerleader for absolutized autonomy. For instance, Kevorkian states: "In my view the 
highest principle in medical ethics -- in any kind of ethics -- is personal autonomy, self-
determination. What counts is what the patient wants and judges to be a benefit or a value 
in his or her own life. That's primary." No doubt, this is "autonomy run amok" as Daniel 
Callahan correctly affirmed.154  The issue here is that people with this view of autonomy 
tend to describe themselves in terms of personal characteristics instead of as in 
connections to other people. As noted above under the section on ethics of care and 
ATM, human beings are relational and connected. People of this worldview tend to 
describe themselves in terms of connection with others wherein autonomy is relational, 
and the caring, empathy, reciprocity, compassion, solidarity, and responsibility of 
individuals for others are the capacities that define people as moral agents.155  
Likewise, as noted in Chapters Three and Four, human beings are not only 
relational; they are interdependent. They are social beings, and, therefore, relational and 
dependent on others. And dependence does not necessarily make us less a person or 
human. Therefore, Daniel Callahan insists:  
It is a profound error to think we are somehow lessened as persons because dependency 
will happen to us, as if that condition itself necessarily robbed us of some crucial part of 
the self. It does not. There is a valuable and necessary grace in the capacity to be 
dependent on others, to be open to their solicitude, to be willing to lean upon their 
strength and compassion. To be a self is to live with the perpetual tension of dependence 
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and independence. The former is as much a part of us as the latter. The latter may just 
feel better, and surely flatters us more. It still remains only half the story of our lives, 
however.156 
 
In their various works, John Hardwig, Augustine Frimpong-Mansoh, and 
Jacquelyn Ann K. Kegley noted that illness is about the whole person and not just about 
the biophysical aspect of the person. The biophysical notion of illness and disease leads 
to thinking that illness -- and, therefore, healing and treatment -- is something that takes 
place only within the body of the patient. Consequently, it appears that what happens in 
one’s body, except for a contagious disease, does not affect one’s family members, 
relatives, friends, and community. On the contrary, illness and disease hardly possess “a 
solitary causal mechanism.” They have medical, psychological, religio-cultural and 
economic effects which impact the patients, their families, and the community, as well as 
the society at large. Medical decision-making should, therefore, include families and 
close relatives, that is, the community.157 The recognition of the need to include families 
and community in medical decision-making, by African scholars such as Frimpong-
Mansoh, as well as scholars from the USA, such as Hardwig and Kegley, gives credence 
to ATM practice.  
 Finally, the practice of RAIC in ATM supports and projects the notion of the 
common good and, hence, the objective concept of the good life. A good life is the good 
of the community and the good of the individual. There is more or less a common notion 
of the good and the goal of medicine in ATM. The goal of medicine is the healing of the 
patient, the family, and the community, including the ancestors, spirits, and the 
environment by restoring the balance that has been destroyed by the illness. The 
healthcare ethics committees would have to work with this concept in its deliberations 
and policy making. 
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 In conclusion, it is hoped that the healthcare ethics committees in Africa will not 
only be the integrated model, but will also incorporate the implications of the ATM’s 
RAIC approach to the decision-making process for the informed consent of patients. That 
African values such as relationships, solidarity, communal living, relational autonomy, 
etc., should help direct the committees to explore moral pathways that are truly African, 
and craft institutional morality that is grounded in African values, resulting in appropriate 
policies. The committees need not uncritically embrace Western, or “American Standard 
Version” of value or morality and healthcare ethics committees. After all, ethics is about 
living or “lived lives and moral experience,” even though, often, it appears as an 
“exercise in the application of moral standards to remote circumstances.” 158 Therefore, 
sometimes, it is necessary for healthcare ethics committees in the application of ethical 
principles to consider the content or meaning of the principles, and how to apply them in 
light of the context and culture. According to Cynthia A. Brincat, these are missing from 
the principles.159 In being reflective, critical, and faithful to the African values, healthcare 
ethics committees will be able to help in the “articulation of important elements of local 
morality. That is, they may be able to aid in diagnosing and giving expression to 
understandings of local morality not adequately reflected in the “American Standard 
Version.”160  
5. D. Summary  
By focusing on the decision-making process involving informed consent by 
patients, this chapter presents an applied example that involves the contribution of the 
ATM-RAIC approach for healthcare ethics committees in Africa. By way of introduction, 
the chapter provides a general description of healthcare ethics committees and traces their 
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history both in the USA and in Africa. The history of healthcare ethics committees in the 
USA indicates that they arose from needs at healthcare facilities for expert ethical advice 
in complex ethical situations or dilemmas. In addition to these needs, some other 
important events influenced and fostered their emergence, namely, the need to regulate 
research on human subjects which, subsequently led to the formation of the National 
Commission, Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Institutional Review Board (IRB), 
and other types of peer review group. These, in turn, precipitated the formation of 
healthcare ethics committees albeit with some modifications. Other events include the 
discovery of new medical technologies, which created additional ethical dilemmas, thus 
necessitating the formation of healthcare ethics committees to help resolve them. 
Ultimately, the New Jersey Supreme Court ruling in the Quinlan case recommended 
healthcare ethics committees. The final boost, however, came with JCAHO requiring 
healthcare ethics committees as one of the criteria for the accreditation of hospitals.  
There are no known healthcare ethics committees in ATM. However, in allopathic 
or modern medicine where few healthcare ethics committees exist in Africa, their origins 
somehow paralleled those in the USA. On both continents they perform almost the same 
functions: education, consultation, policy development, and review.  
The analysis of healthcare ethics committees in this chapter then progresses to the 
exploration of the idea of the “integrated” healthcare ethics committee which calls for a 
shift from being reactive to being proactive and systematic in addressing ethical issues, in 
integrating ethics consultation, preventive ethics, and ethics leadership. By this 
integration and proactivity, healthcare ethics committees not only resolve ethical 
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dilemmas but they also prevent their recurrence and bring about ethical organizational 
transformation which eventually results in improved patient care.  
Furthermore, finding no known healthcare ethics committees in ATM, the chapter 
analysis addresses the issue of the need for healthcare ethics committees in ATM 
adducing reasons why they are necessary and required in ATM. The chapter then 
explores suitable healthcare ethics committees for ATM, and argues that the integrated 
healthcare ethics committee model reflects African communal values, more than the old 
model and, therefore, is better suited for ATM. The chapter proffers a multi-facility 
healthcare ethics committee as a possible alternative for small ATM facilities that cannot 
afford to form healthcare ethics committees independently.  
Finally, the analysis in this chapter concludes with the implications of applying 
RAIC to healthcare ethics committees while focusing on how the implications influence 
and foster the patient decision-making process of informed consent, which in turn leads 
to improvement of patient care. These implications include integration of elements of 
traditional decision-making methods into healthcare ethics committees, a flexible 
understanding of confidentiality, advance directive, and emphasis on solidarity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
321 
 
5. E. Endnotes  
                                                 
1 “Committee,” Encarta World English Dictionary; also, “Committee,” The Free Dictionary. Online.  
2 Hackler and Hester, “Introduction: What Should an HEC Look and Act Like?” 5.  
3 Levine, “Questions and (Some Very Tentative) Answers about Hospital Ethics Committees,” 9; and 
Pearlman, “Ethics Committees and Ethics Consultation.” Online.  
4 Cranford and Doudera, Institutional Ethics Committee, 6. 
5 Youngner, et al., “Hospital Ethics Committees,” 5; Levine, “Questions and (Some Very Tentative) 
Answers about Hospital Ethics Committees,” 9ff; also, Fletcher and Hoffmann, “Ethics 
Committees,” 335-336.  
6 Hackler and Hester, “Introduction: What Should an HEC Look and Act Like?” 3.  
7 Bernt, et al., “Ethics Committees in Catholic Hospitals,” 1; also, Hackler and Hester, “Introduction: What 
Should an HEC Look and Act Like?” 3-4.  
8 Hackler and Hester, “Introduction: What Should an HEC Look and Act Like?” 4. 
9 Hackler and Hester, “Introduction: What Should an HEC Look and Act Like?” 4. 
10 Deciding Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment (DFLST) 155-156; cited by Hackler and Hester, 
“Introduction: What Should an HEC Look and Act Like?” 4-5. 
11 Karen Teel, Baylor Law Review Winter (1975): 6-9, cited by Levine, “Questions and (Some Very 
Tentative) Answers about Hospital Ethics Committees,” 9ff. 
12Ashley, De Blois, and O'Rourke. Health Care Ethics, 228; and Bernt et al., “Ethics Committees in 
Catholic Hospitals,” 18-25.  
13 Post, Blustein, and Dubler, Handbook for Health Care Ethics Committees, 13-14.     
14 In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert, denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). Cited by Fletcher, and 
Hoffmann, “Ethics Committees,” 335.  
15 Levine, R. J., Ethics and Regulation in Clinical Research. 2nd ed., also,  Fletcher and Hoffmann, “Ethics 
Committees,” 335. 
16 President's Commission, Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment, 5; and 49 Federal Register 
1622-1654 (12 January 1984). See also Fletcher and Hoffmann, “Ethics Committees,” 335.  
17 Youngner, et al., “Hospital Ethics Committees,” 443-57; Joint Commission for Accreditation of 
Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO). Accreditation Manual for Hospitals, 106ff; Levine, R. J., 
Ethics and Regulation in Clinical Research. 2nd ed.,  9ff, also, Fletcher and Hoffmann, “Ethics 
Committees,” 335-337. 
18 Joint Commission for Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations. Accreditation Manual for Hospitals, 
106; also, Hackler and Hester, “Introduction: What Should an HEC Look and Act Like?” 5. 
19 Maryland Health-General. Code Sec. 19-370. (1990 and Supp. 1992.); New Jersey Administrative Code 
title 8, Sec. 486-5.1 (March 16, 1992); and New York Assembly Bill 7166 (1993); cited by 
Fletcher and Hoffmann, “Ethics Committees,” 335. 
20 Ashley, De Blois, and O'Rourke, Health Care Ethics, 228-230; Post, Blustein, and Dubler, Handbook for 
Health Care Ethics Committees, 1-2 and preface xi; also, Klugman and Dalinis, Ethical Issues in 
Rural Healthcare, 46ff. 
21 ASBH, Core Competencies for Healthcare Ethics Consultation, 1. 
22 Derr, Healthcare Ethics Committees, 89. 
23 Cf. Ashley, De Blois, and O'Rourke, Health Care Ethics, 228-29. 
322 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
24 Rangel, “Clinical Ethics and the Dynamics of Group Decision-Making,” 221.  
25 Hackler and Hester, “Introduction: What Should an HEC Look and Act Like?” 7. 
26 Hackler and Hester, “Introduction: What Should an HEC Look and Act Like?” 6-7. 
27 Engelhardt, “Healthcare Ethics Committees,” 90. 
28 Pearlman, “Ethics Committees and Ethics Consultation.” Online.  
29 Hackler and Hester, “Introduction: What Should an HEC Look and Act Like?” 6; and Post, Blustein, and 
Dubler, Handbook for Health Care Ethics Committees, xi.  
30 Cotter and Vaszar, “Hospital Ethics Case Consultation.” Online; also, ASBH, Core Competencies for 
Healthcare Ethics Consultation, 11.  
31 Hackler and Hester, “Introduction: What Should an HEC Look and Act Like?” 9.  
32 Fox, Myers, and Pearlman, “Ethics Consultation.” See also Rangel, “Clinical Ethics and the Dynamics of 
Group Decision-Making,” 207. 
33 ASBH, Core Competencies for Healthcare Ethics Consultation, 5.  
34 ASBH, Core Competencies for Healthcare Ethics Consultation, 5.  
35 ASBH, Core Competencies for Healthcare Ethics Consultation, 6.  
36 See ASBH, Core Competencies for Healthcare Ethics Consultation, 6-7.  
37 ASBH, Core Competencies for Healthcare ethics consultation, 12.  
38 ASBH, Core Competencies for Healthcare Ethics Consultation, 13. 
39 ASBH, Core Competencies for Healthcare Ethics Consultation, 13. 
40 ASBH, Core Competencies for Healthcare Ethics Consultation, 13. 
41 ASBH, Core Competencies for Healthcare Ethics Consultation, 14. 
42 ASBH, Core Competencies for Healthcare Ethics Consultation, 14. 
43 Lipkin, Putnam, and Lazare, The Medical Interview, 3-19, also, ASBH, Core Competencies for 
Healthcare Ethics Consultation, 14.  
44 Ashley, De Blois, and O'Rourke, Health Care Ethics, 228.  
45 ASBH, Core Competencies for Healthcare Ethics Consultation, 10.  
46 ASBH, Core Competencies for Healthcare Ethics Consultation, 10.  
47 Engelhardt, “Healthcare Ethics Committees,” 90. 
48 Ashley, De Blois, and O'Rourke, Health Care Ethics, 228; and Hackler and Hester, “Introduction: What 
Should an HEC Look and Act Like?” 7-8. 
49 Cotter and Vaszar, “Hospital Ethics Case Consultation.” Online. 
50 Cotter and Vaszar, “Hospital Ethics Case Consultation.” Online. 
51 Hackler and Hester, “Introduction: What Should an HEC Look and Act Like?” 8. 
52 Pearlman “Ethics Committees and Ethics Consultation;” also, Post, Blustein, and Dubler, Handbook for 
Health Care Ethics Committees, 2-5. 
53 Aulisio, et al., “Health Care Ethics Consultation,” 66.  
54 Guidelines for Ethics Committees in Healthcare Institutions. CEJA Report E-1-84. 2698-99.  
323 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
55 ASBH, Core Competencies for Healthcare Ethics Consultation, 15. For comprehensive lists of required 
skills, see Section 5 A2 above or ASBH, 13-14. 
56 Seeley and Goldberger, “Integrated Ethics: Synecdoche in Healthcare,” 202-09. See also Foglia and 
Pearlman, “Integrating Clinical and Organizational Ethics,” 31.   
57Blake, “Reinventing the Healthcare Ethics Committees,” 9.   
58 Blake, “Reinventing the Healthcare Ethics Committees,” 9.   
59 Blake, “Reinventing the Healthcare Ethics Committees,” 9-10.  
60 Foglia and Pearlman, “Integrating Clinical and Organizational Ethics,” 31.  
61 Foglia and Pearlman, “Integrating Clinical and Organizational Ethics,” 33.  
62 Foglia and Pearlman, “Integrating Clinical and Organizational Ethics,” 34.  
63 Foglia and Pearlman, “Integrating Clinical and Organizational Ethics,” 34. 
64 Foglia and Pearlman, “Integrating Clinical and Organizational Ethics,” 35.  
65 Blake, “Reinventing the Healthcare Ethics Committees,” 10-11. 
66 Blake, “Reinventing the Healthcare Ethics Committees,” 11. 
67 Blake, “Reinventing the Healthcare Ethics Committees,” 11-12. 
68 Blake, “Reinventing the Healthcare Ethics Committees,” 12. 
69 Blake, “Reinventing the Healthcare Ethics Committees,” 11. 
70 Blake, “Reinventing the Healthcare Ethics Committees,” 14. 
71 Wenger, “The Healthcare Ethics Committee Model of the Future,” 34.  
72 Blake, “Reinventing the Healthcare Ethics Committees,” 22. 
73 See Blake, “Reinventing the Healthcare Ethics Committees,” Tables A, B, C, and D, on 18-19. 
74 Blake, “Reinventing the Healthcare Ethics Committees;” and Murphy, “A Next Generation Ethics 
Committee.”  
75 Wenger, “The Healthcare Ethics Committee Model of the Future,” 33.  
76 Muller, Grey's Hospital Ethics Committee. Online. 
77 Kass, et al., “The Structure and Function,” 27. 
78 Frenkel, “The Role of the Ethics Committee,” 627-33. 
79 Muller, Grey's Hospital Ethics Committee. Online. 
80 Kass, et al., “The Structure and Function,” 26-31; Moodley and Myer, “Health Research Ethics 
Committees in South Africa,” 1-8. Online.  
81 Ministry of Health Ghana. Code of Ethics and Standards of Practice, Sect. 2, Articles 32 and 35; South 
African Department of Health, “Draft Policy on African Traditional Medicine;” and African 
Union, “The Status of Traditional Medicine in Africa,” 1-14.   
82 “Dakar Declaration on Ethics and Bioethics,” In: Promoting Bioethics in Africa: Report on the First 
Days of Bioethics for West and Central Africa, 11. 
 
83 “Dakar Declaration on Ethics and Bioethics,” In: Promoting Bioethics in Africa: Report on the First Days 
of Bioethics for West and Central Africa, 12. The emphasis is mine. 
324 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
84 Larcher, Lask, and McCarthy, “Paediatrics at the Cutting Edge Do We Need Clinical Ethics 
Committees?” 245-247; Slowther, et al., “Clinical Ethics Support Services in the UK,” i2-i8. See 
also Larcher, “The Development and Function of Clinical Ethics Committees,” 47.  
85 Larcher, “The Development and Function of Clinical Ethics Committees,” 48; and Slowther, et al., 
“Clinical Ethics Support Services in the UK,” i2-i8.  
86 DuVal, et al., “A National Survey of U.S. Internists' Experiences,” 251-58; also, Cotter and Vaszar, 
“Hospital Ethics Case Consultation.” Online. 
87 Chwang, E, D. C. Landy, R. R. Sharp, “Views Regarding The Training of Ethics Consultants: A Survey 
Of Physicians Caring For Patients in the ICU.” Journal of Medical Ethics 33 (2007): 320-324; 
cited by Cotter and Vaszar, “Hospital Ethics Case Consultation.” Online. 
88 McClung, et al., “Evaluation of a Medical Ethics Consultation Service,” 456-60; Orr, et al., “Evaluation 
of an Ethics Consultation Service,” 135-141; also, Cotter and Vaszar, “Hospital Ethics Case 
Consultation.” Online. 
89 Cohn, Felicia, Paula Goodman-Crews, William Rudman, Lawrence J Schneiderman, and Ellen 
Waldman, “Proactive Ethics Consultation in the ICU: A Comparison of Value Perceived by 
Healthcare Professionals and Recipients.” Journal of Clinical Ethics 18 (2007): 140-47; cited by 
Cotter and Vaszar, “Hospital Ethics Case Consultation.” Online. 
90 Levine, “Questions and (Some Very Tentative) Answers,” 9-12. 
91 Muller, Grey's Hospital Ethics Committee. Online.   
92 Slowther, et al., “Clinical Ethics Committees,” 5. 
93 Slowther, et al., “Clinical Ethics Committees,” 5. 
94 Slowther, et al., “Clinical Ethics Committees,” 5. 
95 Daniels, “Accounting for Reasonableness,” British Medical Journal 321 (2000): 1300-01; cited by 
Slowther, et al., “Clinical Ethics Committees,” 6. 
96 Daniels, “Accounting for Reasonableness,” British Medical Journal 321 (2000): 1300-01; cited by 
Slowther, et al., “Clinical Ethics Committees,” 6. 
97 Slowther, et al., “Clinical Ethics Committees,” 6.  
98 Traditional African Clinic, October 2007. Online; and “What Is the African Traditional Herbal Research 
Centre/Clinic?” Online. 
99 Gbenga-Mustapha, “Adodo, Others Seek Co-Operation among Stakeholders.” Online. 
100 Ilonzo, CPHA AWKA NIGERIA (Video Clip 1 of 7) - 9/8/2008. Online.   
101 Nelson, “Where is the Evidence,” 193-95; also, Klugman, et al., Ethical Issues in Rural Health Care, 
49.  
102 Loeben, “Networking Healthcare Ethics Committees,” 227. 
103 Loeben, “Networking Healthcare Ethics Committees,” 228. 
104 Fox, et al., “Integratedethics,” 19-20.  
105 Fox, et al., “Integratedethics,” 7. 
106 Blake, “Reinventing the Healthcare Ethics Committees,” 10-11. 
107 Rueping and Dugan, “A Next-Generation Ethics Program in Progress,” 54.  
108 Rueping and Dugan, “A Next-Generation Ethics Program in Progress,” 54. 
325 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
109 Azétsop and Rennie, “Principlism, Medical Individualism, and Health Promotion,” 1.  
110 Frimpong-Mansoh, “Culture and Voluntary Informed Consent,” 111. 
111Miller, "Understanding the Principle of Autonomy in Bioethics," 9-14. 
112 Azétsop and Rennie, “Principlism, Medical Individualism, and Health Promotion,” 4; Francis, et al., 
“How Infectious Diseases Got Left Out,” 316ff; also, Barth-Rogers and Jotkowitz, “Executive 
Autonomy,” 39ff.    
113 Azétsop and Rennie, “Principlism, Medical Individualism, and Health Promotion,” 4.  
114 Azétsop and Rennie, “Principlism, Medical Individualism, and Health Promotion,” 3 and 4. 
115 Promoting Bioethics, 55. 
116 See Chapter Three and Four. See also Sichel, “Ethics of Caring,” 50. 
117 Sichel, “Ethics of Caring,” 50. 
118 Sichel, “Ethics of Caring,” 50. 
119 Jones, “Literature and Medicine,” 1243; and Brincat, “Not Putting All Your Eggs in One Basket,” 221. 
120 Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 5th ed., 305-06.  
121 Post et al., Handbook for Health Care Ethics Committees, 62.  
122 Murove, “African Ethics,” 171. 
123 Cf. Gordon, D. “Embodying Illness, Embodying Cancer,” Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry 14 (1990): 
273-95. Cited by Turner, “From the Local to the Global,” 309. 
124 Turner, “From the Local to the Global,” 310; and Beyene, “Medical Disclosure and Refugees,” 328-29. 
125 Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 5th ed., 370. 
126 Post et al., Handbook for Health Care Ethics Committees, 215ff.  
127 Veatch. “Ethical Dimension of Advanced Directive,” 66-91; and Chan, “Sharing Death and Dying,” 88.  
128 Chan, “Sharing Death and Dying,” 89. 
129 “Facts on Act 169 (Advance Directives),” Pennsylvania Medical Society Website. 
130 “Facts on Act 169 (Advance Directives),” Pennsylvania Medical Society Website. 
131 Chan, “Sharing Death and Dying,” 92; also, Buchanan and Brock, Deciding for Others, 136. 
132 Chan, “Sharing Death and Dying,” 92. 
133 Arras. “Beyond Cruzan,” 407; and Chan, “Sharing Death and Dying,” 92. 
134 Arras, “Beyond Cruzan,” 408, and Chan, “Sharing Death and Dying,” 92-93. 
135 Post et al., Handbook for Health Care Ethics Committees, 216ff. 
136 Achebe, Things Fall Apart, 20-21.  
137 Capron, “Advance Directives,” 261–271. See also Chan, “Sharing Death and Dying,” 93. 
138 Chan, “Sharing Death and Dying,” 94. 
139 United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Ethical and Religious Directives, no. 56; and Kelly, 
Contemporary Catholic Health Care Ethics, 128. 
140 Chan, “Sharing Death and Dying,” 96-7. 
141 Po-Wah, “Is Just Caring Possible?” 48. 
326 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
142 Sonja Laden, “Middle-Class Matters, or How to Keep Whites Whiter, Colours Brighter, and Blacks 
Beautiful,” Critical Arts  11 (1997): 134. Cited by Kamwangamalu, “Ubuntu in South Africa.” 24 
(18). 
143 Yanga, T. (1997). “African Languages and the Discourse of African Renaissance.” Paper presented at 
the Transformation Forum of South Africa Conference on African Renaissance: Setting the 
Agenda for the 21 Century. Johannesburg, 23 September 1997, p. 13. Quoting Alexis Kagame, La 
Philosophie Bantu Comparée. Paris: Présence Africaine, (1976). Cited by Kamwangamalu, 
“Ubuntu in South Africa.” 24 (18). 
144 Kamwangamalu, “Ubuntu in South Africa.” 24 (18). 
145 Gyekye, “Person and Community in African Thought,” 311.  
146 Murove, “African Bioethics: An Exploratory Discourse,” 170.  
147 See P. Allmark, “Can there be an Ethics of Care?” In: Healthcare Ethics and Human Values: An 
Introductory Text with Readings and Case Studies. Edited by KWM Fulford, Donna L. Dickenson, 
and T. H. Murray, 63-69 (Oxford/New York: Blackwell, 2002) Cited by Dickenson, Gender and 
Ethics Committees, 121.  
148 Derrick, K. S. Au, “Brain Injury, Brain Degeneration, and Loss of Personhood.” In: The Moral Status of 
Persons: Perspectives on Bioethics, Edited by Gerhold Becker. 209-18 (Amsterdam/Atlanta: 
Rodopi, 2000). Cited by Po-wah, “Is Just Caring Possible?” 48.  
149 Daryl Pullman, “The Ethics of Autonomy and Dignity in Long-Term Care.” Canadian Journal on Aging 
18 (1999): 26-46, 26; cited by Po-wah, “Is Just Caring Possible?” 49. 
150Nedelsky, “Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources,” 11; and Held, Feminist Morality: Transforming Culture, 
Society, 62.  
151 Hardwig, “What about the Family?” 5ff; 
152 McCormick, “Bioethics, a Moral Vacuum?” 8-12; also, Azétsop and Rennie, “Principlism, Medical 
Individualism, and Health Promotion,” 5. 
153 McCormick, “Bioethics, a Moral Vacuum?” 9; also, Jack Kevorkian, “Free Inquiry,” Fall 1991; cited by 
McCormick, “Bioethics, a Moral Vacuum?” 9.  
154 McCormick, “Bioethics, a Moral Vacuum?” 9.  
155 Chan, “Sharing Death and Dying,” 95. 
156 Callahan, The Troubled Dream of Life, 144. See also, McCormick, “Bioethics, a Moral Vacuum?” 9. 
157 Hardwig, “What about the Family?” 5-6; Frimpong-Mansoh, “Culture and Voluntary Informed 
Consent,” 113ff; and Kegley, “A New Bioethics Framework,” 91ff. 
158 Brincat, “Not Putting All Your Eggs in One Basket,” 220-21. 
159 Brincat, “Not Putting All Your Eggs in One Basket,” 220-21. 
160 Engelhardt, “Healthcare Ethics Committees,” 97. 
327 
 
CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION 
This chapter provides a summary of the analysis of the issues studied in each 
chapter of this dissertation, and identifies its contribution to bioethics in Africa, and the 
significance of the dissertation for global bioethics in general.  
Traditional African societies are community-oriented and emphasize communal 
values such as relationships, solidarity, compassion, cooperation, and interdependence. 
Hence, a widespread practice is to help those who are in need, especially the sick 
members of the community. This practice has survived despite urbanization and the 
migration of people to cities. It is common for community members to play an active role 
in the medical regimen of a sick member, for example, accompanying the patient to 
consult the African traditional medicine (ATM) doctor or an allopathic medicine 
physician, and making medical decisions with the patient. Generally, the heads of the 
family or of relevant community members consult to decide on a common course of 
action. The decision is reached by consensus. Some of the members of the community sit 
in with the patient while the ATM doctor is being consulted. If need be, they will help the 
patient to recount the history of the illness and respond to questions on behalf of the 
patient. Although consent may be given within this context, the final consent for 
decision-making rests on group consensus rather than on the individual patient alone.  
The ATM practice described herein differs substantively from the Western model 
of informed consent which characteristically and legally gives full authority and 
responsibility for decision-making to the individual patient. Although the patient may 
reach consent by consulting the clinician and, at times, close family members, the 
individual patient has the final authority to decide and give consent in accordance with 
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one’s own values and interests. This Western model has so dominated the understanding 
and practice of autonomy in informed consent that it casts doubt on alternative models 
from other cultures. The dissertation argues that the ATM practice constitutes a 
legitimate form of informed consent.  
Although some studies have been done on informed consent and autonomy in 
Africa, to date most of these studies have concentrated on research and clinical trials 
involving the practice of allopathic medicine. A few scholars, particularly those focusing 
on the discipline of African philosophy, have studied the place of the individual vis-à-vis 
the community in African culture, but with little input on the nature of personal 
autonomy and informed consent in a communal culture.1 Likewise, these studies have not 
been correlated with informed consent in the context of ATM and its practices. In effect, 
the main area of ATM has been neglected in these studies irrespective of the fact that 
ATM forms a large portion of the health care systems in Africa. For example, World 
Health Organization (WHO) statistics confirm that as much as 80% of the population in 
Africa uses traditional medicine for primary health care. With such a large constituency, 
it is only just that ATM and its practices should receive more attention in bioethics.  
This dissertation argues that, based on the concept of relational autonomy referred 
to as relational autonomy in informed consent (RAIC), the ATM focus on consent via 
consensus constitutes a legitimate decision of informed consent. To interpret and 
enlighten the significance of the ATM approach to RAIC, the analysis in this dissertation 
examines the ethics of care movement in Western bioethics insofar as the latter also 
advocates a relational approach to informed consent. Interestingly, both the ethics of care 
movement and the ATM approach have been overshadowed by the dominance of the 
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autonomy model in Western bioethics. However, by comparing the ethics of care 
approach with the ATM approach to RAIC, this dissertation aims to provide a relational 
approach to informed consent in order to inform the restrictive emphasis upon individual 
autonomy in Western bioethics, with a view towards fostering and enhancing current 
discourse on global bioethics.  
6. A. Dissertation Summary   
The dissertation is divided into four major chapters. The analysis begins with an 
historical overview of informed consent in Western bioethics, followed in turn by a 
systematic analysis of ethics of care, a comparative analysis of ATM and ethics of care, 
and, finally, an applied analysis to ethics committees in Africa. Hence, the analytical 
progression moves from a discussion of the historical context to a systematic analysis, a 
comparative interpretation, and an applied example (historical, systematic, comparative, 
and applied analysis). More specifically, the following points are considered.  
Chapter One provides a brief introduction to the dissertation, noting how the 
Western concept and practice of informed consent differ and dominate other forms of 
informed consent in bioethics. The Western, that is, Euro-North American, tradition 
places more emphasis on individual and personal values, and it approaches informed 
consent from the perspective of patient self-determination or individual autonomy. The 
Asian tradition lays more emphasis on family, and approaches informed consent from the 
perspective of family-determination.2 Here the family, instead of the individual, has the 
final authority to make medical decisions. By contrast, African tradition places more 
emphasis on communal values and relationships, hence communal-determination. In 
African tradition, informed consent must be understood from the perspective of relational 
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autonomy or RAIC. This emphasis on relationship and the approach to informed consent 
from the perspective of relational autonomy can be associated with ethics of care in 
Western bioethics.  
Chapter One addresses the following issues: a) the Western liberal concept of 
informed consent, especially as it is practiced in the USA; b) the ethics of care which also 
emanates from Western bioethics; and c) the ATM giving particular attention to four 
representative ethnic groups on the continent of Africa: the Akan, the Hausa-Fulani, the 
Igbo, and the Yoruba.  
Chapter Two presents the historical context of the analysis by discussing the 
liberal approach to informed consent in Western bioethics which emphasizes individual 
and rights-oriented autonomy. Using the historical analysis of informed consent in 
Western bioethics as a starting point provides a context for the discussion and helps to 
underscore the contrast in various approaches to informed consent -- liberal, ethics of 
care, and ATM.  
Focusing on the history of informed consent, the study notes that the legal origin 
of informed consent was marked by various litigations and court decisions over the years, 
among which is the 1914 landmark opinion of Justice Cordozo in the Schloendorff v 
Society of N. Y. The legal wrangling in areas of malpractice and negligence in the 1960s 
was incorporated into the statutory laws of many states in the United States of America. 
These laws required physicians, as a professional duty, to notify their patients of the 
following: the nature of the intervention, the condition and its expected course, the 
benefits and risks of any proposed treatment, and the choice of alternative treatment or 
non-treatment.3 In 1973, the American Hospital Association was instrumental in 
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publishing a patient’s Bill of Rights which was adopted by the Joint Commission on 
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO). This Bill of Rights introduced the 
language of “rights” into the discourse and the practice of patient autonomy. As a result, 
the language of rights suddenly shifted the focus to a different direction.4 While the legal 
formulations were in process, the importance of informed consent was also being 
critically examined and discussed from a moral perspective in the area of medical 
experiments and research.5 There were, for instance, events at Nuremberg, Helsinki, the 
National Institutes of Health (NIH), and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) that 
began to have a cumulative ground-breaking effect on medicine, especially on research 
ethics. These events, more than anything, drew and directed the attention of scholars in 
law, theology, history, and biomedical and behavioral sciences to the subject matter of 
informed consent.6  
Finally, informed consent emerged, in part, because of a reaction against 
paternalism: the intentional overriding of an individual's known wishes and choices or 
actions by another person. Physicians and medical professionals directed the conversation 
and sanctioned what we today would consider to be ethically suspect, such as the 
withholding and the distortion of truth. Subsequent medical ethicists and moral 
philosophers joined to condemn the practice of medical paternalism. Thus emerged the 
principle of informed concept which is based on respect for autonomy.  
Respect for autonomy involves recognizing that individuals have the freedom (or 
liberty) to make choices based on personal values and beliefs, and to accept or refuse 
medical treatments that affect their life as well as their well-being. It is embedded in 
common morality that one ought to respect the autonomous choices of individuals even if 
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there is little or no agreement about the nature, scope, or strength of this respect for 
autonomy.7 This notion of autonomy focuses narrowly on the self as independent and 
rationally controlling, impartial and devoid of emotion, and has impacted the notion of 
informed consent operative in the Western thought.  
Besides autonomy, informed consent is also defined and affected on by the 
understanding of the nature of person. There are various notions of human person in 
Western culture. For instance, the existentialists believe that human beings are relational, 
that to be is to be in relationship. However, rather than existentialist understanding, it was 
the Kantian and liberal Protestant concept of the human person that laid the ground that 
very much impacted the concept of the human person that is at the basis of autonomy in 
the USA and in Western tradition, in general.  
When it comes to the issue of who decides treatment in a liberal society, it really 
depends on the individual and on the values that shape and give meaning to the life of the 
individual in question. John Stuart Mill reasons that, even though individuals may 
sometimes make poor decisions, the individual is in the best position to judge what 
constitutes one’s own good.8 Furthermore, not only is the patient as an individual the best 
judge of these needs, but the patient is also expected to be strong and independent even in 
illness or vulnerability in order to make sound decisions in healthcare situations. In the 
clinical setting, the tradition of medical ethics in Western liberal society emphasizes the 
individual. It focuses on the patient and on the patient’s interests and autonomy as 
isolated from the patient’s social context.9 Granted, the need to defend the vulnerability 
and privacy of patients is a powerful reason; yet, the tendency to treat patients, their 
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autonomy, and their interests in isolation from their social context needs to be re-
examined. 
Discussing reason and emotion in morality, René Descartes, Immanuel Kant, and 
John Stuart Mill ennobled reason over emotion in moral decision-making. Philosophers 
of history, Plato, and Kantians argue that emotional attitudes towards moral issues 
themselves interfere with rationality and should be disregarded. They encourage people 
to discipline themselves against desires, impulse, and inclination in order to ensure a 
more rational course of moral deliberation and action. For these philosophers, while 
decision and action based on emotions, that is, impulse, inclination, and passion, might be 
good, they are not morally good because they are not based on an “appropriate cognitive 
framework.”10 On the contrary, it is now known that emotions can direct or alter 
reasoning, just as reasoning and reasons can inform and modify emotional responses.  
Furthermore, regarding individual patient rights, liberty of the individual has 
dominated the philosophy of Western liberal thought since the eighteenth century. 
Consequently, there are rights of self-determination, rights to privacy and non-
interference, autonomy rights, and rights of informed consent. For example, for a liberal 
rights theorist, the collective goal is not sufficient justification for denying individuals 
their rights or denying people what they wish, as individuals, to have or to do. 
In exploring individual autonomy, the analysis in Chapter Two notes that, from 
Descartes to contemporary theorists, many philosophers consider the self as 
individualistic, isolated, and ahistorical. In health care or within a clinical setting, the 
Western liberal tradition gives the individual patient the final authority to make decisions 
according to his/her own values and interests. Self-determination and patient autonomy 
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were aimed at eliminating the image of patients as passive care receivers, and at curbing 
paternalistic influences on patients’ decision-making processes, especially from family 
members who might have divergent values and priorities other than those of the patient. 
Thus, the Western liberal concept of autonomy is focused narrowly on self as 
independent and self-sufficient leading to individualistic autonomy, which privileges the 
independent decision of the individual patient in informed consent.  
Finally, the analysis in Chapter Two discusses the subjective conception of the 
good (Life) in relation to informed consent. Because Western liberal societies promote a 
social system that delineates value as determined in substance or content by individuals 
in that society; and because, in the framework of a liberal society, there is a lack of 
agreement about what constitutes the good life or the common good among individuals 
and across communities, the basis for individual self-decision-making follows the 
principle of autonomy in Western liberal society and advocates a subjective conception of 
the good. One is considered as having made a good decision if that decision satisfies 
one’s prudent desires, preferences, and expectations. It does not matter whether the 
individual’s desires and preferences are or are not in conformity with a set of impersonal 
values objectively defined.11  
Chapter Three, however, presents a systematic analysis of ethics of care as a 
hermeneutic to interpret ATM. The discussion examines the emphasis in ethics of care 
upon relational autonomy as a foundation for enlightening the meaning of relational 
autonomy in informed consent (RAIC). The chapter explores the emphasis in the ethics 
of care movement on relationships that posit a concept of persons as relational beings 
who are socially embedded, and interprets patient autonomy in relationship with others.  
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The analysis begins by tracing the history and origin of ethics of care, noting how 
Howard Curzer, a professor of philosophy at Texas Technical University in Lubbock, 
tried in his paper to identify some germs of ethics of care in the works of Aristotle.12 The 
origin of ethics of care has been rightly traced in part to the revolutionary critique of 
dominant moral theories: Kantian; utilitarian and deontological; and liberal individualist 
moral approaches advanced by women and feminist movements. This strand helped to 
bolster the development of “alternative feminist moral theories” through which 
contemporary ethics of care emerged.13 The origin has also been traced in part to 
“alternative feminist moral theories.” Emanating from the feminist movement and the 
critique of dominant moral theories, there emerged other moral alternatives such as 
feminist ethics, feminist contractualism, a feminist form of liberal individualism, Kantian, 
and utilitarian moral theories. The analysis proceeds to the meaning of ethics of care as a 
form of ethics that constructs an entire approach to ethics based on our daily activities 
and universal experience of care or caring. Caring is defined by Diemut Bubeck as the 
meeting of the needs of one person by another person, where face-to-face interaction 
between the one caring and the one cared for is a crucial element of the overall activity. 
As a criterion, emphatic caring works in both the individual or private sphere of life as 
well in the social, public, political, and international sphere. Held speaks of caring 
relations, especially when they involve forming a political entity and developing a civil 
society. Comparing relations of care with those of justice in the formation of a political 
entity and the development of a civil society, Held believes that it is on the basis of care 
instead of justice that people can identify with others enough to form a political entity as 
well as to develop a civil society.14  
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As in the liberal Western tradition, informed consent in ethics of care is defined 
and shaped by the concept of person and autonomy in ethics of care. Ethics of care 
characteristically draws from our experience of caring to give a better account of persons 
as relational, rational, emotional beings, as well as interdependent beings who make 
moral decisions by taking into consideration both their emotions and their reason.15 
Ethics of care emphasizes the notion of personhood as being dependent merely upon 
connectedness in particularistic relationships, instead of being dependent merely upon the 
capacity for rationality. Po-wah argues that, because particularity implies irreplaceability 
and non-substitutability, ethics of care scholars are, in effect, establishing that persons 
possess value simply because of their irreplaceability. However, Kant proposed that 
human beings are an end-in-themselves possessing dignity by virtue of their rational will 
or law-making capacity (i. e., autonomy).16 Critiquing the dominant moral theories or 
principle-based approaches of Western tradition, ethics of care questions whether 
rationality is sufficient in defining personhood.  
Thus, ethics of care centers on personal relations, family, and social ties, and it 
rejects the social contract thesis which posits that relations relevant to morality have been 
entered into voluntarily by free and equal individuals. Rather, ethics of care recognizes 
the dependency and interdependency of persons and human existence. Caring evokes the 
element of dependence that is in relationships and which is part of the human condition.17 
Human beings exist in interdependent relationships that entail ethical responsibilities.18 
This notion of an interdependent being and moral agent in ethics of care contrasts 
markedly with the Kantian inspired or the dominant moral theories where the moral agent 
is like an isolated, independent (self-sufficient) individual.  
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Consequently, ethics of care proposes relational autonomy. Both Nedelsky and 
Held see relational autonomy as an effort to relate human beings’ experience of 
relatedness and being socially constituted in relationships to others with “the value of 
self-determination.” Nedelsky speaks of “becoming autonomous,” in association with 
other people, wherein relatedness is a literal precondition of autonomy, and 
interdependence is a constant constituent of autonomy. Therefore, autonomy is developed 
and fostered through relationships with others.19 As a result of this analysis of autonomy 
in the context of relationships, Clement, Nedelsky, Held, and other ethics of care scholars 
advocate a relational autonomy which, in this dissertation, is referred to as RAIC 
(relational autonomy in informed consent). One infers that ethics of care adopts an RAIC 
approach; consequently, ethics of care does not place too much emphasis on the 
individual patient as the sole authority in medical decision-making or in the informed 
consent process.  
As a result, by contrast with philosophers of history and Kantians who see passion 
and emotions as impediments to moral judgment, ethics of care regards emotion as an 
essential part of human nature in moral decision-making. Because in a moral analysis, 
ethics of care embraces emotions, Held and scholars of ethics of care have a problem 
with the Kantian Categorical Imperative: the Law of Reason that requires us to act in a 
manner consistent with reason and logic, devoid of emotions, feelings, wishes, and 
circumstances in order to act autonomously.  
Finally, the analysis in Chapter Three concludes with the concept of individual 
patient rights. For Kroeger-Mappes, the ethics of care and an ethic of rights are an 
integral part of one system of ethics. Here the ethics of care is a necessary basis for an 
338 
 
“ethic of rights” emphasizing moral relationships within social reality.20 Critically 
challenging the concept of rights in liberal and traditional moral theories, Nedelsky 
asserts that, if rights were to be used in constraining democratic outcomes, then people 
should employ rights in a way that “is true to the essentially contested and shifting 
meaning of rights.”21 She insists on the need to confront the history of rights and 
acknowledge the depth of the changes that have occurred in both legal and popular 
understandings of rights. 
Likewise, Nedelsky admits that rights have been criticized as “undesirably 
individualistic,” as obfuscating “the real political issues,” and as serving to isolate and 
distance people from one another. Nedelsky asserts that all rights -- indeed, the very 
concept of rights -- are best understood in terms of relationship. Hence, she concludes 
that conceptualizing rights in terms of the relationships that they foster will radically 
transform the problem of individualism.22 
Chapter Four is a comparative interpretation of ATM with ethics of care. The 
analysis shows ATM exhibits practices similar to those of ethics of care, such as focusing 
on relationships, maintaining that persons are relational beings who are socially 
constituted in a community, and exercising autonomy in relationship with others in the 
community. Therefore, ATM adopts a relational approach to informed consent (RAIC) as 
does ethics of care. Likewise, in this discussion, the ethics of care movement provides the 
hermeneutic to enlighten the significance of the ATM approach as a legitimate model of 
RAIC.  
The analysis begins with the meaning and history of ATM. Traditional medicine 
can be said to be the entire combination of knowledge and practice, whether explainable 
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or not, used in preventing, diagnosing, healing or eliminating diseases, whether physical, 
mental, or social, “and which may rely exclusively on past experience and observation” 
transmitted from generation to generation, verbally or in writing.23 ATM constitutes 
medical practices and knowledge that existed before the arrival of allopathic or modern 
Western style medicine on the African continent. To understand ATM well, one needs 
some knowledge of African Traditional Religion (ATR) because both ATM and ATR are 
very much connected. In general, there is a holistic understanding of health wherein good 
health encompasses physical, mental, emotional, and spiritual wellbeing for the patients, 
their family members, and for their community; that is, a good relationship with God, 
creations, and the cosmos.24 Therefore, the belief in Africa is that the supernatural, 
biological, and psychosocial spheres are inextricably linked with health. Thus, disease 
and misfortunes are often explained in terms of religious experience, and, therefore, 
require a religious approach in resolving them.  
Likewise, the practice of ATM is understood as a vocation. ATM doctors are 
chosen by the special spirit. For instance, the clearest and indispensable sign of a call to 
be an ATM doctor is possession by the spirit -- of agwu (as it is known among the Igbo 
people) -- the special spirit of the traditional medicine doctors.25 Following their call, 
they go on to receive the required training and initiation for their trade. The training is 
effected through one or more of the following: inheritance, spirit possession, 
apprenticeship, and, more recently, by formal classroom training programs.26  
In African traditional societies, to make a serious decision such as a healthcare 
decision, customarily the community is involved. The reason is that one’s wellbeing is 
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intertwined with that of one’s members of the community. Decision is made by reaching 
consensus after a long and broad consultation and discussion.27  
In this approach, patients make medical decisions and give consent in consultation 
with members of their community and an ATM doctor. Often, but not necessarily, the 
final consent to decision-making is based on the consensus reached in consultation with 
the group rather than by the individual patient alone. Thus, the process of consultation in 
ATM gives much more substantive weight to the consensus decision-making process. 
The Western model, however, privileges the decision of the individual patient who, 
typically, reaches consent by consulting the clinician and, at times, close family.  
The analysis proceeds to explore the concept of person and autonomy in ATM 
and contrasts it with the ethics of care movement. Central to this analysis is the idea of 
relationship community which is the conceptual base in which most African 
understanding, beliefs, values, ontology, cosmology, and ways of life are grounded.28 The 
analysis focuses on the following characteristics of human person as related to autonomy 
and informed consent. The analysis considers the individual patient in relation to the 
community wherein the human person is seen as a relational being. In African culture, 
persons are defined both communally and individually where the individual helps to 
define oneself and the community as well. In African thought, the individual is also 
defined by the relationship entered into by the individual, as well as by the individual’s 
creative spirit embodying the destiny of the person.  
Furthermore, the analysis presents another characteristic which is closely related 
to the relational nature of human beings, namely, the affirmation of the dependency and 
interdependency of persons and human existence. This notion is captured and 
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summarized by Mbiti’s dictum “I am, because we are; and since we are, therefore I am,” 
and the resultant implication that the joys, sorrows or concerns of the individual are also 
those of the community.29  Ukọ kọwa anụmanụ ọ ga n’ukwu osisi ma ọkọwa mmadụ ọ 
gakwụrụ mmadụ ibe ya, (“When an animal feels itchy, it goes to a tree to scratch its 
body; whereas, the human being who feels itchy goes to a fellow human being to be 
scratched.”) Onipa yieye firi onipa, (“The well-being of man depends on his fellow 
man.”) These are from the Igbo of Nigeria and the Akan of Ghana, respectively. The 
point of the proverbs is that sometimes one needs the assistance, good will, sympathy, 
and compassion of others to achieve one’s goals or to fulfill one’s life.30  
Because ATM focuses on relationships and understands human beings as social, 
relational, and interdependent beings, ATM, therefore, sees autonomy in terms of 
relationships wherein autonomy is developed and fostered in relationship with others in 
the community. Thus, ATM practices what, in this dissertation, is referred to as RAIC 
which is similar to the practice in ethics of care. It means that, in medical decision-
making, final consent rests on the consensus reached in consultation with the family and 
representatives of the community, not by the individual patient alone.  
Consequently, the practice of RAIC in ATM supports and projects the notion of 
the common good and, hence, the objective notion of the good life. This concept of the 
common good is intrinsically linked to the idea of community and is symbolized in the 
Akan culture, for example, as a Siamese crocodile. A good life is the good of the 
community and the good of the individual.  
The practice of RAIC in ATM does not focus primarily upon rights. Communal 
existence and relationality denote a responsibility of the community for the individual 
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and the individual for the community. Living in relation with others directly involves a 
person in social and moral roles, duties, obligations, and commitments which the 
individual person must fulfill.31 This emphasis on relation also involves other 
characteristics of African communal morality, such as solidarity, interdependence, 
cooperation, compassion, reciprocity, and the social and ethical values of social well-
being. These primarily impose on individual members of the community a duty to the 
community as well as to its members. Rights, therefore, are reduced to a secondary 
position. Priority is given to the duties which individuals owe to the collectivity, and their 
rights are seen as secondary to the exercise of their duties.  
Chapter Five provides an applied analysis of the RAIC of ATM to healthcare 
ethics committees in Africa, focusing on the decision-making process for the informed 
consent of patients in ATM. The analysis is introduced by tracing the meaning, history, 
composition, and general functions of healthcare ethics committees in the USA and in 
Africa where healthcare ethics committees arose, in part, because of the need of 
healthcare facilities for expert ethical advice in complex ethical circumstances. Likewise, 
among other functions, ethics committees carry out the three traditional broad functions 
of policy development and review, education, and consultation. There is no known 
healthcare ethics in ATM practices and facilities in Africa. However, there abound in 
ATM similar situations, needs, and exigencies that necessitated establishment for 
healthcare ethics in the facilities of modern medicine in both the USA and in Africa.  
However, in consideration of the practice of RAIC and the circumstances in 
which ATM is practiced, this dissertation proposes the establishment of integrated 
healthcare ethics committees for better patient care outcomes. There is a need for such 
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committees to be proactive and not simply reactive. The primary healthcare needs of 
Africa call for preventive care and avoidance of recurrence of the same problem 
previously treated. Likewise, following the integrated understanding as well as the 
relational, communal orientation and values of Africa as well as RAIC, healthcare ethics 
committees have to be integrated into the organization and function and not isolated from 
them. Because most ATM facilities are small and private, they will not be able to sustain 
healthcare ethics committees independently. Multiple facilities can collaborate to form a 
joint healthcare ethics committee, that is, a multi-facility healthcare ethics committee.  
The analysis, then, applies RAIC to healthcare ethics committees in the decision-
making process involving the informed consent of patients. RAIC includes elements of 
traditional decision-making methods in the work of healthcare ethics committees, such as 
extensive discussions on issues, and reaching consensus after considerable consultation. 
These provide an opportunity for all members of healthcare ethics committees and 
everyone involved in the case at hand to contribute to the discussion and to be part and 
parcel of the decision reached.  
Likewise, the practice of the RAIC model in ATM necessitates a flexible 
understanding of confidentiality. In Western bioethics, confidentiality is based on 
individualism where the patient is understood to have an inviolable right to deal with 
illness and to decide solely regarding one’s own treatment. What transpires between the 
patient and the doctor or the medical personnel remains with them and with whomever 
the patient decides should be included. However, in the African context, the patient is 
accompanied by family and/or members of the community to consult the doctor and to 
help make decisions regarding treatment, admissions, feeding, and payment. In some 
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cases, when these people get back to the community, they have to give a situation report 
to the elders of the community. In such a case, the understanding of confidentiality 
assumes an entirely different meaning. Part of the responsibility of healthcare ethics 
committees, therefore, is to address confidentiality with regard to this relational situation.  
Furthermore, the RAIC model implies a nuanced concept of the advance 
directive. The advance directive presupposes the right of the individual to make 
independent medical decisions and to deal with illness independently. Advance directive 
also envisages situations where an individual has no one at all to make health care 
decisions or does not trust those available. In the RAIC model, which presupposes a 
strong family and community role in patient care and medical decision-making, there is a 
substantive change in the concept of advance directive. The family and members of the 
community (relatives) are culturally designated to perform the function of durable power 
of attorney for health care, a function considered as a fiduciary duty.  
Hence, the ATM RAIC model emphasizes solidarity. Community living is about 
building relationships. Most often, what is right or wrong is determined by what fosters 
community and solidarity among members. It is not so much about the individual rights 
of the patient. Rather, the interests and rights of the patient are constantly juxtaposed 
alongside the interests and rights of the community. This is vital for both the members of 
ethics committees and for the conduct of consults in resolving conflicts.  
The RAIC approach fosters solidarity among family members and the 
community. The process of decision-making in RAIC allows members of the family and 
the community to exercise their roles and to fulfill what is seen as a fiduciary 
responsibility toward the sick relative. By contrast, the Western liberal individual 
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approach to informed consent tends to provoke alienation within the family and among 
community members because family members are often seen as interfering in patient 
autonomy.  
Finally, healthcare ethics committees should be integrative and proactive, 
incorporating RAIC in the process of medical decision-making to support informed 
consent provide better patient care.  
6. B. Contribution of the Dissertation  
 A summary of the dissertation having been given above, this section considers 
what this dissertation contributes to bioethics in Africa.  
First and foremost, this dissertation is the first known study focusing on informed 
consent in ATM. To date, most of the studies regarding informed consent and autonomy 
in Africa have concentrated on research and clinical trials involving the practice of 
Western style medicine in Africa. A few scholars, particularly those concentrating on the 
discipline of African philosophy, have studied the place of the individual vis-à-vis the 
community in African culture, but with little input on the nature of personal autonomy in 
community or in a communal culture. Moreover, these studies have not been correlated 
with informed consent in the context of ATM and its practices. Effectively, the main area 
of African traditional medicine has been ignored in these studies.32 Yet, ATM forms a 
large portion of the healthcare systems in Africa. As noted above, World Health 
Organization (WHO) statistics show that as much as 80% of the population in Africa uses 
traditional medicine for primary health care. With such a large constituency, it follows 
that ATM and its practices should receive more attention in bioethics.   
346 
 
Second, the dissertation is distinctive insofar as it employs the ethics of care as a 
hermeneutic to interpret ATM. The analysis examines the ethics of care movement in 
Western bioethics to explore its relational approach to informed consent. The discussion 
compares ATM and the ethics of care. ATM and ethics of care recognize that human 
beings are embedded in a context of social relationships or community. Therefore, the 
understanding of autonomy in both ethics of care and ATM is rooted in this notion of 
social relationships. Human beings are socially constituted to a large extent. They are 
dependent on one another because no one individual is self-sufficient. For the African, 
the self and the community help to define the individual.  Individuals are constituted by 
the relationships of which they are a part. Every one of us enters into a complex web of 
relationships, and ties that include family, friends, fellow community members, 
colleagues, and fellow citizens. We are not fundamentally isolated and independent 
individuals as understood in liberal individualist thought.33   
In this context, social relationships or community define individuals. The 
development and nurturing of one’s autonomy occurs within a communal setting, thereby 
giving rise to relational autonomy in informed consent (RAIC). The ethics of care and 
ATM argue that autonomy is fostered and, indeed, can only be nurtured in the context of 
relationships. The individual can only build and exercise autonomy in relations to family, 
friends, teachers, and community.34 It is through this prism that the contribution of ATM 
to healthcare ethics in the area of informed consent can be highlighted. Furthermore, by 
comparing the ethics of care approach with the ATM approach to RAIC, this dissertation 
aims to provide a relational approach to informed consent in order to inform the 
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restrictive emphasis on individual autonomy in Western bioethics, with a view towards 
nurturing and enhancing current discourse on global bioethics.  
Third, the emphasis on relationships and the practice of RAIC in ATM means that 
patients make medical decisions and give consent in consultation with members of their 
community and the ATM doctor. Often, but not necessarily, the final consent in their 
decision-making process rests on the consensus reached in consultation with the group 
rather than by the individual patient alone.  
Hence, the form of informed consent in ATM, (that is, RAIC) constitutes a 
legitimate form of informed consent even though it differs from the Western model of 
informed consent which places the authority for decision-making on the individual 
patient. By contrast, the process of consultation in ATM gives much more substantive 
weight or authority to the communal or consensus decision-making process. This 
dissertation argues that the ATM focus on consent based on consensus constitutes a 
legitimate informed consent based on the concept of relational autonomy which is 
commonly referred to as relational autonomy in informed consent (RAIC).  
Fourth, this dissertation is the first study that discusses healthcare ethics 
committees in ATM. The analysis explains that integrated ethics committees require 
ethics committees to move from being primarily reactive and case-based. Instead, they 
should be primarily proactive and systematic in addressing ethical issues integrating 
ethics consultation, preventive ethics, and ethical leadership. In this manner, ethics 
committees combine clinical ethics and organizational ethics.  
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As a result, healthcare ethics committees can foster the collaboration and 
integration of ATM and allopathic or modern medicine in Africa. The goal here is to 
enhance relational decision-making processes of informed consent.  
The African healthcare system in the future should fully reflect the African 
cultural milieu in order to serve the people well. Or, as Murove states, “the African 
healthcare practice of the future should be the vibrant product of cross-breeding between 
the mechanistic world-view, as entrenched in Western medical practices and the holistic 
world-view of African traditional healthcare.”35 A crucial step will be (the appreciation 
of) the vital role of ATM and its practitioners in the provision of healthcare in Africa. 
The focus on RAIC in this dissertation also helps to clarify the significance of the 
analysis for global bioethics. 
6. C. RAIC and Global Bioethics  
 RAIC makes a substantive contribution to the emerging importance of global 
bioethics that combines the need for universal rights with cultural diversity. In the 
practice of RAIC in ATM patients make medical decisions and give consent in 
consultation with their community. Often, but not necessarily, the final consent to 
decision-making is based on the consensus reached in consultation with the group rather 
than by the individual patient alone. Thus, the process of consultation in ATM gives 
much more substantive weight to the consensus decision-making process. The Western 
model, however, privileges the decision of the individual patient who typically reaches 
consent by consulting the clinician and, at times, close family members.  
Insofar as the ethics of care movement advocates a relational approach to 
informed consent (RAIC), it is used as a hermeneutic to interpret ATM. The point of the 
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analysis is that RAIC, like the ethics of care, emphasizes relationships, presenting a 
concept of persons as relational beings who are socially embedded, thereby interpreting 
patient autonomy in relationships with others. This is crucially important for the meaning 
of global bioethics. By comparing the ethics of care approach to RAIC with that of ATM, 
the dissertation has proffered a relational approach to informed consent that can inform 
the restrictive emphasis upon individual autonomy in Western bioethics, thereby 
fostering and enhancing discourse on global bioethics today.  
Human beings live in a pluralistic world, and this should be taken into account. 
The UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity not only acknowledges our 
pluralistic world and cultural diversity, it insists that the “defence of cultural diversity is 
an ethical imperative, inseparable from respect for human dignity.”36 This “implies a 
commitment to human rights and fundamental freedoms, in particular the rights of 
persons belonging to minorities ….”37 The reason is that culture is understood as a set of 
distinctive material, intellectual, spiritual, and emotional features of society or of a social 
group. Culture embraces lifestyles, values systems, ways of living together, beliefs, and 
traditions.38 The ethical norms, and moral principles and practices of other socio-cultural 
groups should be recognized as legitimate unless, of course, they violate fundamental 
human morality.   
As Ruiping Fan noted, people need to stop “taking for granted the moral premises 
and rules of moral evidence that support social-democratic viewpoints,” especially the 
viewpoints that emphasize an individualistic, anti-family, and anti-communitarian 
cultures. This tendency stems from the moral and cultural colonization of Africa, Asia, 
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and South America by “dominant European and North American secular moral 
traditions.”39  
In 1984 when Renée Fox and Judith Swazey returned to the United States of 
America from their research trip in China, they remarked that “Bioethics as developed in 
the USA was simply one among many possible incarnations of medical morality.”40 They 
spoke the truth although their observation wasn’t well received. It has become much 
more apparent since then that the discipline of bioethics which is grounded in the Euro-
North American cultures and moral philosophy does not fit all cultures of the world. The 
adaptation of Western bioethics to the various cultural settings is not always the best. The 
issues that come under the umbrella of bioethics -- doing good or beneficence, non-
maleficence or avoiding harm, justice, respecting people and autonomy -- may be of 
concern to all humans and can be said to be universal. However, what people view as 
benefits or harms, how the human body and illness are to be interpreted as well as the 
role of religion and belief systems in health and in the alleviation of suffering, vary 
among cultures.41 Some practices taken for granted in one culture or society may be 
abhorred in some other culture or society. Such practices include but are not limited to 
telling the truth about a fatal disease to a patient, removal of life support, use of advance 
directive, and organ donation. 
A proper bioethics should be open to voices from different cultural regions of the 
globe, such as Africa, America, Asia, and Europe. These cultural regions have their long 
rich moral traditions, cultural norms and belief systems, as well as healing traditions. A 
global bioethics (as a global field of inquiry) requires that care be taken not to silence 
ethical impulses and constrict the moral life of other cultures but to appreciate moral 
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diversity and take it seriously first, by fostering the conditions under which it can 
flourish. Second, it is necessary to affirm the importance of exploring regional and 
cultural bioethics.42 Likewise, it is essential that we become conscious of the socio-
cultural matrices of our own ideas and principles in dealing with other cultures.43 
However, to emphasize the significance of culture is not to suggest that bioethics or 
morality is relative. It is not to say that everything is allowed. It is rather to recognize the 
“plurality of moral norms, social practices, and patterns of kingship,” insisting at the 
same time that “particular practices are more humane and justifiable than alternative 
forms of life.”44 Of course, except where a particular norm or a cultural practice impinges 
on fundamental human dignity. Thus, Article 12 of the UNESCO Declaration warns that 
“No one may invoke cultural diversity to infringe upon human rights guaranteed by 
international law, nor limit their scope.”45  Its reason is that human rights arise from 
“erasing cultural differences, from ending the hierarchy of cultures,” because they are not 
only natural born rights, they “are defined by international law, unlike culture.”46 
 Often the Western voice is so dominant that it tends to prevent voices from other 
cultural regions from being heard or recognized. This is the case with the principle of 
informed consent. The Western liberal approach to informed consent is so dominant that 
other cultural perspectives to informed consent run the risk of being lost. Therefore, this 
dissertation highlights the African perspectives of informed consent -- relational 
autonomy in informed consent (RAIC) -- as a substantive contribution to the emerging 
awareness and importance of global bioethics.  
In 2006, another important international document on global bioethics was 
published, the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights. This 
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UNESCO Universal Declaration aimed at setting out “Universal standards in the field of 
bioethics with due regard for human dignity and human rights and freedoms, in the spirit 
of cultural pluralism inherent in bioethics.”47 In effect, UNESCO wanted to make sure 
that the “standards and regulations concerning bioethical issues reflect a global 
perspective beyond national and regional interests and concerns.”48 In doing that the 
UNESCO Universal Declaration offers ideals to which government organizations, 
communities, institutions (Public and Private), and individuals should aspire.49 The 
UNESCO Universal Declaration makes available a “framework of general principles that 
is open to various interpretations and applications in the context of human rights and 
fundamental freedom.”50 These ideals and standards need practical guidance in different 
cultures and socioeconomic contexts for their implementation. Without such practical 
guidance to take care of the cultural, gender, political, and socioeconomic context that 
might limit the implementation of the standards set out by the UNESCO Universal 
Declaration. This dissertation offers one such practical guidance and step in the areas of 
autonomy and informed consent by proposing RAIC which explains, among other things, 
how the African region understands and practices the concept of autonomy and informed 
consent.    
However, when it comes to the relationship between the individual and the 
community, it is not always that the interest of the individual trumps that of the 
community or society. As argued in this dissertation, in African communal cultures the 
emphasis is on both individual’s and communal interests, and not simply on one of them. 
The movement is towards harmonization of both interests for the good of both the 
individual and the community. Both interests are important because both the individual 
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and the community need each other as is confirmed in the African saying: “I am, because 
we are; and since we are, therefore, I am.”51 Thus, autonomy and informed consent of the 
individual is not disrespected. In this aspect, the analysis in this dissertation agrees in part 
with the spirit of the UNESCO Universal Declaration as expressed in Article 5: that “the 
autonomy of persons to make decisions, while taking responsibility for those decisions 
and respecting the autonomy of others, is to be respected;” and to protect the interest of 
those who are not capable of exercising autonomy.52  
Nevertheless, the analysis of the dissertation points out that, autonomy and 
informed consent are fostered and exercised in relationship with others in the community, 
hence RAIC. Consequently, often, the final consent to decision-making is based on the 
consensus reached in consultation with the group rather than by the individual patient 
alone.  Therefore, the emphasis is not on individualistic autonomy, isolated from the 
community wherein an individual’s autonomy always overrides the interests of the 
community. Thus, the spirit of RAIC does differ from the value Articles 3b and 6c of the 
UNESCO Universal Declaration seem to proffer: that an individual’s autonomy or 
interest always trumps that of the community. Article 3b of the UNESCO Universal 
Declaration advocates a value that is at variance with the familial and communal values 
of Asia and Africa respectively.53 Moreover, Willem Landman and Udo Schuklenk points 
out correctly that public health policies that are crafted for the purpose of preventing or 
reducing the spread of infectious diseases, will most likely take precedence over the 
interests of the individuals concerned. They concluded, therefore, that it is untenable to 
require that “individual’s interest should always have absolute priority over society” or 
communities’ interests.54     
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 Furthermore, Article 19 of the UNESCO Universal Declaration deals with the 
need for ethics committees. Here there is a call for the establishment of ethics committees 
to not only provide regulation for research, but to “provide advice on ethical problems in 
clinical settings;” to “assess scientific and technological developments, formulate 
recommendations and contribute to the preparation of guidelines on issues within the 
scope of this declaration.” Article 19 also advocates for ethics committees to “foster 
debate, education and public awareness of, and engagement in, bioethics.”55  
This dissertation not only advocates for the establishment of ethics committees in 
Africa, but it proposes the kind of ethics committees that will be effective and suitable for 
the practices of African concept of autonomy and informed consent -RAIC. Therefore, 
the dissertation can be said to be an aid to the implementation of the UNESCO Universal 
Declaration, thereby contributing to the strife for Global bioethics. The dissertation 
applies also the ATM’s RAIC approach to ethics committees in Africa, focusing 
especially upon the decision-making process for patient informed consent. The 
dissertation presents how ATM’s RAIC approach affects the composition of ethics 
committees and their policy-making criteria in Africa. It requires a flexible understanding 
of confidentiality, advance directives, and emphasis on solidarity. 
Finally, it is hoped that this dissertation will inspire discourse between the 
healthcare professionals of both ATM and allopathic medicine, and foster collaboration 
and eventual integration of both medical systems into one national medical system that is 
native to Africa. Both forms of medicine have come to stay in Africa, thus, in order to be 
of better service to Africans and to achieve better patient care, an integration is 
imperative. It is an integration in which neither side should claim superiority over the 
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other.56 If the integration is achieved, it will be a fulfillment in Africa of the call and the 
endeavors of WHO for the integration of traditional and allopathic medical systems in 
WHO member countries.57     
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